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d’Alzheimer,	le	refus	de	soins	
üJournées	de	formation	aux	statistiques	appliquées	en	neuropsychologie,	CMRR	de	Reims	les	18	et	19	Juin	
2009	
üParticipation	aux	entretiens	francophones	de	la	Psychologie	(2008)	
üTrois	 participations	 aux	 Journées	 Nationales	 des	 Equipes	 Pluridisciplinaires	 des	 Centres	 Mémoire	 de	
Ressources	et	de	Recherches	
üJournée	de	formation	régionale	du	Syndicat	National	des	Psychologues,	17	octobre	2008	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		 13	
Psychologue	spécialisé	en	neuropsychologie:	clinique	et	formation	
	
	
Neuropsychologie	clinique	
	
	
Depuis	le	10	Janvier	2007	
Psychologue	spécialisé	en	neuropsychologie,	CHU	PONTCHAILLOU,	Service	de	Neurologie	&	Centre	
Mémoire	de	Ressources	et	de	Recherche	de	Haute-Bretagne,	Rennes.	(Titulaire	FPH	depuis	le	01/02/2014).	
Membre	du	bureau	du	service	des	psychologues	de	2008	à	2014.	Co-fondateur	de	l’OFPN,	ex-ARNPN,	
Organisation	Française	des	Psychologues	spécialisés	en	Neuropsychologie	
	
Juillet	2004	–	Décembre	2006	
Psychologue	spécialisé	en	neuropsychologie,	Hôpital	d’Instruction	des	Armées	Clermont	Tonnerre,	
Service	de	Neurologie	&	Centre	Mémoire	de	Ressources	et	de	Recherche,	Brest.	
	
Mai	2004	–	Juin	2005	
Psychologue	spécialisé	en	neuropsychologie,	CHU	Morvan,	Service	de	Médecine	Physique	et	de	
Réadaptation,	Brest.	
	
Septembre	2002	–	Septembre	2003	
Psychologue	spécialisé	en	neuropsychologie,	CHU	Maison	Blanche,	Service	de	Neurologie,	Reims.		
	
Juillet-Août	2001	
Stagiaire	psychologue	spécialisé	en	neuropsychologie,	Centre	de	Rééducation	et	de	Rédaptation	
Fonctionnelle	de	Trestel,	Côtes	d’Armor	
	
Janvier	–	Mai	2001	
Stagiaire	psychologue	spécialisé	en	neuropsychologie,	Centre	de	Santé	Paul	Gilbert	de	Charny,	Québec,	
Canada	
	
Novembre	2000	–	Janvier	2001	
Stagiaire	psychologue	spécialisé	en	neuropsychologie,	Centre	de	Réadaptation	Fonctionnelle	InterVal	de	
Trois-Rivières,	Trois-Rivières,	Québec,	Canada	
	
	
Enseignement,	formation	et	conférences	
	
	
Charges	de	cours	universitaires	
En	cours	
	
üUniversité	 de	 Rennes	 2	 (Master	 2,	 Licence	 3	 &	 Licence	 1)	;	 Université	 François	 Rabelais	 de	 Poitiers	
(Master	2)	;	Université	de	Bretagne	Occidentale	;	Faculté	de	Médecine,	(DCEM	4	&	5)	;	Université	de	Caen	
Basse	Normandie,	(DIU	syndromes	démentiels)	;	Université	de	Savoie,	(Master	2)	;	Université	de	Rennes	1,	
(Master	Neurosciences	cliniques)	
	
2005	&	2006	
	
üUniversité	de	Bretagne	Occidentale	et	de	Rennes	1	(Facultés	de	Médecine,	D.I.U.	Prise	en	charge	de	la	
maladie	d’Alzheimer	et	des	syndromes	apparentés)	
	
2003-2005	
	
üUniversité	de	Bretagne	Occidentale	(Département	de	Psychologie,	Maîtrise	et	DEUG	1)	
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Enseignement,	formation	et	conférences	(suite)	
	
	
Enseignements	post-universitaires	et	formation	professionnelle	
	
En	cours	
	
üInvitations	 régulières	 pour	 formation	 aux	 statistiques	 appliquées	 à	 la	 psychométrie	 du	 cas	 unique	 en	
neuropsychologie.	Public:	neuropsychologues.	(Nancy,	Dijon,	Toulon,	Rennes,	Lyon,	Nice)	
üFormation	régulière	de	stagiaires	étudiants	en	psychologie	(Licence	3	à	Master	2)	et	en	médecine	dans	
le	cadre	de	D.I.U.	
üFormation	à	une	démarche	clinque	en	pratique	médicale	libérale	devant	une	plainte	cognitive	
üFormation	des	internes	en	médecine	(D.E.S.	de	neurologie)	
üOrganisateur	des	«	Journées	de	Neuropsychologie	du	CMRR	de	Haute-Bretagne	»	
üFormation	Médicale	Continue	(Gériatres,	Neurologues,	Psychiatres)	:	approche	neuropsychologique	des	
manifestations	comportementales	dans	les	démences	;	fonctions	exécutives	;	systèmes	mnésiques	
üFormateur	 à	 l’Institut	 de	 Formation	 en	 Ergothérapie	 de	 Rennes	 (IFPEK)	:	 vieillissement	 cognitif,	
démences	;	Aspects	psychologiques	et	neuropsychologiques	
	
2012-2016	
	
üCo-organisateur	du	Congrès	National	de	Neuropsychologie	Clinique	
üMembre	du	comité	scientifique	du	Congrès	National	de	Neuropsychologie	Clinique	
	
	
Juin	2012	
	
üCo-organisateur	des	Journées	Nationales	des	Equipes	Pluridisciplinaires	des	CMRR,	Rennes.	
üCo-organisateur	 de	 la	 première	 journée	 de	 formation	 continue	 du	 Collectif	 Breton	 des	 Psychologues	
Neuropsychologues	 des	 Consultations	 Mémoire.	 Thèmes	 retenus	:	 «	Penser	 la	 complexité	»	 et	
«	Psychopatologie	et	neuropsychologie	».	Formateur	:	Professeur	Martial	Van	der	Linden.	
	
2004-2006	
	
üFormation	aux	troubles	cognitifs	à	l’IFSI	de	Morlaix	
üFormation	au	vieillissement	cognitif	dans	le	Master	1	Action	Sociale,	Université	de	Bretagne	Occidentale,	
Département	de	la	Formation	Continue	
üCapacité	 en	 gérontologie	:	 «	 Approche	 neuropsychologique	 des	 syndromes	 démentiels	».	 Faculté	 de	
Médecine	de	Brest	
üFormation	des	soignants	du	Centre	Alzheimer	«	Kuzh	Heol	»,	Bourg	Blanc	(29)	«	Démences	et	troubles	
du	comportement	
	
Conférences	grand	public	
	
En	cours	
ü4	à	8	conférences	annuelles	à	l’Université	du	Temps	Libre	de	Bretagne	
ü2	conférences	et	2	ateliers	dans	le	cadre	de	la	semaine	du	cerveau,	2017	et	2019	
üAnimations	des	ateliers	«	Bien	Vieillir	»	de	l’Office	des	Retraités	de	la	ville	de	Rennes	
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Recherche	clinique	hospitalière	&	académique	
	
	
En	cours	
	
ü	Exposition	Préalable	et	Mémoire	de	Reconnaissance	dans	 la	Maladie	d’Alzheimer,	Centre	Mémoire	
de	Ressources	et	de	Recherches	de	Rennes	;	CHU	Rennes	(CORECT	2014)	;	Fondation	de	l’Avenir	(2015)	;	
Institut	 des	 Neurosciences	 Cliniques	 de	 Rennes	 (2015)	;	 Université	 de	 Rennes	 2	 (Département	 de	
Psychologie)	;	 Plateforme	 Neurinfo	;	 Unité	 Projet	 Visages	 U1228,	 Inria,	 CNRS,	 Inserm,	 Université	 de	
Rennes	1,	Rennes	;	Centre	de	Recherches	Cerveau	et	Cognition,	CNRS	UMR	5549,	Toulouse.	
ü	 Bases	 neurales	 de	 l’apprentissage	 de	 nouvelles	 connaissances	 dans	 l’amnésie	 développementale.	
Collaboration	avec	la	plateforme	de	neuroimagerie	Neurinfo	(CHU	Pontchaillou)	
ü	 Projet	 SAB-Fame:	 Impact	 des	 connaissances	 préalables	 sur	 la	 reconnaissance	 ultra-rapide	 (CerCo	
Toulouse,	Centre	de	Recherche	en	Psychologie,	Cognition	et	Communication,	Université	de	Rennes	2)	
ü	 Projet	 DRM-MST:	 l’implication	 des	 processus	 de	 séparation	 de	 pattern	 dans	 la	 genèse	 des	 faux	
souvenirs	(Centre	de	Recherche	en	Psychologie,	Cognition	et	Communication,	Université	de	Rennes	2)	
ü	Projet	SAB2Rf	:	apprentissage	en	mémoire	de	reconnaissance	(CerCo	Toulouse,	Centre	de	Recherche	
en	Psychologie,	Cognition	et	Communication,	Université	de	Rennes	2)	
ü	 «	La	 variabilité	 cognitive	 intraindividuelle	 peut-elle	 marquer	 le	 déclin	 cognitif	 et	 prédire	 la	
démence	?	».	 Collaboration	 avec	 A.	 Noël,	 MCU	 au	 Centre	 de	 Recherche	 en	 Psychologie,	 Cognition	 et	
Communication,	Université	de	Rennes	2.	
ü	Elaboration	et	validation	d’une	tâche	d’apprentissage	verbal,	spatial	et	associatif.	Collaboration	avec	
A.	Noël,	MCU	au	Centre	de	Recherche	en	Cognition	et	Communication,	Université	de	Rennes	2.	
	
2007-20014	
	
ü	 Substrats	 cognitifs	 et	 cérébraux	 des	 troubles	 de	 mémoire	 dans	 la	 maladie	 d’Alzheimer	 pré-
démentielle.	Collaboration	avec	l’unité	Inserm	U1077	du	Prof.	F.	Eustache,	CHU	Côte	de	Nacre,	Caen.	
ü	Suivi	exploratoire	d’une	cohorte	de	patients	atteints	de	démence	sémantique	(Dr	S.	BELLIARD,	CHU	
PONTCHAILLOU,	Rennes)	:	organisation	psychologique	et	neurologique	des	connaissances	sémantiques	
chez	l’humain.	
ü	 PHRC	«	Imagerie	Multimodale	de	 la	maladie	d’Alzheimer	Précoce	»	 (depuis	 2008,	Dr	G.	CHETELAT,	
Inserm	U1077	Caen).	Inclusion	et	suivi	des	participants	
ü	Participation	(inclusions	et	administration	des	 tests)	aux	essais	 cliniques	pharmaceutiques	en	cours	
dans	le	CMRR	
	
2005-2006	
	
ü	 PHRC	 «	Origine	 du	 manque	 du	 mot	 dans	 la	 maladie	 d’Alzheimer	 débutante	»	 (2005-2006,	 Dr	 S.	
BELLARD,	HIA	Clermont	Tonnerre,	Brest)	Co-investigateur	en	charge	des	aspects	neuropsychologiques	
ü	 PHRC	 «	Elaboration	 d’une	 épreuve	 de	 mémoire	 épisodique	 visuo-spatiale	»	 (2005-2006,	 Dr	 S.	
BELLARD,	HIA	Clermont	Tonnerre,	Brest)	Co-investigateur	en	charge	des	aspects	neuropsychologiques	
	
2002-2003	
	
ü	 PHRC	 «	Stimulation	 corticale	 directe	 per-opératoire	:	 résection	 tumorale	 et	 fonctions	 supérieures	»	
(2002-2004	Prof.	S.	Bakchine,	CHU	Maison-Blanche,	Reims	&	Prof.	H.	DUFFAU,	APHP	Salpêtrière,	Paris	:	
élaboration	et	rédaction	de	la	partie	neuropsychologique)	
ü	 PHRC	 «	Traitement	 visuo-spatial	 dans	 la	maladie	 de	Huntington	»	 (Prof.	 S.	 BAKCHINE,	 CHU	Maison-
Blanche,	 Reims	:	 élaboration	 et	 rédaction	 d’une	 sous-partie	 du	 protocole,	 inclusion	 et	 évaluation	 des	
patients)	
ü	 PHRC	 «	Recherche	 de	marqueurs	 biologiques	 et	 neuropsychologiques	 des	 syndromes	 démentiels	»	
(Prof.	S.	BAKCHINE,	CHU	Maison-Blanche,	Reims	:	inclusion	et	évaluation	des	patients)	
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“The	art	of	remembering	is	the	art	of	thinking.	
	
When	we	wish	to	fix	a	new	thing	in	(…)	our	own	mind	(…),	our	conscious	effort	should	not	be	
so	much	to	impress	and	retain	it	as	to	connect	it	with	something	else	already	there.	
The	connecting	is	the	thinking;	and,	if	we	attend	clearly	to	the	connection,	the	connected	thing	
will	certainly	be	likely	to	remain	within	recall.”	
	
	
	
William	James,	1983,	p.	87,	cited	in	Lockhart	&	Craik,	(1990)	
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Willem	de	Kooning.	
Unused	preparatory	drawing	for	In	Memory	of	My	Feelings	(Franck	O’Hara),	1967	
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General	Introduction	
General	Introduction	
	
Why	and	how	can	we	remember	some	past	experiences	while	others	just	fade	away?	
What	are	the	cognitive	(psychological)	and	neural	determinants	of	successful	learning	in	
humans?	Why	and	how	past	memories	interact	with	the	on	going	learning	process?	
These	 fascinating	 questions	 have	 challenged	 cognitive	 sciences	 for	 decades,	 and	
remain	 under	 investigation	 within	 various	 disciplines.	 Cognitive	 neuropsychology	 has	
been	particularly	fruitful	in	providing	models	that	aimed	to	account	for	the	dissociations	
observed	 in	 brain-injured	 patients,	 putting	 forward	 multiple	 memory	 systems	 with	
various	 specific	 properties.	 Experimental	 psychology	 has	 provided	 comprehensive	
frameworks	 that	 predict	 the	 optimized	 conditions	 where	 learning	 may,	 or	 not,	 occur.	
Contemporary	cognitive	and	computational	neurosciences	more	recently	provided	some	
mechanistic	accounts	for	various	aspects	of	successful	learning.	Still,	the	dynamics	of	the	
cognitive	systems	 involved	 in	 learning	and	their	relationships	remain	only	partly	known,	
as	are	their	neural	implementation.	
The	clinical	phenotypes	of	degenerative	diseases	like	Alzheimer’s	disease	or	Semantic	
dementia	 dramatically	 illustrate	 the	 typical	 episodic-semantic	 distinction.	 Episodic	
memory	 is	 a	 system	 dedicated	 to	 the	 storage	 of	 so-called	 “events”,	 while	 semantic	
memory	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 storage	 of	 general	 knowledge	 (about	 the	world,	 including	
oneself	 biography),	 or	 “facts”	 (e.g.	 Tulving,	 1972).	 To	 define	 a	memory	 as	 semantic	 or	
episodic	 in	 nature	 will	 entirely	 depend	 on	 its	 content.	 If	 the	 by-product	 of	 retrieval	
processes	 is	 the	 association	 between	 one	 autobiographical	 event	 (e.g.	 the	 birth	 of	my	
eldest	daughter)	and	the	unique	context	where	that	event	has	occurred	(e.g.	at	3:44	pm,	
a	 rather	cloudy	Friday	of	December,	2008),	 then	both	the	event	and	 its	unique	context	
have	 been	 remembered	 bound	 together,	 and	 that	 is	 an	 instance	 of	 episodic	 memory.	
However,	 whenever	 retrieval	 processes	 result	 in	 a	 simple	 fact	 (e.g.	 December	 is	 the	
month	when	the	fall	ends	and	the	winter	begins),	or	even	in	an	event	that	is	not	bound	to	
any	 specific,	 unique,	 context	 (e.g.	We	 used	 to	 listen	 to	Malian	music	 dancing	with	my	
eldest	daughter	when	she	started	learning	to	walk),	then	this	is	an	instance	of	semantic	
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memory.	 Available	 evidence	 show	 that	 the	 hippocampal	 formation	 –	 acknowledged	 as	
the	 heart	 of	 episodic	 learning	 –	 is	 impaired	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 in	 both	 diseases	 (i.e.	
Alzheimer’s	 disease	 and	 Semantic	 Dementia),	 thus	 ruling	 out	 the	 temptation	 to	 simply	
associate	one	memory	system	(e.g.	episodic	memory)	to	one	single	brain	structure	(e.g.	
the	 hippocampus).	 Similarly,	 while	 theories	 of	 explicit	 learning	 generally	 agree	 to	
consider	 the	medial	 temporal	 lobe	 (MTL)	as	 the	main	 functional	 region	underlying	new	
learning,	 functional	 dissociations	 within	 the	 MTL	 are	 still	 debated.	 Strikingly,	 clinical	
evidence	is	mixed,	pointing	either	towards	the	absence	of	new	declarative	learning	after	
damage	to	any	MTL	structures,	or	to	some	preserved	learning	as	long	as	subhippocampal	
structures	 are	 preserved.	 There	 is,	 therefore,	 room	 from	 improvement	 of	 our	
understanding	 of	 a	 very	 common	 but	 critical	 phenomenon	 for	 our	 adaptation	 to	 the	
world,	namely	new	learning.	
---	
In	 the	 field	 of	 memory	 research,	 the	 emphasis	 has	 been	 traditionally	 been	 put	 on	
highlighting	the	differences	between	semantic	and	episodic	memories.	For	the	episodic	
component,	 the	 experiments	 generally	 require	 subjects	 to	 learn	 and	 recall	 series	 of	
stimuli,	or	to	recall	remote	memories.	For	the	semantic	component,	experiments	usually	
involve	retrieving	knowledge	from	memory,	categorizing	stimuli	or	generating	exemplars	
related	to	a	given	concept.	Accordingly,	the	search	for	neuropsychological	dissociations	
between	these	memories	has	largely	contributed	to	shape	our	understanding	of	learning	
in	 terms	 of	multiple	memory	 systems	 (e.g.	 model	 SPI,	 Tulving,	 1995).	 Still,	 while	 brain	
pathology	can	lead	to	some	kinds	of	dissociations	isolating	one	form	of	memory	–	either	
semantic	or	episodic	–,	inferences	that	can	be	made	on	the	normal	functioning	of	learning	
and	 memory	 in	 humans	 are	 limited	 because	 under	 physiological	 conditions,	 these	
memory	 systems	 works	 together.	 Thus,	 when	 neuropsychological	 data	 do	 inform	 us	
about	the	possible	architectures	of	memory	systems,	the	method	 leads	to	compare	the	
normal	 expression	 of	 the	 coordinate	 works	 of	 distinct	 memory	 systems	 with	 the	
pathological	 performance	 of	 brain-damaged	 patients	who	 rely	 upon	 one	 single	 kind	 of	
memory	system.	 In	 such	a	comparison,	what	 is	missing	 in	neuropsychological	 studies	 is	
the	amount	of	performance	that	is	determined	not	only	by	one	or	another	system,	but	by	
the	relationships	between	systems.	In	other	words,	within	the	multiple	memory	systems	
framework,	 thorough	 studies	 of	 brain-damaged	 patients	 with	 impaired	 episodic	 or	
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semantic	memory	are	not	sufficient	to	 inform	us	on	how	the	different	systems	interact,	
and	whether	these	interactions	alter	performance.	
Yet,	 these	 interactions	 must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 for	 the	 building	 of	 any	
comprehensive	theory	about	learning	and	memory.	
Consider	the	following	situation:	weeks	ago,	you	had	to	buy	a	new	car.	Let’s	suppose	
you	are	not	really	interested	in	cars,	so	your	goal	here	is	just	to	find	a	new	one	as	quickly	
as	possible.	Let’s	 suppose	again	 that	you	 finally	have	chosen	a	Volkswagen	Golf.	Great,	
the	job	is	done;	you	bought	this	car,	and	started	driving	for	a	few	weeks.	Now,	didn’t	you	
ever	experience	that	strange	feeling	making	you	think:	“It’s	as	if	since	I	bought	my	own	
Golf,	I	feel	like	I	see	it	everywhere”….?	
	
Figure	1.	Why,	since	I	bought	a	Golf,	do	I	feel	like	I	see	it	everywhere?	
I	 suppose	 everyone	 would	 agree	 that	 this	 feeling	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 due	 to	 an	
extraordinary	coincidence,	namely	that	by	chance,	at	the	time	you	have	bought	your	car,	
there	 was	 a	 sudden	 massive	 increase	 in	 Golfs	 sales	 in	 your	 area.	 More	 seriously,	 that	
feeling	 can	 hardly	 be	 experienced	without	 declarative	 learning.	 Being	 able	 to	 consider	
that	your	frequency	of	encounters	with	that	particular	car	has	incredibly	increased	since	
you	bought	your	own,	 requires	 that	you	have	kept	some	record	of	 these	events	during	
some	period	of	time.	Given	that	there	 is	no	 logical	reason	why	you	would	not	have	had	
the	 same	 frequency	 of	 “Golf	 encounters”	 before	 your	 purchase,	 something	 else	must	
explain	 why	 you	 got	 that	 feeling.	 In	 other	 words,	 why	 do	 the	 very	 same	 event	 (i.e.	
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bumping	 into	a	VW	Golf),	 likely	 involving	 the	 same	 stimuli	 across	 very	 similar	 contexts,	
seems	to	lead	to	memory	formation	in	one	case,	but	just	fades	away	in	the	other	case?	
	
Similar	 examples	 can	 be	 mentioned,	 sometimes	 even	 more	 striking.	 One	 colleague	
explained	 me	 that	 since	 the	 day	 she	 knew	 she	 was	 pregnant,	 she	 felt	 like	 she	 saw	
pregnant	women	everyday	and	everywhere	around	her.	As	 for	myself,	 since	 I	was	 first	
explained	 how	 to	 discriminate	 between	 a	 herring	 gull	 and	 a	 great	 black-black	 gull,	 not	
only	did	I	become	good	at	doing	so,	but	also	for	months	if	not	years	I	had	the	feeling	that	
the	 headcount	 of	 black	 gulls	 kept	 increasing,	 when	 this	 gull	 remained	 even	 quite	
constantly	rare	at	that	time.	A	last	example	again	illustrating	how	very	similar	events	can	
turn	 into	 long-term	 memories	 or	 just	 rapidly	 fade	 away.	 The	 classmate	 my	 youngest	
daughter	 plays	 the	 more	 with	 is	 named	 Lola.	 Some	 time	 after	 we	 met	 her	 –	 I	 can	
remember	how	this	first	name	sounded	rather	funny	and	original	to	me	in	the	first	place	-,	
I	realized	that	actually	a	lot	of	little	girls	in	my	daughter’s	school	were	named	Lola,	and	it	
was	definitely	not	as	unusual	as	I	first	thought.	
	
More	 empirical	 evidence	 highlighting	 the	 critical	 role	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	
subsequent	 learning	comes	 from	the	psychology	of	expertise.	One	of	 the	most	 famous	
experiments,	back	in	the	early	1970’s,	has	shown	that	adult	with	chess	expertise	(either	a	
“class	 A”	 player	 or	 a	 Master)	 were	 far	 more	 accurate	 at	 recalling	 from	 short-term	
memory	chess	positions	than	an	adult	chess	novice	(Chase	&	Simon,	1973a)	(see	Figure	2).	
The	 most	 important	 result	 though	 was	 that,	 when	 chess	 positions	 were	 randomly	
organized	rather	than	inspired	from	real	games,	experts	were	not	better	anymore.	
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Figure	2.	Learning	curves	of	a	Chess	Master	and	a	Class	A	Player	vs.	a	Novice,	immediate	recall	of	
pieces	positions	on	a	chessboard.	Chess	experts	outperform	novice	only	for	actual	games,	but	not	
for	random,	unlikely,	games.	Taken	from	Chase	&	Simon	(1973a),	p.	61.	
	
This	result	 is	even	more	striking	when	considering	that	there	 is	no	significant	difference	
between	novices	and	experts	in	terms	of	gross	perceptual	processing	of	the	chessboard	
(De	Groot,	1978).	The	critical	role	of	expertise	–	that	can	be	viewed	as	a	domain-specific	
knowledge	–	has	also	been	put	forward	for	cognitive	development.	Consider	for	example	
that	 when	 asked	 to	 recall	 from	 short-term	 memory	 chessboard	 displays,	 children	
“experts”	in	chess	are	better	than	novice	adults	(Chi,	1978).	In	the	meantime,	the	adults	
still	showed	the	expected	superiority	in	the	more	classical,	digit-span,	short-term	memory	
task.	 Similarly,	 fourth-graders	 children	 experts	 in	 football	 were	 more	 accurate	 than	
novices	 in	 recalling	 short	 passages	 about	 soccer	 games,	 but	 more	 importantly	 they	
outperformed	adult	novices	for	this	verbal	long-term	memory	task	(Weinert,	1984,	1986).	
In	a	quite	unusual	report,	Chi	&	Koeske,	(1983)	have	studied	a	4.5	years	old	boy	who,	as	is	
quite	often	the	case,	became	an	expert	in	dinosaurs.	Strikingly,	one	year	after	his	intense	
interest	 for	 dinosaurs	 was	 over,	 this	 boy	 was	 far	 better	 at	 recalling	 the	 names	 of	 the	
dinosaurs	that	fell	within	his	 initial	“expertise”,	and	thus	had	been	familiar	to	him,	than	
the	 names	 of	 unfamiliar	 dinosaurs.	 Finally,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 these	 “intense	
interests”	 in	 childhood	may	be	of	 great	matter	 for	 early	memory	development,	 in	 that	
they	 have	 proven	 beneficial	 for	 knowledge	 acquisition,	 persistence,	 attention	
heightening,	and	deeper	information	processing	(Hidi,	2000;	Renninger,	1992;	Renninger	
&	Wozniak,	1985;	Schiefele	&	Krapp,	1996).	
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These	 examples	 suggest	 that	 the	 cognitive	 processing	 of	 a	 given	 event	 seems	 to	 be	
biased	towards	memory	formation	when	prior	knowledge	is	available.	If	we	come	back	to	
the	 car	 example,	 before	 your	 purchase,	 each	 event	 involving	 a	 VW	 Golf	might	 just	 be	
processed	minimally,	 e.g.	 includes	 some	“there’s	 a	 car”.	 The	probability	 of	 subsequent	
memory	 for	 that	 event	may	 be	 at	 chance	 level;	 indeed	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 serve	 any	
relevant	adaptive	purpose.	By	contrast,	imagine	yourself	as	the	recent	proud	owner	of	a	
brand	new	Golf.	 Each	 time	 you	bump	 into	 a	Golf,	 that	 event	 could	 be	 processed	quite	
differently,	 because	 your	 perceptual	 processing	 now	 matches	 to	 a	 large	 amount	 of	
personally	 relevant	 knowledge	 that	 you	 have	 just	 acquired	 about	 that	 vehicle.	
Importantly,	 this	 altered	 processing	 can	 serve	 the	 simple	 purpose	 of	 being	 able	 to	
discriminate	from	now	on	your	own	car	from	the	other	Golfs,	which	of	course	is	critical	in	
parking	areas…	We	can	argue	that	 in	that	situation	(being	the	recent	owner	of	a	Golf),	
the	 fact	 that	 perceptual	 processing	 at	 encoding	 relates	 to	 recently	 acquired	 prior	
knowledge	not	only	allows	you	better	identifying	the	object,	but	might	also	enhance	the	
probability	of	subsequent	memory	for	the	event.	After	a	few	similar	events,	you	may	well	
form	the	feeling	that	you	bump	into	the	same	car	as	yours	everywhere,	when	you	cannot	
remember	 you	 ever	 even	 noticed	 Golfs	 around	 you	 before!	 Here	 it	 is	 important	 to	
emphasize	 that	 while	 these	 phenomena	 clearly	 depends	 on	 learning	 and	 memory	
functioning,	 still	 they	 differ	 in	 one	 critical	 aspect,	 namely	 repetition	 effects.	 The	most	
acknowledged	factor	 leading	to	memory	formation	 is	 repetition:	repetition	of	the	same	
stimulus	 leads	 to	 memory	 effects	 observable	 from	 the	 cellular	 level	 (i.e.	 Long-Term	
Potentiation)	to	the	behavioural	level	(faster	responses	in	perceptual	priming,	increased	
recall	accuracy	in	words-list	tasks).	However,	the	phenomenon	we	are	interested	in	here	
apparently	does	not	relate	to	repetition.	If	we	come	back	to	the	first	name	example,	the	
amount	of	repetitions	of	a	target	event	(i.e.	seeing	or	hearing	the	first	name	“Lola”)	does	
not	differ	before	and	after	the	moment	when	you	really	met	one	“Lola”.	Similarly,	there	is	
no	reason	why	you	would	have	been	exposed	to	more	VW	Golfs	after	you	bought	your	
own	one	than	before	(actually	it	is	even	more	likely	that	you	experienced	more	crossings	
of	 such	 a	 car	 before	 your	 purchase).	 So,	 if	 there	 is	 some	 alteration	 of	 learning	 and	
memory	for	a	particular	event	after	the	acquisition	of	relevant	knowledge	about	 it,	 this	
phenomenon	is	by	no	way	resulting	from	a	“learning	curve”	effect.	Rather,	it	seems	that	
some	qualitative	difference	may	drive	this	effect,	rather	than	a	quantitative	difference	in	
terms	of	the	number	of	prior	exposures,	for	example.	
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Thus,	the	role	of	the	relationships	between	what	we	know	and	what	we	learn,	 in	the	
service	of	learning,	is	of	great	matter.	How	do	we	learn	what	we	know?	
---	
Noteworthy,	the	idea	that	prior	memories	may	alter	new	learning	can	be	tracked	back	
to	 Hermann	 Ebbinghaus,	 in	 very	 concrete	 terms.	 When	 Ebbinghaus	 attempted	 to	
rigorously	 investigate	human	 learning,	 his	 use	of	meaningless	 syllables	was	purposeful:	
Robert	 Bjork	 reminds	 us	 that	 the	 German	 scientist	 “wanted	 new	 learning	 not	 to	 be	
corrupted	 by,	 sort	 of…learning	 you	 already	 knew”	 (quote	 from	 an	 interview	 of	 Robert	
Bjork,	 retrieved	 at	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTo35X2rqls	 on	 May,	 25th).	 Far	
from	 the	Plato’s	metaphor	of	 the	wax	 tablet	 (see	Roediger,	 1980),	 new	 learning	never	
occurs	 in	 a	 vacuum:	 instead	 and	 typically,	 new	 episodes	 are	 processed	 in	 relation	 to	
existing	 knowledge,	 namely,	 prior	 memories	 may	 have	 a	 major	 influence	 on	 learning.	
While	the	typical	learning	experiments	in	psychology	or	neuropsychology	require	subjects	
to	learn	lists	of	rather	unfamiliar	stimuli	(e.g.	words)	in	an	unfamiliar	environment	(i.e.	the	
lab),	everyday	 learning	occurs	with	highly	familiar	stimuli	within	highly	familiar	contexts	
(routines	 are	 a	 big	 part	 of	 our	 lives,	 aren’t	 they?).	 Thus,	within	 the	 continuous	 flow	of	
information	that	we	process	everyday,	our	need	for	later	remembering	some	episodes,	or	
to	 simply	 recognize	 some	 situation	 as	 familiar,	 can	be	 viewed	 as	 closely	 relying	on	 the	
relationships	between	perceptual	processing	and	the	relevant	prior	knowledge	available	
–	 or	 its	 absence	 –	 at	 encoding.	 Little	 effort	 however	 has	 been	 made	 to	 improve	 our	
understanding	of	how	knowing	 influences	 learning,	by	comparison	to	the	 large	amount	
of	experiments	dedicated	to	learning	(e.g.	“verbal	learning”	period	within	a	short	history	
of	 the	 science	 of	 memory,	 see	 Tulving,	 (2000),	 to	 episodic	 memory	 or	 to	 semantic	
memory	specifically.	The	work	I	have	done	during	that	thesis	was	aimed	at	contributing	
filling	this	gap.	
The	present	thesis	aimed	at	improving	our	understanding	of	how	learning	occurs,	both	
at	a	cognitive	and	at	a	neural	level.	Among	the	various	factors	known	to	strongly	predict	
whether	 learning	will	occur	or	not,	we	aimed	at	 investigating	whether	prior	knowledge	
plays	a	role;	if	so,	how	can	we	better	characterize	that	influence,	namely,	which	memory	
processes	 are	 altered	 at	 retrieval	 when	 prior	 knowledge	 is	 available	 at	 encoding,	 and	
does	the	kind	of	prior	knowledge	matter,	or	does	any	sort	of	prior	knowledge	exerts	the	
same	influence.	Moreover,	we	aimed	at	shedding	some	light	upon	the	neural	substrates	
underlying	 the	 role	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 learning.	 To	 this	 end,	 we	 will	 first	 report	 a	
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thorough	 case	 study	 of	 patient	 KA,	 a	 patient	 with	 severe	 developmental	 amnesia.	
Meeting	patient	KA	was	indeed	the	neuropsychological	starting	point	of	that	thesis.	That	
is,	the	first	series	of	experiments	with	this	patient	brought	strong	evidence	that	despite	
no	residual	episodic	learning,	and	massive	damage	to	the	whole	hippocampal	system,	KA	
presented	with	 supranormal	 levels	 of	 explicit	 learning	 and	 semantic	 knowledge.	 These	
findings	 in	 patient	 KA	 were	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 with	 his	 inability	 to	 recognize	 simple	
meaningless	items,	which	has	led	us	to	focus	on	the	interactions	between	what	we	know	
and	what	we	 learn,	as	stated	above.	The	second	series	of	experiments	aimed	at	testing	
the	very	basic	 idea	that	when	available,	prior	knowledge	at	encoding	can	be	a	powerful	
learning	 enhancer.	 These	 included	 an	 investigation	 of	 whether	 aging	 alters	 prior	
knowledge-dependent	learning	the	same	way	it	does	for	typical	instances	of	learning.	The	
third	experiment	used	 functional	neuroimaging	 to	 test	data-driven	hypothesis	 resulting	
from	our	behavioural	results	regarding	the	brain	networks	involved	in	memory	encoding,	
depending	on	the	kind	of	existing	prior	knowledge.	That	experiment	also	aimed	at	testing	
whether	 mildly	 memory	 impaired	 patients	 could	 benefit	 any	 kind	 of	 prior	 knowledge.	
Finally,	we	will	report	on	a	last	experiment	with	patient	KA,	that	aimed	at	testing	whether	
more	 severe	 amnesia	 could	 nonetheless	 be	 reduced	 for	 stimuli	 with	 prior	 knowledge	
derived	from	experimental	procedures.	
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The	problem	of	learning	and	memory	
	
The	problem	of	learning	and	memory	
	
«	Memory	is	a	biological	abstraction.	There	is	no	place	in	the	brain	that	one	could	point	at	
and	say,	Here	is	memory.	There	is	no	single	activity,	or	class	of	activities,	of	the	organism	
that	could	be	identified	with	the	concept	that	the	term	denotes.	There	is	no	known	
molecular	change	that	corresponds	to	memory,	no	known	cellular	activity	that	represents	
memory,	no	behavioural	response	of	a	living	organism	that	is	memory.	Yet	the	term	
memory	encompasses	all	these	changes	and	activities.	»	
Endel	Tulving,	1995,	p.	751.	
	
Like	 for	many	 concepts	 that	 are	widely	 used,	 the	 concepts	 of	 learning	 and	memory	
prove	 hard	 to	 define.	 	 This	 section	 is	 aimed	 at	 clarifying	 why	 classical	 definitions	 of	
learning	are	problematic,	and	how	a	recently	proposed	definition	may	better	fit	with	the	
purposes	of	the	present	thesis.	
“Learning”	as	an	ill-defined	concept	
In	 a	 classical	 textbook,	 Alan	 Baddeley	 himself	 starts	 a	 chapter	 entitled	 “What	 is	
memory?”	stating	that	“Memory	is	something	we	complain	about”	(Baddeley,	Eysenck,	&	
Anderson,	2015),	but	does	not	provide	a	clear	definition.	Strikingly,	despite	the	thousands	
of	 scientific	 studies	 addressing	 the	 question	 of	 how	 learning	 and	 memory	 work,	 that	
topic	 being	 one	 of	 the	main	 topics	 of	 experimental	 psychology	 over	 the	 20th	 century,	
researchers	hardly	define	precisely	what	“learning”	means.	Still,	any	scientific	approach	
first	needs	a	clear	definition	of	its	matter.	
One	very	straightforward	way	to	define	learning	is	the	adoption	of	a	simple	functional	
definition	 like	“Learning	 is	 the	modification	of	behaviour	 resulting	 from	experience”.	 In	
fact,	most	of	the	classical	textbooks	adopt	such	a	functional	definition:	“Learning	refers	
to	 a	 relatively	 permanent	 change	 in	 behaviour	 as	 a	 result	 of	 practice	 or	 experience”	
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(Lachman,	 1997).	 The	expected	by-product	of	 learning	 is	memory,	which	 can	 simply	be	
defined	as	the	faculty	by	which	the	mind	stores	and	remember	information.		Defined	this	
way,	any	behaviour	that	would	be	experience-dependent	(e.g.	quote	from	Larry	Squire,	
retrieved	 at	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NyDNxIaTgPM&t=100s)	 could	 be	 an	
instance	of	memory,	 resulting	 from	 some	 learning.	 Such	a	 simple	definition	of	 learning	
takes	his	roots	in	the	behaviourist	approach	to	learning,	where	“all	one	needs	to	predict	
someone’s	behaviour	is	a	catalogue	of	specific	facts	and	generalizations	about	his	or	her	
past	 responses	 to	 situations	 resembling	 the	present	one”	 (Bower,	p.	 59,	 in	Allan	et	al.,	
2000).	
The	 first	 problem	 with	 that	 definition	 is	 that	 it	 makes	 unlikely	 any	 experimental	
attempts	 to	study	 learning.	Since	one	can	 infer	 that	 some	 learning	has	occurred	only	 if	
one	 has	 identified	 a	 memory,	 learning	 becomes	 unobservable.	 That	 is,	 if	 we	 were	
interested	 in	 learning,	 following	 that	 definition,	 any	 investigation	 of	 learning	would	 be	
indirect:	 learning	cannot	be	explored	 independently	from	its	consequence,	 i.e.	memory,	
so	that	at	 the	time	we	would	 infer	anything	on	how	 learning	takes	place,	such	 learning	
would	already	have	occurred.	Typically,	 learning	experiments	 involve	a	study	and	a	test	
phase.	Whether	learning	has	occurred	or	not	is	inferred	based	on	the	test’s	variable,	that	
is,	far	from	when	learning	has	supposedly	occurred.	
The	second	problem	with	such	a	simple,	functional	definition	is	that	it	is	over-inclusive.	
Not	 all	 experience-dependent	 changes	 in	 behaviour	 reflect	 learning;	 conversely,	 not	 all	
experiences	yield	memory	formation.	As	an	example,	imagine	you	walk	into	a	new	room,	
an	odd-colored	light	fills	the	room,	and	then	a	loud	and	threatening	rattling	noise	goes	off	
and	persists.	You	exit	with	haste	(Eichenbaum,	2002,	p.3).	Here,	the	change	of	behaviour	
is	a	direct	consequence	of	experience,	although	it	may	hardly	be	considered	an	instance	
of	learning.	Other	changes	in	behaviour	like	the	slowing	of	information	processing	speed	
or	 the	decrease	 in	 response	 accuracy	 can	be	 experience-dependent,	 like	 in	 the	 case	of	
fatigue	or	 lack	of	motivation.	Still,	these	experiences	cannot	be	considered	as	causes	of	
learning.	
The	third	problem	with	the	classical	 functional	definition	 is	that	 it	also	excludes	well-
acknowledged	 instances	 of	 learning,	 like	 classical	 conditioning.	 In	 the	 example	 of	
Pavlovian	 conditioning,	 the	 learned	association	between	a	 tone	and	 the	 food	does	not	
yield	any	change	in	behaviour:	the	salivation	behaviour	pre-existed	to	learning,	however,	
a	change	in	stimulus	effectiveness	has	occurred	due	to	learning.	Here,	what	has	changed	
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as	 a	 result	 of	 experience	 is	 the	 Stimulus-Response	 relationship,	 rather	 than	 the	
behavioural	response	per	se.	
Unsatisfactory	alternatives	
Alternative	definitions	have	therefore	been	proposed,	however,	they	also	present	with	
difficulties	casting	some	doubt	on	how	useful	they	can	be	for	the	experimental	study	of	
learning	(de	Houwer,	2011;	De	Houwer,	Barnes-Holmes,	&	Moors,	2013).	These	definitions	
generally	 assume	 a	 mechanistic,	 rather	 than	 functional,	 approach	 to	 the	 problem	 of	
learning.	Thus,	(Lachman,	1997)	proposes,	“Learning	is	the	process	by	which	a	relatively	
stable	 modification	 in	 stimulus-response	 relations	 is	 developed	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	
functional	environmental	interaction	via	the	senses“	(p.479),	while	(Domjan,	2010)	states:	
“Learning	is	an	enduring	change	in	the	mechanisms	of	behaviour	involving	specific	stimuli	
and/or	 responses	 that	 results	 from	 prior	 experience	 with	 those	 or	 similar	 stimuli	 and	
responses“	 (p.	 17).	 These	 alternative	 definitions	 assume	 that	 learning	 is	 better	
characterized	 by	 a	 series	 of	 mechanisms	 mediating	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	
experience	and	the	behavioural	change.	A	strong	advantage	is	that	learning	is	considered	
as	one	series	of	processes	among	others	that	determine	behaviour,	making	a	change	 in	
behaviour	 unnecessary	 to	 infer	 that	 learning	occurred.	However,	 they	 imply	 that	 some	
change	 in	the	organism	has	occurred,	reflecting	the	above-mentioned	mechanisms,	and	
that	these	changes	have	a	direct	(or	contiguous)	causal	relationship	with	learning.	Typical	
learning	 effects	 are	 observed	 after	 a	 delay,	 that	 is,	 the	 experience	 at	 time	 1	 that	
supposedly	 includes	 these	 learning	mechanisms	 are	 no	 longer	 present	 at	 time	 2,	when	
the	behaviour	is	tested.	Tenants	of	these	mechanistic	accounts	therefore	suggest	that	a	
change	in	the	organism	–	the	core	basis	of	learning	–	occurs	with	experience,	and	that	it	
lasts	 over	 time	 so	 that	 it	 is	 still	 present	 at	 test,	 therefore	 being	 responsible	 for	 the	
observed	 change	 in	 behaviour	 (de	 Houwer,	 2011).	 Thus,	 defining	 that	 change	 in	 the	
organism	and	having	accurate	proxies	 for	 it	 is	 inherent	 to	 the	mechanistic	definition	of	
learning.	 Unfortunately,	 we	 currently	 miss	 a	 clear	 description	 of	 what	 changes	 in	 the	
organism	 as	 a	 result	 of	 experience,	 as	 well	 as	 how	 to	 assert	 that	 such	 a	 change	 has	
occurred	 or	 not.	 It	 follows	 that	 we	 also	 miss	 a	 taxonomy	 of	 these	 changes	 in	 the	
organism	 that	 may	 reflect	 the	 different	 kinds	 of	 learning	 acknowledged	 at	 the	
psychological	 level	 (associative	 learning,	 item	 learning,	 declarative	 vs.	 non	 declarative	
learning),	 making	 it	 unlikely	 to	 move	 forward	 on	 the	 scientific	 investigation	 of	 the	
learning	phenomenon.	It	therefore	seems	that	the	use	of	behavioural	proxies	for	learning	
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remains	mandatory.	A	recent	definition	of	learning	has	been	proposed	that	may	solve	the	
pitfalls	arising	from	the	simple	functional	definition,	or	the	mechanistic	approach.	
Towards	a	new	definition	of	learning	
De	 Houwer	 et	 al.,	 (2013)	 have	 brought	 a	 new	 definition	 of	 learning	 as	 follows:	
“Learning	can	be	defined	as	changes	in	the	behaviour	of	an	organism	that	are	the	result	of	
regularities	 in	 the	environment	of	 that	organism“	(p.	633).	Below	we	will	argue	that	 this	
definition	is	very	relevant	to	the	question	of	“how	do	we	learn	what	we	know?”	and	how	
it	avoids	the	above-mentioned	limitations	of	prior	definitions.	
Putting	 forward	 that	 regularities	 in	 the	environment	of	 an	organism	are	a	necessary	
condition	 for	 learning	 to	 occur	 sounds	 to	 us	 like	 a	 critical	 progress	 in	 the	 definition	 of	
learning.	 Prior	 functional	 definitions	 evoked	 “experience”	 or	 “prior	 experience	 with	
stimuli”	 or	 “functional	 environmental	 interactions	 via	 the	 senses”,	 and	 thus	 included	
virtually	all	experiences	as	potential	learning	triggers.	Mechanistic	definitions	in	particular	
assume	that	any	information	processing	can	trigger	learning,	thus	the	locus	of	learning	is	
restricted	 to	 the	 mechanisms	 underlying	 behavioural	 changes.	 The	 causal	 experience	
would	 not	 have	 any	 relevant	 property	 for	 understanding	 learning;	 only	 the	 processes	
supporting	behavioural	changes	would	be	the	matter	of	interest.	Yet,	it	is	acknowledged	
that	the	repetition	of	the	same	experiences,	or	the	extraction	of	shared	properties	across	
similar	yet	distinct	experiences	(“experiences”	here	not	only	 include	stimuli	processing,	
but	 also	 response	processing	 and	 stimulus-responses	 associations)	 is	 a	major	 condition	
for	learning.	Putting	forward	the	“regularities”	in	the	environment	therefore	includes	the	
likely	possibility	 that	some	features	of	 the	environment	 itself	are	a	core	determinant	of	
learning.	
For	present	purposes,	this	is	quite	relevant	since	the	investigation	of	the	role	of	prior	
knowledge	in	learning	implies	that	learned	stimuli	have	already	been	experienced	before,	
under	 various	 circumstances	 and	 with	 various	 regularities.	 Consider	 for	 example	 the	
classical	 distinction	 between	 explicit	 and	 implicit	 learning:	 while	 implicit	 learning	 as	
assessed	 within	 priming	 paradigms	 typically	 relies	 on	 a	 few	 recent	 prior	 exposures,	
explicit	 learning	 often	 involves	 stimuli	 that	 has	 been	 exposed	 many	 times,	 across	 the	
entire	 life	 of	 the	 subject.	 The	 definition	 from	 De	 Houwer	 et	 al.,	 (2013)	 allows	 one	 to	
explore	 whether	 distinct	 regularities	 prior	 to	 learning	 could	 trigger	 distinct	 learning	
mechanisms,	 as	observed	 through	distinct	 changes	 in	behaviour.	Moreover,	 it	makes	 it	
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possible	to	establish	a	direct	relationship	between	some	cause	(i.e.	some	specified	type	
of	 regularity)	 and	 some	 kind	 of	 learning	 (i.e.	 a	 specific	 behavioural	 change),	 thus	
attempting	 to	model	 functional	 learning	 rules.	 Prior	 definitions,	 by	 contrast,	 allow	 the	
investigation	of	only	one	side	of	the	coin,	namely,	behavioural	changes	on	the	one	hand	
or	change	in	the	organism	on	the	other	hand.	
Finally,	 that	 new	 definition	 of	 learning	 also	 presents	 the	 benefits	 of	 avoiding	 the	
pitfalls	 mentioned	 before.	 First,	 the	 concept	 of	 regularity	 avoids	 the	 over-inclusion	 of	
experience-dependent	behaviours	that	cannot	be	considered	instances	of	learning.		If	an	
experience	produces	some	behavioural	change	but	is	not	associated	with	regularity	in	the	
environment	 (e.g.	 to	bend	down	when	hearing	a	 loud	bang),	 then	 it	won’t	count	as	an	
instance	of	learning.	Second,	that	definition	avoids	the	need	to	assume	that	some	change	
in	the	organism,	and	therefore	in	behaviour,	must	occur	at	the	time	of	“study”	and	lasts	
enough	until	the	time	of	“test”,	like	in	the	mechanistic	definitions.	Instead,	De	Houwer	et	
al.,	 (2013)	 definition	 states	 that	 only	 the	 functional	 relationship	 between	 some	
environmental	regularity	(e.g.	recognizing	a	face	under	different	orientations)	and	some	
behavioural	change	(e.g.	being	accurate	at	identifying	that	face	across	different	contexts)	
constitutes	 an	 instance	 of	 learning.	 Thus,	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 assume	 any	 behavioural	
change	at	both	points	in	time	to	identify	that	learning	has	occurred.	Moreover,	this	allows	
avoiding	the	dependency	on	accurate	proxies	 for	an	organism’s	changes	that	would	be	
learning-specific,	 proxies	 that	 we	 still	 currently	 miss.	 However,	 by	 adopting	 a	 broad	
definition	 of	 “behavioural	 changes”,	 encompassing	 “every	 observable	 response	 that	 a	
living	organism	can	make,	regardless	of	whether	the	response	is	produced	by	the	somatic	
nervous	system	(e.g.,	pressing	a	 lever),	the	autonomic	nervous	system	(e.g.,	salivation),	
or	neural	processes	(e.g.,	electrical	activity	in	the	brain)”	(De	Houwer	et	al.,	2013,	p.	633),	
this	 functional	 definition	 includes	 every	 research	 using	 physiological	 measurements	
within	 the	 scope	 of	 learning	 research,	 as	 long	 as	 environmental	 regularities	 are	
manipulated	as	independent	variables.	
In	the	present	thesis,	we	will	thus	refer	to	learning	within	that	conceptual	framework,	
asking	whether	distinct	 regularities	 in	 the	environment,	 resulting	 from	distinct	 kinds	of	
prior	knowledge,	can	result	in	distinct	kinds	of	learning.	
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Introduction:	state-of-the-art	
	
Overview	
	
“Few	problems	in	science	are	as	difficult	as	those	of	working	out	the	precise	relation	
between	two	complex	concepts	that	are	deceptively	similar.	The	relation	between	episodic	
and	semantic	memory	belongs	in	this	category.”	
Endel	Tulving,	1993,	“What	Is	Episodic	Memory”,	p.	67	
In	 the	 present	 thesis,	we	will	 focus	 on	 how	what	we	know	 (general	 knowledge	of	 the	
world)	 influences	 what	 we	 remember.	 Following	 the	 widely	 acknowledged	 distinction	
between	 episodic	 and	 semantic	 memory,	 we	 will	 thus	 address	 the	 question	 of	 how	
semantic	 memories	 (i.e.	 prior	 existing	 context-free	 representations)	 influence	 the	
acquisition	 of	 new	 episodic	 memories	 (i.e.	 new	 context-rich	 representations).	 The	
importance	of	this	topic	can	be	highlighted	if	one	considers	the	expected	benefits	in	the	
field	 of	 education	 (e.g.	 	 van	 Kesteren,	 Krabbendam,	 &	 Meeter,	 2018),	 neurological	
conditions	responsible	for	memory	disabilities	(e.g.	amnesia,	 Irish	&	van	Kesteren,	2018;	
Kan,	Alexander,	&	Verfaellie,	 2009).	More	generally,	 factors	 allowing	 the	most	efficient	
memorization	are	 increasingly	scrutinized	(e.g.	Tabibian	et	al.,	2019),	and	our	hope	 is	to	
offer	some	contribution	here.	
---	
In	 the	 first	 Introduction	 section,	 we	 will	 present	 the	 concepts	 of	 declarative	 memory	
together	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 Medial	 Temporal	 Lobe	 as	 a	 functional	 entity,	 focusing	 on	
recognition	memory	tasks.	We	will	here	explain	why	we	chose	recognition	memory	as	the	
main	behavioural	method	for	the	assessment	of	learning	and	memory.	Most	importantly,	
we	will	present	the	current	theoretical	frameworks	for	recognition	memory	performance,	
putting	 the	emphasis	on	how	 the	 fractionation	of	declarative	has	progressed	 since	 the	
earthquake	for	memory	research	driven	by	the	study	of	the	patient	HM.	
---	
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The	second	and	third	Introduction	sections	will	be	devoted	to	provide	a	historical	sketch	
on	 how	 experimental	 psychology	 and	 cognitive	 neuropsychology	 have	 led	 to	 the	 divorce	
between	remembering	general	facts	and	remembering	facts	related	to	the	self,	opening	the	
still	 in	use	era	of	the	semantic	-	episodic	memory	distinction.	This	oriented	overview	will	
highlight	the	close	interactions	between	these	memories	that	may	have	been	overlooked.	
At	 that	 point,	 we	 will	 underscore	 one	 critical	 issue	 remaining	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
relationships	 between	 semantic	 and	 episodic	 memories.	 We	 will	 argue	 that	
neuropsychological	evidence	for	distinct	brain	systems	underlying	semantic	and	episodic	
learning	 is	 actually	 incomplete,	 thus	 weakening	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 separate	 memory	
systems	(i.e.	distinct	biological	entities).	
---	
A	 fourth	 Introduction	 section	 will	 address	 the	 long	 story	 of	 the	 relationships	 between	
semantic	and	episodic	memories,	highlighting	the	key	contributions	of	the	psychology	of	
expertise.	We	will	honour	the	inspiring	and	sometimes	underrated	works	of	psychologists	
from	 the	 late	 19th/early	 20th	 centuries.	 This	 short	 historical	 sketch	will	make	 the	point	
that	 early	 experimental	 studies	 considered	 knowing	 and	 remembering	 as	 naturally	
married	in	healthy	subjects,	i.e.	exerting	a	mutual	influence	on	each	other.	
---	
A	fifth	 Introduction	section	will	deal	with	the	 limitations	of	the	traditional	expert-novice	
paradigm	for	the	study	of	how	knowing	affects	remembering,	therefore	making	the	case	
for	the	need	of	equalizing	the	perceptual	processing	differences	across	subjects.	The	special	
case	 of	 faces	 will	 be	 addressed,	 by	 presenting	 the	 current	 understanding	 of	 how	 prior	
knowledge	 about	 faces	 changes	 further	 remembering.	 At	 that	 point,	 we	 will	 further	
develop	 the	 reasons	 why	 human	 faces	 were	 chosen	 as	 the	 main	 materials	 under	
investigation	in	this	work.	
---	
A	 last	 Introduction	section	will	 review	the	contemporary	neurocognitive	accounts	 for	 the	
role	of	prior	knowledge	 in	declarative	 learning,	 including	the	models	supporting	 the	key	
role	of	Novelty	 (thus	 to	some	extent,	 the	absence	of	prior	knowledge)	 in	 learning,	and	
the	respective	core	predictions.	
---	
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We	will	finally	highlight	some	unresolved	issues	related	to	the	interactions	between	what	
we	know,	and	what	we	remember.	More	specifically,	we	will	put	the	emphasis	on	
- the	lack	of	neuropsychological	evidence	making	clearly	the	case	for	two	separate	
learning	pathways,	one	supporting	semantic,	the	other	episodic,	learning;	
- the	lack	of	unified	theory	regarding	the	influence	of	prior	knowledge	on	episodic	
learning	as	assessed	through	recognition	memory;	
- the	divergences	regarding	as	to	whether	recognition	memory	is	changed	broadly	
when	prior	knowledge	 is	 available	at	encoding,	or	 if	 its	 impact	 targets	 specific	
retrieval	processes	
- the	 contradiction	 between	 some	 theoretical	 frameworks,	 predicting	either	 that	
novelty	 detection	 or	 integration	 to	 prior	 knowledge	 are	 core	 determinants	 of	
learning	
- 	the	lack	of	knowledge	regarding	whether	prior	knowledge	influences	on	episodic	
learning	change	with	age,	in	striking	contrast	with	the	acknowledged	fact	that	the	
elderly	have	built	a	large	amount	of	knowledge	and	keep	largely	intact	access	to	it	
- the	 absence	 of	 data	 regarding	whether	 prior	 knowledge	 influences	 on	 episodic	
learning	change	with	Alzheimer’s	disease	
---	
As	stated	above,	the	project	of	this	thesis	was	born	with	the	meeting	of	patient	KA,	with	
an	atypical	syndrome	of	developmental	amnesia.	Because	it	soon	became	obvious	that	1)	
this	patient	had	an	unexpected	superior	 level	of	general	knowledge;	and	2)	surprisingly	
he	could	 learn	new	context-free	memories	 for	meaningful,	but	not	meaningless	stimuli,	
the	present	thesis	explores	two	distinct	paths.	
First,	 we	 aimed	 at	 establishing	 whether	 KA	 could	 retrieve	 and	 acquire	 new	 explicit	
memories	 like	 controls,	 and	 to	 seek	 evidence	 for	 related	 abnormalities	 in	 his	 brain.	
Second,	we	wished	to	explore	whether	and	how	prior	knowledge	affects	new	declarative	
learning.	
We	further	present	an	overview	of	the	experimental	section	accordingly.	
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The	first	series	of	experiments	of	this	thesis	will	be	presented,	along	the	single	case	study	
of	 patient	 KA,	 which	 hopefully	 will	 directly	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 distinct	
functional	systems	can	underlie	semantic	vs.	episodic	learning.	
We	 will	 present	 a	 second	 experiment	 with	 patient	 KA	 showing	 that	 preserved	 explicit	
learning	 in	 amnesia	 may	 not	 generalize	 to	 meaningless	 memoranda.	 This	 finding	 has	
launched	the	central	issue	addressed	in	this	thesis,	namely,	to	what	extent	and	how	prior	
knowledge	can	provide	for	new	learning?	In	a	nutshell,	how	do	we	learn	what	we	know?	
A	third	series	of	2	experiments	will	 then	be	presented,	where	we	attempted	to	contrast	
the	 impact	 of	 novelty	 and	 of	 two	 kinds	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	 subsequent	 item	 and	
associative	memory,	within	a	lifespan	perspective.	
The	 fourth	experiment	will	address	 the	question	of	 the	neural	basis	 for	 the	 influence	of	
two	 kinds	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	 associative	 learning,	 both	 in	 healthy	 elderly	 and	 in	 a	
group	of	memory-impaired	patients	with	prodromal	Alzheimer’s	disease.	
The	 fifth	 experiment	 will	 come	 back	 to	 the	 study	 of	 patient	 KA,	 investigating	whether	
prior	knowledge	availability	can	benefit	new	learning	despite	amnesia.	
	
Finally,	 in	 the	 discussion	 section,	 some	 perspectives	 regarding	 the	 mechanisms	
underlying	 the	 impact	of	prior	 knowledge	on	new	 learning	will	 be	 suggested,	 amongst	
which	we	have	ran	2	new	experiments	that	will	be	presented	in	the	Appendix.	
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Chapter	I	
Declarative	memory,	Medial	Temporal	Lobes,	and	Recognition	Memory	
	
I.1.	Overview	
	
One	 could	 summarize	 briefly	 the	 story	 of	 the	 link	 between	 declarative	 memory,	
recognition	memory,	and	the	medial	temporal	 lobe	as	follows.	The	large	removal	of	the	
bilateral	MTL	 in	 the	patient	HM	has	dramatically	demonstrated	 that	 learning	depended	
on	 these	 structures.	 Further	 investigations	 in	 the	 patient	 revealed	 that	 some	 learning	
abilities	were	 eventually	 preserved,	 leading	 to	 the	 distinction	 between	Declarative	 and	
Procedural	 (Non-declarative)	memories.	 In	 the	quest	of	preserved	 learning	 functions	 in	
HM	 and	 other	 amnesic	 patients,	 controversies	 emerged	 as	 to	 whether	 recall	 and	
recognition	 tests	 similarly	 tapped	 on	 declarative	 memories.	 Reports	 of	 proportional	
impairments	 in	recall	and	recognition	 in	other	amnesic	patients	seemed	to	confirm	that	
recognition	memory	 tasks	did	 tap	on	declarative	memory	 (Haist,	 Shimamura,	&	 Squire,	
1992).	 Yet,	 disproportionate	 impairments	 in	 recall	 were	 also	 observed	 (e.g.	 Huppert	 &	
Piercy,	 1976;	 Hirst,	 Phelps,	 Johnson,	 &	 Volpe,	 1988;	 see	 for	 review	 Aggleton	 &	 Shaw	
1996).	Such	inconsistent	reports	occurred	in	the	context	of	new	research	in	mathematical	
psychology	supported	by	the	information-processing	theory,	which	soon	provided	a	solid	
framework	 for	 accurate	 modelling	 of	 recognition	 performance.	 Supported	 by	 animal	
research	 on	 the	 neural	 basis	 of	 recognition	memory	 (Meunier,	 Bachevalier,	Mishkin,	 &	
Murray,	 1993;	Mortimer	Mishkin,	 1978;	Murray	&	Mishkin,	 1998;	 Zola-Morgan,	 Squire,	&	
Amaral,	 1989b,	 1989a;	 Zola-Morgan,	 Squire,	 Amaral,	 &	 Suzuki,	 1989),	 the	 idea	 that	 the	
preservation	 or	 impairment	 of	 recognition	 memory	 could	 depend	 on	 whether	 extra-
hippocampal	 structures	within	 the	MTL	 are	 damaged	 has	 emerged.	 Aggleton	 &	 Shaw,	
(1996)	 ran	 a	 meta-analysis	 of	 recognition	 memory	 performance	 for	 faces	 and	 words	
(Recognition	Memory	Test,	Warrington,	 1984)	 reported	 in	N=112	amnesic	patients.	They	
connected	findings	of	 impaired	recognition	after	selective	damage	to	the	rhinal	cortices	
(perirhinal	and	entorhinal	cortices)	in	monkeys	(Meunier	et	al.,	1993)	with	their	findings	of	
preserved	 recognition	 memory	 in	 amnesic	 patients	 when	 damage	 was	 supposedly	
restricted	 to	 the	 hippocampus.	 A	 dissection	 of	 the	 processes	 underlying	 recognition	
memory	 therefore	 started,	 pointing	 towards	 distinct	 retrieval	 processes.	 Shortly,	 the	
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revolution	of	in	vivo	imaging	techniques	has	led	to	better	characterizing	the	extent	of	the	
MTL	 damage	 in	 amnesic	 patients.	 In	 the	 early	 2000’s,	 this	 yielded	 convergent	 findings	
across	experimental	psychology	(especially	with	the	processing	approach,	e.g.	(Atkinson	
&	 Juola,	 1974)	 and	 neuropsychology	 (amnesic	 cases	 of	 apparent	 dissociation	 between	
recall	and	recognition,	e.g.	(Aggleton	et	al.,	2005;	Barbeau	et	al.,	2005;	Bastin	et	al.,	2004;	
Holdstock	 et	 al.,	 2002;	 Holdstock,	 Mayes,	 Gong,	 Roberts,	 &	 Kapur,	 2005;	 Mayes,	
Holdstock,	 Isaac,	 Hunkin,	 &	 Roberts,	 2002;	 Turriziani,	 Fadda,	 Caltagirone,	 &	 Carlesimo,	
2004;	 Vargha-Khadem	 et	 al.,	 1997),	 highlighting	 the	 very	 likely	 duality	 of	 recognition	
memory.	 This	 resulted	 in	 strong	 neuroanatomical	 accounts	 for	 recognition	 memory	
performance	 within	 the	 MTL	 that	 we	 will	 tackle	 below,	 generally	 acknowledging	 that	
correct	 recognition	 can	 rely	 on	 two	 independent	 pathways	 within	 the	 MTL,	 each	
supporting	one	kind	of	recognition	memory	process,	namely	familiarity	and	recollection.	
In	 the	meantime,	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 nineties,	 it	 has	 become	 evident	 that	 declarative	
memory	 had	 to	 be	 fractionated	 (Vargha-Khadem	 et	 al.,	 1997),	 distinguishing	 episodic	
from	semantic	memory	systems.	A	very	clear	idea	of	the	importance	of	these	progresses	
for	the	cognitive	neurosciences	of	human	memory	can	be	made	from	Figure	3.	
	
Figure	3.	Episodic	memory	»	citations	have	literally	skyrocketed	from	the	mid-1990’s.	Y-axis	shows	
the	absolute	proportions	of	citations	per	year	(source:	https://esperr.github.io/pubmed-by-year/)	
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Figure	4	and	Figure	5	depict	an	overview	of	both	the	situation	of	 the	MTL	structures	and	
the	complexity	of	their	anatomy.	We	further	detail	shortly	this	historical	background	to	
finally	 expose	 the	main	 theoretical	 frameworks	 for	 recognition	memory,	 as	 well	 as	 its	
neural	 substrates	 since,	 as	 will	 be	 shown	 later,	 almost	 all	 the	 experiments	 run	 in	 the	
present	thesis	have	in	common	the	interest	for	the	computations	performed	by	the	MTL	
structures,	 and	 /	 or	 the	 behavioural	 consequences	 of	 damage	 to	 some	 of	 these	
structures.	
	
Figure	4.	Macroscopic	anatomy	(dissection)	of	the	temporal	lobe,	medial	view	of	a	human	right	
hemisphere.	Taken	from	Duvernoy,	(2005).	(1)	portion	of	the	hippocampus;	(2)	parahippocampal	
gyrus;	(3)	fusiform	gyrus;	(4)	inferior	temporal	gyrus;	(5)	calcarine	sulcus;	(6)	occipital	lobe	
(cuneus);	(7)	parietal	lobe	(precuneus);	(8)	cingulate	gyrus;	(9)	superior	frontal	gyrus;	(10)	corpus	
callosum;	(11)	fornix;	(12)	third	ventricle.				
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Figure	5.	Detailed	anatomy	of	the	MTL,	taken	from	Duvernoy	(2005)	(Figure	5A)	and	Mai,	Paxinos,	
&	Voss,	(2008)	(Figure	5B).	
	
I.2.	Definition	and	relevance	for	the	present	thesis	
	
Recognition	memory	can	be	simply	defined	as	our	ability	to	decide	whether	or	not	a	given	
object	or	event	has	been	experienced	before	(Atkinson	&	Juola,	1974).	More	specifically,	
we	are	interested	in	the	recognition	of	the	prior	occurrence	of	an	event	(Mandler,	1980).	
This	can	be	considered	as	an	elementary	manifestation	of	memory	in	our	everyday	lives:	
as	our	everyday	routines	unfold,	we	consistently	rely	upon	recognition	memory	processes	
to	 further	 guide	 our	 behaviour.	 Many	 situations	 actually	 involve	 this	 simple	 form	 of	
declarative	memory	(Squire	&	Schacter,	2002),	like	during	social	interactions.	As	you	meet	
one	 relative	 in	 the	 street,	 your	 ability	 to	 quickly	 identify	 not	 only	 that	 you	 know	 this	
person,	 but	 also	 to	 access	 details	 related	 to	 your	 last	 encounter,	 will	 be	 decisive	 in	
adopting	 an	 appropriate	 behavior.	 As	 a	 neuropsychologist	 working	 in	 a	Memory	 clinic	
setting	 for	 15	 years,	 I	 have	 countless	 anecdotes	 revealing	 how	 impaired	 recognition	
memory	can	be	debilitating.	A	typical	illustration	is	when	Mrs.	X,	spouse	of	Mr.	Y	suffering	
early	 Alzheimer’s	 disease,	 recall	 how	 confused	 she	 felt	when	 her	 husband	 asked	 some	
news	about	Mrs	Z,	their	neighbour’s	sister,	the	day	after	the	neighbour	sadly	said	that	his	
sister	had	died.	For	Mr.	Y,	encountering	his	neighbour	did	not	yield	accurate	recognition	
of	their	prior	encounter	when	he	announced	this	sad	news.	Even	more	common	are	the	
instances	when	patients’	 family	circle	states	 that	day	after	day,	 they	have	 to	say	“But	 I	
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told	 you	 that	 already”,	 illustrating	 what	 happens	 when	 one	 information	 given	 in	 a	
conversation	 is	not	associated	with	a	sense	of	prior	occurrence,	 thus	yielding	repetitive	
questioning.	
In	the	present	work,	we	thus	used	recognition	memory	tasks,	rather	than	recall	tasks	for	
three	main	reasons.	
First,	 judgment	 of	 prior	 occurrence	 intuitively	 seemed	 to	 be	 the	 most	 ubiquitous	
manifestation	of	declarative	memory	retrieval	in	everyday	lives.	Accordingly,	recognition	
memory	 abilities	 can	 be	 identified	 as	 early	 as	 in	 the	 first	 days	 of	 life,	 and	 are	 strongly	
predictive	of	cognitive	outcome	up	to	6	years	of	age	in	pre-terms	new-borns	(Pascalis	&	
de	Schonen,	1994;	Rose,	Feldman,	&	Jankowski,	2004;	Rose	&	Wallace,	1985).	Considering	
a	 typical	 working	 day,	 instances	 of	 recognition	 memory	 decisions	 seem	 much	 more	
regular	than	 instances	of	 free	recall.	This	 is	because	virtually	each	and	every	perceptual	
processing	 can	 result	 in	 positive	 or	 negative	 judgment	 for	 prior	 occurrence,	 while	
situations	 where	 we	 engage	 ourselves	 in	 the	 recall	 of	 prior	 events	 are	 generally	
independent	from	the	continuous	flow	of	information	processing.	
Second,	recognition	memory	tasks	allow	to	controlling	experimental	variables	involved	in	
memory	retrieval	much	more	than	recall	tasks,	where	the	mental	operations	carried	out	
by	the	subjects	remain	more	elusive.	Consider	the	following	extreme	example	of	learning	
a	list	of	words.	A	recall	task	can	lead	to	the	accurate	retrieval	of	one	word	resulting	from	
e.g.	 free	 association	 operations,	with	 no	 chance	 for	 the	 experimenter	 to	 separate	 this	
from	 an	 instance	 of	 recall	 resulting	 from	 correct	 retrieval	 of	 the	 study	 episode.	 By	
contrast,	a	simple	“Old”/”New”	recognition	memory	task	provides	multiple	metrics	(e.g.	
see	 below	 the	 signal	 detection	 theory	 account	 of	 recognition	 memory)	 that	 allow	 to	
accurately	model	performance,	as	controlling	for	chance	level.	
Third,	we	aimed	at	 investigating	how	knowledge	and	memory	 interacts,	 implying	to	dig	
into	 the	 underappreciated	 but	 strong	 interactions	 between	 encoding	 and	 retrieval	
processes.	Any	alteration	of	new	memory	formation	(learning)	resulting	from	knowledge	
(past	 experiences)	 necessarily	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 the	 role	 of	 retrieval	 processes	 at	
encoding.	The	Transfer	Appropriate	Processing	theory	(Morris,	Bransford,	&	Franks,	1977)	
illustrates	 this	 very	 well,	 by	 stating	 that	 successful	 learning	 critically	 depends	 on	 the	
degree	of	overlap	between	cognitive	operations	at	encoding	and	at	retrieval.	Because	we	
are	interested	in	determinants	of	new	declarative	–	i.e.,	explicit	–	memories,	recognition	
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tasks	 looked	 appropriate:	 these	 tasks	 require	 the	 subject	 to	 consciously	 retrieve	 past	
events,	and	if	at	encoding	they	attended	to	conceptual	more	than	perceptual	features	of	
the	 stimuli,	 they	 are	 likely	 to	 perform	 better.	 This	 is	 in	 sharp	 contrast	 with	 implicit	
retrieval	 tasks	 like	 perceptual	 identification	 priming	 where	 attending	 to	 conceptual	
features	 at	 encoding	 won’t	 matter,	 while	 attending	 to	 perceptual	 ones	 will	 make	 the	
difference	(e.g.	Dallas	&	Jacoby,	 1981;	Klavehn,	Gardiner,	&	Java,	 1994).	 In	other	words,	
encoding	 processes	 are	 not	 “good	 or	 bad”	 (Wimber,	 Heinze,	 &	 Richardson-Klavehn,	
2010):	what	 really	matters	 is	whether	 the	 aspects	 of	 the	 tasks	 subjects	 attended	 to	 at	
study	will	be	relevant	or	not	at	retrieval.	In	our	case,	as	stated	above,	we	were	concerned	
with	how	past	experiences	 shape	new	 learning	 in	a	day-to-day	 routine,	 that	 is,	when	 1/	
much	knowledge	is	available	at	“encoding”	and	2/	later	retrieval	processes	must	flexibly	
guide	 behaviour.	 To	 our	 knowledge,	 the	 judgment	 of	 prior	 occurrence	 is	 the	 most	
efficient	 instance	of	memory	 retrieval	making	available	 to	awareness	 the	by-product	of	
learning	processes.	
As	 long	 as	 the	 quest	 of	 psychology	 is	 ideally	 to	 find	 universal	 laws	 and	 functional	
explanations	 for	 naturalistic	 aspects	 of	 behaviour	 (Bronfenbrenner,	 1979),	 recognition	
memory	tasks	seemed	to	us	as	an	ideal	compromise.	
	
I.3.	Patient	HM:	an	earthquake	in	memory	research	
	
The	 seminal	 case	 of	 the	 patient	 HM,	 who	 has	 undergone	 an	 experimental	 surgical	
procedure	 in	 1953	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 treat	 a	 severe	 epilepsy	 resisting	 to	 high	 doses	 of	
anticonvulsant	medication,	revealed	the	critical	role	of	the	medial	temporal	 lobe	 in	new	
learning	(Scoville	&	Milner,	 1957).	The	surgical	procedure	resulted	 in	the	removal	of	the	
bilateral	medial	structures	of	the	temporal	lobe.	The	tragic	outcome	of	this	surgery	was	a	
very	 severe	 anterograde	 amnesia,	which	 patient	 HM	himself	 described	 as	 “like	waking	
from	a	dream….	everyday	is	alone	in	itself…”	(Milner	et	al.,	1968,	p.	217;	cited	in	Squire,	
2009).	Most	 important,	 perhaps,	was	 the	observation	 that	 patient	HM	did	 not	 present	
with	any	other	sensory,	motor	or	cognitive	impairment.	The	idea	that	a	selective	damage	
to	 the	 medial	 temporal	 lobe	 (MTL)	 could	 result	 in	 a	 selective	 disruption	 of	 learning	
abilities	was	already	 in	the	mind	of	Brenda	Milner	and	William	Penfield	at	the	time.	One	
year	 before	HM’s	 surgery,	 Dr	Milner	was	 a	 PhD	 student	 at	McGill	 University	when	 she	
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encountered	two	patients	(PB	and	FC)	who	became	amnesic	following	unilateral	removal	
of	 the	 left	 MTL,	 also	 in	 the	 context	 of	 treatment	 of	 epileptic	 seizures.	 It	 is	 after	 the	
presentation	 of	 patients	 PB	 and	 FC	 at	 the	 1955	meeting	 of	 the	 American	 Neurological	
Association	 that	 W.	 Scoville	 called	 W.	 Penfield	 to	 further	 talk	 about	 the	 similarities	
between	patient	HM	and	his	patients	 (Squire,	 2009).	This	was	 the	starting	point	of	 the	
fruitful	collaboration	between	Scoville	and	Milner,	resulting	in	the	1957	paper,	one	of	the	
most	 cited	neuroscience	papers	ever.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 such	observations	were	a	 real	
earthquake	in	the	field	of	memory	research.	
It	has	put	an	end	to	the	previous	view	that	any	part	of	the	brain	could	actually	perform	
the	 computations	 required	 for	 high	 level	 functions,	 as	 first	 suggested	 by	 Jean-Pierre	
Flourens	 following	 extensive	 lesion	 studies	 in	 birds.	 Strikingly,	 in	 1950,	 Karl	 Spencer	
Lashley	 had	 generalized	 this	 view,	 also	 after	 an	 extensive	 research	 program	 purposely	
designed	 to	 “locate	 the	 [memory]	 engram”.	 Lashley	 concluded	 that,	 due	 to	 effective	
neural	plasticity,	virtually	all	the	regions	of	the	cerebral	cortex	could	mediate	learning,	a	
principle	he	termed	“equipotentiality”.	A	finding	of	a	selective	disruption	of	new	learning	
following	 the	 removal	 of	 a	 very	 circumscribed	 region	 in	 a	 human	 brain	 was	 thus	
unexpected.	
	
I.4.	Declarative	and	Non	declarative	memories	
	
In	the	following	years,	 it	became	obvious	that	patient	HM	had	some	preserved	learning	
abilities.	 For	 example,	 the	 patient	 could	 learn	 and	 remember	 tracking	or	mirror-tracing	
tasks	 as	 well	 as	 controls,	 despite	 lacking	 any	 recollection	 of	 the	 repeated	 learning	
episodes	 (Brooks	&	 Baddeley,	 1976;	 Cohen	 and	 Squire,	 1978	 -	 cited	 in	 Cohen	&	 Squire,	
1980).	 But	 the	 demonstration	 that	 not	 only	 basic	 perceptual-motor	 skills	 learning,	 but	
also	more	 sophisticated	skills	 like	mirror-reading,	 that	 clearly	 involved	highly	 integrated	
perceptual	 abilities	 with	 little	 motor	 involvement	 could	 be	 learned	 despite	 severe	
amnesic	patients	 (Cohen	&	Squire,	 1980),	 led	 to	 the	proposal	 that	 “knowing	 that”	 and	
“knowing	 how”	 could	 rely	 on	 distinct	 memory	 systems.	 This	 opened	 the	 era	 of	 the	
multiple	 memory	 systems	 view	 in	 neurosciences,	 considering	 declarative	 (conscious	
memory	 for	 facts	 and	 events)	 and	 non	 declarative	 or	 procedural	 (habits	 and	 skills	
memory,	 inaccessible	 to	 conscious	 processing)	 memories,	 extensively	 developed	 from	
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neuropsychological	 evidence	 along	 Neil	 J.	 Cohen	 PhD	 dissertation	 (Neuropsychological	
evidence	 for	 a	 distinction	 between	 procedural	 and	 declarative	 knowledge	 in	 human	
memory	and	amnesia.	PhD	thesis.	Univ.	Calif.,	San	Diego,	1981).	Declarative	memory	was	
therefore	 considered	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 so-called	 “medial	 temporal	 lobe	memory	 system”	
(Squire	&	Zola-Morgan,	1991),	including	the	hippocampal	region	(cornu	Ammonis	with	its	
subfields,	 the	 dentate	 gyrus,	 and	 the	 subicular	 complex)	 and	 adjacent	 entorhinal,	
perirhinal	and	parahippocampal	cortices	making	up	much	of	the	parahippocampal	gyrus	
(Squire,	Stark,	&	Clark,	2004).	
	
	
Figure	6.	The	Medial	Temporal	Lobe	structures.	Adapted	from	Bird	&	Burgess,	2008	
	
It	 should	 be	 stressed	 from	 here	 that	 subsequent	 lesion	 studies	 both	 in	 humans	 and	
animals	 further	 revisited	 this	 view	 mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 Medial	 Temporal	 Lobe	
structures,	 and	 thus	 revisited	 the	 neuroanatomy	 of	 amnesia.	 A	 major	 breakthrough	 is	
summarized	 in	 	 Aggleton	 &	 Brown,	 (1999)	 who	 integrated	 the	 available	 evidence	 and	
highlighted	that	not	only	the	MTL,	but	rather	the	“Extended	Hippocampal	System”,	was	
critical	for	new	declarative	learning.	Indeed,	damage	to	any	part	of	this	system	(including	
the	hippocampus,	 fornix,	mammillary	bodies,	mammillothalamic	 tract,	anterior	 thalamic	
nuclei,	 and	 retrosplenial	 cortex;	 Aggleton	 et	 al.,	 (2010)	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 result	 in	
amnesia	(Aggleton	&	Saunders,	 1997;	Vann	&	Nelson,	2015).	Moreover,	other	structures	
outside	the	MTL	are	also	involvled,	although	less	critically,	in	declarative	learning,	like	the	
prefrontal	cortex	and	some	nuclei	of	the	basal	forebrain	(see	Figure	6).	
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Figure	7.	Illustration	of	the	Extended	Hippocampal	System:	main	structures	and	connections.	
(Thalamus	image	adapted	from	Krauth	et	al.,	(2010)	
	
I.5.	Anatomy	of	the	Medial	Temporal	Lobes	
	
Neuropsychological	 evidence	 from	amnesic	patients	has	 led	 to	 the	 identification	of	 the	
Medial	 Temporal	 Lobe	 (MTL)	 structures	 as	 a	 functional	 system	 in	 the	brain	devoted	 to	
declarative	memory.	We	 further	 briefly	 summarize	 its	 anatomy	 after	Duvernoy,	 (2005);	
Mai,	 Paxinos	 and	 Voss,	 (2008);	 Squire,	 (2004);	 Suzuki	 &	 Naya,	 (2014);	 Witter,	 Doan,	
Jacobsen,	Nilssen,	&	Ohara,	(2017).	
-	 The	 first	 structure	 of	 the	MTL	 is	 the	hippocampus.	 The	 hippocampus	 bulges	 into	 the	
temporal	horn	of	the	lateral	ventricle,	and	is	arched	around	the	mesencephalon.	The	arch	
can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	 segments,	 the	 head	 (rostral	 segment)	 and	 the	 tail	 (caudal	
segment)	that	are	transversally	oriented,	and	the	body	(middle	segment)	that	is	sagitally	
oriented.	 The	 hippocampus	 consists	 of	 a	 bilaminar	 structure:	 the	 cornu	 Ammonis,	 also	
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called	hippocampus	proper,	and	the	dentate	gyrus,	one	lamina	being	rolled	up	inside	the	
other.	The	cornu	Ammonis	has	a	heterogenous	structure	resulting	from	distinct	aspects	
of	 its	 pyramidal	 neurons,	which	 has	 led	 to	 the	most	 acknowledged	 description	 of	 four	
subfields:	CA	1-4,	with	the	CA	1	subfield	being	by	large	the	most	extended	subfield.	
The	dentate	gyrus	has	a	simpler	structure	by	comparison	with	the	cornu	Ammonis,	with	
its	three	plainly	visible	layers	(stratum	granulosum,	stratum	moleculare	and	polymorphic	
layer)	enclosing	the	CA	4	subfield.	
Anatomically,	 the	 CA	 1	 subfield	 continues	 from	 the	 subiculum,	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	
“bed”	 of	 the	 hippocampus.	 While	 the	 subiculum	 is	 anatomically	 a	 part	 of	 the	
parahippocampal	gyrus,	it	is	often	studied	as	a	component	of	the	hippocampal	formation.	
	
Figure	8.	(A).	Illustration	of	how	the	developmental	trajectories	of	the	dentate	gyrus	(dotted	area)	
and	the	cornu	Ammonis	(hatched	area)	result	in	their	mutual	coiling.	(B).	Schematic	drawing	of	a	
coronal	view	of	a	right	medial	temporal	lobe.	(1)	cornu	Ammonis;	(2);	dentate	gyrus;	(3)	
hippocampal	sulcus;	(4)	fimbria;	(5)	prosubiculum;	(6)	subiculum	proper;	(7)	presubiculum;	(8)	
parasubiculum;	(9)	entorhinal	area;	(10)	parahippocampal	gyrus;	(11)	collateral	sulcus;	(12)	
collateral	eminence;	(13)	temporal	horn	of	the	lateral	ventricle;	(14)	tail	of	the	caudate	nucleus;	(15)	
stria	terminalis;	(16)	choroid	fissure	and	choroid	plexuses;	(17)	lateral	geniculate	body;	(18)	lateral	
part	of	the	transverse	fissure;	(19)	ambient	cistern;	(20)	mesenchephalon;	(21)	pons;	(22)	
cerebellum	tent	;	Taken	from	Duvernoy,	2005.	
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Apart	 from	the	hippocampus,	 the	MTL	system	 is	composed	of	other	structured	 located	
below	 (i.e.	 ventrally)	 the	 hippocampal	 formation,	 further	 referred	 to	 as	 the	
“subhippocampal	anterior	structures”.	
-	 One	 of	 the	most	 poorly	 demarcated	 structures	within	 the	MTL	 is	 the	 entorhinal	 area	
(Brodmann’s	 areas	 28	 and	 34),	 especially	 regarding	 its	 posterior	 extension	 along	 the	
parahippocampal	gyrus.	The	entorhinal	area	typically	continues	ventrally	 from	the	most	
medial	 section	of	 the	 subiculum	 (the	parasubiculum),	medially	 to	 the	parahippocampal	
gyrus.	The	entorhinal	cortex	is	subdivided	between	a	lateral	and	a	medial	part	(lERC	and	
mERC),	along	a	functional	view	(Witter	et	al.,	2017),	and	it	forms	the	main	cortical	 input	
towards	the	hippocampus.	
-	The	perirhinal	cortex	 (Brodmann’s	areas	35	and	36)	 lies	on	both	sides	of	the	collateral	
sulcus,	 its	 caudal	 boundary	 is	 the	 parahippocampal	 cortex,	while	 the	 entorhinal	 cortex	
ventrally	and	medially	borders	it.	
-	Finally,	the	parahippocampal	cortex	(which,	along	with	the	perirhinal	and	the	entorhinal	
cortices,	 composes	 the	 parahippocampal	 gyrus)	 is	 caudally	 adjacent	 to	 the	 perirhinal	
cortex.	As	a	useful	reminder,	the	anterior	part	of	the	parahippocampal	gyrus	includes	the	
perirhinal	and	the	entorhinal	cortices,	while	the	parahippocampal	cortex	alone	forms	the	
parahippocampal	gyrus	in	its	more	caudal	part.	
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Figure	9.	Overview	of	the	Medial	Temporal	Lobe.	Taken	from	Raslau	et	al.,	2015,	Am	J	Neuroradiol;	
retrieved	from	
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268791398_Memory_Part_2_The_Role_of_the_Medial_
Temporal_Lobe	on	February,	6th,	2019.	
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Figure	10.	Coronal	section	of	the	medial	temporal	lobe.	Adapted	from	Raslau	et	al.,	2015,	Am	J	
Neuroradiol;	retrieved	from	
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268791398_Memory_Part_2_The_Role_of_the_Medial_Temporal
_Lobe	
	
The	 main	 feature	 of	 the	 MTL	 anatomy	 that	 should	 be	 highlighted	 for	 the	 present	
purposes	 is	 that	 it	 is	hierarchically	organized,	 and	 that	 such	an	organization	accordingly	
supports	 hierarchical	 information	 processing	 along	 its	 structures	 (e.g.	 see	 Mishkin,	
Suzuki,	 Gadian,	 &	 Vargha-Khadem,	 1997;	 but	 for	 some	 evidence	 and	 discussion	 against	
this	view,	see	Barbeau	et	al.,	2011;	Lacot	et	al.,	2017).	Animal	studies	have	been	critical	in	
establishing	 the	 connectivity	 of	 the	MTL	 structures.	 First,	 the	 parahippocampal	 cortex	
(further	 named	 PHC)	 and	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 (further	 named	 PRC)	 received	most	 of	
their	afferences	from	the	dorsal	and	the	ventral	pathways,	respectively.	 In	the	monkey,	
the	majority	of	the	neocortical	input	to	the	entorhinal	area	comes	from	the	PRC	and	PHC;	
the	 entorhinal	 cortex	 in	 turn	 is,	 by	 large,	 the	 main	 source	 of	 cortical	 input	 for	 the	
hippocampus	(CA	3	subfield	and	dentate	gyrus),	making	of	this	area	the	principal	gateway	
been	 the	 entire	 neocortex	 and	 the	 hippocampus,	 which	 is	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 MTL	
hierarchy.	The	entorhinal	cortex	and	the	hippocampus	are	mutually	interconnected	with	
bidirectional	pathways.	The	hippocampus	projects	onto	the	ERC,	which	in	turns	projects	
towards	 the	 PRC	 and	 PHC	 so	 that	 the	 information	 flows	 back	 to	 the	 neocortex.	
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Moreover,	structures	within	this	hierarchy	are	also	interconnected	(e.g.	PHC	&	PRC),	and	
the	hippocampus	also	receives	afferences,	albeit	reduced,	directly	from	the	PHC	and	PRC.	
Finally,	within	the	so	called	“extended	hippocampal	system”,	information	is	processed	in	
a	hierarchical	way,	 starting	 from	stimuli	 low-level	 features	processing	 in	 the	dorsal	 and	
ventral	 streams	 up	 to	 item-context	 bindings	 represented	 in	 the	 hippocampus,	 that	
transmits	 this	 information	 through	 the	 fornix	 to	 the	 mammillary	 bodies,	 then	 to	 the	
anterior	thalamus	through	the	mammillothalamic	tract.	From	the	thalamus,	much	of	the	
information	 is	 relayed	 through	 the	 cingulum	 bundle	 towards	 medial	 prefrontal	 and	
parietal	lobes	areas	(anterior	and	posterior	cingulate	gyri,	retrosplenial	cortex)	as	well	as	
back	to	the	hippocampus.	
	
Figure	11.	Hierarchical	organization	of	Medial	Temporal	Lobe	structures	and	their	connections.	
Taken	from	(A.	Mayes,	Montaldi,	&	Migo,	(2007).	Left	images	show	(i)	an	anterior	and	(ii)	a	
posterior	coronal	section	of	the	brain,	below	which	the	MTL	structures	are	outlined.	Yellow	line	
corresponds	to	the	amygdala,	blue	to	the	hippocampus,	green	to	the	entorhinal	cortex,	red	to	the	
perirhinal	cortex	and	purple	to	the	parahippocampal	cortex.	On	the	right,	the	same	colour	code	is	
used	to	illustrate	these	MTL	structures	together	with	their	connections.	
	
I.6.	Inconsistencies	in	recall	vs.	recognition	dissociations	in	amnesia	
	
To	 some	 extent,	 one	 can	 consider	 that	 inconsistent	 findings	 in	 recall	 vs.	 recognition	
performance	 in	 amnesic	 patients	 have	 favoured	 the	 shift	 from	 the	 structural	 (memory	
systems)	 to	 the	 process	 approach	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 learning	 and	 memory.	
Neuropsychological	 single	 and	 multiple	 case	 studies	 have	 ended	 in	 three	 divergent	
patterns	of	results	with	that	respect.	
		 51	
First,	 amnesic	 patients	 were	 found	 to	 present	 a	 disproportionate	 impairment	 in	 recall	
tests,	in	accordance	with	the	old	tradition	that	the	main	clinical	feature	of	these	patients	
is	that	they	lack	the	recollective	processes	supporting	recall	from	memory.	For	example,	
patients	with	Korsakoff	syndrome	were	able	to	recognize	words	and	pictures	as	well	as	
alcoholic	controls,	even	after	a	delay	of	several	weeks,	and	with	a	normal	forgetting	rate	
(Huppert	&	Piercy,	1976).	However,	when	asked	to	discriminate	between	distinct	targets	
presented	 ten	 minutes	 or	 24hrs	 ago,	 the	 patients	 were	 severely	 impaired	 (see	 also	
Huppert	&	Piercy,	1978).	Similarly,	after	controlling	for	the	exposure	time	at	study,	patient	
HM	was	 found	 to	 have	preserved	 visual	 recognition	memory	 and	normal	 forgetting	by	
comparison	with	controls:	HM	accurately	recognized	78.8%	of	120	pictures	after	studying	
the	stimuli	 for	20	seconds	each,	vs.	78.2%	 in	controls	who	were	allowed	spending	only	1	
second	per	target	picture	(Freed	et	al.,	1987;	1988).	Using	a	supplementary	exposure	time	
for	amnesic,	or	an	extended	interval	before	testing	in	Controls	yielded	similar	conclusions	
of	 a	 disproportionate	 impairment	 in	 recall	 (Hirst,	 Phelps,	 Johnson,	 &	 Volpe,	 1988).	
Altogether,	 these	 early	 findings	 suggest	 that	 recall	 and	 recognition	 tasks	 could	 rely	 on	
distinct	 cognitive	 substrates:	 a	mere	 sense	 of	 familiarity	 or	 “trace	 strength”	would	 be	
favoured	 by	 the	 patients	 in	 recognition	 judgments,	 because	 they	 lack	 the	 recollective	
processes	which	are	more	involved	in	recall	tasks.	
Second,	a	meta-analysis	of	case	reports	and	small	group	studies	led	by	Aggleton	&	Shaw	
(1996)	(see	also	Aggleton	&	Brown,	1999)	suggested	that	damage	to	any	component	of	
the	 “extended	 hippocampal	 system”	 (restricted	 to	 the	 hippocampus,	 the	 fornix,	 the	
mammillary	bodies,	the	mammillothalamic	tract	or	the	anterior	thalamus)	always	resulted	
in	impaired	recall	but	preserved	recognition.	Nonetheless,	floor	effects	in	recall	scores	of	
patients	with	large	MTL	lesions	made	any	definitive	conclusion	hazardous.	Another	effort	
to	 characterize	 the	 recall	 /	 recognition	 dissociation	 involved	 56	 hypoxic	 patients	 who	
were	 reported	 as	 being	 less	 impaired	 in	 simple	 “Old/New”	 recognition	 memory	 tasks	
than	 in	 recall	 tasks	 (Yonelinas,	 2002).	 This	 finding	was	 challenged	 however	 because	 of	
one	highly	aberrant	outlier	who	on	its	own	was	shown	to	drive	the	claimed	dissociation	
(Wixted	&	Squire,	2004).	Subsequent	case	studies	yet	confirmed	that	selective	damage	to	
the	 hippocampus,	 sparing	 the	 sub	 hippocampal	 structures,	 indeed	 led	 to	 severe	
disruption	of	recall	but	normal	recognition.	For	example,	patient	YR	who	became	amnesic	
following	an	ischemic	infarct	underwent	43	recognition	memory	tests,	among	which	only	
10%	yielded	 impaired	performance,	while	she	failed	95%	of	the	recall	 tests	(Mayes	et	al.,	
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2002).	Patient	MR	suffered	from	barbiturate	and	carbon	monoxide	poisoning	resulting	in	
damage	to	the	bilateral	pallidum,	parietal	lobe	and	hippocampus	(Bastin	et	al.,	2004),	and	
was	 found	 impaired	 in	 100%	of	 the	 recall	 tests	while	his	performance	was	normal	 for	 5	
distinct	recognition	testing	procedures.	Another	single	case	study	brought	similar	results	
(patient	KN,	meningoencephalitis,	Aggleton	et	al.,	 2005).	More	 robust	evidence	 for	 the	
dissociation	came	from	patient	Jon	with	developmental	amnesia	(Vargha-Khadem	et	al.,	
1997;	Baddeley,	Vargha-Khadem,	&	Mishkin,	2001),	a	condition	involving	neonatal	damage	
to	 the	hippocampus,	generally	due	 to	early	hypoxia.	Strikingly,	modality-specific	effects	
have	been	 reported,	 like	 in	 the	 right-handed	patient	 FRG	who	 suffered	herpes	 simplex	
encephalitis,	 leaving	 her	with	 extended	 damage	 to	 the	 bilateral	MTL,	 sparing	 the	 right	
parahippocampal	 gyrus	 (Barbeau	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 This	 patient	 was	 severely	 impaired	 in	 8	
distinct	recall	tasks,	whatever	visual	or	verbal	memoranda	were	used.	She	also	failed	in	6	
different	verbal	recognition	memory	tasks,	but	she	succeeded	at	14/18	visual	recognition	
memory	tests.	A	group	study	of	patients	with	selective	damage	to	the	fornix	(Tsivilis	et	
al.,	 2008)	 found	 a	 large	 deficit	 in	 recall	 contrasting	 with	 relative	 preservation	 of	
recognition.	Finally,	in	a	small	series	of	12	patients	with	left	thalamic	infarction,	(Danet	et	
al.,	 2015)	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 the	mammillothalamic	 tract	 in	 verbal	 recall	 tasks.	 This	
highly	consistent	pattern	of	results	suggests	that	the	extended	hippocampal	system	may	
be	critical	for	recall,	but	not	recognition,	memory	tasks.	
Third,	another	series	of	amnesic	patients	were	found	to	present	equally	severe	disruption	
of	 recall	 and	 recognition	 memory	 (e.g.	 Haist	 et	 al.,	 1992;	 Manns,	 Hopkins,	 Reed,	
Kitchener,	 &	 Squire,	 2003;	Manns	&	 Squire,	 1999;	 Reed,	 Stefanacci,	 Hamann,	&	 Squire,	
1997).	These	four	studies	 involved	20	unique	patients	overall,	of	which	5	participated	 in	
each	study	(Cases	RC,	PN,	JW,	AB,	LJ).	Importantly,	the	three	first	patients	were	amnesics	
following	a	Korsakoff	syndrome,	with	no	evidence	of	damage.	AB	had	suffered	anoxia	in	
1976	and	was	unable	to	undergo	an	MRI	scanner,	but	a	CT	Scan	in	2001	suggested	limited	
damage	to	the	hippocampal	region	(Schmolck,	Kensinger,	Corkin,	&	Squire,	2002).	Finally,	
aetiology	for	the	amnestic	condition	lacked	in	LJ.	Considering	the	15	remaining	patients,	5	
actually	had	either	suspected	or	proven	diencephalic	damage	without	MTL	 involvement	
(NC,	VF,	DM,	MG,	NA);	2	lacked	any	clear	aetiology	or	even	cause	(JL,	PH);	4	had	suffered	
hypoxia	(LM,	JRW)	or	respiratory	failure	following	overdose	(GW,	RS);	one	had	suffered	
CO	 poisoning	 (JS);	 one	 severe	 cerebrovascular	 disease	 (MJ);	 one	 suffered	 amnesia	
following	 surgery	 complications	 with	 hypotension	 (GD);	 and	 finally	 the	 most	 severely	
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amnesic	 patient	 (EP)	 had	 suffered	 herpes	 simplex	 encephalitis.	 If	 one	 only	 keeps	 the	
cases	 for	which	 detailed	MRI	 findings	 and	 clear	 aetiology	was	 available,	 these	 findings	
thus	 suggest	 that	 damage	 to	 either	 the	 hippocampus	or	 diencephalic	 structures	 led	 to	
proportionate	recall	and	recognition	impairments.	
	
Beyond	the	differences	in	aetiology,	and	the	lack	of	detailed	knowledge	of	the	extent	of	
the	 lesions	 within	 the	 MTL	 of	 the	 extended	 hippocampal	 system,	 it	 has	 been	
demonstrated	that	recall	and	recognition	performance	could	greatly	vary	even	after	well	
documented	selective	hippocampal	damage	(Holdstock	et	al.,	2008).	We	certainly	miss	a	
critical	part	of	the	problem	behind	these	inconsistencies.	
	
At	the	time	of	the	earliest	investigation	of	recall	/	recognition	dissociations	in	brain	injured	
patients,	decades	of	research	in	psychology	had	ended	in	theoretical	frameworks	stating	
that	recognition	memory	was	not	unitary	(first	proposed	by	William	James,	1890,	but	see	
Atkinson	&	Juola,	1974,	Mandler,	1980).		
	
I.7.	Beyond	signal	detection	theory:	one	single	recognition	process	is	not	enough	
	
Early	works	on	recognition	memory	performance	in	humans	have	considered	the	interest	
of	confidence	ratings,	namely	the	levels	of	confidence	subjects	had	on	their	recognition	
judgments	(Egan,	1958).	To	account	for	the	observed	uncertainties	expressed	by	subjects	
in	their	 judgment,	 it	was	proposed	that	the	 judgment	of	prior	occurrence	was	made	on	
the	 basis	 of	 a	 “familiarity	 signal”,	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 Signal	 Detection	 Theory	 that	
was	just	developed	in	psychology	(Tanner	&	Swets,	1954).	Signal	Detection	Theory	(SDT)	
basically	aims	at	accounting	for	the	patterns	of	performance	achieved	by	any	system	that	
is	 supposed	 to	 discriminate	 a	 signal	 (e.g.	 a	 given	 stimulus)	 from	 noise	 (i.e.	 irrelevant	
inputs).		
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Figure	12.	Signal	Detection	Theory	as	applied	to	Recognition	Memory	performance.	The	red	
Gaussian	curve	depicts	the	signal	(familiarity	index)	distribution	for	noise,	the	black	is	for	signal.	
Under	the	assumption	of	equal	variance,	an	index	of	discriminability	is	computed	as	the	difference	
between	Signal	and	Noise	central	tendencies	(i.e.	Z-scores);	while	Response	Bias	is	computed	as	
half	the	distance	between	the	distributions	(here,	Bias	is	equal	to	zero).	Adapted	from	
http://gru.stanford.edu/doku.php/tutorials/sdt	
	
Applying	the	principles	of	 the	SDT	to	 recognition	memory	 resulted	 in	 the	proposal	 that	
performance	 could	 be	 fully	 described	 by	 a	 function	 of	 the	 familiarity	 index.	 Subjects	
implicitly	set	a	response	criterion	(Response	Bias)	along	the	familiarity	index	continuum,	
and	 will	 detect	 the	 signal	 whenever	 the	 familiarity	 strength	 reaches	 or	 exceeds	 the	
criterion.	Whenever	the	familiarity	strength	is	below	such	threshold,	subjects	will	detect	
noise,	 i.e.	 novelty	 in	 the	 case	 of	 recognition	memory	 (namely,	 a	 distractor	 item).	 This	
proposal	 further	mapped	 the	 confidence	 ratings	 onto	 the	 familiarity	 index:	 confidence	
increases	as	the	familiarity	 index	moves	from	the	criterion.	Moreover,	one	can	compute	
two	indices	of	performance,	the	discriminability	index	and	the	response	bias	(see	Figure	
12)	that	fully	describe	the	pattern	of	responses.	The	main	advantage	of	this	analysis	is	that	
discriminability	 and	bias	 are	 independent	measures,	 thus	providing	 a	 complete	 account	
for	 participants’	 performance.	 Discriminability	 accounts	 for	 the	 overall	 ability	 to	
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discriminate	signal	from	noise	(i.e.	targets	from	distractors),	while	Bias	accounts	for	the	
relative	trend	to	provide	“Old”	or	“New”	judgments	(see	Figure	12).	
Subsequent	work	 however	 revealed	 that	 in	 some	 instances,	 the	 familiarity	 index	 alone	
could	not	suffice	to	provide	a	recognition	judgment	(Kintsch,	1967;	Atkinson,	Hermann	&	
Wescourt,	 1974).	 In	 these	 cases,	 the	 authors	 proposed	 that	 a	 later	 explicit	 retrieval	
process	(i.e.	“after”	recognition	failure	based	on	the	familiarity	signal	strength)	must	be	
involved,	allowing	providing	a	memory	judgment.	These	proposals	have	launched	a	list	of	
attempts	 to	 better	 model	 recognition	 memory	 performance,	 resulting	 in	 at	 least	 one	
consensus:	 recognition	 memory	 relies	 on	 two	 distinct	 retrieval	 processes,	 namely	
familiarity	and	recollection	(Mandler,	1980;	Yonelinas,	2002).	
I	enter	a	friend’s	room	and	see	on	the	wall	a	painting.	At	first	I	have	the	strange,	
wondering	 consciousness,	 ‘surely	 I	 have	 seen	 that	 before,’	 but	 when	 or	 how	
does	not	become	clear.	There	only	 clings	 to	 the	picture	a	 sort	of	penumbra	of	
familiarity,	-	when	suddenly	I	exclaim:	‘‘I	have	it,	it	is	a	copy	of	part	of	one	of	the	
Fra	Angelicos	in	the	Florentine	Academy	-	I	recollect	it	there!’’	
From	The	Principles	of	Psychology	(p.	658)	by	William	James,	cited	in	Yonelinas,	
Aly,	Wang,	&	Koen,	(2010)	
→Recollection	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 memory	 retrieval	 process	 whereby	 subjects	 retrieve	
“qualitative	 information	about	a	 specific	 study	episode,	 such	as	when	and	where	an	event	
took	 place”,	 typically	 inducing	 a	 moderate-to-strong	 confidence	 in	 memory	 judgment	
(Yonelinas	et	al.,	2010).	
→Familiarity	rather	refers	to	as	a	mere	feeling	of	prior	occurrence,	without	any	information	
retrieval	about	the	study	episode,	typically	leading	to	a	large	range	of	confidence	in	memory	
judgment	(Endel	Tulving,	1985;	Yonelinas	et	al.,	2010).	
One	critical	distinction	between	these	recognition	memory	processes	 is	 therefore	that	only	
recollection	 involves	 recall	 of	 perceptually	 absent	 information.	 However,	 put	 this	 way,	
confidence	 is	 not	 a	 strictly	 defining	 feature	 of	 recollection	 vs.	 familiarity.	 That	 is,	 high-
confidence	 judgments	may	reflect	 recollection	but	also	 familiarity,	as	 long	as	no	qualitative	
information	from	the	study	episode	can	be	recalled.	The	most	influential	authors	in	the	field	(	
(Tulving,	1985;	Mayes	&	Roberts,	2001;	Parks,	2007;	Parks	&	Yonelinas,	2007;	Squire,	Wixted,	
&	 Clark,	 2007;	Wixted	 &	 Squire,	 2010;	 Yonelinas	 &	 Parks,	 2007)	 accept	 that	 the	 subjective	
experience	 of	 re-living	 the	 study	 episode	 can	 be	 an	 instance	 of	 qualitative	 information	
retrieval	 that	 is	uniquely	 related	to	recollection.	Such	“re-living”	 is	 typically	associated	with	
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the	 highest	 confidence	 ratings.	 This	 is	 a	 strong	 assumption	 of	 e.g.	 the	Dual-Process	 Signal	
Detection	 theory	 of	 recognition	 memory	 (Yonelinas	 &	 Jacoby,	 1994)	 on	 which	 Receiver	
Operating	Characteristic	estimations	of	the	two	processes	is	grounded.	Accordingly,	we	will	
consider	as	an	acceptable	approximation	that	correct	recognition	judgments	associated	with	
the	highest	confidence	judgments	are	instances	of	recollection.	
However,	 what	 remains	 under	 debate	 is	 whether	 these	 processes	 operate	 in	 a	 fully	
independent	 manner,	 in	 parallel,	 serially,	 or	 if	 they	 can	 better	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 a	
unique	(strength)	signal	 (Diana,	Yonelinas,	&	Ranganath,	2010;	Squire	et	al.,	2007).	Very	
recent	neural	evidence	from	electrophysiology,	for	example,	 illustrates	how	challenging	
are	 these	 issues	 for	 the	 field	 (Weidemann	&	Kahana,	2019).	While	 these	debates	are	of	
great	matter,	 they	 are	beyond	 the	 scope	of	 the	present	work.	Here,	we	will	 retain	 the	
wide	 consensus	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 two	 distinct	 processes	 underlying	 recognition	
memory.	 This	 consensus	 has	 led	 to	 an	 impressive	 amount	 of	 neuropsychological,	
psychological	 and	 neuroimaging	 studies	 sharing	 the	 use	 of	 recognition	memory	 tasks,	
resulting	 in	the	development	of	several	models	of	episodic	 learning,	mostly	focusing	on	
the	contribution	of	the	structures	of	the	MTL	described	above.	We	will	further	summarize	
the	most	influential	models	proposed	so	far.	
	
I.8.	Models	of	episodic	learning	and	recognition	memory	
	
The	most	influential	frameworks	can	be	distinguished	on	the	basis	of	whether	they	focus	
on	 the	 contents	 of	 memory	 representations,	 or	 on	 the	 processes	 (or	 computations)	
performed	 by	 the	 MTL.	 However,	 growing	 evidence	 questions	 the	 relevance	 of	
considering	 the	MTL	as	a	 functional	entity	 specialized	 in	declarative	memory,	yielding	a	
shift	 towards	 a	 new	 paradigm	 in	 the	 cognitive	 neurosciences	 of	 memory	 that	 we	 will	
shortly	 mention	 in	 the	 last	 of	 the	 following	 sections.	 Importantly,	 none	 of	 these	
frameworks	has	so	far	refuted	the	 idea	of	multiple	memory	systems,	or	the	hierarchical	
organizational	 principles	 underlying	 the	 functional	 neuroanatomy	 of	 the	 MTL.	 We	 will	
therefore	start	with	providing	a	short	reminder	of	the	SPI	model	and	of	the	hierarchical	
organizational	view	of	the	MTL.	
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I.8.1.	Serial	Parallel	Independent	model	and	the	hierarchical	organization	of	the	MTL		
	
Figure	13.	The	SPI	model	(Tulving,	1995)	including	the	direct	perceptual-episodic	route	(Kim	S.	
Graham,	Simons,	Pratt,	Patterson,	&	Hodges,	2000).	On	the	left	are	displayed	three	memory	
systems,	on	the	right	the	kind	of	«	retrieval	»	processes	that	typically	give	access	to	each	
system/store.	Arrows	depict	the	relationships	between	the	systems:	at	encoding,	the	hierarchical-
serial	view	posits	a	fixed	sequential	relation,	which	yield	parallel	storage	in	each	system.	At	
retrieval,	representations	can	be	rebuilt	from	each	system	independently.	
	
The	Serial	Parallel	Independent	model	(Tulving,	1995)	emphasizes	both	a	structural	and	a	
process	approach.	From	a	structural	point	of	view,	the	core	feature	of	the	model	lies	in	its	
modularity:	 memory	 is	 organized	 in	 five	 distinct	 systems	 (procedural,	 perceptual	
representation,	 semantic,	 primary	 (working	 memory),	 and	 episodic	 –	 note	 that	 only	 3	
systems	 are	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 13).	 From	 a	 processing	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 relationships	
between	these	systems	are	described	as	dependent	upon	the	operations	carried	out	by	
encoding,	storage	 and	 retrieval	 processes.	Encoding	 is	 thought	 to	occur	 serially,	 so	 that	
input	must	be	encoded	in	the	procedural	system	before	being	encoded	in	the	perceptual	
representation	system,	and	so	forth	up	to	the	episodic	system.	This	sequential	encoding	
process	results	in	parallel	storage:	encoding	is	supposed	to	create	or	modify	the	memory	
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trace	in	each	system.	Lastly,	retrieval	processes	operate	independently	in	each	system,	so	
that	a	semantic	trace	can	be	retrieved	 independently	of	an	episodic	trace,	 for	example.	
Moreover,	each	system	is	assumed	to	have	a	distinct	retrieval	mode,	or	to	be	associated	
with	a	distinct	 retrieval	process.	Retrieval	 from	the	perceptual	 representation	system	 is	
supposed	to	rely	on	priming,	namely,	through	processing	facilitation.	Retrieval	from	the	
semantic	 system	 is	 thought	 to	 occur	 via	 familiarity-based	 processes	 (a	 feeling	 of	
knowing),	and	recollection	 is	assumed	to	be	 the	 typical	 retrieval	mode	 involved	 for	 the	
episodic	 system.	 Tulving	 further	 associates	 various	 kinds	 of	 consciousness	 to	 each	
memory	 system	 retrieval:	 anoetic	 consciousness	 is	 the	 correlate	 of	 the	 procedural	 and	
the	perceptual	representation	systems,	noetic	consciousness	characterizes	retrieval	from	
semantic	 memory,	 and	 autonoetic	 consciousness	 features	 episodic	 retrieval.	 For	 the	
present	 purposes,	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	 this	 model	 is	 that	 episodic	 learning	 is	 predicted	 to	
depend	on	semantic	knowledge.	In	other	words,	it	should	not	be	possible	to	acquire	new	
episodic	memories	in	the	case	of	severe	semantic	memory	disruption.	This	is	perfectly	in	
line	with	 the	 idea	developed	early	 by	 Endel	 Tulving	 that	Hermann	Ebbinghaus’s	 results	
when	 using	meaningless	materials	 do	 not	 contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 episodic	
learning	(Tulving,	1985;	Tulving,	1983).	This	also	fits	with	the	findings	of	improved	episodic	
memory	after	semantic	encoding	(i.e.	Craik	&	Lockhart,	1972;	Craik	&	Tulving,	1975),	and	
also	 with	 the	 reports	 of	 subnormal	 levels	 of	 semantic	 knowledge	 despite	 impaired	
episodic	memory	(e.g.	Vargha-Khadem	et	al.,	1997).	
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Figure	14.	The	hierarchical	organization	of	the	Medial	Temporal	Lobe	as	supporting	«	cognitive	
memory	»	after	Mishkin	et	al.,	1997.	
	
Neuropsychological	findings	supporting	this	model,	along	with	animal	research	with	the	
delayed	 non-matching-to-sample	 procedure	 (see	 Chapter	 III),	 has	 led	 to	 an	 anatomo-
functional	model	of	memory	largely	consistent	with	the	SPI	model	(Mishkin	et	al.,	1997)	
(see	 Figure	 14).	 Altogether,	 this	 framework	 highlights	 a	 correspondence	 between	 the	
hierarchical	 anatomical	 organization	 of	 the	 MTL	 and	 Tulving’s	 idea	 of	 serial	 memory	
encoding	along	a	set	of	hierarchically	organized	memory	systems.	Here,	episodic	learning	
would	depend	on	the	information	processing	flow	up	to	the	top	of	the	hierarchy,	namely	
the	hippocampus.	That	structure	is	thought	to	underlie	new	episodic	encoding,	which	is	
thought	to	be	 impaired	 in	amnesic	patients.	However,	the	acquisition	of	new	memories	
depending	 on	 “inferior”	 or	 downstream	 memory	 systems	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 would	 not	
require	 the	 hippocampus,	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 remaining	 “context-free”	 by	 contrast	 with	
“context-rich”	memories.	Episodic	memories	are	considered	“context-rich”	 in	that	their	
contents	include	the	individual	sensory	components	of	an	experience	within	their	context	
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of	processing.	Semantic	memories	contents,	however,	miss	 the	context	 to	only	 include	
individual	 components	 of	 past	 experiences.	 Thus,	 semantic	 (or	 context-free)	 learning	
remains	 possible	 despite	 impaired	 episodic	 (context-rich)	 memory.	 Such	 proposals	
account	 for	 the	 findings	 in	 developmental	 amnesia	 and	 in	 some	 amnesic	 patients	with	
damage	limited	to	the	hippocampus.	
The	 strength	 of	 these	 accounts	 lied	 in	 the	 consistency	 between	 animal	 and	 human	
research,	 especially	 the	 cases	 of	 developmental	 amnesia,	 however	 not	 without	
exceptions.	
First,	 recognition	 memory	 for	 item-location	 associations	 proved	 inconsistent	 across	
species.	 As	 acknowledged	 by	 Mishkin	 et	 al.	 (1997),	 parahippocampal,	 rather	 than	
hippocampal,	damage	in	monkeys	resulted	in	impaired	object-place	associations	learning.	
By	 contrast,	 no	 evidence	 for	 parahippocampal	 damage	 could	 be	 found	 in	 the	 patients	
described	by	Vargha-Khadem	et	al.	(1997),	still	they	failed	such	task	(as	well	as	voice-face	
associative	learning).	Further	work	has	not	yet	fully	resolved	theses	issues,	suggesting	at	
least	 in	monkeys	 that	memory	 for	 the	 context	 results	 from	close	 interactions	between	
the	parahippocampal,	perirhinal	cortices	and	the	hippocampus	(Bachevalier,	Nemanic,	&	
Alvarado,	 2015),	 along	with	a	possible	 specific	 role	 for	 the	hippocampus	 in	object-place	
long-term	 memory	 binding	 (see	 Bachevalier	 &	 Nemanic,	 2008;	 Belcher,	 Harrington,	
Malkova,	&	Mishkin,	2006;	Malkova	&	Mishkin,	2003).	
Second,	 neuropsychological	 evidence	 gathered	 in	 patients	 with	 selective	 semantic	
impairment	 also	 spoke	 against	 this	 model.	 Semantic	 dementia	 (Hodges,	 Patterson,	
Oxbury,	 &	 Funnell,	 1992;	 Snowden,	 Goulding,	 &	 Neary,	 1989)	 is	 a	 neurodegenerative	
condition	where	bilateral	temporal	poles	undergo	focal	progressive	atrophy,	resulting	in	
a	 typical	 cognitive	profile	of	 selective	 semantic	 impairments,	with	preserved	day-to-day	
memory.	 Empirical	 evidence	 for	 preserved	 episodic	 learning	 (as	 assessed	 through	
recognition	 memory	 tasks)	 even	 for	 stimuli	 unidentifiable	 by	 the	 patients	 (Graham,	
Becker,	&	Hodges,	1997;	Graham,	Patterson,	&	Hodges,	1999;	Graham	et	al.,	2000;	Simons	
et	 al.,	 2002;	 Simons,	 Graham,	 Galton,	 Patterson,	 &	 Hodges,	 2001)	 is	 incompatible	 with	
core	 predictions	 of	 both	 the	 SPI	 model	 and	 the	 hierarchical	 view	 of	 the	 MTL.	 These	
frameworks	 indeed	 predict	 that	 impaired	 semantic	 memory	 –	 or	 damage	 to	 the	
parahippocampal	gyrus	–	 should	 lead	 to	proportional	 impairments	 in	 semantic	memory	
and	episodic	memory,	independently	of	the	hippocampal	status.	An	evolution	of	the	SPI	
model,	 named	 the	 Multiple	 Input	 Model	 (“MIM”,	 Graham,	 2000)	 was	 then	 proposed,	
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involving	a	direct	encoding	route	between	the	perceptual	representation	system	and	the	
episodic	system,	as	depicted	in	Figure	13,	and	that	is	restricted	to	visual	learning.	Further	
work	has	extended	 the	MIM	 to	 include	 the	SPI	proposal	within	other	memory	 systems	
and	 sub-systems	 in	 an	effort	 to	provide	a	more	 comprehensive	 view	of	 the	 concept	of	
autobiographical	 memory	 (MNESIS	 model,	 Eustache	 &	 Desgranges,	 2008;	 Eustache,	
Viard,	 &	 Desgranges,	 2016).	 Noteworthy,	 a	 similar	 evolution	 of	 the	 SPI	 model,	 but	
involving	a	direct	encoding	route	from	PRS	to	episodic	memory	could	be	expected	if	the	
suggestive	 findings	 of	 Gagnepain,	 Lebreton,	 Desgranges,	 &	 Eustache,	 (2008)	 were	
replicated	and	extended	to	patients	with	selective	semantic	impairments.	
	
In	summary,	the	SPI	model	can	be	considered	a	content-based	theory	in	that	it	assumes	
that	e.g.	semantic	and	episodic	memories	have	fundamentally	distinct	properties.	But	it	is	
also	a	process-based	approach	theory,	 in	that	each	memory	system	is	associated	with	a	
privileged	kind	of	retrieval	process,	and	because	relationships	between	systems	depend	
on	the	memory	process	considered.	This	model	was	built	on	strong	neuropsychological	
grounds,	and	is	supported	by	consistent	findings	regarding	the	anatomy	of	the	MTL	and	
from	monkey	research,	which	has	eventually	resulted	in	a	framework	guiding	research	in	
the	 last	 decades.	 Still,	 several	 modifications	 have	 been	 put	 forward	 to	 account	 for	
unpredicted	findings	both	from	a	functional	neuroanatomical	and	cognitive	perspective.	
Endel	 Tulving	 essentially	 did	 not	 include	 these	 proposed	 updates	 to	 his	 framework,	
basically	arguing	that	the	episodic	learning	tasks	used	actually	did	not	meet	all	criteria	for	
episodic	 memory.	 All	 in	 all,	 such	 divergences	 may	 have	 led	 to	 a	 dead	 end,	 but	 other	
proposals,	somehow	departing	from	the	episodic-semantic	distinction,	finally	emerged	in	
the	early	2000’s.	
	
I.8.2.	Content-based	models	
	
Given	 that	 recollection,	 as	 opposed	 to	 familiarity,	 involves	 the	 recall	 of	 perceptually	
absent	information,	it	is	considered	a	fundamentally	associative	process.	Therefore,	if	one	
can	relate	a	memory	cue	with	some	prior	context	of	occurrence	(context	here	is	taken	in	
a	very	broad	sense,	encompassing	not	only	spatial	and	temporal	features	of	an	event,	but	
also	any	thought,	feeling,	emotion	unfolding	during	the	event),	the	resulting	memory	will	
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necessarily	 includes	 relations	 between	 its	 components.	 Unsurprisingly,	 thus,	 several	
models	have	 focused	on	 the	 contents	of	memory:	does	encoding	of	 relations	between	
components	of	an	experience	rely	on	the	same	mechanisms	and	neural	substrates	as	the	
encoding	of	its	individual	components?	
	
I.8.2.1.	Relational	theory	
The	monitoring	of	eye	movements	in	healthy	subjects	and	amnesic	patients	while	viewing	
colour	 images	of	 real-world	scenes	has	provided	strong	evidence	for	 the	existence	of	a	
relational	encoding	system	(Ryan,	Althoff,	Whitlow,	&	Cohen,	2000).	In	controls,	a	second	
presentation	 of	 a	 visual	 scene	 in	which	 an	 individual	 component	 has	 been	 removed	or	
added	by	comparison	with	its	initial	viewing	generated	more	fixations	in	the	region	where	
manipulations	 of	 relations	 among	 scene	 elements	 had	 occurred.	 This	 “relational	
manipulation	 effect”	 was	 found	 only	 when	 participants	 were	 not	 aware	 of	 the	
manipulation,	and	it	was	not	found	in	amnesic	patients	(see	Figure	15).	
	
	
Figure	15.	The	relational	manipulation	effect.	White	crosses	indicate	eye	fixations	and	black	lines	
eye	movements,	for	two	different	healthy	subjects.	On	the	left,	the	exact	same	scene	has	been	
presented	before.	On	the	right,	the	same	scene	was	presented	before	but	including	two	girls	
located	within	the	black	rectangle	on	the	white	path.	The	scene	manipulation	resulted	in	increasing	
fixations	within	the	manipulated	area,	an	effect	no	elicited	in	amnesic	patients.	(Taken	from	Ryan	
et	al.,	2000)	
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These	 findings	 and	 subsequent	 studies	 (Ryan	&	Cohen,	 2003,	 2004a,	 2004b)	 led	 to	 the	
proposal	 that	 1/	 conscious	access	 to	 stored	memories	may	not	be	a	defining	 feature	of	
declarative	memory	and	2/	 the	hippocampus	 is	 essential	 for	 any	 learning	 task	 requiring	
the	 encoding	 of	 relations	 between	 distinct	 items,	 a	 process	 named	 relational	 memory	
binding	(see	also	Cohen	&	Eichenbaum,	1993).	Importantly,	the	hippocampus	is	assumed	
to	 store	 relational	memory	 in	 a	 flexible	way,	 as	 both	 the	 relations	 between	 items	 and	
individual	 items	 remain	 accessible	 separately	 from	 long-term	 memory.	 However,	 the	
individual	 components	 of	 an	 experience	 are	 supposed	 to	 be	 stored	 separately	 in	 the	
neocortex,	 the	 hippocampus	 being	 involved	 only	 in	 relational	 encoding	 through	 the	
binding	process.	A	strong	advantage	of	this	view	is	that	it	explains	how	inferences	can	be	
made	from	memory.	For	example,	provided	that	 relational	 information	A	+	B	and	B	+	C	
has	 been	 encoded,	 any	 further	 episode	 involving	 A	will	 reactivate	 the	 relation	with	 B,	
likewise	presentation	of	B	will	reactivate	the	relation	with	C.	Therefore,	presentation	of	A	
and	B	will	reactive	both	relational	information	that	share	C	in	common,	allowing	the	A	+	C	
relation	to	be	inferred.	So	a	cue	absent	from	the	study	phase	(here,	C)	can	nonetheless	be	
reactivated	thanks	to	the	unique	hippocampal	computations,	which	is	a	defining	feature	
of	 recollection.	 Such	 relational	 information	 may	 thus	 be	 stored,	 and	 during	 next	
encounters	 with	 either	 A,	 B	 or	 C,	 the	 corresponding	 individual	 representations	 will	 be	
reactivated	via	extra-hippocampal	neocortical	computations,	while	the	hippocampus	will	
allow	the	 retrieval	of	 the	A	+	B	+	C	 relational	network	 (Moses	&	Ryan,	2006).	Finally,	 it	
must	be	mentioned	that	within-domain	item	+	item	relations	are	supposed	to	take	place	
without	 relational	 binding,	 as	 long	 as	 these	 individual	 elements	 can	 be	 processed	 as	 a	
unimodal	perceptual	“blend”,	i.e.	a	unique	element.	A	key	prediction	from	that	model	is	
therefore	 that	 following	 hippocampal	 damage,	 relational	 inferences	won’t	 be	 possible;	
however,	 the	 acquisition	 of	 maintenance	 of	 perceptual	 “blends”	 can	 take	 place,	 but	
these	 representations	 are	 considered	 “rigid”	 in	 that	 it	 cannot	 be	 updated	 when	 new	
related	contexts	occur.	Similarly,	relational	information	stored	before	amnesia	should	not	
be	updated.	
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I.8.2.2.	Conjunctive	theory	
This	account,	largely	based	on	animal	research	with	rats,	shows	some	similarity	with	the	
relational	 theory:	 in	 both	 cases,	 the	 hippocampus	 is	 supposed	 to	 support	 associative	
processes	that	underlie	the	formation	of	representations	composed	of	distinct	elements	
(O’Reilly	 &	 Rudy,	 2001;	 Rudy	 &	 O’Reilly,	 1999).	 However,	 these	 representations	 called	
“conjunctive”	 in	that	model	 include	both	the	relationships	between	 individual	elements	
of	 an	 experience,	 and	 the	 unique	 individual	 features	 of	 the	 event	 that	 differ	 from	 the	
individual	 elements	 (e.g.	 in	 the	 negative	 patterning	 problem,	 the	 representation	 “AB”	
must	 be	 learned	 as	 a	 unique	 entity,	 that	 is,	 distinct	 from	 “A”	 and	 “B”	 presented	
individually).	 Put	 this	 way,	 individual	 elements	 and	 its	 relationships	 within	 a	 unique	
conjunctive	 representation,	once	 stored,	 cannot	be	 retrieved	 independently,	which	 is	 a	
key	 difference	 with	 the	 relational	 theory.	 To	 some	 extent,	 these	 conjunctive	
representations	 are	 close	 to	 the	 perceptual	 “blend”	 concept	 in	 the	 relational	 theory.	
However,	multiple	conjunctive	representations	would	be	formed	from	different	vantage	
points	but	for	a	single	event,	as	well	as	individual	elements	representations.	The	process	
of	pattern	 completion,	uniquely	 associated	with	hippocampal	 computations,	 is	 thought	
to	 allowing	 incoming	 representations	 to	 be	 compared	 with	 stored	 representations.	
Pattern	completion	can	achieve	memory	retrieval	this	way,	even	based	on	a	partial	cue.	
This	 account	 therefore	 keeps	 the	 idea	of	 flexibility,	which	here	emanates	not	 from	 the	
relational	encoding	itself	but	from	the	pattern	completion	process	that	allows	retrieval	of	
the	ad	hoc	conjunctive	representation	for	the	current	behavioural	goal	(O’Reilly	&	Rudy,	
2001).	 Finally,	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 the	 conjunctive	 theory	 that	 differs	 from	 the	
relational	 theory	 is	 that	 hippocampal	 computations	 are	 supposed	 to	 allow	 the	 rapid	
encoding	 of	 conjunctive	 representations.	 However,	 the	 surrounding	 cortices	 also	 can	
support	conjunctive	representations	encoding,	but	through	extensive	repetitions	during	
a	 slow	 learning	 process.	 A	 strong	 prediction	 therefore	 is	 that	 damage	 to	 the	
hippocampus	 should	prevent	 from	rapid	 learning	of	associations:	hippocampal	amnesia	
should	 not	 obliterate	 associative	 learning,	 but	 it	 could	 take	 place	 only	 at	 a	 slow	 pace,	
incidentally,	and	in	the	service	of	specific	situations	like	problem-solving	tasks.	
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I.8.2.3.	Binding	In	Context	(BIC)	
Based	 on	 an	 extensive	 review	 of	 available	 behavioural,	 neuropsychological	 and	
neuroimaging	 data	 in	 humans	 as	 well	 as	 animal	 research	 including	 single	 neurons	
recording	 in	 the	 MTL,	 Eichenbaum,	 Yonelinas,	 &	 Ranganath,	 (2007)	 proposed	 the	
“Binding	In	Context”	(BIC)	model.	This	model,	 like	the	previous	content-based	theories,	
explicitly	 states	a	 functional	dissociation	within	 the	MTL,	between	the	hippocampus	on	
the	one	hand,	and	surrounding	rhinal	cortices	and	parahippocampal	cortex	on	the	other	
hand.	The	BIC	 is	a	three-components	model,	where	the	perirhinal	cortex	and	the	 lateral	
entorhinal	 cortex,	 because	 they	 receive	 most	 of	 the	 projections	 from	 the	 “What”	
pathway,	encode	individual	items.	The	parahippocampal	cortex	and	the	medial	entorhinal	
cortex,	being	the	main	targets	of	the	“Where”	pathway,	encode	the	context	associated	
with	the	 item(s).	A	particular	emphasis	 is	put	on	the	spatial	aspects	of	the	context,	but	
leaving	open	the	possibility	 that	non-spatial	 features	of	 the	context	(e.g.	 temporal)	can	
be	 represented	 here	 too	 (see	 also	 Eichenbaum,	 2013;	 Eichenbaum,	 2004).	 Finally,	 the	
hippocampus	 is	 the	 structure	 where	 “where”	 and	 “what”	 information	 converges,	
allowing	 for	 the	 encoding	 of	 item	 -	 context	 associations.	 Importantly,	 the	 familiarity	
component	 of	 recognition	 memory	 is	 thought	 to	 arise	 from	 a	 matching	 computation	
between	 the	 representation	of	an	 individual	 input	and	a	pre-existing	 representation,	 at	
the	level	of	the	perirhinal	and	lateral	entorhinal	cortices.	Thus,	familiarity-based	judgment	
in	recognition	does	not	require	hippocampal	computations.	However,	as	long	as	the	task	
involves	 not	 only	 the	 item	 but	 the	 associated	 study	 context	 as	 well,	 recollection	 will	
depend	on	the	hippocampus	and	parahippocampal	cortex.	
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Figure	16.	Binding	In	Context	(BIC)	model	of	recognition	memory	and	the	MTL,	taken	from	
Eichenbaum	et	al.,	2007.	
	
In	accordance	with	the	conjunctive	theory,	pattern	completion	is	of	great	importance	for	
recollection	in	the	BIC	model.	When	presented	with	a	familiar	item,	it	is	processed	up	to	
the	PRC	and	 lERC,	and	the	by-product	may	serve	as	a	cue	for	pattern	completion	 in	the	
hippocampus.	 If	successful	(i.e.	normal	subject),	this	process	may	allow	the	reactivation	
of	 the	 activated	 pattern	 that	 occurred	 at	 study	 (i.e.	 during	 the	 last	 occurrence).	 Such	
activity,	 as	 an	 input	 to	 the	 parahippocampal	 cortex,	 will	 reactivate	 the	 corresponding	
context	 representation,	 thus	 leading	 to	 recollection.	 Therefore,	 at	 variance	 with	 the	
conjunctive	 theory,	 recollection-based	 retrieval	 depends	 not	 only	 on	 the	 hippocampus,	
but	also	on	 the	PHC	 (see	also	Diana,	Yonelinas,	&	Ranganath,	 2007).	Note	 that	 the	BIC	
model	 also	predicts	 that	whenever	a	 study	 context	alone	 triggers	a	 familiarity	 signal	 in	
the	PHC,	 this	 could	drive	 the	 reactivation	of	 the	 corresponding	hippocampal	 activation	
pattern,	leading	in	turn	to	the	retrieval	of	the	associated	item,	again	yielding	recollection.	
From	 this	 perspective,	 it	 must	 be	 understood	 that	 the	 BIC	 model	 shares	 with	 the	
relational	 theory	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 hippocampus	 does	 not	 encode	 individual	 items,	 or	
event	features,	but	rather	it	represents	associations	between	items.	
Finally,	the	BIC	model	also	assumes	that	recollection	can	occur	on	the	basis	of	PRC/lERC	
or	PHC/mERC	processing	only,	with	no	need	of	pattern	completion,	 in	 situations	where	
associations	between	items	can	be	“unitized”,	namely	encoded	as	a	single	item	(Murray	
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&	 Ranganath,	 2007;	 Quamme,	 Yonelinas,	 &	 Norman,	 2007;	 Yonelinas,	 1999).	While	 we	
have	focused	here	on	the	MTL	structures,	further	refinements	of	the	BIC	model	will	add	
distinctive	 roles	of	 the	dorsolateral	and	ventrolateral	prefrontal	 cortices	 in	contributing	
to	the	item-item	associations	and	to	the	selection	of	the	relevant	features	of	the	episode	
to	increase	the	distinctiveness	of	the	represented	episodes	(Ranganath,	2010).	
	
I.8.2.4.	The	representational	account	(Davachi	et	al.,	2006)	
A	closely	related	model	has	been	proposed	based	on	task-based	functional	neuroimaging	
(Davachi,	 2006).	 This	 model,	 like	 the	 BIC	 model,	 argues	 that	 the	 hippocampus	 is	
responsible	for	the	relational	binding	of	the	individual	elements	of	an	episode,	including	
its	 context	 of	 occurrence.	 However,	 based	 on	 findings	 showing	 successful	 memory	
effects	for	 individual	 items	extending	posteriorly	to	the	perirhinal	cortex,	encompassing	
portions	of	 the	PHC,	 this	model	 suggests	 that	a	 single	 relational	vs.	 item	contrast	does	
not	 fully	 account	 for	 the	 MTL	 involvement	 in	 declarative	 learning.	 Instead,	 the	 model	
proposed	 that	 while	 the	 hippocampus	 is	 responsible	 for	 domain-general	 episodic	
encoding,	the	PRC	and	PHC	would	be	critical	for	domain-specific	encoding.	Based	on	the	
robust	 findings	 of	 a	 differential	 response	 of	 the	 PRC	 and	 PHC	 to	 objects	 and	 scenes,	
respectively,	 the	 representational	 account	 states	 that	 recollection	 for	 object-related	
features	 could	 be	 achieved	 through	 PRC	 computations,	 while	 recollection	 of	 scene-
related	features	could	be	achieved	through	PHC	computations	(see	Staresina,	Duncan,	&	
Davachi,	2011).	The	model	therefore	predicts	that	the	respective	contributions	of	distinct	
MTL	structures	to	recollection	or	familiarity-based	retrieval	may,	to	some	extent,	depend	
on	 the	 representational	domain	of	 studies	events.	However,	 relational	 encoding	across	
domains	(i.e.,	domain-general)	requires	hippocampal	processing.	
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I.8.2.5.	Posterior-Medial	/	Anterior	Temporal	(PMAT)	framework	
This	theoretical	framework	results	from	an	extensive	review	of	anatomical	and	functional	
connectivity	studies	of	the	MTL,	and	aimed	at	accounting	for	mental	functions	extending	
beyond	 declarative	 learning	 (Ranganath	 &	 Ritchey,	 2012;	 Reagh	 &	 Ranganath,	 2018;	
Ritchey,	Libby,	&	Ranganath,	2015).	We	will	briefly	 summarize	 the	 important	aspects	of	
the	framework	that	are	directly	relevant	for	declarative	memory	learning.		
	
	
Figure	17.	The	PMAT	framework,	taken	from	Ritchey	et	al.,	2015.	Blue	circles	depict	the	Postero-
Medial	network,	red	circles	the	Anterior	Temporal	network,	and	purple	circles	represent	possible	
area	of	integration	of	the	information	processed	in	both	networks.	[Prec=Precuneus;	AnG=Angular	
Gyrus;	PCC=Posterior	Cingulate	Cortex;	RSC=RetroSplenial	Cortex;	PHC=ParaHippocampal	Cortex;	
aThal=anterior	nuclei	of	the	Thalamus;	mPFC=medial	PreFrontal	Cortex;	IOFC=lateral	OrbitoFrontal	
Cortex;	aVTC=anterior	Ventral	Temporal	Cortex;	AMY=Amygdala;	PRC=PeriRhinal	Cortex;	
HF=Hippocampal	Formation;	vmPFC=ventromedial	PreFrontal	Cortex]	
	
The	PMAT	 framework	was	 intended	 to	 integrate	neocortical	areas	 involved	 in	memory-
guided	 behaviour	 to	 the	 existing	 models	 focusing	 on	 the	 MTL	 contributions	 and	 its	
connections	with	the	dorsal	and	ventral	streams	only.	It	proposes	that	the	two	large-scale	
networks	depicted	in	Figure	17	are	differentially	involved	in	learning	mechanisms:	the	PM	
network	would	be	responsible	for	“the	processing	and	the	long-term	storage	of	learned	
contexts	 in	 the	 form	 of	 situation	models”	 (Ritchey	 et	 al.,	 2015,	 p.47).	 The	 AT	 network	
would	be	in	charge	of	the	“processing	and	long-term	storage	of	previously	learned	items	
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in	the	form	of	concepts”	(Ritchey	et	al.,	2015,	p.47).	As	a	consequence	of	these	distinct	
contents,	the	AT	would	mainly	support	familiarity-based	recognition	while	the	PM	would	
be	associated	with	recollection-based	recognition	memory.		
Both	networks	would	share	a	common	purpose	that	is	extracting	statistical	regularities	of	
the	environment,	which	make	of	these	functionally-interconnected	regions	core	learning	
structures,	according	to	 the	definition	of	 learning	we	have	developed	before	 (see	“The	
problem	of	 learning	and	memory”	section	p.	 17	and	 followings).	However,	 the	memory	
contents	 that	 each	network	deals	with	would	 extend	prior	 suggestions:	 the	PM	would	
essentially	process	and	store	associations	between	contexts,	while	 the	AT	would	do	so	
for	 individual	components	of	episodes.	We	further	quote	Reagh	&	Ranganath	(2018)	 to	
clarify	the	respective	contributions	of	these	networks:	
“Walking	through	a	building,	visual	context	information	represented	by	PHC	might	be	used	to	
orient	oneself	relative	to	one’s	knowledge	of	the	topology	of	the	building,	accessed	via	a	
spatial	situation	model	supported	by	activated	representations	in	extra-MTL	PM	cortical	areas,	
such	as	retrosplenial	cortex,	posterior	cingulate,	and	precuneus.	Upon	encountering	a	familiar	
person	in	the	room,	activation	of	the	corresponding	PRC	representation	of	the	person’s	face	
can	be	linked	with	knowledge	about	the	person’s	traits,	via	activation	of	representations	in	AT	
network	areas,	such	as	the	amygdala	and	temporopolar,	orbito-	frontal,	and	insular	cortex.”	
Reagh	&	Ranganath,	2018,	p.	70	
A	highly	relevant	aspect	of	the	model	for	the	present	purposes	is	that	it	allows	addressing	
the	complexity	of	how	prior	experiences	could	guide	behaviour,	and	contributing	to	new	
learning.	 For	 example,	 stored	 conceptual	 knowledge	 retrieved	 through	 the	 temporal	
poles	 and	 the	 PRC	 can	 provide	 top-down	 input	 to	 the	 visual	 ventral	 stream,	 thus	
providing	a	comparison	space	where	predictions	can	be	confronted	to	actual	processing,	
which	 generates	 a	 prediction	 error	 signal	 helping	 to	 flexibly	 guide	 behaviour,	 and	
encoding	new	episodes	simultaneously.	Similarly,	the	PMAT	framework	provides	insights	
into	 how	 memory	 “schemas”	 could	 be	 stored	 and	 used	 in	 behaviour.	 Semantic	
knowledge	 resulting	 from	 associations	 between	 items	 would	 be	 supported	 by	 the	 AT	
while	 semantic	 knowledge	 resulting	 from	 associations	 between	 contexts	 would	 be	
supported	 by	 the	 PM,	 a	 schema	 being	 activated	 via	 the	 convergence	 between	 both	
representations.	 This	 idea	 is	 in	 line	 with	 models	 highlighting	 the	 role	 of	 hippocampal-
vmPFC	 interactions	 in	 schema-dependent	 learning	 (Van	 Kesteren,	 Ruiter,	 Fernández,	 &	
Henson,	 2012,	 see	 Chapter	 VI).	 These	 schemas,	 or	 their	 item-based	 vs.	 context-based	
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components	 in	 the	AT	 vs	 PM	networks,	 respectively,	 are	 further	 assumed	 to	provide	 a	
scaffold	on	which	new	episodes	can	be	encoded.		
Moreover,	 the	 model	 allows	 to	 accounting	 for	 findings	 linking	 extra-MTL	 regions	 to	
familiarity	 and	 recollection.	 For	 example,	 familiarity	 for	 faces	 has	 been	 associated	with	
anterior	lateral	temporal	cortex	(Leveroni	et	al.,	2000),	and	the	role	of	the	parietal	cortex	
in	 autobiographical	 memory	 retrieval	 is	 well	 acknowledged	 (e.g.	 Cabeza,	 2008;	 for	 a	
review	 of	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 ventral	 posterior	 parietal	 cortex	 in	 qualitative	
recollection,	see	Moscovitch,	Cabeza,	Winocur,	&	Nadel,	2016).	
	
I.8.2.6.	Summary	of	content-based	models	
These	models,	exception	made	of	the	PMAT	framework,	do	not	specifically	address	the	
question	 of	 how	 prior	 knowledge	 influences	 episodic	 learning.	 Some	 predictions	 can	
nonetheless	be	made.	
1.	 The	 Relational	 theory	 predicts	 that	 during	 encoding,	 pre-existing	 representations	
associated	with	the	memoranda,	when	present,	will	be	activated	through	hippocampus-
dependent	 relational	 binding.	 Only	 within-domain	 pre-existing	 representations	 can	 be	
reactivated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 neocortical	 processing.	 Thus,	 hippocampal	 damage	 should	
result	 in	 at	 least	 a	 decrease	 or	 an	 absence	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 effect	 on	 memory	
formation	
2.	 Similarly,	 the	 Conjunctive	 theory	 predicts	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 activation	 critically	
depends	on	pattern	completion,	which	is	supposedly	taking	place	in	the	hippocampus,	so	
that	 again,	 memory	 should	 not	 benefit	 from	 prior	 knowledge	 at	 encoding	 in	 case	 of	
hippocampal	damage.	However,	at	variance	with	 the	Relational	 theory,	 the	Conjunctive	
theory	 predicts	 that	 learning	 of	 conjunctions	 remains	 possible	 after	 hippocampal	
damage,	at	the	cost	of	intensive	repetitions	and	at	a	slow	rate.	
3.	 Activation	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 for	 relevant	 stimuli	 is	 also	 expected	 to	 depend	 on	
pattern	 completion	 in	 the	 hippocampus,	 within	 the	 BIC	 framework.	 However,	 a	 critical	
role	 for	 the	 PRC	 is	 outlined,	 which	 provides	 a	 kind	 of	 “comparison	 space”	 between	
incoming	information	and	past	experience,	resulting	in	a	prediction	error	signalling.	In	the	
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case	where	pre-existing	representations	are	available,	the	PRC	detects	familiarity,	and	as	
long	 as	 the	 task	 does	 not	 involve	 contextual	 retrieval	 or	 source	 monitoring,	 accurate	
recognition	can	be	provided	without	hippocampal	computations.	Thus,	the	model	may	be	
compatible	 with	 the	 prediction	 that	 studying	 stimuli	 with	 pre-existing	 representations	
should	 trigger	 familiarity	 and	 reactivation	 of	 past	 contextual	 encounters	 (based	 on	
pattern	completion	and	PHC	activation),	thus	enriching	the	memory	trace	and	making	it	
more	distinctive.	This	may	result	 in	 improved	recognition	memory	for	the	 item,	with	no	
clear	 prediction	 regarding	 familiarity	 or	 recollection.	 While	 this	 provides	 a	 more	
comprehensive	 account	 for	 potential	 prior	 knowledge	 effect,	 it	 still	 predicts	 that	
hippocampal	damage,	as	it	would	impair	pattern	completion,	should	result	in	the	absence	
of	memory	gain	due	to	prior	knowledge.	The	BIC	model	however	suggests	one	exception,	
namely	 unitization.	 In	 the	 case	where	 the	 item	 and	 its	 context	 can	 be	 processed	 as	 a	
single	 item,	 then	 further	 associative	 recognition	 can	be	 based	on	 familiarity.	Note	 that	
this	 should	 be	 independent	 from	 prior	 knowledge	 effect:	 unitized	 item-context	
combinations	 should	 lead	 to	 accurate	 recognition,	 even	 after	 hippocampal	 damage,	
whether	 or	 not	 the	 combination	 is	 associated	with	 pre-existing	 representations.	 But	 it	
may	be	the	case	that	prior	knowledge	promotes	unitization:	in	such	instances,	according	
to	the	BIC	model,	successful	recognition	would	not	result	from	prior	knowledge	itself	but	
from	unitization,	and	should	be	achieved	only	on	the	basis	of	familiarity,	not	recollection.	
4.	 Finally,	 one	 core	 prediction	 added	 by	 the	 PMAT	 framework	 is	 that,	 consistently	with	
other	theories	presented	in	Chapter	VII,	medial,	orbital	prefrontal	cortices	together	with	
the	 temporal	 pole,	 the	 amygdala	 and	 the	 PRC	 should	 be	 of	 great	 matter	 for	 prior	
knowledge	activation.	It	therefore	predicts	that,	beyond	the	role	of	the	hippocampus,	the	
functional	interplay	between	these	regions	and	the	hippocampus	is	critical	for	detection	
and	use	of	prior	knowledge	in	new	learning.	
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I.8.3.	Process-based	models	
	
I.8.3.1.	Aggleton’s	model:	hippocampal	systems	and	the	dual	process	model	of	recognition	memory	
Based	 on	 animal	 research	 in	 monkeys	 investigating	 the	 MTL	 connections,	 and	 more	
specifically	the	hippocampal	projections,	Aggleton	(2012)	highlights	four	distinct	efferent	
systems:	 the	 extended-hippocampal	 system;	 the	 rostral	 hippocampal	 system;	 the	
reciprocal	 hippocampal-parahippocampal	 system;	 and	 the	 parahippocampal-prefrontal	
system	(see	Figure	18).	
	
Figure	18.	The	four	functional	MTL	systems	(Aggleton,	2012).	(A)	The	Extended	Hippocampal	
System;	(B)	the	Rostral	Hippocampal	System;	(C)	the	Reciprocal	Hippocampal-Parahippocampal	
System;	(D)	the	Parahippocampal-Prefrontal	System.	(Adapted	from	Aggleton,	2012)	
	
- The	 Extended	 Hippocampal	 System	 connects	 the	 subiculum	 to	 the	 anterior	
thalamic	nuclei	via	the	fornix,	mammillary	bodies	and	the	mammillo-thalamic	tract,	
A B 
C D 
		 73	
and	the	retrosplenial	cortex.	This	system	is	thought	to	underlie	recollection-based	
recognition	memory	 and	 thus,	 would	 support	 episodic	memory	 formation.	 One	
reason	 why	 the	 recollective	 experience	 may	 stem	 from	 this	 system	 is	 that	
hippocampal	 efferents	 to	 the	 mammillary	 bodies,	 thalamus	 and	 retrosplenial	
cortex	 are	 organized	 in	 a	 way	 favouring	 the	 maintenance	 of	 information	
segregation,	 until	 convergence	 that	 could	 occur	 in	 the	 thalamus.	 Thus,	 high-
resolution	 representations	 inputs	 to	 the	 subiculum	 could	 be	 maintained	 as	
separated	through	separated	streams	of	information	within	this	system,	making	it	
well	 tuned	 to	 support	 the	 formation	 of	 context-rich	 memories	 (i.e.	 involving	
multiple	associations	between	elements).	
- The	Parahippocampal-Prefrontal	System	includes	the	dense	reciprocal	connections	
between	the	parahippocampal	region	and	various	prefrontal	cortex	areas,	as	well	
as	the	medial	dorsal	nucleus	of	the	thalamus	and	structures	of	the	basal	forebrain.	
This	 system	 is	 further	divided	 in	 two	networks,	 the	“orbital	prefrontal	network”	
featuring	 connections	 with	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 and	 the	 “medial	 prefrontal	
network”	 corresponding	 to	 the	 connections	 with	 the	 parahippocampal	 cortex.	
The	first	network	would	support	familiarity-based	retrieval,	while	the	roles	of	the	
second	 are	 less	 clear.	One	possibility	 is	 that	 it	 contributes	 indirectly	 to	 strategic	
aspects	of	retrieval,	on	the	ground	of	the	parahippocampal	connections	with	the	
hippocampus.	
- The	Rostral	Hippocampal	System	connects	 the	CA1	 subfield	and	 the	subiculum	to	
medial	 and	 orbital	 prefrontal	 areas,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	 amygdala	 and	 nucleus	
accumbens.	Rather	than	being	involved	directly	in	new	learning,	this	system	would	
be	 responsible	 for	 the	 modulation	 of	 memory	 formation	 depending	 on	 the	
emotional	 and	motivational	 (reward	 values)	 stimuli	 or	 tasks	 contents.	 Thus,	 this	
system	 would	 be	 critical	 for	 memory	 formation	 of	 events	 including	 social	 and	
affective	features.	
- The	 Reciprocal	 Hippocampal-Parahippocampal	 System	 features	 the	 bidirectional	
connections	 between	 the	 parahippocampal	 region	 and	 the	 hippocampus,	
highlighting	 as	 previous	models	 the	 relative	 segregation	 between	 the	 perirhinal	
and	 the	 parahippocampal	 cortices	 connections.	 While	 the	 former	 would	 be	
involved	 in	 the	 representations	 of	 item-based	 information,	 the	 latter	 would	 be	
responsible	for	representing	context-based	information.	Here,	the	Aggleton	view	
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is	 not	 distinct	 from	 the	 BIC	 model,	 however	 he	 importantly	 refers	 to	 the	
“gatekeeper”	 hypothesis	 for	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 on	 which	 we	will	 come	 back	
later	(Chapter	VI)	since	it	is	of	relevance	for	the	present	thesis.	
	
I.8.3.2.	Domain	dichotomy	model	
This	model	was	originally	proposed	in	2007	and	later	refined	in	2010	(Mayes	et	al.,	2007;	
Montaldi	&	Mayes,	2010)	by	the	Manchester	group.	Basically,	the	model	was	grounded	on	
particular	recognition	memory	tasks	tapping	associative	recognition	performance,	which	
is	 at	odds	with	 the	models	presented	above.	The	 idea	 is	 that	declarative	memories	are	
inherently	 associative,	 and	 that	 three	 kinds	 of	 associations	 can	 be	 distinguished:	 intra-
item,	within-domain	inter-items,	and	between-domains	inter-items	associations.	It	follows	
that	 distinct	 MTL	 regions	 will	 be	 devoted	 to	 distinct	 encoding	 processes	 allowing	 the	
representation	 of	 these	 distinct	 kinds	 of	 associations.	 Since	 the	model	 has	mainly	 put	
forward	 the	 recognition	 memory	 processes	 (Familiarity,	 Recollection)	 as	 supporting	
different	associations,	we	considered	 it	as	a	process-,	rather	than	content-based	model.	
Moreover,	 declarative	 memories	 can	 only	 be	 accessed	 through	 recall,	 which	 is	 also	
considered	 an	 associative	 process:	 in	 recognition	 memory	 tasks,	 a	 cue	 may	 allow	 the	
association	with	perceptually	absent	 information,	but	related	to	the	encoding	situation.	
This	 is	an	 instance	of	 recall	 (cued	recall),	and	defines	 recollection-based	retrieval	 in	 this	
model.	However,	familiarity-based	retrieval	 is	not	considered	an	instance	of	recall.	Thus,	
this	 model	 has	 no	 ambiguity	 regarding	 the	 related	 concepts	 of	 episodic	 vs.	 semantic	
memories	and	recollection	vs.	familiarity.	Only	recollection	can	allow	retrieval	of	episodic	
or	 semantic	memories,	while	 familiarity	 is	 leading	 to	 nothing	more	 than	 a	 “feeling”	 of	
memory	(Mayes	et	al.,	2007,	p.	126).	
The	domain-dichotomy	model,	like	the	BIC	account,	strongly	relies	on	pattern	completion	
and	 pattern	 separation	 processes	 derived	 from	 computational	 models	 (Norman	 &	
O’Reilly,	2003)	 to	 further	characterize	the	respective	 roles	of	 the	PRC	and	HPC.	Pattern	
separation	allows	 to	creating	distinct	memory	 representations	 from	very	 similar	 inputs,	
and	it	takes	place	in	the	hippocampus.	This	separation	process	supposedly	enables	cued	
recall	–	pattern	completion	–	at	recognition,	and	this	is	how	the	hippocampus	may	binds	
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together	between-domains	 items,	and	more	generally	any	association	between	context	
and	 an	 existing	 representation.	 The	 resulting	 hippocampal	 representations	 are	 highly	
flexible,	 allowing	 the	 recall	 of	 both	 its	 individual	 components	 and	 their	 relations,	 in	 a	
similar	 view	with	 the	 relational	 theory.	 By	 contrast,	 the	perirhinal	 cortex	would	 not	 be	
suited	 to	 perform	 pattern	 separation	 and	 pattern	 completion,	 instead	 being	 biased	
towards	generalization.	Generalization	here	refers	to	the	extraction	of	common	features	
(or	 components)	 across	 several	 inputs.	 In	 rapid	 learning	 tasks	 (i.e.	 one-trial	 learning	
recognition	 tasks),	 generalization	 would	 therefore	 fail	 to	 support	 recollection,	 instead	
underlying	 familiarity-based	 retrieval.	Note,	however,	 that	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	PRC	
supports	 familiarity	 for	 associations	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 individual	
components	 of	 the	 association	 converges	 in	 this	 structure.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	
components	 of	 a	 between-domains	 association	 actually	 involve	 neural	 processing	
sufficiently	close	in	the	ventral	pathway	space,	then	it	could	converge	within	the	PRC	and	
be	 retrieved	on	 the	basis	 of	 familiarity.	 This	 also	 could	be	 the	 case	when	 the	orienting	
task	 at	 encoding	 explicitly	 facilitates	 a	 direct	 link	 between	 the	 components	 of	 an	
association	(i.e.,	unitization),	even	if	they	belong	to	different	domains.	
Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 original	 formulation	 of	 the	 Domain	 Dichotomy	
(DD)	model	 did	not	 address	 the	 role	of	 the	PHC.	 This	was	done	 somewhat	 later	 in	 the	
CRAFT	 model	 (Convergence,	 Recollection	 And	 Familiarity	 Theory,	 Montaldi	 &	 Mayes,	
2010),	which	proposes	 that	 the	PHC	would	be	 specifically	 involved	 in	 familiarity	 for	 the	
context,	 whereas	 the	 PRC	 remains	 critical	 for	 objects/items	 familiarity.	 Overall,	 the	
Domain	 Dichotomy	 and	 CRAFT	 models	 have	 strong	 connections	 with	 the	 relational,	
conjunctive,	 and	 BIC	 content-based	 theories:	 the	 hippocampus	 uniquely	 represents	
associations	 that	 are	 dependent	 on	 pattern	 separation	 processes,	 while	 surrounding	
cortices	 can	 represent	 single	 objects,	 or	 items,	 with	 a	 proposed	 distinction	 between	
context	 (PHC)	 and	 items	 (PRC).	 However,	 it	 differs	 from	 all	 these	 theories	 in	 that	 the	
focus	 is	 put	 on	 how	 distinct	 recognition	 processes	 operate,	 rather	 than	 how	 distinct	
representations	support	these	processes.	Furthermore,	at	variance	with	the	conjunctive	
theory,	DD	and	CRAFT	assume	that	 flexibility	of	hippocampal	memories	arises	 from	the	
possibility	 to	 recall	 its	 individual	 components.	 Finally,	 DD	 and	 CRAFT	 models	 strongly	
disagree	 with	 the	 BIC	 model	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 role	 of	 the	 PHC,	 which	 supports	
familiarity	processes	here,	while	in	the	BIC	model	it	is	involved	in	recollection.	
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I.8.3.3.	The	Complementary	Learning	System	(CLS)	computational	model	
Acknowledging	that	some	functional	specialization	is	most	likely	within	the	MTL,	Norman	
&	 O’Reilly	 (2003)	 also	 make	 the	 point	 that	 simples	 dichotomies,	 either	 process-	 or	
content-based	 (i.e.	 recollection	 vs.	 familiarity;	 item-	 vs.	 associative	 memory)	 fail	 to	
account	 for	 the	variable	 recognition	memory	 impairments	observed	after	MTL	damage.	
The	 authors	 thus	 propose	 a	 computational	 model	 that	 is	 mapped	 onto	 the	 specific	
computational	 properties	 (i.e.	 neural	 processes)	 of	 the	 parahippocampal	 gyrus	 on	 the	
one	 hand,	 and	 the	 hippocampus	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 This	 model	 is	 grounded	 on	 the	
general	principle	of	the	CLS	(McClelland,	McNaughton,	&	O’Reilly,	1995;	O’Reilly	&	Rudy,	
2001),	namely	that	rapid	learning	of	specific	events	relies	on	the	hippocampus	while	the	
neocortex	 can	 support	 a	 slow	 learning,	 by	 detecting	 environmental	 regularities.	
However,	it	was	dedicated	to	the	explanation	of	recognition	memory	performance.	
	
The	 parahippocampal	 region	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 responsible	 for	 slow	 learning,	 because	
these	 structures	 are	 thought	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 memory-based	 generalization,	 only	
possible	 after	 numerous	 learning	 trials.	 Thus,	 the	 computations	 performed	 here	would	
mainly	be	the	detection	of	statistical	regularities	across	events	and	items,	to	allow	similar	
stimuli	(or	events,	or	events’	features)	to	be	represented	similarly.	With	time,	this	would	
result	 in	 the	 representation	 of	 commonalities,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 representing	 common	
knowledge	structures	across	multiple	inputs.	In	the	CLS	framework,	the	core	function	of	
the	parahippocampal	gyrus	is	the	building	of	“knowledge”	structures	represented	in	the	
neocortex.	 These	 structures	 then	 allow	 generalization,	 which	 basically	 corresponds	 to	
our	ability	to	infer	properties	to	new	stimuli	based	on	prior	knowledge,	in	as	much	as	the	
novel	input	has	some	similarities	with	stored	representations.	In	the	model,	these	cortical	
computations	 support	 familiarity-based	 recognition.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 the	
representations	 built	 in	 the	 parahippocampal	 region	 (and	 especially	 the	 PRC)	 become	
sharper	with	 repetitions:	 after	 a	 sufficient	 number	of	 trials,	 the	PRC	 can	 represent	 e.g.	
objects	with	a	high	 level	of	sharpness,	making	these	representations	distinct	enough	to	
be	 discriminated	 from	 novel	 inputs.	 In	 that	 case,	 a	 single	 signal	 detection	 theory	 is	
sufficient	 to	 account	 for	 recognition	 performance.	 However,	 whenever	 high	
discriminative	 demands	 are	 placed	 on	 recognition	 (e.g.	 high	 similarity	 between	 targets	
and	foils),	the	parahippocampal	computations	would	not	allow	sufficient	accuracy.	These	
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subhippocampal	computations	would	thus	be	responsible	for	objects	 /	 items	or	context	
representations,	in	a	similar	way	to	the	BIC	model.	
	
By	contrast,	the	main	computation	performed	in	the	hippocampus	is	pattern	separation,	
a	 process	 whereby	 similar	 inputs	 can	 nonetheless	 trigger	 orthogonal	 representations.	
This	 is	a	mandatory	mechanism	to	avoid	 the	“catastrophic	 interference”	 that	would	be	
associated	with	 familiarity-signal	 alone.	 In	 other	words,	 if	 generalization	were	 the	 only	
driving	force,	then	processing	of	any	single	stimulus	would	result	in	“overwritting”	prior	
representations.	On	 the	 contrary,	 pattern	 separation	 allows	 for	 the	 unique	 recollective	
experience	 that	 characterizes	 episodic	 memory	 (i.e.	 recollection-based	 recognition).	
Pattern	 separation	 supports	 the	 rapid	 encoding	of	neocortical	 patterns	of	 activity	 (e.g.	
multiple	sensory	inputs	while	an	event	unfolds)	so	that	when	presenting	with	partial	cues	
later	on,	the	recall	of	the	event	is	made	possible	through	pattern	completion.	
Kumaran,	Hassabis,	&	McClelland,	(2016)	and	Kumaran	&	McClelland,	(2012)	have	notably	
updated	 the	CLS	 framework	 in	way	 that	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	present	work.	An	 important	
modification	 is	 that	 this	 new	 model	 (REcurrency	 and	 Episodic	 Memory	 Results	 in	
GEneralization,	 REMERGE)	 allows	 for	 rapid	 neocortical	 learning	 to	 occur,	 but	 only	 in	
situations	where	 the	 sensory	 input	 is	 consistent	with	 prior	 knowledge	 (in	 the	 form	 of	
memory	 schemas,	 see	 Chapter	 VI).	 In	 these	 cases,	 prior	 knowledge	 at	 encoding	would	
result	 in	accelerated	 system	consolidation	 (Fernández	&	Morris,	 2018a;	Wang	&	Morris,	
2010;	see	also	Packard	et	al.,	2017;	Tibon,	Cooper,	&	Greve,	2017).	
	
I.8.3.4.	Summary	of	process-based	models	
	
The	process	approach	models	acknowledge	the	idea	of	a	functional	dissociation	with	the	
MTL,	distinguishing	between	 familiarity	and	 recollection.	These	models	consistently	put	
forward	 the	 PRC	 as	 a	 critical	 structure	 for	 familiarity,	 while	 the	 hippocampus	 is	
considered	the	key	structure	for	recollection.	Similarly,	all	these	models	highlight	the	role	
of	pattern	separation	and	pattern	completion	processes	as	critical	for	the	building	of	new	
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memories,	 and	 especially	 for	 recollection,	 thus	 contributing	 to	 moving	 the	 field	 from	
psychologically	 defined	 processes	 (i.e.	 recollection	 and	 familiarity)	 to	 computationally	
defined	 processes	 (i.e.	 pattern	 separation	 vs.	 pattern	 completion).	 Some	 differences	
must	be	outlined.	
First,	 the	Aggleton	 view	 integrates	 larger	 scale	MTL-neocortical	 networks	 as	 important	
for	these	processes,	while	the	other	models	mainly	focus	on	the	MTL	structures.	Second,	
the	DD	and	CRAFT	models	only	explicitly	predicts	 that	 familiarity-based	 recognition	can	
support	rapid	learning	of	associations,	provided	that	either	1/	 intra-items	associations;	2/	
within-domain	inter-items	(e.g.	face-face)	associations	or	3/	between-domain	items	under	
specific	 task	 instructions	 emphasizing	 unitization,	 are	 considered.	 Third,	 the	 REMERGE	
model	 importantly	 adds	 a	 situation	 where	 rapid	 learning	 could	 occur,	 namely	 when	
incoming	information	is	consistent	with	prior	knowledge.	
Altogether,	some	of	the	process-based	models	of	recognition	memory	therefore	predict	
that	 new	 learning	may	 be	 supported	 by	 extra-hippocampal	 neocortical	 structures	 at	 a	
fast	rate,	under	certain	circumstances.	Models	then	diverge	on	these	circumstances,	but	
one	can	speculate	that	unitization	and	congruence	with	prior	knowledge	would	be	critical	
factors	for	such	learning	to	occur.		
	
I.8.4.	Representational-hierarchical	models	
	
We	will	only	shortly	here	describe	the	more	recent	and	innovative	accounts	for	the	role	of	
the	MTL	 in	 learning.	 Accumulated	 evidence	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades	 has	 demonstrated	
that	the	MTL,	including	the	hippocampus,	was	also	involved	in	perception	and	short-term	
or	working	memory	 tasks,	 thus	 casting	 doubt	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 unique	 specialization	 in	
long-term	memory	(for	review,	see	e.g.	Yonelinas,	2013).	This	has	 led	several	authors	to	
new	theoretical	 approaches	where	mnemonic	and	perceptual	 functions	of	 the	MTL	are	
no	longer	segregated.	Since	these	theories	assume	that	the	MTL	is	no	longer	a	functional	
entity	devoted	to	declarative	learning,	and	that	memory	itself	cannot	be	fully	separated	
from	 other	 elementary	 cognitive	 processes,	 we	 decided	 not	 to	 report	 it	 with	 other	
contents-	or	processes-based	models.	
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The	 dominant	 model	 here	 is	 the	 perceptual-mnemonic	 or	 representational-hierarchical	
view	 (Rosemary	 A.	 Cowell,	 Bussey,	 &	 Saksida,	 2010;	 Elisabeth	 A.	 Murray,	 Bussey,	 &	
Saksida,	 2007).	 Along	with	 prior	 proposals	 (e.g.	 the	 BIC	model,	 see	 also	Mishkin	 et	 al.,	
1997),	 this	 view	 acknowledges	 the	 hierarchical	 organization	 of	 the	MTL,	 but	 considers	
that	 learning	 and	memory,	 rather	 than	 being	 a	 cognitive	 function	per	 se,	 would	 result	
from	 the	 dynamic	 interactions	 between	 high-	 and	 low-level	 perceptual	 representations	
distributed	widely	in	the	brain	(Graham,	Barense,	&	Lee,	2010).	Structures	of	the	MTL	also	
are	 considered	 to	 have	 specific	 processing	 properties,	 according	 to	 a	 hierarchical-
representational	 principle.	 This	 principle	 states	 that,	 along	 the	 visual	 ventral	 pathway,	
information	 processing	 is	 incrementally	 integrated	 up	 to	 the	 PRC,	 and	 finally	 to	 the	
hippocampus,	 resulting	 in	 a	 gradient	 of	 complexity	 in	 the	 representations	 built	 from	
caudal	 to	 rostral	 region.	 Thus,	while	 the	 “earliest”	 structures	would	 deal	with	 building	
representations	 of	 items	 features,	 and	 these	 representations	would	 become	more	 and	
more	 integrated,	 finally	 reaching	 the	 PRC	 where	 the	 “entity”	 could	 be	 represented,	
namely	the	set	of	features	and	properties	of	a	stimuli	embedded	within	a	single,	unique	
“conjunctive”	representation	(see	Figure	19).	This	complex	representation	would	serve	as	
an	 input	 to	 the	hippocampus,	 in	charge	of	binding	together	 these	representations	with	
their	spatial	relationships	(e.g.	Barense	et	al.,	2012).	
	
Figure	19.	Illustration	of	the	representational-hierarchical	view	(taken	from	Douglas	&	Lee,	2015).	
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This	model	therefore	highlights	how	distinct	tasks	–	including	memory	tasks	–	may	place	
distinct	 demands	 regarding	 representational	 complexity.	 For	 example,	 perceptual	
discrimination	 between	 conceptually	 similar	 but	 perceptually	 dissimilar	 objects	 would	
place	little	demand	on	visual	discrimination,	so	that	it	could	be	successfully	preformed	by	
caudal	 structures.	 By	 contrast,	 either	 perceptual	 discrimination	 or	 recognition	memory	
for	 highly	 similar	 objects	 –	 both	 conceptually	 and	 perceptually	 –	 may	 require	 the	
perirhinal	 cortex	 to	 be	 involved,	 or	 the	 hippocampus	 depending	 on	 e.g.	 background	
contextual	features	similarity.	This	 is	a	radically	different	view	because	typical	reasoning	
in	terms	of	“encoding,	storage	and	retrieval”	ever	since	Sir	Arthur	Melton	(e.g.,	Melton,	
1963)	 no	 longer	 holds	 here.	 In	 an	 elegant	 study	 in	 rats	 for	 example,	 Bartko,	 Cowell,	
Winters,	Bussey,	&	Saksida,	(2010)	have	shown	increased	sensibility	to	interference	in	an	
animal	model	of	amnesia	could	be	explained	inclusively	by	impaired	encoding	and	storage	
and	 retrieval.	 After	 postrhinal	 cortex	 damage,	 encoding	 and	 storage	 are	 impaired	
because	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 most	 complex	 representation	 of	 a	 stimulus	 is	 not	
possible,	only	lower	levels	of	representational	complexity	can	be	achieved.	If	the	memory	
task	 further	 requires	 the	 resolution	 of	 ambiguities	 between	 foils	 and	 targets	 that	 are	
similar,	then	retrieval	will	be	impaired	as	well,	because	the	cue	processing	is	not	sufficient	
to	 resolve	 the	 ambiguity,	 and	 because	 ad	 hoc	 stored	 representation	 is	 no	 longer	
available.	Thus,	the	typical	interference	effect	explaining	amnesia	can	be	considered	as	a	
direct	by-product	of	 impaired	 representations	 at	 some	 level	 of	 the	 ventral	 pathway,	 as	
long	as	 the	 location	of	 the	 lesion	 is	 incompatible	with	the	representational	demands	of	
the	 task,	 irrespectively	 of	 whether	 perception	 or	 memory	 are	 involved.	 Note	 that	
regarding	 recognition	 memory,	 this	 theoretical	 view	 does	 not	 map	 recollection	 or	
familiarity-based	 retrieval	 processes	 on	 specific	 MTL	 structures.	 Each	 structure	 can	
theoretically	contribute	to	both	processes,	depending	on	the	representational	demands	
of	 the	 task.	 However,	 given	 that	 the	 hippocampus	 is	 thought	 to	 encode	 the	 spatial	
relationships	 between	 complex	 item	 representations,	 the	model	 predicts	 that	 recall	 or	
recognition	tasks	requiring	the	maintenance	and	retrieval	of	complex	episodes	including	
critical	 spatial	 components,	 which	 often	 matches	 with	 recollective	 experiences,	 will	
depend	on	the	hippocampus.	With	that	respect,	a	highly	related	theoretical	perspective	
for	 the	 role	of	 the	hippocampus	 is	 the	 scene	construction	 theory	 (Hassabis	&	Maguire,	
2007,	2009;	Maguire	&	Mullally,	2013),	which	argues	that	the	core	hippocampal	function	
would	be	to	build	mental	scenes,	a	scene	being	defined	by	an	ensemble	of	at	least	three	
distinct	entities	sharing	spatial	relationships	within	a	3D	mental	image.	
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Finally,	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 representational	 account	 for	 the	 present	 work	 can	 be	
illustrated	with	 the	 following	example.	Consider	 two	distinct	 situations,	one	where	you	
meet	a	new	colleague	at	work,	and	the	other	where	you	meet	a	friend	of	yours	at	work.	
In	both	 situations,	 extensive	prior	 knowledge	about	 the	context	 is	 available,	while	pre-
existing	representations	about	the	person	are	available	only	for	your	friend.	Due	to	this	
difference,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 a	 higher-level	 representation	would	 be	 achieved	 for	 the	
“friend	 at	 work”	 than	 for	 the	 “new	 colleague	 at	 work”	 event.	 This	 is	 because	 the	
background	context	 (work	setting)	and	the	face	trigger	 familiarity,	so	you	need	further	
representational	processing	to	separate	prior	representations	of	your	friend	(i.e.	meeting	
in	different	contexts	than	at	your	work)	from	that	particular	event.	By	contrast,	the	new	
colleague	face	does	not	yield	familiarity,	against	a	very	familiar	background.	This	face	 is	
therefore	perceived	as	highly	distinctive	(see	also	“isolation	effect”,	Hunt	&	Lamb,	2001)	
and	 a	 lower-level	 representation	 should	 be	 built.	Here,	 prior	 knowledge	may	 therefore	
have	distinct	influences	on	further	retrieval.	If	asked	to	simply	make	a	judgement	of	prior	
occurrence	on	the	faces	of	your	friend	or	of	the	new	colleague,	low-level	representations	
in	 the	ventral	 stream	should	do	the	 job,	and	therefore	no	 impact	of	prior	knowledge	 is	
expected.	 However,	 if	 the	 test	 involves	 face-context	 combinations	 as	 stimuli,	 with	 the	
context	held	constant	(i.e.	the	work	setting),	but	varying	the	faces	(targets	friends’	faces	
and	 new	 friends’	 faces,	 target	 new	 colleague’s	 face	 and	 new	 unknown	 faces)	 the	
situation	would	be	quite	different	and	prior	knowledge	would	play	a	role.	This	is	because	
the	 target	 friend’s	 face	 had	 been	 represented	 at	 a	 higher	 level	 in	 the	 hierarchy,	 thus	
allowing	 discrimination	 between	 this	 particular	 face-context	 association	 and	 distractor	
combinations	 involving	the	same	context	(work)	but	a	different	friend’s	face.	However,	
for	 the	 unknown	 face,	 a	 lower	 (i.e.	 less	 integrated)	 representation	 of	 the	 association	
should	make	 it	harder	 to	discriminate	 the	 target	 from	combinations	 involving	 the	same	
context	but	with	new	unknown	faces.	Following	this	logic,	prior	knowledge	influence	on	
recognition	memory	should	therefore	depend	on	the	available	cues	at	test.	
I.8.5.	Summary	of	recognition	memory	models	and	relevance	for	the	present	work	
	
Current	 influential	 theoretical	 accounts	 for	 recognition	memory	 vary	 greatly	 regarding	
the	 influence	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	 episodic	 learning.	 Most	 of	 these	 models	 do	 not	
explicitly	address	the	issue,	but	some	consistent	predictions	can	be	emphasized,	beyond	
the	differences	between	these	theories:	
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-	 Content-based,	 like	process-based,	models	predict	 that	 the	hippocampus	 is	 critical	 for	
the	reactivation	of	prior	knowledge	associated	with	the	memoranda.	It	follows	that	any	
condition	that	changes	hippocampal	processing	(like	in	the	case	of	hippocampal	amnesia,	
or	 even	 in	 aging)	 should	 affect	 any	 learning	 situation	 requiring	 prior	 knowledge	
reactivation.	
-	It	follows	that	in	most	situations	hippocampal	damage	should	result	in	the	absence	or	at	
least	significant	lessening,	of	prior	knowledge	influence	on	episodic	learning.	
-	Prior	knowledge	detection	(i.e.	assessment	of	the	congruency	of	the	sensory	input	with	
pre-existing	representations)	depends	on	an	extended	MTL-neocortical	network,	mainly	
involving	 medial	 prefrontal	 structures	 regarding	 congruency	 with	 prior	 conceptual	
knowledge.	
-	Some	of	 the	models	predict	 that,	under	specific	circumstances,	new	 learning	can	take	
place	outside	 the	hippocampus.	 Such	 learning	 can	be	achieved	 rapidly	 either	when	 the	
memoranda	 is	congruent	with	prior	knowledge,	or	 in	cases	where	unitization	can	occur	
(namely,	 when	 elements	 of	 an	 experience	 can	 be	 processed	 as	 a	 single	 entity).	 Prior	
knowledge	 could	 be	 one	 factor	 promoting	 unitization	 (e.g.	 processing	 the	 association	
between	 a	 famous	 singer	 and	 a	 concert	 stage	 as	 a	 single,	 highly	 integrated	
representation,	vs.	the	association	“your	neighbour	unexpectedly	met	in	a	concert	hall”).	
However,	 in	such	cases,	further	memory	could	only	be	based	on	familiarity	according	to	
some	frameworks	(e.g.,	BIC).	
-	Finally,	the	representational	account	would	predict	that	prior	knowledge	influence	will	
entirely	 depends	 on	 the	 representational	 demands	 at	 retrieval,	 with	 low	 demands	
supposedly	immune	to	prior	knowledge	effect,	and	high	demands	sensitive	to	it.	
	
Importantly,	the	process	approaches	to	recognition	memory	leads	to	a	conceptual	shift	in	
our	approach	to	memory	that	is	highly	relevant	for	the	present	work.	These	models	put	
forward	 the	 interactions	 between	memory	 processes,	 rather	memory	 systems.	 In	 that	
perspective,	 a	 new	 proposal	 is	 to	 consider	 knowledge	 systems	 rather	 than	 memory	
systems,	 and	 to	 use	 the	 term	 “memory”	 only	 by	 reference	 to	memory	 recollection,	 or	
“remembering”	(see	Craik	&	Lockhart,	1972;	Lockhart	&	Craik,	1990;	Nadel,	2008).	Thus,	
multiple	 knowledge	 system	 would	 represent	 distinct	 pre-existing	 representations	
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supported	by	specific	neural	routes	(i.e.	knowing	what,	knowing	where,	knowing	where,	
knowing	 how,	 knowing	 valence,	 Nadel,	 2008).	 This	 range	 of	 knowledge	 could	
differentially	 influence	 the	 reconstructive	 processes	 of	 memory	 (remembering),	
depending	on	the	task	goals	and	demands.	From	this	point	of	view	and	considering	our	
definition	of	 learning	(see	pp.	18-24),	 learning	would	have	 little	to	do	with	memory	(the	
act	of	remembering)	but	rather	with	how	we	extract	regularities	from	our	environment	
to	build	 new	knowledge,	 i.e.	 new	bricks	 for	 further	memory.	Given	 that	 all	 the	models	
described	 above	 consider	 that	 the	 extraction	 of	 regularities	 across	 experiences	 is	 not	
hippocampus-dependent,	 but	 rather	 depends	 on	 the	 parahippocampal	 gyrus	 and	
connected	structures,	we	will	be	especially	interested	in	how	knowledge	acquisition	and	
influence	may	stem	from	computational	processing	in	these	structures	(see	Expts	1	&	4).	
In	summary,	the	process-based	models	may	lead	to	a	paradigm	shift	in	memory	research,	
considering	that	prior	knowledge	is	the	key	factor	driving	further	memory.	Processes	like	
unitization	or	 congruency	 detection	may	be	 decisive	 in	 further	 remembering,	 either	 by	
allowing	 hippocampus-independent	 learning	 or	 by	 complementing	 the	 rapid,	
hippocampal-dependent,	episodic	learning.	
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Chapter	II	
A	historical	sketch	for	the	episodic	–	semantic	distinction:	evidence	from	
experimental	psychology	
	
	
“The	Swiss	psychologist	Claparede	(1911),	
discussing	the	feelings	of	familiarity	in	
recognition,	contrasted	two	kinds	of	mental	
connections:	those	established	between	
representations,	and	those	established	
between	representations	and	the	self.	He	
suggested	that	the	activation	of	connections	
of	the	first	kind	does	not	produce	any	feelings	
of	familiarity	or	recognition,	and	that	only	
those	'between	the	perception	and	the	feeling	
of	me-ness'	are	capable	of	doing	so	(1911,	p.	
63).”	Cited	in	Tulving,	1983,	p.17	
	
Figure	20.	Portrait	of	Edouard	Claparède,	
retrieved	from	
https://www.notrehistoire.ch/medias/51989		
At	 the	 time	 Ebbinghaus	 started	 to	 investigate	 his	 own	 learning	 abilities,	 learning	 and	
memory	were	highly	related	to	the	concept	of	knowledge.	That	 is,	 learning	was	mainly	
about	 the	 acquisition	 of	 knowledge,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 was	 associated	 with	 the	 idea	 of	
intelligence.	This	is	not	surprising	since	Greek	philosophers	defined	“intelligence”	as	“the	
activity	 allowing	 the	 acquisition	 of	 science”	 (e.g.	 Speussipus	 in	 “Definitions”,	 a	 list	 of	
definitions	for	the	terms	used	in	the	early	work	from	the	inescapable	Plato).	However,	at	
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variance	with	famous	pioneers	of	experimental	psychology	like	Wundt	or	Titchener,	and	
despite	of	 the	 common	use	of	 introspection	 (in	 that	Ebbinghaus	had	 for	 single	 subject	
himself),	 he	 fundamentally	 seeked	 for	 the	 mathematical	 rules	 guiding	 learning	 and	
memory.	Thus,	the	aim	was	not	to	characterize	the	 individual	structures	responsible	for	
learning,	 but	 rather	 to	 find	 out	 the	 fundamental	 rules	 underlying	memory	 processing.	
Ninety	years	later,	the	“Levels-of-processing	framework”	paper	(Craik	&	Lockhart,	1972)	-	
with	more	than	12200	citations	ever	since	(GoogleScholar)	 -	summarizes	this	processing	
approach:	“[...]	it	is	the	qualitative	nature	of	the	task,	the	kind	of	operations	carried	out	on	
the	 items,	 that	determines	 retention”	 (cited	 in	Roediger,	Gallo,	&	Geraci,	 2002).	Beyond	
the	 processing	 approaches	 though,	 structuralism	 remains	 a	 very	 strong	 framework	 in	
memory	research.	The	episodic-semantic	dichotomy	(Tulving,	1972)	was	interestingly	first	
on	stage	the	very	same	year,	 reaching	above	7700	citations	ever	since	(GoogleScholar),	
and	remains	widely	accepted	in	the	community,	at	least	as	an	unavoidable	heuristic.	The	
idea	of	multiple	memory	systems	pushed	into	the	background	the	assimilation	of	learning	
and	memory	to	the	concept	of	 intelligence,	or	of	conceptual	knowledge	 inherited	from	
Plato.	 Instead,	 memory	 is	 conceptualized	 as	 the	 set	 of	 processes	 allowing	 to	 encode,	
store	 and	 retrieve	 information	 within	 different	 memory	 stores	 hosting	 memory	
representations	with	 distinct	 properties,	 thus	making	 the	 synthesis	 between	 structural	
and	processing	approaches	(Tulving,	1995).	Let	us	start	with	a	reminder	of	how	this	idea	
came	up	in	the	late	1960’s.	
	
II.1.	What	do	we	learn	in	list-learning	paradigms?	
	
In	 the	 late	 1950’s	 and	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1960,	 namely	 at	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 “verbal	
learning”	 era,	 and	 at	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 “information	 processing”	 era	 (Tulving,	
2001),	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 researchers	 were	 investigating	 learning,	 without	 any	
mention	 of	 memory.	 However,	 and	 essentially	 because	 memory	 students	 were	 well	
aware	of	the	lack	of	ecological	validity	of	word-lists	learning	experiments,	they	started	to	
think	 about	 the	 words	 in	 terms	 of	 to-be-remembered	 events,	 rather	 than	 individual	
items.	The	rationale	for	this	is	that	when	subjects	recall	a	word	they	have	just	heard,	they	
do	 not	 inform	 the	 experimenter	 about	 how	 well	 they	 know	 this	 particular	 word	 (i.e.	
meaning,	 spelling);	 rather,	 and	 accordingly	 with	 the	 task	 instructions,	 they	 recall	 the	
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encoding	episode,	and	one	specific	moment	within	the	study	episode	when	a	given	word	
was	displayed	(Tulving,	1983).	In	another	words,	research	moved	from	“verbal	learning”	
to	“event	memory”.	
Endel	Tulving	started	 to	develop	 the	 idea	of	episodic	memory	because	he	 realized	 that	
“event	memory”	had	to	be	dissociated	from	the	kind	of	memory	described	 in	the	early	
attempts	towards	theorizing	how	language	operates.	The	term	“semantic	memory”	was	
used	after	Quillian	(1966)	to	designate	the	set	of	processes	involved	in	the	understanding	
of	language,	i.e.	the	meaning	of	words	and	sentences.	This	was	because	the	psychology	
of	 language	 acknowledged	 the	 necessary	 role	 of	 memory	 in	 knowledge	 about	 words	
meaning	 and,	more	 generally,	 in	 the	 use	 of	 language.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 seemed	 obvious	
that	these	language	theories	-	e.g.	about	the	structure	of	knowledge,	(Collins	&	Quillian,	
1969;	Collins	&	Quillian,	1972)	 -	could	bring	 little	 if	any	 insight	 into	the	problem	of	event	
memory.	Thus,	the	idea	of	episodic	memory	emerged	in	a	sense	from	an	epistemological	
issue:	the	psychology	of	recalling	“mini-events”	in	a	typical	word-list	learning	paradigm	
and	 the	 psychology	 of	 recalling	 the	 meaning	 of	 a	 given	 concept	 to	 comprehend	
language	could	not	be	confounded.	The	attempts	towards	such	a	distinction	resulted	in	
the	Chapter	10	entitled	“Episodic	and	semantic	memory”	from	the	book	“Organization	of	
memory”	 edited	 in	 1972,	 a	 Chapter	 that	 has	 been	 cited	 almost	 7800	 times	 (Google	
Scholar).	
We	 further	 consider	 empirical	 evidence	 from	 experimental	 psychology	 supporting	 the	
episodic-semantic	distinction.	
	
II.2.	Experimental	dissociations	in	the	psychology	of	learning	
	
The	distinction	proposed	between	episodic	and	semantic	memory	as	functionally	distinct	
memory	systems	takes	 its	root	 in	experimental	psychology.	Until	 the	end	of	the	1980’s,	
much	of	the	relevant	evidence	took	the	form	of	experimental	dissociations.	If	one	single	
variable	 is	found	to	alter	performance	in	an	episodic	memory	task,	but	not	 in	a	semantic	
memory	 task,	 or	 vice-versa,	 then	 a	 dissociation	 occurs,	 presumably	 supportive	 of	 the	
episodic-semantic	 distinction.	 A	 classical	 example	 can	 be	 found	 in	 paired	 associates	
experiments	 (see	Tulving,	 1983).	Consider	 the	 learning	of	 the	pair	A-B,	until	 the	subject	
accurately	responds	B	when	cued	with	A	(cued	recall	task).	Consider	now	the	response	B’	
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as	 the	most	 likely	 response	 of	 a	 subject	when	 asked	 to	 provide	 the	 first	 thing	 in	mind	
when	 prompted	with	 A	 (free	 association	 task).	 Along	 the	 episodic-semantic	 distinction	
hypothesis,	learning	of	the	association	between	A	and	B	is	typically	requiring	the	episodic	
memory	 system:	 it	 is	 about	 learning	 the	particular	 study	event	when	and	where	A	was	
paired	with	B.	By	contrast,	the	free	association	task	(e.g.	a	category	fluency	task)	would	
more	 likely	 rely	 upon	 the	 semantic	 memory	 system.	 While	 repeated	 study	 of	 A-B	 will	
result	 in	 the	gradual	acquisition	of	 the	association,	 this	will	have	no	 impact	on	 the	 free	
association	A-B’.	 In	 the	meantime,	 repetition	of	 the	A	cue	 in	a	 free	association	task	will	
unlikely	result	 in	different	responses	than	B’.	This	 is	an	 instance	of	dissociation	where	a	
single	variable	(repetition)	alters	performance	in	an	episodic,	but	not	semantic	task.	
After	the	1972	proposal	from	Tulving,	a	series	of	experiments	were	conducted	to	look	for	
such	 dissociations.	 These	 studies	 share	 a	 common	 a	 priori	 view	 about	 what	 is	 an	
“episodic”	memory	and	a	“semantic	task”;	based	on	this,	manipulation	of	the	materials	
(almost	always	words);	or	manipulation	of	the	encoding	task;	or	manipulation	of	“brain	
states”	(Tulving	1983)	e.g.	through	hypnosis	were	used	to	look	for	dissociations.	We	will	
further	 report	 some	 of	 these	 experiments	 because,	 while	 designed	 to	 address	 the	
question	 of	whether	 episodic	 and	 semantic	 are	 separate	memory	 systems	 (or	 “stores”),	
their	findings	and	the	methodological	efforts	achieved	to	dissociate	both	memory	systems	
consistently	 illustrate	 the	 close	 relationship	 between	 semantic	 and	 episodic	 memory	
functioning	 in	 healthy	 subjects.	 It	 is	 therefore	 surprising	 to	note	 that,	 over	 thirty	 years	
later,	 research	remains	essentially	 focused	on	one	or	 the	other	of	 these	systems	rather	
than	on	their	interactions.	
So-called	 “semantic”	 tasks	 varied	 greatly	 and	 included	 -	 among	 others:	 judgments	 of	
sentences’	 accuracy	 (sentence	 verification	 tasks),	 lexical	 decision	 tasks	 with	 priming	
effects,	 perceptual	 recognition	 (i.e.	 perceptual	 identification),	 free	 associations,	
vocabulary,	 spelling,	 judgment	 of	 word	 frequencies.	 “Episodic”	 tasks	 varied	 less,	
essentially	being	free	recall	or	Old/New	recognition	tasks.	
Shoben,	Wescourt,	&	Smith,	(1978)	(Expt.	2)	contrasted	performance	of	healthy	subjects	
in	 a	 sentence	 verification	 task	 and	 in	 a	 sentence	 recognition	 task.	 In	 the	 first	 phase,	
subjects	had	to	decide	as	fast	as	possible	whether	statements	like	“Tigers	have	stripes”	
or	“Donkeys	have	wings”	are	true	or	false.	In	the	second	phase,	subjects	were	asked	to	
discriminate	 from	 memory	 the	 sentences	 presented	 in	 the	 verification	 task	 from	 lure	
sentences.	The	two	phases	were	separated	by	several	days.	The	authors	manipulated	two	
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variables:	 relatedness	 and	 fanning.	 The	 former	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 degree	 of	 semantic	
relationship	 between	 the	 subject	 (i.e.	 “Tigers”)	 and	 the	 predicate	 terms	 of	 the	 target	
statements.	 For	 example,	 “Tigers	 have	 stripes”	 corresponds	 to	 a	 high	 degree	 of	
relatedness	while	“Tigers	have	thighs”	corresponds	to	a	low	degree	of	relatedness.	The	
latter	was	defined	as	 the	number	of	different	statements	per	subject,	or	per	predicate.	
For	example,	if	the	following	statements	were	presented	at	study	“Donkeys	have	wings”,	
“Donkeys	 are	 grey”,	 “Donkeys	 like	 carrots”,	 it	 was	 considered	 as	 a	 “3-Fan”	 condition.	
These	 independent	 variables	were	hypothesized	 to	have	 a	differential	 influence	on	 the	
sentence	 verification	 and	 sentence	 recognition	 tasks.	 Relatedness	 was	 found	 to	 alter	
reaction	 time	 during	 the	 former	 task	 (slower	 for	 high	 relatedness),	 but	 not	 the	 latter.	
Conversely,	 Fanning	 affected	 reaction	 time	 during	 recognition	 (increase),	 but	 not	
verification.	 The	 authors	 proposed	 that	 their	 finding	 of	 a	 double	 dissociation	 was	
consistent	with	the	distinction	between	an	episodic	and	a	semantic	memory	system.	
A	 similar	 experimental	 design	 contrasted	 a	 lexical	 decision	 task	 (Expt.	 1)	 with	 an	 item	
recognition	 task	 (Expt.	 4)	 (McKoon	 &	 Ratcliff,	 1979).	 Critically,	 priming	 effects	 were	
manipulated	in	both	task,	namely	the	finding	that	upon	fast	successive	presentations	of	
individual	 items,	 if	 the	n-1	 item	shares	 some	kind	of	 relationship	 (perceptual,	 semantic)	
with	 the	 n	 item,	 then	 a	 fastening	 of	 processing	will	 be	 observed	 for	 the	 n	 item.	 After	
studying	a	list	of	pairs	of	words,	subjects	had	to	make	a	lexical	decision	on	words,	some	
from	the	study	list	and	others	not,	or	a	word	recognition	task.	The	independent	variables	
were	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	prime	and	the	target	items	in	both	tasks.	
In	 addition	with	 a	 control	 condition	where	 the	prime	 and	 the	 target	 did	 not	 share	 any	
evident	 relationship,	 the	 association	 between	 the	 prime	 and	 the	 target	 could	 be	
“episodic”,	 “semantic”,	 or	 “episodic	 and	 semantic”.	 In	 the	 episodic	 condition,	 the	 n-1	
item	and	the	n	item	corresponded	to	a	study	pair.	In	the	semantic	condition,	the	n-1	item	
and	the	n	item	were	semantically	related	(e.g.	“green-grass”).	Finally,	in	the	“episodic	and	
semantic”	condition,	the	n-1	and	the	n	items	were	semantically	related	and	corresponded	
to	 a	 study	 pair.	 The	 reasoning	 was	 that	 if	 episodic	 and	 semantic	 are	 distinct	 memory	
stores,	then	semantic	priming	should	not	occur	during	recognition	memory,	but	it	should	
be	 the	 case	 during	 lexical	 decision	 task.	 Conversely,	 “episodic”	 priming	 should	 occur	
during	recognition,	but	not	lexical	decision.	To	make	it	clear,	we	can	take	the	example	of	
the	 study	pair	 “City	 -	Grass”	at	 study.	 If	 the	pair	 “Green	 -	Grass”	 follows	 it	 at	 test,	 this	
would	be	 an	 instance	of	 “semantic	 association”	only,	 because	while	 the	 first	word	has	
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not	been	studied,	it	is	highly	semantically	associated	with	the	second	one.	In	turn,	if	“City	
-	 Grass”	 was	 to	 be	 studied	 and	 again	 presented	 at	 test,	 this	 counts	 as	 an	 instance	 of	
“episodic	association”,	since	prior	study	has	led	to	the	episodic	association	between	the	
two	 words,	 without	 any	 semantic	 relationships.	 Finally,	 if	 the	 pair	 “Green	 -	 Grass”	 is	
studied	and	 followed	at	 test	by	“Green	 -	Grass”	would	be	an	 instance	of	“episodic	and	
semantic	 association”.	 The	 findings	 revealed	 that	 while	 in	 the	 lexical	 decision	 task,	
response	times	were	similar	across	the	prime-target	associations	conditions,	it	did	during	
the	recognition	task,	with	faster	responses	corresponding	to	the	“episodic	and	semantic”	
condition,	and	slower	responses	to	the	“semantic”	condition.	Tulving	again	took	this	as	
consistent	 with	 the	 distinction	 between	 separate	 semantic	 and	 episodic	 stores:	 the	
manipulation	 of	 one	 single	 variable	 at	 test	 (i.e.	 the	 kinds	 of	 prime-target	 associations)	
seems	to	uniquely	affect	an	episodic,	but	not	a	semantic	task.	
Similar	 dissociations	were	 reported	 by	 Herrmann	 &	 Harwood,	 (1980),	 who	 focused	 on	
response	time	analysis	during	a	recognition	test.	During	the	test,	subjects	were	showed	
word	 pairs	 of	 three	 types:	 two	 “old”	 words,	 two	 “new”	 words	 and	 mixed	 pairs,	 i.e.	
composed	of	a	new	and	an	old	word.	Subjects	had	to	identify	the	correct	type	of	pair	by	
reference	with	a	study	phase.	During	study,	subjects	explicitly	learned	lists	of	words,	each	
list	made	of	words	from	a	single	category.	At	test,	 the	authors	varied	two	 independent	
variables:	the	semantic	variable	corresponded	to	category	belongingness	of	the	test	pairs	
(Same	vs.	Different	category),	and	the	episodic	variable	-	called	“relatedness”	-	referred	
to	whether	the	words	in	the	test	pairs	belonged	to	a	studied	category	or	not.	The	authors	
focused	on	 the	 response	 times	 for	 the	“new”	pairs,	 and	 found	an	 interaction	between	
the	 semantic	 and	 episodic	 variables,	 resulting	 from	 a	 slower	 response	 time	 for	 words	
pertaining	to	distinct	category,	but	only	when	these	categories	had	been	studied.	When	it	
was	not	the	case,	the	semantic	variable	did	not	alter	response	times.	The	logic	behind	the	
interpretation	was	as	follows.	When	asked	to	make	recognition	memory	decision	during	
about	two	items	(presented	simultaneously	in	this	experiment),	the	response	time	will	be	
influenced	 by	 the	 intrinsic	 organization	 of	 the	 store	 where	 the	 information	 is	
represented.	If	the	items	from	a	pair	are	closely	represented	in	that	store,	then	one	item	
should	prime	the	other,	resulting	in	fastening	of	the	decision.	In	the	“related”	condition,	
the	 finding	 of	 faster	 responses	when	 the	words	 belong	 to	 the	 same	 category	 reflects	
such	mutual	priming.	The	key	issue	is	to	establish	whether	this	priming	effect	results	from	
the	organizational	properties	of	a	single	store	or	from	distinct	organizational	properties	
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from	distinct	 (episodic	 vs.	 semantic)	 stores?	 Put	 simply,	 imagine	 one	 had	 studied	 a	 list	
tools’	 names	 (e.g.	 screwdriver	 -	 hammer	 -	 pincers	 -	 paintbrush)	 and	 a	 list	 of	 vehicles’	
names	(truck	 -	car	 -	bike	 -	underground).	At	test,	 let’s	consider	the	following	new	pairs,	
both	related	to	the	study	categories:	“train	-	plane”	and	“boat	-	drill”.	The	authors	found	
that	 response	 time	 for	 the	 latter	 was	 slower	 than	 for	 the	 former.	 Is	 this	 due	 to	 the	
semantic	pre-experimental	organization	of	these	items,	or	is	this	related	to	their	episodic	
organization	 resulting	 from	 the	 study	 of	 these	 categories	 during	 learning?	 Since	 the	
authors	found	that	in	the	unrelated	condition	(i.e.	when	the	category	of	test	words	was	
different	from	the	categories	presented	at	study),	response	times	were	similar	when	the	
words	 in	a	pair	belonged	to	same	or	different	categories,	they	concluded	that	episodic,	
not	semantic,	organization	was	responsible	for	response	time	modulation	in	the	related	
condition.	The	interpretation	therefore	supported	the	episodic-semantic	distinction,	since	
an	“episodic	variable”	(test	words’	category	relatedness	with	studied	words),	but	not	a	
“semantic	variable”	(same	vs.	different	category	belongingness	of	the	words	in	the	test	
pairs),	alters	performance	in	the	same	recognition	task.	
Finally,	episodic	 recognition	and	perceptual	 recognition	of	words	were	contrasted	after	
manipulating	 the	 encoding	 instructions,	 so	 that	 attention	 of	 the	 subjects	was	 oriented	
towards	the	words	visual	appearance	(capital	typing	or	not),	auditive	features	(rhyming	
with	a	given	word	or	not),	or	its	meaning	(Jacoby	&	Dallas,	1981,	Expt.	1).	In	the	episodic	
recognition	 task,	 the	 target	 words	 were	 mixed	 with	 distractors	 and	 subjects	 had	 to	
decide	whether	the	word	was	“Old”	(i.e.	displayed	at	study)	or	“New”.	In	the	perceptual	
recognition,	the	same	set	of	Old	and	New	words	were	used,	and	the	items	were	visually	
flashed	 for	 35ms.	 Subjects	 had	 to	 say	 what	 the	 word	 was.	 The	 results	 showed	 that	
encoding	instructions	influenced	test	accuracy	in	the	episodic	recognition	task	only,	and	
not	 in	 the	perceptual	 recognition	 task.	 In	other	words,	 the	occurrence	of	an	event	 (i.e.	
studying	a	word)	can	have	 independent	effects	on	a	supposedly	episodic	task	(episodic	
recognition)	 and	 on	 a	 supposedly	 semantic	 task	 (word	 identification,	 called	 perceptual	
recognition	in	the	experiment).	Tulving,	(1983,	1984a,	1984b)	interpreted	this	as	evidence	
for	distinct	memory	stores.	
Note	that	other	experimental	studies	have	been	considered	as	supportive	of	the	episodic-
semantic	distinction,	but	are	less	relevant	here	because	they	are	not	as	representative	of	
the	episodic-semantic	interactions	as	the	one	detailed	above.	We	must	however	mention	
them	 shortly:	 among	 33	memory	measures,	 only	 low	 correlations	 between	 supposedly	
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“episodic”	 and	 “semantic”	 performance	 was	 found	 (Underwood,	 Boruch,	 &	 Malmi,	
1978);	using	hypnose-induced	amnesia,	it	was	found	that	post-amnesia	recall	of	word	lists	
learned	 during	 the	 hypnotic	 state	 was	 severely	 impaired,	 but	 not	 free	 association	
performance	using	 target	words	 from	 the	 studies	 lists	 (Kihlstrom,	Evans,	Orne	&	Orne,	
1980,	Expt.	1).	
	
II.3.	Distinction	vs.	collaboration?	
	
	
Figure	21.	Is	the	episodic	semantic	distinction	necessary	considering	massive	evidence	of	
collaboration?	
	
A	 short	 summary	 of	 these	 findings	 actually	 highlights	 that	 semantic	 variables	 affect	
episodic	 performance	 either	 at	 encoding	 or	 at	 retrieval,	 a	 finding	 consistent	 with	 the	
Levels-Of-Processing	 account	 (“LOP”,	 Craik	 &	 Lockhart,	 1972),	 stating	 that	 deeper	
processing	at	encoding	(e.g.	semantic	processing)	results	in	higher	subsequent	memory.	
The	most	typical	finding	is	perhaps	the	one	from	Jacoby	and	Dallas	(1981,	Expt.	1),	where	
a	semantic	orienting	task	at	encoding	(i.e.	processing	the	meaning	of	target	words)	yields	
a	72%	increase	in	recognition	accuracy	by	comparison	with	a	physical	orienting	task	(i.e.	is	
the	 word	 typed	 in	 capitals?).	 At	 retrieval,	 semantic	 priming	 also	 increases	 response	
latencies	by	19%	by	comparison	with	episodic	priming	(McKoon	and	Ratcliff,	1979,	Expts.	1	
&	4).	 Conversely,	 other	 studies	 contrasting	 recognition	 (i.e.	 episodic)	 and	 identification	
(i.e.	 semantic)	 tasks	 have	 shown	 that	 studying	 a	word	 increases	 the	 performance	 in	 a	
later	semantic	task	-	suggesting	that	episodic	memory	affects	semantic	memory	as	well	-	
but,	 the	 benefit	 does	 not	 correlate	 with	 further	 probability	 of	 recognizing	 this	 word	
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(Jacoby	&	Witherspoon,	1982).	Importantly,	such	independence	between	the	influences	
on	 a	 study	 event	 on	 further	 semantic	 vs.	 episodic	 tasks	 lacks	 generalization.	 For	
example,	 when	 pseudowords	 are	 used,	 prior	 study	 yields	 to	 a	 positive	 correlation	
between	 further	 recognition	 and	 identification	 performance	 (Jacoby	 &	Whitherspoon,	
1982).	
Most	 critically,	 the	 interpretations	 favouring	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 separate	 semantic	 and	
episodic	 stores	 had	 been	 challenged	 on	 several	 grounds.	 For	 example,	 it	 has	 been	
pointed	out	that	“perceptual	recognition”	tasks	(namely,	identification	of	stimuli	-	almost	
always	words	-	after	very	short	presentation)	cannot	be	considered	as	a	typical	semantic	
task,	 since	procedural	 and	 /	 or	 lexical	memories	 are	 involved	 (McKoon,	Ratcliff,	&	Dell,	
1986).	 Similarly,	 lexical	 decision	 tasks	 cannot	 be	 considered	 as	 optimal	 proxies	 for	
semantic	memory,	and	dissociations	between	lexical	decision	performance	and	semantic	
performance	 have	 been	 reported	 (Blazely,	 Coltheart,	 &	 Casey,	 2005).	 Even	 when	 the	
tasks	 used	 to	 gather	 dissociations	 seem	 to	 carry	 more	 clear-cut	 construct	 validity	 for	
semantic	vs.	episodic	memory,	like	in	sentence	verification	vs.	sentence	recognition	tasks	
(Shoben	 et	 al.	 1978),	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 how	multiple	 stores	 would	 better	 account	 for	 the	
results	 than	 a	 single	 memory	 store.	 The	 findings	 that	 high	 relatedness	 items	 were	
processed	 more	 slowly	 than	 low	 relatedness	 items	 in	 the	 verification	 task,	 while	 no	
relatedness	effect	was	observed	in	the	recognition	task,	is	interpreted	as	evidence	for	the	
fact	that	semantic	information	is	used	in	the	former	task,	but	not	in	the	later.	As	such,	this	
could	perfectly	fit	with	the	idea	that	both	prior	occurrence	and	semantic	knowledge	can	
be	represented	 in	a	single	memory	store	(Anderson	&	Ross,	 1980;	Mccloskey	&	Santee,	
1981).	Moreover,	 the	 idea	that	 in	this	experiment,	semantic	 information	at	 retrieval	 (i.e.	
words	 relatedness	 in	 the	 sentence)	 does	 not	 affect	 episodic	 recognition	 is	 a	 rather	
isolated	 result	 among	 the	 wealth	 of	 studies	 reporting	 that	 semantic	 information	
generally	 improves	 further	memory	 (Piaget,	 1929;	Bartlett,	 1932;	Bransford	&	Johnson,	
1972;	Brod,	Werkle-Bergner,	&	Shing,	2013;	Craik	&	Tulving,	1975;	Klatzky	&	Forrest,	1984;	
Lewis	&	Anderson,	1976;	Reggev,	Sharoni,	&	Maril,	2017;	Schulman,	1974).	
	
An	 interim	summary	of	the	evidence	from	experimental	psychology	 in	the	early	
years	 of	 the	 episodic-semantic	 distinction	 therefore	 could	 be	 found	 in	 the	
following	 quote:	 “[...]	 Tulving’s	 depiction	 of	 semantic	 and	 episodic	 memory	 has	
had	 obvious	 heuristic	 value.	 But	 in	 Elements	 he	 argues	 that	 is	 has	 more;	 that	 it	
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represents	 a	 distinction	 between	 two	 systems	 of	memory	with	 the	 potential	 for	
independent	function.	Unfortunately,	 the	evidence	for	dual-systems	approach	(...)	
is	far	from	unequivocal.”	(Klatzky,	1984)	
	
A	particular	ambivalence	lies	in	the	interpretations	made	by	Tulving	of	two	of	the	above-
mentioned	experiments.	
First,	to	estimate	priming	in	lexical	decision,	McKoon	&	Ratcliff,	(1979)	used	the	condition	
where	the	targets	words	were	absent	from	the	study	list,	to	avoid	episodic	contamination	
on	 the	priming	effect.	On	 the	 contrary,	 Tulving	 (1983)	uses	 the	 condition	where	 target	
words	were	 part	 of	 the	 study	 list.	Under	 the	 former	 condition,	 the	 response	 times	 for	
primed	 words	 do	 vary	 along	 with	 the	 kind	 of	 prime-target	 relationship	 (i.e.	 semantic,	
episodic	 or	mixed),	 just	 like	 it	 does	 in	 the	 recognition	 task.	 Under	 the	 latter	 condition	
though,	 response	 times	 for	primed	words	are	not	 influenced	by	 the	priming	conditions	
(see	McKoon	et	al.,	1986;	Ratcliff	&	McKoon,	1986).	Finding	of	episodic	priming	in	lexical	
decision	task	in	subsequent	experiments	(Mckoon	&	Ratcliff,	1986)	had	further	supported	
the	unitary	view	(see	also	Neely	&	Durgunoǧlu,	1985),	and	suggested	that	the	distinction	
between	semantic	and	episodic	priming	found	in	lexical	decision	vs.	recognition	could	be	
accounted	 for	 by	 hypothesizing	 distinct	 retrieval	 processes	 without	 requiring	 the	 dual	
semantic-episodic	view.	As	early	as	in	the	late	1970’s,	this	pointed	out	that	subtle	effects	
of	 semantic	 information	 in	 subsequent	 learning	could	occur	or	not,	depending	on	 the	
nature	of	the	retrieval	processes	involved.	
Second,	 the	 finding	 that	 the	 orienting	 task	 at	 encoding	 boosted	 episodic	 recognition	
leaving	unaffected	perceptual	recognition	(Jacoby	&	Dallas,	1981)	is	also	interpreted	as	an	
instance	of	a	dissociation	between	semantic	and	episodic	memories	(Tulving,	1983,	1984).	
A	careful	examination	of	the	authors’	discussion	however	suggests	otherwise.	Even	if	one	
considers	“perceptual	recognition”	as	a	semantic	memory	task,	the	authors	acknowledge	
the	contradictions	between	their	results	and	the	finding	of	McKoon	&	Ratcliff	(1979),	and	
asked	 (p.	 336):	 “How	 is	 memory	 for	 specific	 occurrences	 of	 an	 item	 related	 to	 more	
general	 memory	 of	 that	 item?”.	 Rather	 than	 considering	 that	 general	 memory	 and	
memory	for	a	specific	occurrence	could	rely	on	separate	stores,	the	authors	put	forward	
the	 recent	 evidence	 for	 two	 distinct	 basis	 for	 recognition	 memory.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
relative	perceptual	fluency	can	lead	to	the	awareness	that	the	item	has	been	experienced	
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before.	On	the	other	hand,	elaboration	of	the	item’s	context	can	be	achieved	at	retrieval	
to	provide	evidence	of	prior	encounter	during	the	study	phase	(the	study	event).	The	idea	
here	is	that	the	latter	basis	for	recognition	would	undergone	semantic	influences	(like	the	
ones	 resulting	 from	 levels	 of	 processing	manipulations	 at	 encoding),	 while	 the	 former	
would	involve	processes	more	similar	to	perceptual	recognition,	thus	being	not	sensitive	
to	 semantic	 elaboration	 at	 encoding.	 This	 proposal	 had	 the	 advantage	 of	 reconciling	
divergent	 findings,	 and	 being	 compatible	with	 the	 ideas	 from	Atkinson	&	 Juola,	 (1974)	
and	Mandler,	(1980)	that	recognition	memory	may	not	rely	on	a	unitary	process.	
	
II.4.	Summary	
	
To	sum	up	the	above	elements,	this	brief	historical	sketch	of	empirical	evidence	derived	
from	experimental	psychology	for	the	episodic-semantic	distinction	reveals	its	frailty.	The	
proposed	distinction	has	in	fact	a	still	in-use	obvious	heuristic	value,	but	evidence	has	not	
clearly	tipped	the	scale	in	favour	of	separate	stores.	What	emerges,	however,	is	that	pre-
experimental	 associations	 have	 a	 strong	 influence	 on	 further	 learning,	 either	 during	
encoding	 or	 retrieval.	 However,	 the	 mechanisms	 underlying	 this	 influence	 are	 not	
specified.	 Interestingly,	 these	series	of	experiments	have	also	put	 forward	 the	value	of	
recognition	 memory	 tasks	 to	 probe	 episodic	 learning,	 and	 its	 relationships	 with	
semantic	memory.	Furthermore,	it	is	noteworthy	that	not	only	recognition	memory	tasks	
started	to	be	a	standard	in	the	psychology	of	memory	at	that	time,	but	also	that	debates	
between	 structure-	 and	 process-based	 approaches	 have	 witnessed	 the	 birth	 of	 dual-
processes	models	 of	 recognition	memory.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 search	 for	 dissociations	
between	semantic	and	episodic	memory	stores	has	promoted	the	idea	that	the	judgment	
of	 prior	 occurrence	 may	 have	 two	 distinct	 basis:	 a	 sense	 of	 prior	 exposure	 based	 on	
perceptual	fluency	on	the	one	hand,	and	an	elaborative	retrieval	process	allowing	to	re-
instantiate	the	study	event	on	the	other	hand.	
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Chapter	III		
A	historical	sketch	for	the	episodic	–	semantic	distinction:	evidence	from	
neuropsychology	
	
	
Figure	22.	Neuropsychological	era	of	memory	research.	Free	adaptation	of	the	butcher-in-the-bus	
phenomenon	
	
III.1.	Early	years:	selective	semantic	memory	impairments	
	
It	is	worth	noting	that	more	than	two	decades	of	research	were	needed	after	the	seminal	
description	of	 the	patient	HM	 (Scoville	&	Milner,	 1957)	 to	 finally	 get	 a	 formal	 proposal	
about	 preserved	 and	 impaired	memories	 in	 amnesia	 following	 bilateral	 damage	 to	 the	
MTL.	It	took	exactly	23	years	for	the	first	occurrence	of	“declarative”	memory	to	appear	
in	the	famous	Science	paper	from	Neil	Cohen	and	Larry	Squire,	cited	over	2800	times	ever	
since	(Cohen	&	Squire,	1980).	In	the	meantime	however,	the	idea	of	a	distinction	between	
episodic	 and	 semantic	 memories	 was	 mainly	 grounded	 on	 findings	 from	 experimental	
psychology	 and	 theoretical	 arguments,	 but	 still	 lacked	 robust	 empirical	 evidence	 in	
neuropsychology.	Consider	that	in	1984,	one	of	the	comments	of	the	Behavioural	&	Brain	
Sciences	 paper	 of	 Endel	 Tulving	 was	 entitled	 “Episodic	 versus	 Semantic	 Memory:	 A	
distinction	whose	time	has	come	–	and	gone?”	(Hintzmann,	p.	240).	Still,	neuropsychology	
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since	HM	has	proved	 very	powerful	 in	 identifying	 core	brain	 regions	 as	 responsible	 for	
unique	 cognitive	 computations,	 thus	 highlighting	 the	 relative	 independency	 between	
some	mental	functions,	and	memory	was	of	no	exception.	
It	is	to	Elizabeth	Warrington	that	we	owe	the	pioneer	work	identifying	semantic	memory	
as	 a	 potential	 separate	 entity	 from	 episodic	 memory.	 In	 1975,	 she	 described	 three	
patients	who	seemed	to	be	selectively	impaired	at	understanding	the	meaning	of	visual	
objects	and	words,	despite	an	overall	preservation	of	reading	and	talking	skills	as	well	
as	 general	 intellectual	 efficiency	 (E.	 K.	 Warrington,	 1975).	 Of	 special	 interest	 was	 the	
patient	AB,	who	failed	to	define	concrete	words	but	could	do	so	for	abstract	words.	 In	
response	 to	 the	word	 “Macaroni”,	AB	 said	 he	 had	 “no	 idea”	of	what	 this	word	would	
mean.	Meanwhile,	when	 prompted	with	 the	word	 “Soul”,	 his	 answer	was	 “Your	 basic	
interior	 element”	 (Warrington,	 1979,	 p.16).	 Warrington	 contrasted	 such	
neuropsychological	profiles	with	their	apparently	normal	day-to-day	memory:	“Yet	these	
patients	were	not	at	all	like	amnesic	patients	with	a	global	amnesia	for	all	on-going	events.	
Unlike	an	amnesic	patient	they	were	all	well-orientated	in	time	and	place;	their	conversation	
was	not	so	repetitive	and	they	were	able	to	refer	forwards	and	backwards	to	detailed	events	
of	 importance	 in	 their	 lives.”	 (Warrington,	 1975,	 p.	 650).	 This	 allowed	 the	 author	 to	
suggest	a	distinction	between	semantic	and	“event”,	or	episodic,	memories.	However,	as	
she	acknowledged,	the	patients	AB	and	EM	were	severely	impaired	in	verbal	recall	tasks	
as	well	as	in	recognition	memory	tests	involving	verbal,	or	non	verbal,	materials,	where	
they	 scored	 even	 below	 the	 level	 of	 global	 amnesic	 patients	 (exception	 made	 of	
recognition	memory	for	paintings).	Thus,	one	could	hardly	consider	these	case	reports	as	
an	 instance	 of	 dissociation	 between	 preserved	 event	 memory	 despite	 impaired	
semantic	memory.	
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Remarkably,	 she	 noted	 that	 during	 paired-associates	 learning	 tasks,	 amnesic	
patients	could	benefit	from	semantic	associations	between	the	words	in	a	pair	(e.g.	
fruit	 –	 apple)	 to	 improve	 cued	 recall.	 However,	 she	 also	 observed	 that	when	 the	
verbal	association	did	not	refer	to	obvious	semantic	categories	(e.g.	green	–	grass),	
this	no	 longer	helped	 the	patients.	 Thus,	 shortly	 after	Tulving’s	proposal	 (1972),	 a	
thorough	 neuropsychological	 approach	 had	 already	 suggested	 that,	 when	 pre-
existing	 representations	 (presumably	 in	 semantic	 memory)	 were	 available	 at	
encoding,	 this	 could	 benefit	 episodic	 learning.	 Such	 empirical	 evidence	
strengthened	the	idea	of	an	episodic	–	semantic	distinction,	but	also	highlighted	the	
close	interactions	between	these	memories.	
	
Later	work	demonstrating	category-specific	impairments	in	patients	with	herpes	simplex	
encephalitis	(Warrington	&	Shallice,	1984),	and	the	first	description	of	semantic	dementia,	
a	degenerative	condition	that	selectively	targets	semantic	memory	(Snowden	et	al.,	1989)	
brought	more	convincing	evidence	 that	 impairments	of	 semantic	memory	could	occur	
despite	leaving	episodic	memory	intact.	
What	was	missing,	however,	was	the	demonstration	of	normal	semantic	learning	despite	
abolished	episodic	learning.	
	
III.2.	Does	evidence	for	preserved	semantic	testing	in	amnesia	speak	for	the	episodic	
semantic	distinction?	
	
In	 the	 early	 1980’s,	 several	 neuropsychological	 studies	 have	 investigated	 whether	
amnesic	 patients	 could	 succeed	 in	 various	 semantic	 tasks.	 For	 example,	 Wilson	 &	
Baddeley,	(1988)	reported	the	case	of	the	densely	amnesic	patient	KJ	who	performed	in	
the	 fully	 normal	 range	 in	 vocabulary	 or	 verbal	 fluency	 tasks,	 even	 reaching	 controls’	
speed	 in	semantic	categorization	tasks,	and	being	at	ceiling	 in	complex	 lexical	semantic	
tasks	 like	 the	Mill	 Hill	 vocabulary	 test.	 The	 authors	 underline	 however	 that	 such	 tasks	
heavily	rely	upon	memories	acquired	along	repeated	exposures,	mostly	occurring	before	
the	 onset	 of	 amnesia.	 Therefore,	 new	 learning	 tasks	 and	 semantic	 tasks	 differ	 in	
multiple	 aspects:	 the	 age	 of	 the	 memory	 trace,	 the	 massed	 vs.	 distributed	 practice	
leading	to	the	traces,	and	the	moment	of	their	acquisition,	i.e.	before	(semantic)	or	after	
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(episodic)	 the	 onset	 of	 amnesia.	Each	 of	 these	 variables,	 or	 some	 combination,	 could	
therefore	 explain	 the	 apparent	 dissociation	 between	 semantic	 and	 episodic	 memory	
performance,	at	variance	with	the	hypothesis	of	separate	memory	stores.	
Moreover,	 evidence	 gathered	 in	 amnesic	 patients	 that,	 when	 prompted	 with	 the	 first	
letters	of	target	words,	memory	is	improved	despite	amnesia	(Warrington	&	Weiskrantz,	
1968)	does	not	 imply	preserved	semantic	memory,	 rather	being	an	 instance	of	priming,	
relying	on	preserved	procedural	learning.	
Thus,	in	the	early	1980’s,	most	of	the	neuropsychological	studies	reporting	dissociations	
between	 semantic	 and	 episodic	memory	 performance	 actually	 contrasted	 learning	 of	
post-onset	events	with	retrieval	of	pre-onset	knowledge,	or	 involved	“semantic”	tasks	
that	could	be	solved	based	on	priming	processes	(e.g.	Damasio,	Eslinger,	Damasio,	Van	
Hoesen,	 &	 Cornell,	 1985;	 Nebes,	 Martin,	 &	 Horn,	 1984;	 Schacter,	 1983;	 Warrington	 &	
Weiskrantz,	 1968).	Besides,	 refinements	 in	 autobiographical	memory	 testing	 in	 the	 late	
1980’s	 resulted	 in	 the	 finding	 of	 highly	 inter-correlated	 scores	 of	 episodic-like	 and	
semantic-like	memories	in	amnesic	patients	and	controls	(Kopelman,	Wilson,	&	Baddeley,	
1989).	This	added	little	evidence	in	favour	of	the	episodic-semantic	distinction,	and	led	to	
the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 acquisition	of	 episodic	 and	 semantic	 information	depends	on	a	
common	 memory	 system	 largely	 supported	 by	 the	 medial	 temporal	 lobes	 (Gabrieli,	
Cohen,	&	Corkin,	1988).	
In	 summary,	 while	 strong	 evidence	 has	 led	 to	 a	 wide	 agreement	 for	 the	
procedural/declarative	 distinction,	 early	 evidence	 for	 dissociations	 in	 amnesic	 patients	
between	semantic	and	episodic	tasks	was	not	sufficient	to	support	the	view	of	episodic	
and	semantic	memories	as	separate	systems	from	a	biological	point	of	view.	
	
III.3.	A	major	step	forward:	patients	TC	and	KC	
	
In	 two	 landmark	studies	reporting	on	the	case	of	patient	TC,	a	young	girl	who	suffered	
herpes	simplex	encephalitis	aged	9,	Wood,	Ebert	&	Kinsbourne	(1982)	(see	Wood,	Brown,	
&	Felton,	1989	for	the	follow-up	case	report)	have	brought	evidence	for	substantial	post-
onset	 learning	despite	dense	amnesia.	Patient	 TC’s	 IQ	 rose	 from	below	50	 1-year	post-
onset	to	83	at	the	age	of	16,	while	remaining	severely	amnesic	in	everyday	life	as	well	as	
when	 tested	 with	 various	 psychometric	 tools.	 The	 authors	 used	 tasks	 of	 reading,	
language	 and	math	 academic	 achievement	 and	 found	 clear	 improvements	 both	before	
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and	 after	 amnesia	 occurred.	 This	 was	 the	 first	 convincing	 data	 suggesting	 that	 some	
form	 of	 declarative,	 anterograde,	 learning	 may	 take	 place	 despite	 severe	 amnesia,	
which	was	a	 reminder	of	previous	work	 showing	 that	amnesic	patients	diagnosed	with	
Korsakoff’s	syndrome	could	learn	the	Fibonacci	suite	and	retain	it	for	weeks	(Wood	et	al.,	
1982).	
	
	
Figure	23.	(A)	&	(B):	Evidence	for	post-onset	declarative	learning	in	the	amnesic	patient	TC.,	
adapted	from	Wood	et	al.,	1989.	(C)	Evidence	for	learning	and	retention	of	the	Fibonacci	suite	in	6	
amnesic	patients	with	Korsakoff’s	syndrome	(taken	from	Wood	et	al.,	1982,	p.	173).	
	
However,	a	second	look	at	the	data	also	revealed	that	TC	was	capable	of	some	residual	
episodic	 learning,	 as	 suggested	 by	 her	 far	 from	 floor	 performance	 during	 the	 Rey	
Auditory	Verbal	Learning	Test	(see	Squire	&	Zola,	1998,	and	Figure	24).	
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Figure	24.	Residual	declarative	learning	in	the	patient	TC,	grounding	Squire	&	Zola’s	(1998)	critique	
against	the	episodic-semantic	distinction,	taken	from	Wood	et	al.	(1989),	p.	84.	Solid	line	depicts	
results	for	the	Rey	Auditory	Verbal	Learning	Task,	the	dotted	line	is	for	card	presentation	of	the	
same	words.	
	
Moreover,	tests	of	academic	achievements	tells	us	 little	on	how	a	given	grade	 level	has	
been	reached,	leaving	opened	the	possibility	that,	with	enough	time	and	repetitions,	and	
relying	upon	her	residual	declarative	learning	abilities,	patient	TC	had	gradually	improved	
her	 academic	 skills.	 This,	 again,	 is	 conceivable	without	 assuming	 two	 separate	 learning	
systems.	
	
In	1983,	Morris	Moscovitch	had	his	attention	drew	upon	a	patient	who	was	“just	like	HM”	
due	to	traumatic	brain	injury	(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2005,	p.	991).	It	was	the	beginning	of	a	
long	 series	 of	 publications	 featuring	 patient	 KC,	 who	 probably	 became	 the	 most	
important	 amnesic	 patient	 in	 the	 theory	 built	 by	 Endel	 Tulving.	 This	 patient,	 KC,	 had	
suffered	two	traumatic	brain	injuries	with	apparently	no	serious	sequels	at	age	16	and	20.	
But	in	1951,	aged	30,	a	motorcycle	accident	was	responsible	for	a	severe	and	devastating	
traumatic	brain	injury.	This	accident	left	him	densely	amnesic,	one	single	anecdote	being	
sufficient	 to	 illustrate	 this	point:	 “Each	 time	he	 is	 told	of	 September	 11,	 he	expresses	 the	
same	 horror	 and	 disbelief	 as	 someone	 hearing	 of	 the	 news	 for	 the	 very	 first	 time.”	
(Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2005,	p.	994).	
A	 series	 of	 experiments	 were	 successful	 in	 demonstrating	 that	 KC	 could	 acquire	 new	
declarative	memories.	When	asked	to	learn	target	words	in	response	to	definitions,	KC	
managed	to	reach	100%	retention	at	6	weeks	(Glisky,	Schacter	&	Tulving,	1986a);	perhaps	
more	 impressive,	patient	KC	could	 successfully	 learn	basic	programming	skills	using	6	
previously	 unknown	 commands	 and	 maintained	 this	 learning	 to	 a	 fair	 level	 several	
months	 later	(Glisky,	Schacter	&	Tulving,	1986b),	and	he	was	also	found	to	significantly	
acquire	new	relationships	between	 familiar	words,	or	humoristic	definitions	 for	 familiar	
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words	 and	 to	 maintain	 these	 acquisitions	 up	 to	 30	 months	 post	 learning	 (Tulving	 &	
Hayman,	1993;	Tulving,	Hayman,	&	Macdonald,	1991).	Importantly,	KC	did	not	ever	show	
any	 sign	of	 recollection	 for	 the	 learning	episodes.	 Critically,	 as	part	of	 the	experiments	
involving	learning	of	new	relationships	between	familiar	words,	Tulving	et	al.	(1991)	found	
that	the	ability	the	recognize	a	target	word	did	not	predict	how	well	the	word	could	be	
recalled	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 fragment	 serving	 as	 a	 probe	 (i.e.	 stem	 completion,	 word	
priming);	 conversely,	 priming	 scores	 did	 not	 predict	 recognition.	 Such	 a	 stochastic	
independence	 (Tulving	&	Hayman,	 1993)	between	priming	performance	and	declarative	
learning	 was	 taken	 as	 evidence	 against	 the	 idea	 that	 procedural	 learning	 would	 have	
supported	new	learning	in	KC.	
These	 data	 provided	 compelling	 evidence	 that	 new	 declarative	 learning	 could	 occur	
despite	 profound	 amnesia,	 and	 the	 proposal	 of	 a	 distinction	 between	 semantic	 and	
episodic	memories	could	easily	account	for	these	findings.	Amnesia	could	therefore	be	
understood	 as	 a	 dramatic	 loss	 of	 episodic,	 but	 not	 semantic,	 memory,	 instead	 of	 a	
selective	 impairment	of	declarative	memory.	Building	up	on	his	earlier	proposals,	Endel	
Tulving	 therefore	 strongly	 based	 his	 SPI	 model	 (Tulving,	 1995)	 on	 these	 observations.	
Beyond	 the	 case	 of	 patient	 KC,	 other	 case	 reports	 had	 brought	 convincing	 pieces	 of	
evidence.	Hirst,	Johnson,	Phelps,	&	Volpe,	(1988)	and	Hirst,	Phelps,	et	al.,	(1988)	reported	
on	patient	CS	who	eventually	progressed	similarly	to	her	husband	in	learning	French,	and	
two	 patients	 (AG	 and	 GS)	 were	 successfully	 taught	 new	 concepts	 (Van	 der	 Linden,	
Meulemans,	 &	 Lorrain,	 1994).	 Still,	 it	 remained	 unclear	 why	 some	 amnesic	 patients	
seemed	to	acquire	new	semantic	memories	while	others	could	not.		
	
One	must	mention	here	that,	in	the	late	1970’s	and	up	to	the	early	1990,	several	
authors	have	proposed	that	among	the	factors	explaining	these	discrepancies,	
prior	 knowledge	 or	 “meaningfulness”	 might	 be	 relevant	 (Warrington,	 1979;	
Glisky	 et	 al.,	 1986a;	 Tulving	 et	 al.,	 1991;	 Van	 der	 Linden	 et	 al.,	 1994;	 see	 also	
Kitchener,	Hodges,	&	McCarthy,	1998).	The	idea	here	is	that	when	the	material	
involves	 stimuli	 for	which	 pre-existing	 knowledge	 (i.e.	 pre-onset)	 is	 available,	
amnesic	patients	could	more	easily	update	their	semantic	knowledge	and	thus	
acquire	 the	 corresponding	new	 fact.	However,	when	 such	prior	 knowledge	 is	
absent,	 patients	would	 have	 to	 learn	 entirely	 new	 associations,	 which	would	
not	be	possible.	This	account	could	indeed	explain	why	Gabrieli	et	al.	(1988),	by	
using	rather	uncommon	items	(e.g.	anchorite),	did	not	find	semantic	acquisition	
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in	the	patient	HM	while	Hirst	et	al.	(1988)	or	Glisky	et	al.	(1986a)	did.	The	French	
vocabulary	was	partly	acquired	before	amnesia	in	the	case	of	patient	CS,	and	so	
were	 computer	 words	 for	 the	 patient	 KC.	 Yet,	 by	 successfully	 teaching	 new	
concepts	 to	 two	 amnesic	 patients,	 using	 stimuli	 largely	 unfamiliar	 to	 the	
patients,	Van	der	Linden	et	al.	(1994)	suggested	that	this	may	not	be	the	main	
factor	involved,	pointing	towards	the	use	of	the	vanishing	cue	method	instead.	
	
Apart	from	Tulving’s	studies	with	patient	KC,	and	some	other	cases	of	amnesia	(e.g.	Hirst	
et	 al.,	 1988;	 Van	 der	 Linden	 et	 al.,	 1994,	 patients	 AG	 and	 GS;	 Van	 der	 Linden,	 Brédart,	
Depoorter,	&	Coyette,	1996,	patient	AC),	other	research	groups	failed	to	find	evidence	for	
preserved	semantic	 learning	 in	amnesia.	Patients	EP	and	GP,	with	extensive	damage	 to	
the	 whole	 MTL,	 were	 found	 unable	 to	 recall	 or	 recognize	 information	 about	 famous	
people	or	events	from	the	post-onset	period	(Bayley	&	Squire,	2005).	 In	case	of	patient	
EP,	intensive	repetition	of	stimuli	across	24	learning	sessions	(vs.	only	2	sessions	required	
in	controls)	failed	to	provide	evidence	for	new	context-free	learning.	Even	when	damage	
was	limited	to	the	hippocampal	formation,	five	other	patients	performed	at	chance	level	
when	asked	to	make	a	“Living	/	Deceased”	judgment	on	famous	names	(Manns,	Hopkins,	
Squire,	&	Diego,	2003).	
More	generally,	when	preserved	semantic	learning	was	reported	in	amnesia,	such	learning	
was	usually	1)	slower	than	controls;	2)	achieved	through	extensive,	repeated	exposure	to	
the	 to-be-learned	 material	 (Stark,	 Stark,	 &	 Gordon,	 2005);	 3)	 resulting	 from	 dedicated	
learning	 techniques	 such	 as	 vanishing	 cues	 or	 errorless	 learning.	 These	 features	 of	
semantic	 learning	 in	 amnesia	 led	 some	 authors	 to	 suggest	 that	 it	 should	 not	 be	
considered	as	declarative	in	nature,	but	rather	relies	upon	perceptual	learning	processes	
(Bayley	&	 Squire,	 2002),	 thus	 accounting	 for	 the	 hyper	 specificity	 and	 rigid	 features	 of	
these	memories,	as	acknowledged	earlier	(Glisky	et	al.,	1986b).	
Moreover,	 evidence	 for	 preserved	 semantic	 learning	 in	 amnesic	 patients	 can	 be	
interpreted	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 dissociation	 within	 declarative	 memory	 if	 and	 only	 if	 no	
evidence	for	residual	episodic-like	learning	can	be	found,	as	stated	above	(Squire	&	Zola,	
1998).	 At	 variance	with	 this,	 several	 cases	 display	 residual	 recall	 abilities.	 For	 example,	
patient	PS	with	damage	thought	to	be	limited	to	the	hippocampal	formation	obtained	a	
general	 memory	 index	 of	 90	 (Wechsler	 Memory	 Scale-Revised),	 clearly	 denoting	
considerable	 residual	 abilities	 for	 episodic	 learning	 (Verfaellie,	 Koseff,	 &	 Alexander,	
2000).	Likewise,	patients	AG	and	GS	scored	above	30/48	at	the	Free	and	Cued	Selective	
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Reminding	Test	(immediate	free	+	cued	recall,	Van	der	Linden	et	al.,	1994),	and	patient	CS	
obtained	a	general	memory	index	of	88,	together	with	far	from	floor	associative	learning	
abilities	 (Randt	Memory	 Test,	 see	 Hirst	 et	 al.,	 1988,	 Table	 1.).	 In	 such	 cases,	 preserved	
“semantic”	 learning	 could	 actually	 be	 the	 result	 of	 those	 residual	 aptitudes,	 though	
requiring	more	time	and	efforts	than	in	controls.	Indeed,	each	and	every	studies	showing	
semantic	 learning	 in	 amnesic	 patients	 within	 controlled	 experimental	 designs	 involved	
very	 intensive	 learning	 protocols:	 consider	 for	 example	 that	 after	 22	 learning	 sessions,	
once	or	twice	per	week,	patient	KC	at	the	best	could	recall	about	50%	of	the	64	sentences	
of	the	memoranda	(Tulving	et	al.,	1991).	
	
Altogether,	 these	 criticisms	 remained	 strong,	 and	 late	 in	 the	 1990’s	 there	was	 still	 no	
agreement	 about	 whether	 patients	 with	 hippocampal	 amnesia	 could	 acquire	 new	
semantic	information	(Mortimer	Mishkin,	Vargha-Khadem,	&	Gadian,	1998;	Squire	&	Zola,	
1998;	 Endel	 Tulving	&	Markowitsch,	 1998).	Another	 important	 limitation	was	 that,	 until	
the	 early	 1990’s,	 medical	 imaging	 techniques	 did	 not	 allow	 fine	 quantifications	 and	
localizations	 of	 the	 patients’	 lesions.	 Thus,	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 semantic	 and	 episodic	
memories	 would	 rely	 on	 separate	 anatomo-functional	 systems,	 although	 appealing,	
remained	far	from	compelling.	
	
III.4.	The	syndrome	of	“developmental	amnesia”:	robust	evidence	for	the	episodic-
semantic	distinction	
	
A	brief	summary	of	the	neuropsychological	evidence	for	the	episodic-semantic	distinction	
until	 the	 late	 1990’s	could	be	as	 follows.	After	bilateral	damage	to	 the	medial	 temporal	
lobe,	 patients	 are	 severely	 impaired	 in	 declarative	 learning,	 but	 show	 preserved	
procedural	 learning.	However,	some	patients,	under	conditions	that	remain	unclear,	but	
at	the	cost	of	intensive	training	and	repeated	stimulus	exposures,	and	through	dedicated	
learning	 techniques,	 seem	 to	 acquire	 new	 factual	 knowledge.	 In	 an	 even	more	 limited	
number	of	cases,	and	probably	 in	one	unique	patient	(i.e.,	patient	CS,	Hirst	et	al.,	1988),	
new	knowledge	acquisition	was	reported	to	occur	at	the	same	rate	than	in	controls.	Note	
however,	 that	 there	was	here	one	unique	control	 subject	who	happened	 to	be	patient	
CS’s	husband.	
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This	is	the	context	where	Faraneh	Vargha-Khadem	and	coworkers	published	their	famous	
Science	paper	in	1997.	Their	key	findings	were	the	following:	
- Three	children	with	brain	injury	limited	to	the	hippocampus	that	occurred	at	birth,	
at	4-	or	at	9-years	old,	displayed	global	amnesia	
- All	three	obtained	normal	or	subnormal	IQs,	and	attained	mainstream	school	with	
low-average	to	average	levels	of	factual	knowledge	
- All	 three	presented	with	preserved	 recognition	memory	 for	 single	 items	and	 for	
pairs	 of	 items	 as	 long	 as	 they	 belonged	 to	 the	 same	 domain	 (i.e.	 recognition	
memory	 for	 pairs	 of	 faces	 and	 pairs	 of	 non	 words	 was	 preserved,	 but	 not	 for	
mixed	pairs	combining	faces	and	voices,	or	objects	and	places)	
	
That	 publication	 was	 followed	 by	 other	 reports	 of	 patients	 with	 “developmental	
amnesia”	 (Bindschaedler,	 Peter-Favre,	 Maeder,	 Hirsbrunner,	 &	 Clarke,	 2011;	 Brizzolara,	
Casalini,	Montanaro,	&	Posteraro,	 2003;	D’Angelo,	Kacollja,	Rabin,	Rosenbaum,	&	Ryan,	
2015;	Gadian	et	al.,	2000;	John	M	Gardiner,	Brandt,	Baddeley,	Vargha-Khadem,	&	Mishkin,	
2008;	 Guillery-Girard,	 Martins,	 Parisot-Carbuccia,	 &	 Eustache,	 2004;	 Martins,	 Guillery-
Girard,	Jambaqué,	Dulac,	&	Eustache,	2006;	Picard	et	al.,	2013;	R	S	Rosenbaum	et	al.,	2011;	
Vargha-Khadem	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Vicari	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Consistently	 across	 reports,	 bilateral	
damage	 apparently	 restricted	 to	 the	 hippocampus	 was	 observed,	 together	 with	
anterograde	amnesia,	contrasting	with	low	average	to	average	IQ	and	factual	knowledge	
abilities.	
	
The	simple	fact	that	these	children	and	young	adults	have	been	reported	with	average	IQ	
was	thus	the	strongest	piece	of	evidence	for:	
- the	existence	of	semantic	acquisition	despite	global	amnesia	
- the	existence	of	a	 learning	pathway	 largely	 independent	 from	the	hippocampus,	
albeit	allowing	new	declarative	learning	
	
Obviously,	 the	episodic	memory	 theory	of	 Tulving,	 and	his	 recent	 SPI	model	 predicting	
that	 semantic	 learning	can	occur	without	episodic	memory,	 and	 that	 semantic	 retrieval	
can	 also	 take	 place	 without	 episodic	 memory,	 was	 the	 best	 candidate	 to	 account	 for	
these	neuropsychological	finding.	This	landmark	study	has	thus	moved	the	field	from	the	
declarative	memory	theory	to	the	still	in	use	era	of	the	semantic	–	episodic	distinction.	
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III.5.	Critical	influence	of	monkey	research	on	the	findings	from	Vargha-Khadem	et	al.	
	
To	account	for	the	cognitive	profile	of	developmental	amnesia	patients,	it	is	important	to	
acknowledge	the	contribution	of	animal	–	and	especially	monkeys	–	literature.	At	the	time	
patient	HM	was	described,	 little	was	known	about	the	extent	of	his	damage	within	the	
MTL.	 Nonetheless,	 researchers	 aimed	 at	 finding	 an	 animal	model	 of	 amnesia	 that	 only	
could	 provide	 a	 detailed	 anatomical	 account	 for	 the	 findings	 of	 impaired	 declarative	
learning,	leaving	intact	procedural	learning.	
The	 initial	 lesion	studies	of	 the	hippocampus	 in	monkeys	actually	 failed	 to	 replicate	 the	
devastating	 effects	 found	 in	 humans	 (Meunier	 &	 Barbeau,	 2013).	 It	 was	 not	 until	 1978	
that,	using	the	delayed	nonmatching-to-sample	(DNMS)	procedure	combined	with	 large	
ablation	 of	 the	 MTL	 in	 monkeys,	 a	 deficit	 in	 recognition	 memory	 was	 found	 that	
reproduced	the	impairments	showed	in	HM	(Milner,	1972;	Mishkin,	1978).	However,	which	
structure	 within	 the	MTL	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 deficit	 remained	 unclear,	 until	 1993.	
That	year,	Meunier	et	al.	showed	that	selective	damage	to	the	rhinal	cortices	(namely,	the	
perirhinal	 and	 entorhinal	 cortices)	while	 sparing	 the	 hippocampus	 sufficed	 to	 replicate	
the	 severe	 impairments	 observed	 by	 Mishkin	 (1978)	 after	 aspiration	 of	 the	 inner	 MTL	
structures,	i.e.	amygdalo-hippocampectomy	(Meunier	et	al.,	1993).	The	reason,	as	shown	
in	 Figure	 25,	 was	 that	 such	 aspiration	 necessarily	 implied	 the	 resection	 of	 the	 rhinal	
cortices.	
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Figure	25.	Illustration	of	the	anatomical	constraints	within	the	MTL,	depicting	the	reason	why	the	
aspiration	of	the	amygdala	and	the	hippocampus	(Mishkin,	1978)	implies	the	removal	of	the	rhinal	
cortices.	Taken	from	Meunier	and	Barbeau,	2013.	
	
Conversely,	 when	 Murray	 &	 Mishkin,	 (1998)	 performed	 toxic	 lesions	 restricted	 to	 the	
amygdala	 and	 hippocampus,	 but	 sparing	 the	 rhinal	 cortices,	 the	 monkeys	 behaved	
normally	 at	 the	 DNMS.	 This	 very	 brief	 reminder	 of	 over	 40	 years	 in	 animal	 research	
demonstrates	 that,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 first	 description	 of	 patients	with	 developmental	
amnesia,	 it	became	plausible	 that	due	 to	 its	position	at	 the	 top	of	 the	MTL	hierarchical	
structure,	the	hippocampus	may	be	only	involved	in	memory	tasks	requiring	the	highest	
level	of	information	integration.	This	fitted	with	the	observation	of	preserved	recognition	
for	items,	and	within-domain	pairs,	but	impaired	recognition	for	pairs	of	items	belonging	
to	distinct	domains,	(e.g.	object-places)	in	developmental	amnesia	(Vargha-Khadem	et	al.,	
1997).	
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III.6.	No	getting	away	from	facts:	the	missing	piece	for	the	episodic	theory	puzzle	
	
If	 the	 cases	 of	 developmental	 amnesia	 are	 to	 provide	 definitive	 evidence	 for	 the	
episodic-semantic	distinction,	it	therefore	implies	that:	
- Acquisition	 of	 new	 semantic	 knowledge	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 highly	 integrated	
processes,	but	rather	on	single-item	or	item-item	associative	learning	
- Acquisition	 of	 new	 semantic	 knowledge	 can	 occur	 at	 normal	 pace	 outside	 the	
hippocampus	
We	argue	that	these	predictions	have	not	been	verified,	on	several	grounds	of	evidence.	
	
First,	 lesion	 studies	 –	 including	 case	 reports	 of	 developmental	 amnesia	 -	 have	 mostly	
focused	 on	 discriminating	 patients	 with	 damage	 strictly	 limited	 to	 the	 hippocampal	
formation	or	to	the	whole	MTL.	However,	episodic	learning	is	thought	to	depend	on	the	
so-called	 “extended	 hippocampal	 system”	 that	 includes	 the	 hippocampus,	 fornix,	
mammillary	 bodies,	mammillo-thalamic	 tract,	 anterior	 nuclei	 of	 the	 thalamus	 as	well	 as	
retrosplenial	 cortex	 (Aggleton	et	 al.,	 2010).	 Indeed,	damage	 to	any	part	of	 that	 system	
has	been	shown	to	result	 in	amnesia,	with	particular	vulnerability	of	episodic	memories	
(Aggleton	&	Saunders,	1997;	Vann	&	Nelson,	2015).	Therefore,	in	case	reports	of	damage	
restricted	 to	 the	 hippocampal	 formation	 one	 cannot	 rule	 out	 the	 possibility	 that	
preserved	 semantic	 learning	 may	 also	 occur	 through	 the	 functional	 preservation	 of	
some	 intact	 components	of	 the	extended	hippocampal	 system.	Moreover,	 in	principle,	
one	hardly	conceive	how	semantic	knowledge	like	“we	used	to	eat	cookies	and	drinking	
fruit	 juice	 after	 playing	 soccer	with	my	 friends	 during	 the	whole	 period	 of	my	 primary	
school”	 may	 have	 been	 acquired	 without	 contribution	 of	 highly	 integrated	 processes,	
that	 should	 depend	 on	 the	 extended	 hippocampal	 system.	 Evidence	 is	 therefore	 still	
lacking	that	could	clarify	this	point.	
	
Second,	that	patients	with	developmental	amnesia	score	in	the	low	average	to	average	
range	 in	 semantic	 tests	 that	almost	 invariably	assess	 formal	academic	knowledge	 (i.e.	
subtests	of	the	Wechsler	Adult	Intelligence	Scale,	Mill	Hill	vocabulary	test,	etc.)	cannot	be	
taken	as	strong	evidence	 for	normal	 semantic	memory.	More	 thorough	assessments	of	
semantic	 knowledge	 always	 elicit	 performances	 in	 the	 low-to-normal	 range	
(Bindschaedler	et	al.,	2011;	Brizzolara	et	al.,	2003;	Martins	et	al.,	2006)	or,	in	some	cases,	
impaired	 performances	 (e.g.,	 Patient	 KF,	 Martins	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Patient	 CL,	 Vicari	 et	 al.,	
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2007;	 Patient	 Jocelyn,	 Picard	 et	 al.,	 2013).	Moreover,	 recent	 findings	 in	 the	 patient	 HC	
suggest	 that	 her	 semantic	 knowledge	 structure	 may	 differ	 from	 that	 of	 healthy	
individuals	(Blumenthal	et	al.,	2017;	D’Angelo,	Rosenbaum,	&	Ryan,	2016).	Thus,	to	make	a	
strong	case	for	semantic	preservation,	what	is	needed	is	the	demonstration	of	an	at	least	
fully	 normal	 range	 (but	 see	 below)	 of	 performance	 across	 multiple	 semantic	
assessments,	encompassing	distinct	input	modalities.	
	
Third,	evidence	for	a	normal	rate	of	semantic	acquisition	is	missing	in	amnesic	patients.	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 for	 adult-onset	 cases	 with	 evidence	 of	 semantic	 acquisition,	 it	
occurred	 at	 a	 great	 cost	 in	 terms	 of	 efforts,	 repetition,	 dedicated	 learning	 techniques,	
which	 certainly	 do	 not	 match	 controls’	 way	 of	 learning.	 Moreover,	 when	 assessed	
thoroughly,	 semantic	 knowledge	 was	 sometimes	 impaired,	 and	 /	 or	 abnormally	
organized.	Given	that	most,	if	not	all	cases	of	developmental	amnesia	have	shown	some	
non-negligible	residual	learning	abilities	(e.g.	words	list	learning,	recall	of	Rey	figure,	see	
Squire	&	Zola,	1998),	one	cannot	rule	out	the	possibility	the	slow	and	effortful	 learning,	
supported	 by	 these	 residual	 abilities,	 can	 take	 place.	 Evidence	 for	 new	 declarative,	 or	
explicit,	learning	at	the	same	speed	of	controls	and	in	the	absence	of	detectable	residual	
episodic	memory	is	therefore	still	missing,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge.	
	
Fourth	 and	 last,	 there	 is	 some	 circularity	 in	 reasoning	 when	 comparisons	 between	
semantic	 and	 episodic	 performance	 are	 made	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 separate	
semantic	and	episodic	memories.	As	an	example,	let’s	consider	the	case	report	of	RS,	a	
49-years	old	man	who	was	tested	13	years	after	a	subarachnoid	haemorrhage	leaving	him	
densely	 amnesic	 (Kitchener	 et	 al.,	 1998).	 The	 authors	provide	 an	 impressive	 amount	of	
tests	 results	 and	 found	 that	 post-morbid	 knowledge	 was	 invariably	 impaired	 by	
comparison	 with	 controls	 (famous	 faces,	 famous	 names,	 famous	 events,	 vocabulary).	
However,	because	RS	was	found	to	be	very	deeply	amnesic,	with	no	detectable	residual	
episodic	 abilities,	 and	 because	 his	 performance	 in	 post-morbid	 knowledge	 tests	 was	
above	 chance,	 the	 authors	 concluded:	 “We	 argue	 that	 our	 patient,	 R.S.,	 has	 provided	
irrefutable	evidence	that	new	semantic	information	may	be	acquired	in	the	absence	of	any	
significant	 anterograde	 episodic	 memory.”	 However,	 their	 results	 also	 showed	 that	 RS	
performed	 at	 chance	 level	 when	 asked	 to	 judge	 whether	 names	 of	 personally	 known	
people	met	since	the	onset	of	amnesia	were	familiar	to	him	or	not.	The	authors	argued	
that	this	strengthens	the	idea	of	undetectable	episodic	learning	in	RS.	It	is	unclear	to	us	
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why	 familiarity	 judgments	 about	 famous	 names	 of	 people	 who	 came	 to	 prominence	
after	the	onset	of	amnesia	is	considered	as	a	semantic	test,	while	familiarity	judgment	
about	 the	 names	 of	 people	 met	 after	 the	 stroke	 is	 considered	 as	 an	 episodic	 test.	
Moreover,	 the	 idea	 that	 above-chance	 (but	 still	 impaired)	 performance	 in	 semantic	
memory	tests	is	unexpected	given	the	total	absence	of	episodic	learning	implies	that	we	
have	 some	 method	 to	 estimate	 the	 level	 of	 semantic	 knowledge	 given	 episodic	
performance.	Unfortunately,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case,	 and	 it	 probably	does	not	make	 sense	
within	the	multiple	memory	systems	framework,	where	semantic	and	episodic	memories	
are	 supposed	 to	 have	 fully	 distinct	 properties.	 Thus,	 evidence	 for	 residual	 semantic	
knowledge	 in	patients	with	dense	amnesia	does	not	 imply	 separate	memory	 systems,	
because	 we	 do	 not	 know	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 small	 amount	 of	 preserved	 semantic	
knowledge	 is	 commensurate	 with	 their	 general	 recall	 and	 recognition	 abilities.	
Neuropsychological	 evidence	 for	 the	 semantic	 –	 episodic	 distinction	 would	 thus	 be	
convincing	only	 if	 an	amnesic	patient	with	no	detectable	episodic	 learning,	 as	assessed	
through	typical	learning	tests,	would	present	with	high-average	or	even	superior	level	of	
performance	 in	 semantic	 knowledge	 tests.	 This	 might	 be	 the	 only	 cognitive	 profile	
circumventing	the	inescapable	circularity	of	the	episodic	–	semantic	comparison.	
	
III.6.	Consequences	for	the	theoretical	framework	behind	the	present	work	
	
Of	course,	since	the	present	work	aimed	at	further	characterizing	how	prior	knowledge	
associated	with	 the	memoranda	may	 influence	new	 learning,	 the	 above	 considerations	
regarding	 the	“episodic-semantic	distinction”	are	of	great	matter.	 If	 separate	biological	
entities	were	to	be	considered	as	supporting	episodic	and	semantic	memory	stores,	then	
it	makes	sense	to	consider	that	our	question	relates	to	how	semantic	knowledge	alters	
episodic	 learning	 within	 a	 multiple-memory	 systems	 theoretical	 framework	 (e.g.	 SPI,	
Tulving,	 1995).	 On	 the	 contrary,	 if	 evidence	 for	 separate	 stores	were	 lacking,	 then	 the	
same	 question	 would	 have	 to	 be	 addressed	 in	 a	 different	 theoretical	 framework.	
Candidates	could	be	theories	based	on	(see	section	1.8	for	more	details):	
- memory	 processes,	 rather	 than	 systems	 (e.g.	 the	 question	 here	 would	 be	 how	
familiarity-based	 retrieval	 influence	 recollection-based	 retrieval,	 (Aggleton	 &	
Brown,	1999;	A	P	Yonelinas,	2002)	
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- memory	 contents,	 rather	 than	 systems	 (e.g.	 influence	 of	 context-free	 on	 the	
acquisition	 of	 context-rich	 memories,	 Mishkin	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 or	 influence	 of	
conjunctive	 memory	 traces	 on	 the	 acquisition	 of	 relational	 memories,	
Eichenbaum,	2007)	
- hierarchical	 representations,	 rather	 than	 systems	 (e.g.	 within	 the	
perceptual/mnemonic	 view	of	 the	MTL	 functions	 (Baxter,	 2009;	Murray	&	Wise,	
2004),	the	question	would	be	how	intermediate	 levels	of	processing	 impacts	the	
acquisition	of	memories	depending	on	the	highest	levels	of	processing?)	
	
Below	we	summarize	Chapter	III	and	argue	for	a	choice	among	these	alternatives.	
III.7.	Summary	
	
Over	 50	 years	 of	 neuropsychological	 case	 studies	 of	 amnesia	 have	 brought	 strong	
empirical	evidence	for	the	dissociation	between	severely	impaired	learning	of	new	events	
or	 episodes,	 and	 preserved	 performance	 in	 semantic	 memory	 tasks.	 Neuropsychology	
has	 also	 established	 that	 the	 medial	 temporal	 lobes	 are	 responsible	 for	 successful	
learning	of	new	facts	and	events,	termed	declarative	memory.	Converging	data	from	case	
reports	also	points	toward	considerable	residual	abilities	to	learn	new	factual	knowledge	
after	apparently	selective	bilateral	hippocampal	damage,	at	least	when	injury	occurs	early	
in	 life.	 However,	 available	 evidence	 does	 not	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 these	 preserved	
learning	abilities	 can	occur	normally	outside	 the	hippocampal	 system,	nor	 that	patients	
can	reach	a	fully	normal	range	of	semantic	knowledge	if	assessed	thoroughly.	Our	claim	
here	 is	 therefore	 that	 neuropsychological	 evidence	 for	 the	 episodic	 memory	 theory	
remains	 incomplete.	Moreover,	 pioneer	neuropsychological	 studies	had	 suggested	 that	
among	 the	 factors	 predicting	 whether	 or	 not	 an	 amnesic	 patient	 would	 acquire	 new	
declarative	 memories,	 the	 use	 of	 meaningless	 vs.	 meaningful	 (i.e.	 carrying	 pre-
experimental	knowledge	or	not)	stimuli	could	be	of	great	matter.	Yet,	this	has	remained	
largely	speculative,	and	the	most	consistent	factor	has	been	the	use	of	dedicated	learning	
techniques	 such	as	 the	 vanishing	 cues	method,	 yielding	very	 slow	and	gradual	 learning	
over	countless	repetitions.	
Finally,	the	processing	approaches	to	learning	and	memory,	that	assumes	the	idea	of	dual	
processes	 underlying	 recognition	 memory,	 are	 by	 far	 the	 most	 widely	 accepted	
conception.	 Considering	 our	 point	 that	 evidence	 for	 fully	 separate	 memory	 stores	 is	
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missing,	the	present	work	will	therefore	refer	to	these	process-based	models,	rather	than	
on	 the	 content-based	 or	 representational	 accounts.	 Thus,	 the	 question	 we	 further	
address	in	this	thesis	could	be	better	expressed	as	“how	does	memory	retrieval	influence	
new	declarative	learning?”	
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Chapter	IV	
How	prior	knowledge	and	new	learning	have	long	been	married:	a	
historical	sketch	of	the	semantic-episodic	interactions	
	
IV.1.	Prior	knowledge	influences	on	new	learning	and	Behaviourism	
	
It	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 the	 problem	of	 the	 relationships	 between	prior	 knowledge	 and	
new	learning	has	in	fact	long	been	addressed	in	psychology,	though	most	often	implicitly.	
Coming	back	 to	 the	golden	era	of	Behaviourism,	 the	amount	of	data	accumulated	with	
early	 paired-associates	 learning	 paradigm	 witnesses	 this	 fact	 (for	 review,	 see	 Kausler,	
1974	 cited	 in	 Bower,	 2000).	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 in	 serial	 learning	 experiments,	
Ebbinghaus	 himself	 used	 -	 actually	 invented	 -	 nonsense	 syllables	 purposely,	 to	 avoid	
variations	regarding	the	familiarity	of	the	to-be-learned	items.	At	the	same	period,	Mary	
Calkins	 (1894,	 cited	 in	 Bower,	 2000)	 introduced	 the	 paired-associates	 learning	 design,	
using	 words	 or	 pictured	 objects,	 a	 method	 that	 came	 to	 be	 favoured	 by	 later	
behaviourists.	In	their	theory,	the	idea	is	that	along	with	repetitions	of	the	encoding	trials,	
a	gradually	increased	associative	strength	is	supposed	to	be	built	up	(so	called	S-R	habit)	
until	the	subject	can	either	recall	or	recognize	e.g.	the	second	associate	when	prompted	
with	the	first.	 	However,	the	rate	of	acquisition	for	this	new	association	was	thought	to	
depend	 on	 prior	 associative	 strengths,	 both	 within	 the	 pair	 and	 between	 each	 pair’s	
component	and	the	rest	of	the	items	in	the	pair’s	list.	For	example,	if	one	would	have	to	
learn	 the	 following	associations	 [cat	 -	dog];	 [bone	 -	mice];	 [tail	 -	 leach],	 the	behaviourist	
approach	would	consider	that	successful	learning	will	require	each	of	these	3	association	
strengths	to	become	stronger	than	any	prior	association.	 In	the	present	example,	given	
that,	 say,	 (cat-mice)	may	have	 a	 stronger	 pre-existing	 association	 that	 the	 target	 (cat	 -	
dog),	 it	 is	expected	that	prior	knowledge	would	result	 in	confusions	 in	early	 responses.	
Similarly,	 because	 pre-existing	 associations	 of	 a	 given	 strength	 might	 be	 available	 for	
(dog-leach),	this	would	interfere	with	the	strengthening	of	the	target	pair	(cat-dog)	along	
learning	trials.	 In	the	first	case,	pre-existing	associations	are	considered	(in	terms	of	S-R	
strength),	and	the	second	case	evokes	“generalizations”	(in	terms	of	overall	association	
strength	between	each	of	the	items	taken	individually).	Importantly,	both	cases	underline	
the	 consideration	 of	 pre-existing	 associations	 as	 major	 factors	 of	 (the	 rate	 of)	 new	
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learning.	Interestingly,	these	early	behaviourist	theories	considered	that,	within	a	paired	
associates	learning	task,	prior	knowledge	could	either	facilitate	or	hinder	new	learning.	
In	the	following	pairs	[cat	-	mice];	[dog	-	bone];	[tail	-	leash],	high	prior	associative	strength	
for	the	first	pairs	 is	supposed	to	improve	learning,	while	the	low	associative	strength	of	
the	last	pair	is	also	supposed	to	facilitate	learning,	because	this	association	has	only	little	
prior	associative	 strength	with	 the	other	 items,	and	 the	one	pre-existing	 (i.e.	 tail	 -	dog;	
leash	 -	 dog;	 tail	 -	 bone;	 leash	 -	 bone;	…)	 are	 supposedly	 far	 weaker	 than	 pre-existing	
associations	between	 [dog	&	bone],	 and	 [cat	&	mice],	 respectively.	We	will	 come	back	
later	 on	 the	 more	 recently	 accumulated	 neural	 and	 behavioural	 evidence	 for	 an	
ambiguous	 role	 of	 pre-existing	 associations	 on	 subsequent	 memory	 formation.	 In	
contradiction	with	 the	 behaviourist	 approach,	 available	 evidence	 highlights	 the	 role	 of	
distinct	 levels	of	processing	at	encoding,	as	well	as	distinct	consolidation	pathways	and	
retrieval	processes.	However,	recent	developments	in	the	field	of	neurosciences	share	a	
common	starting	point	with	these	early	behaviourist	theories:	how	can	we	explain	that	
improved	 learning	 can	 be	 observed	 for	 information	 that	 is	 either	 congruent	 or	
incongruent	with	prior	schemas?	(e.g.	Fernández	&	Morris,	2018b;	Greve,	Cooper,	Tibon,	
&	Henson,	2019;	Van	Kesteren	et	al.,	2012).	
	
IV.2.	The	Psychology	of	Expertise	and	the	Chunking	Theory	
	
A	traditional	field	of	psychology	has	long	been	the	investigation	of	what	make	experts	-	
and	specifically	domain-specific	knowledge	experts	(Schneider,	Körkel,	&	Weinert,	1989)	-	
so	good	in	their	domain.	Probably	because	of	the	involvement	of	strategy	and	problem-
solving	skills,	highly	related	to	the	idea	of	 intelligence,	the	chess	game	was	of	particular	
interest	for	psychologists.	
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“(...)	 Pareillement,	 on	 rencontre	 des	 joueurs	 d’échec	 qui,	 les	 yeux	 fermés,	 la	 tête	
contre	le	mur,	conduisent	une	partie	d’échecs.	On	a	numéroté	les	pions	et	les	cases;	à	
chaque	 coup	 de	 l’adversaire,	 on	 leur	 nomme	 la	 pièce	 déplacée	 et	 la	 nouvelle	 case	
qu’elle	occupe;	ils	commandent	eux-mêmes	le	mouvement	de	leurs	propres	pièces,	et	
continuent	ainsi	pendant	plusieurs	heures	(...)	il	est	clair	qu’à	chaque	coup	la	figure	de	
l’échiquier	 tout	 entier,	 avec	 l’ordonnance	 des	 diverses	 pièces,	 leur	 est	 présente,	
comme	 dans	 un	 miroir	 intérieur,	 sans	 quoi	 ils	 ne	 pourraient	 prévoir	 les	 suites	
probables	du	coup	qu’ils	viennent	de	subir	et	du	coup	qu’ils	vont	commander.”	
Hippolyte	Taine,	De	l’intelligence,	1870,	pp.	81-82	
[English	translation:	
Similarly,	on	can	meet	chess	players	who,	with	 their	eyes	closed,	 their	heads	against	
the	 wall,	 lead	 a	 game	 of	 chess.	 Numbered	 pawns	 and	 boxes;	 at	 each	 move	 of	 the	
adversary,	they	are	called	the	displaced	piece	and	the	new	box	which	it	occupies;	they	
themselves	control	the	movement	of	their	own	pieces,	and	thus	continue	for	several	
hours	 (...)	 it	 is	 clear	 that	at	each	move	the	 figure	of	 the	whole	chessboard,	with	 the	
order	of	 the	various	pieces,	 is	 theirs	present,	as	 in	an	 interior	mirror,	without	which	
they	could	not	foresee	the	probable	consequences	of	the	blow	they	have	just	suffered	
and	the	blow	they	will	command.]	
	
	
Figure	26.	Alphonse	Goetz,	a	famous	chess	master	who	inspired	Alfred	Binet’s	pioneer	studies	on	
experts’	memory.	
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Back	 in	 1891,	 Alfred	 Binet	 was	 inspired	 by	 this	 observation	 of	 the	 french	 philosopher	
when	he	heard	about	Alphonse	Goetz,	a	young	chess	player	who	had	played	eight	chess	
games	simultaneously	blindfolded.	He	started	a	large,	worldwide	survey	to	the	attention	
of	 chess	 players	 who	 considered	 themselves	 as	 being	 able	 to	 play	 the	 chess	 game	
blindfolded	(Binet,	1894).	For	the	anecdote,	Alfred	Binet	achieved	this	by	publishing	an	ad	
in	a	magazine	specialized	in	chess	(“La	Stratégie”),	illustrating	that	great	pioneers	already	
took	advantage	of	ancient	“social	networks”,	well	before	Amazon	Mechanical	Turk©!	He	
was	particularly	interested	in	Alphonse	Goetz’s	statement	that	he	did	not	need	any	form	
of	 “visual	 memory”	 to	 successfully	 play	 multiple	 chess	 games	 blindfolded,	 apparently	
being	able	 to	accurately	 recall	 the	336	 last	moves	 in	 the	middle	of	a	game.	This	 survey	
along	with	multiple	chess	masters	interviews	led	Alfred	Binet	to	underline	the	critical	role	
of	 what	 he	 called	 “erudition”,	 and	 what	 we	 would	 probably	 label	 now	 “semantic	
memory”	or	“schemas”	on	chess	players	memory	for	the	on	going	game.	 In	that,	Binet	
was	among	the	first	psychologists	to	put	forward	the	importance	of	old	memories	in	new	
learning.	He	gives	a	very	clear	illustration	of	the	role	of	“erudition”	in	the	following	quote:	
“Qu’un	 ignorant	 essaye	 de	 retenir	 une	 partie	 dont	 il	 entend	 annoncer	 les	 coups,	
quelle	 que	 soit	 la	 sûreté	 de	 sa	 mémoire,	 on	 peut	 être	 certain	 d’avance	 qu’il	 n’y	
parviendra	pas	 (....)	 C’est	 précisément	parce	 qu’il	 ne	 comprendra	pas	 le	 sens	 des	
coups	qu’il	 aura	 tant	de	peine	à	 les	 retenir;	 il	 est	dans	 la	même	situation	d’esprit	
qu’un	 illettré	 qui	 voudrait	 se	 souvenir	 d’une	 ligne	 imprimée,	 de	 manière	 à	
reproduire	fidèlement	 la	 lettre	qu’il	ne	comprend	pas;	pour	nous,	 il	suffit	de	 jeter	
un	 simple	 coup	 d’oeil	 sur	 la	 ligne,	 et	 nous	 retenons	 toutes	 les	 lettres	 qui	 la	
composent.	Pourquoi?	Parce	que	nous	comprenons	le	sens	des	mots:	les	mots	(...)	
[sont]	des	 signes	d’idées	visibles	pour	notre	esprit;	 et	 la	 suggestion	d’idées	qu’ils	
provoquent	sert	à	les	retenir.	C’est	là	un	curieux	paradoxe	de	la	mémoire;	on	allège	
le	poids	de	sa	charge	en	l’augmentant”	(Binet,	1894,	p.	204)	
	
[English	translation:	
That	 an	 ignorant	 tries	 to	memorize	 a	 game	 for	which	 he	 is	 called	 all	 the	moves,	
whatever	the	security	of	his	memory,	one	can	be	certain	in	advance	that	he	will	not	
succeed	 (....)	 It	 is	 precisely	 because	 he	 will	 not	 understand	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	
moves	 that	 he	 will	 have	 so	 much	 trouble	 withholding	 them;	 he	 is	 in	 the	 same	
		 119	
situation	of	mind	as	an	illiterate	who	would	like	to	remember	a	printed	line,	so	as	
to	 faithfully	 reproduce	 the	 letter	he	does	not	understand;	 for	us,	 it	 is	 enough	 to	
take	 a	 simple	 glance	 on	 the	 line,	 and	we	 retain	 all	 the	 letters	which	 compose	 it.	
Why?	 Because	 we	 understand	 the	 meaning	 of	 words:	 words	 (...)	 [are]	 signs	 of	
visible	ideas	for	our	mind;	and	the	suggestion	of	ideas	they	provoke	serves	to	retain	
them.	This	is	a	curious	paradox	of	memory;	you	reduce	the	weight	of	your	load	by	
increasing	it.]	
	
Following	 this	 consideration,	 Binet	 gives	 multiple	 examples	 of	 famous	 strategies	 and	
techniques,	or	well-known	sequences	of	moves	all	referring	to	great	chess	players,	often	
named	 after	 prestigious	 battles.	 Chess	 masters	 consistently	 reported	 how	 this	 makes	
each	game	unique,	 in	 that	 it	 evokes	a	 single	“storyline”.	Binet	 therefore	 suggests	 that	
“erudition”	 makes	 the	 build	 up	 of	 this	 storyline	 possible,	 by	 the	 constant	 matching	
between	the	last	moves	and	prior	knowledge	about	the	game.	As	we	will	further	report,	
this	remarkable	work	from	Binet	can	be	considered	as	a	genius	intuition	on	what	would	
become	the	Levels-Of-Processing	framework,	developed	almost	80	years	 later	(Craik	&	
Lockhart,	1972).	Another	key	lesson	from	the	series	of	studies	from	Binet,	not	only	about	
chess	masters	but	also	about	prodigy	calculators,	is	the	attempt	towards	a	taxonomy	of	
learning	 and	 memory,	 e.g.	 with	 the	 suggested	 distinction	 between	 “la	 mémoire	 des	
idées”	 and	 “la	 mémoire	 des	 sensations”.	 The	 former	 would	 correspond	 to	 memory	
schemas	as	introduced	by	Jean	Piaget	(1923)	and	popularized	by	Frederic	Bartlett	(1932)	
about	 30	 years	 later,	 or	 more	 broadly	 to	 semantic	 memory.	 The	 latter	 would	 fit	 with	
episodic-like	memory	contents,	which	can	be	quite	large	and	impressive	in	the	short	run	
like	in	prodigy	calculators,	but	rapidly	fades	away	(e.g.	Ebbinghaus,	1885).	
As	a	pioneer	 in	the	psychology	of	expertise,	Alfred	Binet	therefore	has	put	forward	the	
richness	of	the	study	of	expertise	in	the	understanding	of	learning	and	memory.	This	has	
opened	a	long	experimental	tradition,	for	which	more	recent	findings	are	highly	relevant	
in	showing	how	existing	knowledge	and	new	learning	deeply	interact.	
The	most	famous	study	in	the	field	again	used	the	chess	game	as	a	method,	but	focusing	
on	 short-term	 rather	 than	 long-term	 memory,	 like	 in	 the	 Binet’s	 reports.	 The	 authors	
(Chase	 &	 Simon,	 1973a)	 replicated	 earlier	 findings	 from	 De	 Groot,	 (1978)	 when	
contrasting	short-term	memory	performance	for	chess	positions	from	chess	masters	vs.	
		 120	
novices.	 The	participants	 had	 5	 seconds	 to	memorize	 chess	positions	on	 a	 chessboard.	
Then,	an	immediate	recall	test	asked	subjects	to	reconstruct	as	fast	and	as	accurately	as	
possible	the	chessboard	as	it	was	displayed	at	study.	Two	main	types	of	chess	positions	
were	used:	first,	game	positions	were	recorded	from	chess	books	and	magazine;	second,	
random	positions	were	generated	by	 randomly	 replacing	 the	pieces	on	 the	board	 from	
their	original	positions	in	real	games.	Chess	masters	were	able	to	recall	four	times	more	
positions	than	novice	when	real	games	positions	were	used	(i.e.	averaged	positions	recall	
=	 16	 vs.	 4),	 while	 no	 expertise	 advantage	 was	 found	 for	 random	 games.	 Moreover,	
measurements	of	time	intervals	between	the	recall	of	each	piece’s	position	provided	an	
experimental	 basis	 for	 identifying	 the	 boundaries	 of	 perceptual	 “chunks”,	 namely	
ensembles	of	3	to	5	positions	on	the	chess	that	were	perceived	by	chess	masters	as	one	
information	 unit.	 This	 was	 taken	 as	 evidence	 favouring	 the	 “chunking”	 hypothesis	 to	
account	for	the	effect	of	expertise	on	memory:	while	short-term	memory	has	the	same	
capacity	 limits	 in	 experts	 and	 novices,	 experts	 would	 automatically	 chunk	 together	
meaningful	patterns	of	piece’s	positions,	thus	resulting	in	some	kind	of	compression	of	
the	information	to	be	held	in	short-term	memory.	Support	for	this	view	came	from	the	
findings	that	1)	estimates	of	chunks	size	was	larger	in	chess	masters	than	novices;	2)	the	
number	of	chunks	was	higher	 in	experts;	and	3)	when	considering	 the	number	and	the	
size	 of	 chunks	 given	 the	 number	 of	 pieces	 accurately	 recalled	 by	 experts,	 the	 overall	
quantity	 of	 information	 held	 in	 short-term	 memory	 did	 not	 exceed	 the	 memory	 span	
(Chase	&	Simon,	1973a;	Miller,	1956).	
Thus,	 convergent	 findings	 provided	 experimental	 evidence	 for	 the	 beneficial	 role	 of	
accumulated	prior	 knowledge	 (Binet	would	 have	 say	 “erudition”)	 on	new	 learning	 and	
memory.	Importantly,	these	studies	started	to	outline	how	expertise	might	lead	to	better	
memory.	 First,	 superior	memory	 abilities	 are	 not	 responsible	 for	 the	 effect,	 given	 that	
experts	behave	 like	novice	when	asked	to	 learn	random	chess	positions.	Second,	short-
term	memory	 capacities	do	not	differ	 due	 to	 expertise,	 rather	 the	 format	of	 the	 chess	
board	representation	may	differ,	with	the	explicit	idea	from	the	title	of	Chase	&	Simon’s	
study	(“Perception	in	Chess”)	that	an	idiosyncratic	visual	perception,	or	encoding,	of	the	
chess	 board	 discriminates	 experts	 from	 novice.	 Here,	 the	 memory	 advantage	 would	
therefore	result	from	the	interaction	between	prior	knowledge	and	visual	encoding.	The	
regularities	 of	 similar	 pieces’	 positions	 patterns	 across	 thousands	 of	 games	 played	 by	
chess	 masters	 are	 hypothesized	 to	 automatically	 bias	 new	 chessboards	 perception	
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towards	 the	 identification	 of	 pre-existing	 patterns.	 These	 patterns	 are	 considered	
“meaningful”,	 as	earlier	proposed	by	Alfred	Binet,	because	 it	 is	 implicitly	 assumed	 that	
experts	can	 identify	 -	 i.e.	 recognize	 -	 their	prior	occurrence	across	past	games.	 In	other	
words,	a	large	amount	of	prior	domain-specific	knowledge	(here,	chess	game	knowledge)	
would	 lead	 to	 the	 detection	 of	 prior	 occurrences,	 making	 the	 memoranda	 more	
meaningful,	more	likely	than	a	small	amount	of	prior	knowledge.	In	turn,	this	knowledge	
from	 long-term	memory	 could	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 circumventing	 the	 limits	 of	 short-
term	memory	capacity	during	new	learning,	through	the	process	of	chunking	(De	Groot,	
1978;	Gobet	et	al.,	2001;	Miller,	George,	1956).	
This	account	for	the	benefits	of	pre-existing	long-term	memories	on	subsequent	learning	
(known	 as	 the	 “chunking	 theory”)	 illustrates	 how	 the	 psychology	 of	 expertise	 has	
informed	us	on	the	physiological	relationships	between	knowing	and	remembering	in	the	
service	of	normal	 learning.	However,	 a	 critical	point	 in	Chase	and	Simon’s	 views	 is	 that	
during	 new	 learning,	 once	 information	 is	 encoded	 as	 chunks,	 it	 is	 stored	 in	 short-term	
memory.	More	 recent	 studies	 actually	 suggest	 that	 this	may	 not	 be	 the	 case,	 and	 that	
long-term	memory	storage	should	host	these	chunks	instead.	According	to	this	view,	the	
immediate	recall	task	developed	by	de	Groot	(1946/65)	would	therefore	involve	not	only	
short-term,	 or	 working	 memory,	 but	 also	 long-term	 memory	 processes	 in	 experts.	 By	
contrast,	 the	 same	 task	 in	 novices	 would	 mainly	 tap	 on	 working	 memory	 alone.	
Moreover,	the	idea	of	linear	relationships	between	the	amount	of	chunks	available	from	
long-term	memory	and	new	learning	performance	has	also	been	disproved,	as	we	further	
below.	
	
IV.3.	The	limits	of	the	chunking	theory		
	
The	 original	 chunking	 theory	 as	 developed	 by	 Chase	 and	 Simon	 (1973b)	 makes	 the	
assumptions	 that	 information	 encoded	 as	 a	 chunk	 is	 stored	 in	 short-term,	 or	 working	
memory,	 thus	 explaining	 how	 chess	masters	 can	 recall	 four	 times	more	 positions	 than	
novice	 in	 their	 immediate	 recall	 task.	 Given	 the	 acknowledged	 temporary	 nature	 of	
storage	 in	 working	 memory,	 this	 implies	 that	 any	 interfering	 task	 right	 before	 recall,	
preventing	 the	 subject	 from	 active	 maintenance	 and	 rehearsal,	 should	 yield	 a	 drop	 in	
experts’	memory	later	on.	To	take	only	the	example	of	the	chess	game,	such	experiments	
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have	 been	 performed	 and	 results	 disproved	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 chunk	 theory:	 only	 a	
marginal	 performance	 drop	 in	 recall	 was	 observed	 (Charness,	 1976;	 see	 also	 Glanzer,	
Dorfman	 &	 Kaplan,	 1981;	 Glanzer,	 Fisher	 &	 Dorfman,	 1984	 for	 similar	 findings	 with	
different	 materials).	 Further	 evidence	 showing	 that	 chess	 masters	 can	 remember	 two	
chess	 positions	 with	 similar	 accuracy	 as	 they	 can	 recall	 one	 again	 speaks	 for	 the	
mandatory	involvement	of	long-term	memory	(Cooke,	Atlas,	Lane	&	Berger,	1993).	These	
findings	were	interpreted	as	reflecting	the	involvement	of	long-term	memory	storage	in	
the	exceptional	memory	performance	of	experts	(Ericsson	&	Kintsch,	1995;	Gobet,	2000;	
Gobet	&	Simon,	1996a).	
As	mentioned	above,	a	straightforward	prediction	from	the	chunking	theory	 is	 that	 the	
more	 chunks	 -	 or	prior	 knowledge	 -	 is	 available	 from	 long-term	memory,	 the	more	one	
should	 store	 chunks	within	 short-term	memory	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 actual	 perception,	
during	 a	 learning	 task	 for	 example.	 Put	 simply,	 more	 chunks,	 more	 memory	 for	 the	
domain-specific	memoranda.	This	represents	a	big	challenge	since	computer	simulations	
have	 led	 to	 estimates	 ranging	 from	 10,000	 to	 300,000	 chunks	 stored	 in	 long-term	
memory	to	achieve	a	chess	master	level	(Simon	&	Gilmartin,	1973;	Gobet	&	Simon,	2000).	
It	 becomes	 hard,	 therefore,	 to	 understand	 how	 short-term	 memory	 and	 its	 limited	
capacity	could	on	its	own	host	the	complex	combinatorial	computations	required	for,	say,	
playing	 6	 chess	 games	 blindfolded.	 Moreover,	 a	 review	 of	 chess	 board	 memory	
experiments	revealed	that	even	for	random	positions,	experts	kept	some	superiority	over	
novice	 players	 (Gobet	 &	 Simon,	 1996b),	 again	 suggesting	 that	 short-term	 memory	
capacity	optimization	through	chunking	may	not	suffice	to	account	for	the	effect.	
Moreover,	the	organization	of	the	individual	elements	of	information	within	a	chunk	has	
remained	 elusive.	 In	 the	 example	 of	 the	 chess	 game,	 Chase	 and	 Simon	 (1973b)	 have	
acknowledged	 that	 chunks	 in	 chess	 masters	 may	 hold	 together	 by	 “more	 abstract	
relations”	 than	 the	 observed	 bindings	 based	 on	 mutual	 defense,	 proximity,	 attack	 or	
pieces’	colors	and	types	(p.	80).	
Interestingly,	 earliest	 attempts	 to	 characterize	 the	 organization	 of	 knowledge	 are	
contemporary	 of	 the	 chess’s	 studies.	 For	 example,	 individual	 conceptual	 nodes,	 inter-
related	according	to	distinct	properties,	would	form	a	hierarchical	network	as	proposed	
by	Collins	&	Quillian	(1969).	
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Moreover,	 beyond	 the	 domain	 of	 chess	 game,	 several	 studies	 using	 the	 expert-novice	
paradigm	 have	 confirmed	 the	 superiority	 of	 experts	 for	 the	 acquisition	 of	 new	
memories	regarding	their	expertise	domain,	across	a	wide	range	of	domains:	baseball,	
soccer,	 american	 football,	 dinosaurs,	 famous	 films	 sagas,	 cars,	 music,	 odors,	 etc.	 and	
even….beer!	 (Allard,	 Grahams	 &	 Paarsalu,	 1980;	 Frey	 &	 Adesman,	 1976;	 Herzmann	 &	
Curran,	 2011;	 Long	&	Prat,	 2002;	McKeithen,	Reitman,	Rueter,	&	Hirtle,	 1981;	 Schneider,	
Körkel,	&	Weinert,	 1990;	Spilich,	Vesonder,	Chiesi,	&	Voss,	 1979).	 It	 seems	unlikely	 that	
such	a	variety	of	expertise	domains	fit	with	the	chunking	theory,	for	at	least	one	simple	
reason,	namely	that	learning	e.g.	new	dinosaurs	would	hardly	benefit	from	prior	“chunk”-
like	knowledge	stored	in	long-term	memory.	While	chunking	is	a	plausible	hypothesis	for	
domains	 of	 knowledge	 highly	 dependent	 on	 serial	 learning,	 like	 typically	 in	 the	 chess	
game	 or,	 to	 some	 extent,	 in	 musical	 expertise,	 where	 time	 and	 space	 are	 prominent	
features	of	the	memoranda,	one	hardly	sees	how	it	could	be	the	case	for	beer	expertise.	
Here,	 subsequent	 investigations	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 organizational	 structure	 of	 prior	
knowledge	rather	than	the	amount	of	prior	knowledge	available	to	experts.	For	example,	
in	a	quite	unusual	case	study,	the	organizational	structure	of	knowledge	about	dinosaurs	
was	assessed	 in	a	4-years	old	boy	(Chi	&	Koeske,	1983),	thus	contrasting	two	sets	of	20	
items	 based	 on	 the	mother’s	 rating	 of	 her	 son’s	 knowledge	 and	 on	 their	 frequency	 of	
occurrence	 in	 the	child’s	book.	The	authors	then	compared	the	two	semantic	networks	
mappings	(maps	derived	from	spreading	activations	models,	 i.e.	Collins	&	Loftus,	 (1975)	
on	 a	 series	 of	 independent	 criteria	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	 respective	 structures	 of	
knowledge.	 The	 main	 result	 was	 that	 the	 internal	 “cohesiveness”	 accurately	
differentiated	 these	 mappings	 and	 also	 discriminated	 memory	 performance	 one	 year	
later,	when	the	boy	was	asked	to	recognize	and	name	the	dinosaurs	presented	(accuracy	
was	 10%	vs.	55%,	 for	 low-	vs.	high-cohesiveness	sets,	 respectively).	At	variance	with	 the	
chunking	hypothesis,	 such	 findings	 (see	also	e.g.	Gobbo	&	Chi,	 1986)	suggest	 that	 the	
influence	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	 subsequent	 learning	 and	 memory	 is	 not	 a	 simple	
function	of	the	amount	of	knowledge	available,	but	also	depends	on	the	organizational	
structure	of	prior	knowledge.	
Subsequent	studies	have	also	put	 forward	the	 importance	of	a	particular	kind	of	prior	
knowledge	 corresponding,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 chess,	 to	 “abstract	 description	 of	 a	 chess	
position	based	on	tactical	and	strategic	considerations”	(Cooke	et	al.,	1993).	This	kind	of	
knowledge,	referred	to	as	“high-level	knowledge”	(Frey	&	Adesman,	1976;	Goldin,	1978),	
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actually	 corresponds	 to	 conceptual	 knowledge.	 It	 contrasts	 with	 the	 perceptual	
knowledge	assumed	to	underlie	chunks:	 in	 the	original	chunk	theory	as	well	as	 in	more	
recent	accounts	like	the	template	theory	(Gobet	&	Simon,	1996b),	chunks	are	presumably	
stored	 in	 long-term	memory	as	spatial	patterns	of	pieces’	positions	 resulting	 from	their	
regularity	of	occurrence	 across	 thousands	of	 games.	 Such	 knowledge	does	not	 involve	
conceptual	processing,	instead	being	dependent	on	repeated	perceptual	processing	only.	
Yet,	 it	 has	been	 shown	 that	when	 instructed	 to	encode	 chess	positions	 at	 a	 superficial	
level,	 which	 presumably	 constrains	 players	 to	 rely	 only	 on	 perceptual	 chunks,	 their	
memory	advantage	at	 recall	over	novices	 is	eliminated	(Lane	&	Robertson,	 1979).	Thus,	
not	 only	 perceptual	 chunks	 but	 also	 meaningful	 encoding	 should	 be	 involved	 in	 the	
expertise	 effect	 on	 memory,	 and	 one	 candidate	 for	 understanding	 what	 makes	
encoding	“meaningful”	 is	the	hypothesis	of	“high-level	knowledge”,	 i.e.	conceptual	or	
semantic	knowledge	associated	with	the	domain	of	expertise.	
To	 test	 this	 idea,	 an	 elegant	 experiment	 asked	 chess	 experts	 to	 learn	 and	 recall	 chess	
positions,	 but	 they	 were	 provided	 with	 a	 verbal	 description	 of	 the	 chess	 position	
(corresponding	 to	 the	 high-level	 knowledge	 specific	 to	 this	 game,	 e.g.	 “Sicilian-Dragon	
with	opposite-side	castling;	White	is	attacking	the	kingside,	Black	the	Queenside”)	either	
before	or	 after	 the	 study	phase	 (Cooke	et	 al.,	 1993).	Moreover,	 the	 chess	position	was	
displayed	gradually,	by	revealing	during	5	seconds	subsets	of	4	pieces	randomly	picked	up	
from	the	whole	chessboard.	Then	each	subset	was	erased	and	replaced	by	the	following	
set.	This	procedure	allowed	 to	greatly	minimizing	 the	use	of	perceptual	 chunks,	due	 to	
gradual	exposition	of	random	positions,	which	were	unlikely	to	yield	pattern	recognition.	
The	authors	further	reasoned	that	if	high-level	knowledge	retrieval	is	involved	early	in	the	
perception	 and	 encoding	 of	 the	 chess	 board,	 then	 the	 condition	 where	 the	 verbal	
description	 is	presented	before	study	should	benefit	 further	recall	more	than	when	 it	 is	
presented	post-study.	
The	results	fitted	these	expectations,	providing	the	first	direct	evidence	that	conceptual	
(i.e.	semantic)	knowledge	retrieved	from	long-term	memory	at	encoding	contributes	the	
expertise	 effect.	 A	 recent	 study	 (Lane	 &	 Chang,	 2018)	 further	 confirmed	 this	 idea	 by	
showing	 a	 strong	 correlation	 between	 chess	 high-level	 knowledge	 and	 chess	 positions	
memory,	and	especially	finding	that	even	after	controlling	for	chess	experience	(the	main	
factor	 underlying	 the	 number	 of	 perceptual	 chunks	 available),	 chess	 knowledge	
accounted	for	16%	of	the	between-subjects	variance	of	memory	scores.	
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To	 sum	 up,	 while	 the	 chunking	 theory	 partly	 accounts	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 expertise	 on	
memory,	evidence	supports	the	idea	that	chunking	benefits	arise	from	long-term	memory	
effects.	Prior	knowledge	retrieved	from	long-term	memory	seems	to	fasten	new	long-
term	memory	encoding,	beyond	short-term	memory	effects.	Moreover,	the	amount	of	
prior	knowledge	is	not	the	sole	factor	playing	a	role,	since	the	organizational	structure	of	
knowledge	has	proven	critical,	as	well	as	its	nature:	not	only	perceptual,	but	conceptual	
knowledge	is	required	to	fully	account	for	the	superior	memory	of	experts.	
	
IV.4.	Does	prior	knowledge	associated	with	expertise	alter	perception	or	memory?	
	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 range	 of	 domain-specific	 knowledge	 giving	 rise	 to	 superior	
memory	 for	 these	domains	 is	 impressive.	To	give	 just	a	 few	examples,	baseball	experts	
recall	 more	 information	 than	 novices	 from	 baseball	 texts	 (Spilich	 et	 al.,	 1979);	 texts	
narratives	 about	 soccer	 were	 better	 remembered	 and	 better	 understood	 by	 third-to-
seventh	graders	children	when	they	were	experts	in	soccer	knowledge,	independently	of	
their	overall	verbal	aptitudes	(Schneider	et	al.,	1989);	patients’	case	informations	that	are	
relevant	for	the	reasoning	 leading	to	their	diagnosis	are	better	remembered	by	experts	
than	 novice	 physicians	 (Hassebrock,	 Johnson,	 Bullemer,	 Fox,	 &	 Moller,	 1993);	 map	
reading	 experts	 display	 superior	 memory	 for	 topographic,	 but	 not	 planimetric,	 map	
information	(Gilhooly,	Wood,	Kinnear,	&	Green,	1988),	etc.	(see	Vicente	&	Wang,	1998,	for	
an	 exhaustive	 list	 of	 51	 studies	 highlighting	 the	 expertise	 effect	 across	 19	 distinct	
domains).	Thus,	beyond	the	prototypical	case	of	chess	game	in	experimental	psychology,	
some	common	factors	should	account	for	this	effect.	
While	the	chunking	theory	and	its	more	recent	instantiations	have	placed	the	emphasis	
on	early	effects	on	memory	encoding,	an	alternative	could	be	that	experts	may	present	
with	 distinct	 early	 perceptual	 processes.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 from	 experts	 /	
novices	 studies	 that	 early	 perceptual	 processing	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 degree	 of	 past	
experiences,	and	thus,	prior	knowledge.	For	example,	the	entry-level	shift	designates	the	
fact	 that	 experts	 show	 a	 faster	 and	 more	 automatic	 identification	 of	 entities	 at	 the	
subordinate	level	when	it	belongs	to	their	domain	of	expertise.	Typically,	 if	a	novice	has	
to	name	the	picture	of	a	robin	under	time	constraints,	the	response	will	be	a	basic	level	
name	(i.e.	“bird”,	see	Rosch,	Mervis,	Gray,	Johnson,	&	Boyes-Braem,	1976),	however	an	
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ornithologist	will	more	likely	answer	“robin”,	 illustrating	the	so-called	“entry-level	shift”	
(Tanaka	&	Taylor,	1991).	This	shift	is	related	to	the	acknowledged	higher	ability	of	experts	
in	within-category	discrimination	 tasks	 for	 their	 domain	of	 expertise	 (Goldstone,	 1998).	
For	example,	expert	wine	tasters	are	able	to	 isolate	 independent	perceptual	features	 in	
wines	 that	 non-experts	 fail	 to	 identify	 (Melcher	 &	 Schooler,	 1996).	 Another	 striking	
example	 is	 provided	 by	 Seitz	 (2017),	 showing	 that	 for	 non-experts,	 the	 discrimination	
between	 healthy	 and	 unhealthy	 bone	 tissue	 is	 almost	 impossible,	 still	 it	 is	 a	 critical	
aptitude	developed	by	radiologists	for	accurate	cancer	diagnosis	(see	Figure	27).	
	
	
Figure	27.	Identical	x-ray	images	in	a	case	of	bone	cancer.	Red	circles	highlight	malignant	features.	
Can	you	differentiate	the	malignant	features	from	healthy	tissue,	or	even	identify	these	features	on	
the	left	image?	Taken	from	Seitz,	2017.	
	
Goldstone	(1998)	has	proposed	that	two	mechanisms	involved	in	perceptual	learning	are	
particularly	 sensitive	 to	 expertise,	 namely	 differentiation	 and	 unitization.	 The	 former	
refers	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 discriminate	 similar	 percepts	 (see	 Figure	 27)	 while	 the	 latter	
designates	 the	 integration	 of	 individual	 elements	within	 a	 functional	whole.	 Regarding	
unitization,	 the	 most	 famous	 example	 is	 probably	 holistic	 processing.	 In	 the	 case	 of	
familiar	 faces	perception,	 inverting	the	face	(presenting	the	face	upside-down)	 leads	to	
substantial	 loss	 in	 speed	 and	 accuracy,	 but	 this	 “inversion	 effect”	 does	 not	 occur	 for	
other	 objects	 (Tanaka	 &	 Gauthier,	 1997;	 Rossion,	 2008).	 Interestingly	 however,	 the	
inversion	effect	is	found	for	highly	practiced	stimuli	like	in	the	case	of	visual	expertise	for	
a	specific	domain.	A	highly	cited	study	showed	that	dog	experts	presented	with	a	 large	
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inversion	cost	for	dog	breed	recognition,	while	inversion	had	no	effect	on	recognition	in	
novices	(Diamond,	Carey,	Wilson,	Whitaker,	&	Moses,	1986).	
Regarding	discrimination,	some	studies	have	started	to	investigate	how	prior	knowledge	
may	be	beneficial	for	basic	visual	processes.	For	example,	when	objects	for	which	we	are	
experts	are	displayed	in	a	visual	scene,	we	may	be	able	to	scan	a	greater	part	of	our	visual	
field	per	eye	fixation,	resulting	in	expertise	effects	on	the	detection	of	favoured	objects	
(Hershler	 &	 Hochstein,	 2009).	 Moreover,	 when	 perceiving	 familiar	 objects,	 top-down	
processes	can	modify	the	physiological	correlates	of	visual	perception	(ERPs)	as	early	as	
120	ms.	post	stimulus	onset,	which	in	turn	has	been	shown	to	facilitate	discrimination	and	
recognition	 memory	 (Rahman	 &	 Sommer,	 2008).	 Very	 recent	 evidence	 has	 strongly	
supported	a	broader	influence	of	semantic	knowledge	in	early	visual	processing,	within	
a	 strikingly	 similar	 time	 windows	 (120	ms,	 see	 (Samaha,	 Boutonnet,	 Postle,	 &	 Lupyan,	
2018).	
	
In	 summary,	 consistent	 evidence	 favours	 the	 influence	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 gathered	
through	 expertise	 on	 perceptual	 processes.	 Perceptual	 learning	 mechanisms,	 and	
especially	 differentiation	 and	 unitization,	 are	 optimized	 following	 extensive	 training,	
and	 very	 early	 stages	 of	 visual	 processing	 display	 expertise	 effects.	 This	 optimization	
however	 remains	 specific	 to	 the	objects	belonging	 to	 the	domain	of	expertise,	 in	 close	
relation	 with	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 conceptual	 knowledge	 in	 the	 field.	 As	 the	 perceptual	
optimization	 does	 not	 extend	 to	 other	 objects,	 memory	 enhancement	 resulting	 for	
expertise	accordingly	does	not	extend	to	memory	for	other,	unrelated,	memoranda	(e.g.	
Evans	et	al.,	2011,	for	a	very	convincing	example).	One	must	therefore	keep	in	mind	that	
the	 learning	 advantage	 for	 items	 with	 prior	 knowledge	 may,	 at	 least	 partly,	 have	
resulted	in	differential	perceptual	processing	in	experts	and	novice,	or	for	favoured	vs.	
“normal”	objects.	Any	experimental	attempt	to	study	the	impact	of	prior	knowledge	on	
subsequent	declarative	 learning	should	 thus	consider	experimental	designs	 that	allow	
equalizing	 perceptual	 effects	 across	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions.	 One	way	 to	 achieve	
this,	as	we	will	further	develop,	is	to	use	stimuli	for	which	virtually	all	subjects	have	a	high	
level	of	expertise,	but	that	can	–	or	not	–	lack	prior	knowledge.	With	that	respect,	human	
faces	are	obvious	candidates.	
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IV.5.	Does	prior	knowledge	associated	with	expertise	benefit	memory	independently	of	
the	testing	format?	
	
Literature	 on	 expertise	 has	 therefore	 showed	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 of	 multiple	 forms	
supports	 encoding	 processes,	 certainly	 facilitating	 elaborative	 encoding,	 and	 thus	
improving	declarative	learning	within	the	domain	of	expertise.	Another	issue	is	whether	
expertise	 also	 alters	 how	memory	 content	 is	 further	 retrieved.	 This	 has	 long	 remained	
unclear:	 numerous	 reports	 with	 superior	 recall	 for	 the	 domain-specific	 materials	 of	
experts	(Anderson,	1981;	Anderson	&	Pichert,	1978;	Bower,	Black,	&	Turner,	1979;	Fass	&	
Schumacher,	1981;	Johnson	&	Kieras,	1983;	Schneider	et	al.,	1990;	Spilich	et	al.,	1979;	Sulin	
&	Dooling,	1974),	contrasted	with	either	small	or	even	absent	benefits	of	expertise	on	
recognition	 memory	 (Alba	 &	 Hasher,	 1983;	 Alba,	 Alexander,	 Hasher,	 &	 Caniglia,	 1981;	
Moravcsik	&	Kintsch,	1993;	Schneider	et	al.,	1990;	Summers,	Horton,	&	Diehl,	1985).	Such	
dissociation	across	studies	could	reflect	a	specific	 influence	of	expertise	on	recollection,	
while	 familiarity	 could	 remain	 unaffected.	 Indirect	 evidence	 for	 this	 idea	 is	 available	
across	more	recent	studies	that	have	confirmed	the	benefits	of	expertise	on	recognition	
memory,	and	under	which	conditions	it	could	occur.	
	
For	 example,	 it	 was	 shown	 that	 beer	 experts	 were	 better	 than	 novices	 in	 recognition	
memory	for	the	beers	tested,	but	not	for	beers	discrimination	(Valentin,	Chollet,	Beal,	&	
Patris,	 2007).	 This	 suggests	 that	 long-term-related	memory	processes,	 rather	 than	 fine-
tuned	perceptual	processes,	supported	the	expertise	benefit.	Moreover,	 the	effect	was	
tightly	associated	with	expertise	in	that	it	was	observed	only	for	highly	familiar	beers,	for	
which	experts	had	been	 familiarized	during	 their	 formal	 training,	but	not	 for	unfamiliar	
ones.	Here,	a	possibility	raised	by	the	skilled-memory	theory	from	Chase	&	Ericsson	(1981)	
is	 that	 experts	 may	 have	 built	 knowledge	 structures	 helping	 them	 to	 identify	 the	
discriminant	 features	 among	 different	 beers.	 Other	 authors	 have	 proposed	 that	 wine	
experts,	for	example,	may	form	structures	based	on	grapes	varieties	(Hughson,	2003),	a	
somehow	 similar	 idea	 with	 the	 proposal	 that	 chess	 experts	 may	 build	 abstract	
relationships	between	prototypical	patterns,	further	scaffolding	long-term	encoding	and	
retrieval	 (Chase	&	 Simon,	 1973b).	 Recall	would	be	greatly	 facilitated	 if	 these	 structures	
were	 identified	 at	 study,	 and	 available	 as	 retrieval	 cues	 (e.g.	 see	 the	 Constraint	
Attunement	Hypothesis,	Vicente	&	Wang,	1998).	Convincing	evidence	for	this	hypothesis	
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has	 long	been	reported	with	baseball	experts,	whose	 recall	of	baseball	 texts	was	more	
accurate	 that	 novices,	 especially	 considering	 text’s	 proposals	 that	 are	 highly	 related	 to	
the	structure	of	a	baseball’s	game	(Spilich	et	al.,	1979;	see	Schneider	et	al.,	1990	for	similar	
findings	with	soccer	experts).	Thus,	experts’	memory	could	be	supported	at	retrieval	by	
the	availability	of	domain-specific	structures	of	knowledge	serving	as	additional	retrieval	
cues.	
Similar	 data	 from	an	elegant	 study	emphasizes	how	 retrieval	 processes	 involved	 in	 the	
expertise	 advantage	 may	 rely	 upon	 mental	 structures	 or	 “schemas”	 (Piaget,	 1929;	
Bartlett,	 1932)	 closely	 and	 uniquely	 associated	 with	 the	 domain	 considered.	 Eight	 taxi	
drivers	from	Helsinki	and	eight	Helsinki’s	students	serving	as	controls	had	to	learn	lists	of	
streets	names	from	the	Finland	capital.	Taxi	drivers	proved	better	than	students,	but	the	
effect	was	particularly	 large	when	 the	 list	order	was	congruent	with	 the	natural	 spatial	
constraints	 of	 the	 city	 (Kalakoski	 &	 Saariluoma,	 2001).	 Even	 more	 convincing,	 the	
performance	of	 taxi	 drivers	 seemed	 to	 linearly	 increase	with	 the	 increase	between	 the	
order	 of	 street	 names	 displayed	 at	 study	 and	 the	 realistic	 routes	 that	 could	 be	 driven	
(Expt.	 1,	 see	 figure	 1).	 These	 results	 converge	 in	 suggesting	 that	 superior	 memory	
retrieval	for	the	domain	of	expertise	can	take	the	form	of	associative	retrieval,	namely	of	
bound	items	and	contexts,	which	is	highly	suggestive	of	recollection-like	processes.	Such	
results	 in	 recognition	memory	would	 however	 be	 dependent	 on	 the	 experts’	 ability	 to	
rely	not	only	on	their	domain-specific	knowledge,	but	also	on	the	activation	of	 relevant	
structures	of	knowledge	at	study,	which	may	serve	as	additional	retrieval	cues	at	test.	
In	support	of	this	 idea,	 (Kawamura,	Suzuki,	&	Morikawa,	2007)	asked	expert	hikers	and	
novice	hikers	from	the	Osaka	area	(Japan)	to	learn	hiking	trail	pictures	with	high-	or	low-
functionality	 features.	 Functionality	 referred	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 particular	 scene	
attributes	 implying	specific	actions	(like	crossing,	wading,	 resting,	climbing,	etc.),	which	
are	of	particular	 relevance	for	confirmed	hikers.	Strikingly,	expert	hikers	provided	more	
Hits	 and	 fewer	 False	 Alarms	 than	 novice	 hikers,	 but	 only	 for	 the	 “High-functionality”	
photos	 (see	 also	Rawson	&	Van	Overschelde,	 (2008),	 for	 similar	 findings	with	National	
Football	League	experts).	Thus,	the	recognition	memory	advantage	observed	in	experts	
is	not	related	to	their	better	general	knowledge	of	the	hiking	trails,	but	more	specifically	
to	the	availability	of	knowledge	structures	(e.g.	detecting	a	particular	feature	on	a	trail	
pictures	activate	related	knowledge	about	specific	actions	to	be	performed).	Again,	the	
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availability	 and	 use	 of	 these	 structures	 could	 favour	 recollection-based	 rather	 than	
familiarity-based	recognition	memory.	
Nonetheless,	 due	 to	 their	 long	 training,	 experts	 have	 been	 processing	 the	 very	 same	
objects	 (be	 it	 beers,	 wine,	 base-ball,	 chess	 games,	 or	 whatever	 domain	 of	 expertise)	
across	 numerous	 similar	 but	 different	 contexts.	 This	 could	 lead	 to	 the	 expectation	 of	
decreased	 recollection	 of	 the	 specific	 context	 associated	 with	 the	 probe	 during	
recognition	 (e.g.	 Reder,	 Donavos,	 &	 Erickson,	 2002).	 A	 common	 related	 effect	 is	 the	
mirror	effect,	whereby	low-frequency	words	yield	more	Hits	and	fewer	False	Alarms	than	
high-frequency	words.	The	Source	of	Activation	Confusion	dual-process	model	theory	of	
recognition	 (Reder	 et	 al.,	 2000)	predicts	 that	due	 to	higher	 contextual	 competition	 for	
high-frequency	 words	 at	 retrieval,	 their	 accurate	 recognition	 can	 only	 be	 achieved	
through	familiarity-based	retrieval.	Translating	this	to	expertise,	one	could	consider	that	
high-frequency	words	mimic	the	domain-specific	expertise	for	some	class	of	objects	(e.g.	
beer	 tastes),	 and	 thus	 recollection	 would	 be	 expected	 to	 decrease	 in	 experts	 for	
materials	related	to	their	domain	of	expertise,	because	of	the	large	amount	of	contextual	
competition.	
Studies	aiming	at	explicitly	 testing	whether	expertise	affects	 recollection,	 familiarity,	or	
both	retrieval	processes	are	therefore	warranted.	Unfortunately,	they	are	rather	scarce.	
	
In	 one	 such	 study,	 psychology	 students	 who	 were	 defined	 as	 “Star	 Trek	 experts”	 or	
novices	on	the	basis	of	a	Star	Trek	knowledge	test	were	asked	to	learn	either	psychology	
chapters	or	Star	Trek	short	stories	(Long	&	Prat,	2002).	Thus,	all	participants	supposedly	
shared	 a	 common	 expertise	 for	 psychology	 texts	 but	 not	 for	 Star	 Trek	 stories.	
Recognition	 memory	 was	 assessed	 using	 Remember	 /	 Know	 procedures	 (Expt.	 1)	 or	
Process	 Dissociation	 Procedure	 (Expt.	 2).	 In	 both	 experiments,	 Recollection	 but	 not	
Familiarity	 estimates	 showed	 the	 expected	 Group	 X	Material	 interaction.	 Similarly,	 car	
experts	were	 compared	with	 car	 novices	 on	 a	 recognition	memory	 test	 for	 pictures	 of	
cars	 or	 birds	 (Herzmann	&	 Curran,	 2011).	 Estimates	 of	 recollection	 and	 familiarity	were	
based	on	ROC	curve	analysis	and	on	an	adaptation	of	the	Remember	/	Know	procedure.	
The	authors	reported	a	consistent	benefit	of	expertise	on	recollection	estimates,	leaving	
unaffected	 the	 core	 estimate	 of	 familiarity	 (Independent	 Remember	 Know	 familiarity	
estimate),	 but	 nonetheless	 benefiting	 the	 overall	 sensitivity	 measures	 (ability	 to	
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discriminate	Old	 and	New	stimuli).	At	 retrieval,	 ERP	 typically	 associated	with	 familiarity	
(FN400)	 was	 not	 influenced	 by	 expertise.	 In	 the	 meantime,	 the	 electrophysiological	
correlate	 of	 recollection	 (i.e.	 parietal	 Old/New	 effect	 around	 500	 ms	 post	 onset)	 was	
found	 for	 all	 subjects	 with	 birds,	 and	 only	 for	 car	 experts	 for	 cars.	 Finally,	 a	 recent	
experiment	 addressed	 these	 issues	 albeit	 less	 directly	 (Bruett,	 Fang,	 Kamaraj,	 Haley,	&	
Coutanche,	 2018).	 Sport	 experts	 and	 novices	 were	 asked	 to	 perform	 an	 incidental	
encoding	task.	At	study,	they	were	presented	with	combinations	of	unknown	faces	and	a	
written	question.	The	question	was	designed	to	include	information	related	or	unrelated	
to	sports	expertise	(e.g.	“Panthers	running	back”	vs	“Indiana	fire-fighter”).	An	Old/New	
judgment	 for	 faces	was	 asked	after	while,	 and	 for	 each	“Old”	 response,	 subjects	were	
asked	to	recall	as	much	information	as	they	could	that	was	associated	to	the	face	at	study	
(i.e.	 information	included	in	the	question).	The	results	showed	similar	Old/New	accuracy	
for	 expert	 and	 novices,	 but	 the	 experts	 recalled	 more	 associated	 information	 that	
novices.	Not	only	this	study	shows	that	expertise	benefits	memory	event	after	incidental	
encoding,	 but	 it	 also	 implies	 that	 associative,	 but	 not	 item	memory	 benefits	 expertise,	
extending	 prior	 findings	 with	 a	 very	 different	 approach.	 It	 further	 adds	 one	 instance	
where	 the	expertise	advantage	 is	unlikely	 to	be	accounted	 for	by	perceptual	processes	
differences.	
Taken	together,	these	findings	seem	to	support	a	specific	sensitivity	of	recollection,	not	
familiarity,	 to	prior	knowledge	associated	with	expertise.	This	might	explain	why	earlier	
studies	sometimes	failed	to	find	superior	recognition	memory	 in	experts,	as	 long	as	the	
tasks	used	only	tapped	Old/New	judgments.	
	
IV.6.	Interim	summary:	contribution	of	the	expert/novice	paradigm	
	
Research	on	experts’	memory	has	a	long	history	in	psychology,	and	it	has	now	become	a	
domain	 of	 investigation	 in	 cognitive	 neurosciences	 (see	 Hambrick,	 Campitelli	 &	
Macnamara,	2018	for	a	recent	book	on	that	topic).	This	domain	has	put	forward	some	key	
ideas	that	continue	illuminating	the	field:	
- A	critical	factor	explaining	the	superior	domain-specific	memory	of	experts	is	not	
simply	 the	 amount	 of	 domain-relevant	 knowledge,	 but	 rather	 the	 congruency	
between	 incoming	 information	 and	 the	 domain-relevant	 past	 experiences.	 As	we	
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will	 see	 in	 the	 Chapter	 VI,	 congruency	 with	 pre-existing	 schemas	 has	 gained	
considerable	interest	in	contemporary	research	
- An	impressive	memory	advantage	in	experts	can	be	due	to	chunking	processes	in	
short-term	memory,	but	a	 large	part	of	the	effect	 lies	 in	retrieval	 from	long-term	
memory	
- What	is	retrieved	from	long-term	memory	that	helps	experts	memory	correspond	
to	abstract	representations	that	we	now	term	“semantic	knowledge”	
- Explicit	or	incidental	retrieval	of	this	knowledge	seems	to	yield	a	specific	increase	
in	recollection-based	recognition	memory,	leaving	familiarity	unaffected	
Nonetheless,	beyond	expertise	effect	on	memory,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	expertise	also	change	
early	perceptual	processing,	notably	by	 improving	differentiation	 (and,	 thus,	perceptual	
discrimination	 abilities)	 and	 unitization	 (perception	 of	 separated	 elements	 as	 a	 single	
entity)	in	the	domain	of	expertise.	Any	investigation	of	the	influence	of	prior	knowledge	
on	new	learning	therefore	must	take	these	“early”	effects	into	account.	
	
IV.7.	Limits	of	the	Expertise	paradigm	and	plea	for	using	faces	as	memoranda	
	
While	a	huge	literature	with	the	expert-novice	paradigm	has	shaped	our	understanding	of	
how	past	 experiences	 can	 influence	 declarative	 learning,	 some	 very	 basic	 observations	
still	 fall	 out	 of	 the	 range	 of	 the	 expertise	 paradigm.	 A	 famous	 example	 comes	 from	
instances	of	“one-shot	learning”,	which	is	a	categorization	problem	usually	referred	to	in	
the	 field	 of	 computer	 vision	 and	 machine	 learning	 algorithms	 development.	 Basically,	
“one-shot	learning”	corresponds	to	a	durable	modification	of	perception	after	one	single	
exposure	to	a	stimulus.	Some	illustrations	are	provided	in	Figure	28	and	Figure	29.	
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Figure	28.	Once	you	have	seen	the	cigar	hidden	in	the	bricks	(A),	you	will	never	see	this	picture	the	
same	way.	Besides,	on	a	Bayesian	perspective,	the	likelihood	of	perceiving	a	cigar	among	bricks	will	
dramatically	increase	(i.e.	from	zero)	in	your	visual	system;	(B)	see	the	hidden	face?	Adapted	from	
https://michaelbach.de/	
	
	
Figure	29.	How	past	experiences	influence	perception	(beyond	expertise).	On	the	left	picture,	very	
basic	geographical	knowledge	allows	to	recognizing	the	United	Kingdom	and	continents	like	
Oceania,	albeit	quite	slowly	because	of	their	incongruent	presentation	with	prior	knowledge.	On	
the	right	picture,	the	very	same	prior	knowledge	prevents	you	from	seeing	immediately	the	Queen	
profile.	(Adapted	from	https://www.opticalspy.com/opticals/)	
	
As	mentioned	before,	basic	perceptual	(e.g.	expectations	we	have	about	a	wall	of	bricks)	
or	 semantic	 (e.g.	 memory	 for	 the	 contour	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 satellite	 map)	
knowledge	therefore	 leads	to	strong	changes	 in	our	encoding	processes.	Such	changes	
are	long	lasting	in	the	case	of	one-shot	learning,	and	thus	long-term	modifications	in	the	
behaviour	 can	 occur	 in	 response	 to	 environmental	 regularities.	 In	 that	 case,	
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environmental	 regularities	 (think	 of	 the	 various	 and	 numerous	 bricks	 wall	 you	 have	
experienced)	 produce	 perceptual	 and	 semantic	 knowledge,	 and	 one	 single	 change	 in	
these	 regularities	 (top-down	 identification	 of	 one	 feature	 breaking	 prior	 expectations)	
will	 result	 in	a	new	behaviour	(e.g.	always	“seeing”	the	cigar	 in	the	wall).	This	 is	a	clear	
instance	of	learning,	highly	dependent	upon	prior	knowledge,	which	does	not	require	any	
expertise.	 Thus,	 beyond	 the	 field	 of	 domain-specific	 expertise,	 everyday	 information	
processing	provides	 situations	where	prior	 knowledge	 interact	with	memory	 encoding,	
for	which	the	expert-novice	paradigm	is	of	little	help.	
Moreover,	 the	 benefits	 of	 expertise	 on	 learning	 result	 from	 multiple	 sources,	 since	
expertise	 is	 typically	 associated	 with	 specific	 perceptual,	 procedural,	 but	 also	
declarative	 knowledge.	 These	 kinds	of	 knowledge	are	 likely	 to	differentially	 contribute	
domain-specific	learning	improvements,	but	at	various	degrees	depending	on	the	kind	of	
expertise	 considered.	 For	 example,	 chess	 masters	 may	 build	 on	 their	 procedural,	
semantic	and	schemas-like	knowledge	to	support	improved	learning	of	chess	games,	with	
little	 involvement	of	perceptual	skills.	Conversely,	expert	 radiologists	 likely	 rely	on	their	
perceptual	expertise	to	perform	highly	demanding	visual	discrimination	tasks	(see	Figure	
27),	 and	 maybe	 less	 on	 semantic	 knowledge.	 The	 expertise	 paradigm	 offers	 little	
opportunity	 to	 disentangle	 the	 contribution	 of	 each	 variable,	 and	 prevents	 from	
generalizing	the	observed	effects	to	other	domains.	
Beyond	 domain-specific	 expertise,	 studying	 how	 prior	 knowledge	 may	 influence	
declarative	 learning	may	therefore	take	advantage	of	natural	expertise	for	some	class	
of	 stimuli.	 An	 obvious	 example	 is	 the	 case	 of	 memory	 for	 faces	 in	 humans.	 Because	
humans	 are	 likely	 to	 process	 their	 peer’s	 faces	 with	 overall	 similar	 levels	 of	 expertise,	
more	 can	 be	 expected	 from	 paradigms	manipulating	 prior	 knowledge	 associated	 with	
faces	to	investigate	its	impact	on	learning.	Put	simply,	using	stimuli	for	which	we	all	have	
the	same	level	of	expertise,	and	then	controlling	the	amount	and	kind	of	prior	knowledge	
associated	 to	 it,	 could	 circumvent	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 expertise	 paradigm	 (see	 also	
above,	section	5.4.).	
This	 is	one	of	 the	reasons	why	we	have	focused	on	declarative	 learning	of	 faces	across	
several	experiments	 in	 the	present	 thesis.	 In	 the	next	 chapter,	we	will	 further	describe	
available	evidence	for	the	 influence	of	prior	knowledge	associated	with	expertise	 in	the	
particular	case	of	faces.	
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IV.8.	Summary	
	
The	 psychology	 of	 expertise	 has	 been	 particularly	 fruitful	 in	 demonstrating	 that	
representations	stored	 in	 long-term	memory,	rather	than	short-term	memory	chunking	
alone,	 enable	 impressive	 benefits	 on	 subsequent	 learning.	 Research	 has	 brought	
evidence	that	both	perceptual	and	conceptual	representations,	along	with	their	particular	
organization	 in	 experts,	 would	 likely	 account	 for	 superior	 declarative	 learning,	 albeit	
restricted	to	the	domain	of	expertise.	Beyond	the	amount	of	knowledge	available	from	
experts’	long-term	memory,	it	seems	that	successful	retrieval	during	encoding,	driven	by	
congruency	 between	 sensory	 inputs	 and	 stored	 conceptual	 knowledge,	may	 result	 in	
enhanced	 recollection-based	 memory,	 leaving	 familiarity	 unaffected.	 Importantly,	 not	
only	 long-term	memory	but	also	early	perceptual	processes	are	under	 influence	of	prior	
knowledge	resulting	from	expertise	(e.g.	 leading	to	 increase	 in	both	differentiation	and	
unitization).	 Thus,	 moving	 forward	 to	 explore	 the	 impact	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	
declarative	 learning	requires	 to	 reducing	 the	variability	due	 to	perceptual	 expertise.	A	
way	 to	 achieve	 this	 can	 be	 the	 use	 of	materials	 for	which	 there	 is	 little	 inter-individual	
variability	in	perceptual	expertise,	like	faces.	
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Chapter	V	
“Expertise”	influences	declarative	learning:	the	special	case	of	faces	
	
Beyond	the	hot	recent	debate	about	whether	or	not	we	are	experts	for	unfamiliar	faces	
(see	 Rossion,	 2018;	 Young	 &	 Burton,	 2018),	 it	 is	 widely	 acknowledged	 that	 as	 human	
beings,	 we	 are	 particularly	 good	 at	 recognizing	 our	 contemporaries.	 A	 recent	 report	
estimates	 that	we	 know	 –	 and	 recognize	 –	 on	 average	 5,000	 different	 faces	 (Jenkins,	
Dowsett,	&	Burton,	2018).	Moreover,	accurate	recognition	can	be	performed	very	fast,	
probably	well	 below	 400	ms	 (Barragan-Jason,	 Besson,	 Ceccaldi,	 &	 Barbeau,	 2013).	 The	
adaptive	advantage	of	such	 impressive	abilities	 in	humans	 is	obvious:	everyday	routines	
involve	dense	social	 interactions	for	most	of	us,	and	we	need	a	very	efficient	system	to	
guide	 our	 behaviour	 when	 encountering	 a	 peer.	 Recent	 research	 in	 psychiatry	 has	
demonstrated	 the	 close	 relationships	 between	 faces	 learning	 and	 recognition	 on	 the	
one	hand,	and	social	inhibition	and	engagement	in	social	interactions	on	the	other	hand	
(Avery,	 VanDerKlok,	 Heckers,	 &	 Blackford,	 2016;	 Corbett,	 Newsom,	 Key,	 Qualls,	 &	
Edmiston,	 2014).	 In	 patients	 with	 early	 Alzheimer’s	 disease,	 for	 example,	 complaints	
regarding	 the	 inability	 to	 recognize	 and	 name	 the	 relatives	 are	 very	 common	 (e.g.	 see	
(Clare,	 Wilson,	 Breen,	 &	 Hodges,	 1999),	 thus	 highlighting	 the	 functional	 relevance	 of	
memory	for	faces.	
	
Figure	30.	The	special	case	of	faces.	Stimuli	used	in	experiments	3a,	3b,	4	&	5.	
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In	keeping	with	our	aim	of	studying	the	contribution	of	prior	knowledge	to	declarative	
learning,	faces	are	not	only	interesting	because	these	stimuli	allow	equalizing	levels	of	
perceptual	expertise,	but	also	because	of	its	functional	and	clinical	relevance.	What	does	
prior	studies	tell	us	about	the	influence	of	prior	knowledge	on	learning	of	faces?	Studies	
so	far	can	be	divided	in	two	categories.	First,	a	series	of	experiments	have	capitalized	on	
own-race	or	age	effects	to	contrast	learning	of	faces	for	which	we	have	a	superior	level	of	
expertise	 (e.g.	 faces	 of	 people	 of	 your	 own	 age)	 vs	 faces	 for	 which	 our	 expertise	 is	
normal	 (e.g.	 faces	 of	 distinct	 ages	 than	 yours).	 Second,	many	 studies	 have	 contrasted	
famous	and	unknown	faces	to	answer	these	questions,	or	similar	manipulations	meant	to	
contrast	 novel	 faces	 with	 familiar	 faces.	 In	 both	 contexts,	 we	 would	 like	 to	 draw	 the	
reader’s	attention	to	the	importance	of	these	questions	beyond	the	field	of	fundamental	
memory	 research.	 In	 the	 field	 of	 justice,	 for	 example,	 a	 deep	 understanding	 of	 the	
mechanisms	 responsible	 for	 eyewitness	 testimony	 is	 clearly	 mandatory	 when	 one	
considers	 that	 since	 1989	 in	 the	U.S.,	 about	70%	of	 the	300	DNA-based	exonerations	of	
wrongfully	 convicted	 persons	 involved	 eyewitness	 misidentifications	 (Wixted,	 Mickes,	
Clark,	Gronlund,	&	Roediger,	2015).	
	
V.1.	Manipulating	the	cross-race	effects	or	the	own-age	bias	
	
The	“cross-race	effect”	 (CRE)	designates	 the	 finding	of	better	 recognition	performance	
for	own-	vs.	other-race	 faces	 (Chance,	&	Goldstein,	 1996).	Similarly,	 the	“own-age	bias”	
(OAB)	 refers	 to	 the	 finding	 of	 better	 recognition	memory	 for	 faces	 of	 one's	 own	 age	
group	than	for	faces	of	another	age	group	(Anastasi	&	Rhodes,	2005;	Rhodes	&	Anastasi,	
2012).	 In	either	case,	one	can	conveniently	consider	that	the	 level	of	expertise	for	faces	
ranges	from	superior	(for	a	cross-race	or	a	different	age	face)	to	very	superior	for	own-
race	and	own-age	 faces.	Thus,	 it	 seems	clear	 that,	even	after	equalizing	 the	perceptual	
expertise	 factors	 (participants	 are	 all	 face	 experts,	 and	 all	 faces	 are	 unknown),	 some	
additional	factor	makes	a	difference.	
Again	here,	some	studies	aimed	at	 identifying	whether	superior	recollection,	 familiarity,	
or	 both	would	 account	 for	 the	CRE	or	 the	OAB.	 For	 example,	 young	Hispanic	 students	
were	asked	to	 learn	Hispanic	and	African-American	faces	right	before	a	recognition	test	
phase	(Marcon,	Susa,	&	Meissner,	Christian,	2009).	During	test,	lure	faces	were	repeated	
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across	 lags	 of	 various	 lengths,	 and	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	 respond	 “Old”	 only	 to	
faces	presented	at	study	(Expt.	1).	The	authors	reported	a	mirror	effect	similar	to	the	one	
mentioned	above	with	words	(see	section	5.5.),	that	is,	Hispanic	students	made	more	Hits	
and	 fewer	False	Alarms	 for	Hispanic	 faces	 than	 for	African-American	 faces,	 yielding	 the	
expected	 own-race	 effect.	 More	 interesting	 was	 the	 finding	 of	 a	 superior	 rate	 of	
repetition	 errors	 for	 other-	 than	 own-race	 faces.	 That	 is,	 Hispanic	 students	 falsely	
responded	“Old”	to	repeated	lures	more	often	for	African-American	that	Hispanic	faces.	
Repetition	 errors	 can	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 either	 a	 failure	 of	 recollection	 of	 prior	
presentation	 during	 the	 test,	 or	 by	 an	 increased	 familiarity	 incorrectly	 leading	 to	 Old	
judgments.	Thus,	the	CRE	on	repetition	errors	could	reflect	either	a	superior	recollection	
for	 own-race	 (lure)	 faces	 or	 an	 increased	 familiarity	 for	 other-race	 (lure)	 faces.	
Experiment	 2	 addressed	 these	 possibilities	 by	 using	 a	 Process	 Dissociation	 Procedure	
where	the	exclusion	condition	required	subjects	to	respond	“No”	to	repeated	lures,	while	
the	inclusion	condition	asked	for	“Yes”	responses	for	repeated	lures.	Results	suggested	a	
clear-cut	CRE	on	recollect	estimates,	while	familiarity	estimates	did	not	differ	with	faces’	
races.	Note	however	that	Familiarity	estimates	reported	(Table	3,	p.	102)	were	apparently	
much	higher	for	other-	than	own-race	faces	(0.44	vs	0.29),	with	similar	dispersion	(0.26	&	
0.28,	respectively),	yielding	a	p	value	of	0.09.	Thus,	one	possibility	acknowledged	by	the	
authors	 is	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 based	 on	 visual	 expertise	 for	 own-race	 faces	 could	
increase	 recollection-based	 recognition,	 but	 in	 the	meantime	 increase	 familiarity-based	
recognition	memory	 for	 other-race	 faces,	 thus	 contributing	 to	 the	 observed	 CRE.	 In	 a	
similar	 vein,	 Horry,	 Wright,	 &	 Tredoux,	 (2010)	 combined	 a	 Remember	 /	 Know	 /	 Guess	
procedure	for	 faces	recognition	memory	with	a	source	memory	design,	since	each	face	
was	 presented	 at	 study	 within	 one	 of	 four	 possible	 scene	 backgrounds.	 Again,	 the	
authors	 found	consistent	evidence	 for	 superior	 recollection	estimates	 for	 the	own-race	
faces,	 be	 it	 computed	 from	 the	 R/K/G	 procedure	 or	 based	 on	 the	 conditional	 source	
memory	 performance.	 However,	 regarding	 Familiarity,	 results	 were	 less	 consistent,	
depending	on	 the	metrics	 used	 and	on	 the	 ethnicity	 of	 the	participants.	Accordingly,	 a	
very	original	study	found	that	when	faces	are	presented	at	study	as	belonging	to	either	
the	 same	 or	 different	 “personality”	 group	 than	 the	 subject’s,	 a	 same-group	 effect	 is	
observed	 for	 both	 recollection	 and	 familiarity	 estimates	 during	 further	 recognition,	
favouring	the	same	group	(Herzmann	&	Curran,	2013).		
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Studies	investigating	the	OAB	have	reported	similar	results.	Interestingly,	one	such	study	
have	 found	 indirect	evidence	 for	 increased	 recollection	of	own-age	vs.	other-age	 faces,	
but	also	found	that	the	degree	of	exposure	to	same	or	different	age	faces	modulated	the	
OAB	 in	 the	 elderly.	 Thus,	 elderly	with	 frequent	 contacts	with	 persons	 of	 their	 age	 did	
present	 with	 an	 OAB	 during	 face	 recognition,	 while	 the	 effect	 disappeared,	 in	 elderly	
reporting	much	 less	 frequent	 contacts	with	 people	 of	 the	 same	 age	 (Wiese,	 Komes,	&	
Schweinberger,	 2012).	 The	 same	 research	group	has	 suggested	 that	 the	 lack	of	OAB	 in	
elderly	 would	 in	 fact	 be	 the	 result	 of	 impaired	 recollection	 with	 aging,	 so	 that	
recollection-based	 retrieval	 would	 be	 considered	 a	 pre-requisite	 for	 the	 OAB	 (Wolff,	
Wiese,	&	Schweinberger,	2012)	(see	Figure	31),	making	clearly	the	case	for	the	influence	of	
prior	 knowledge	 for	 faces	 on	 recollection,	 but	 failing	 to	 rule	 out	 a	 contribution	 of	
familiarity.	
	
	
Figure	31.	Findings	from	Wolff	et	al.	(2012,	p.	1072).	The	Own	Age	Bias	in	recognition	memory	is	
sensitive	to	aging.	
	
Altogether,	these	findings	point	toward	a	contribution	of	prior	knowledge	that	seems	to	
increase	recollection-based	recognition	for	faces,	while	the	additional	role	of	familiarity	
processes	remains	uncertain.	
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V.2.	Manipulating	the	familiarity	of	faces	
	
Another	 approach	 to	 the	 same	 problem	 is	 to	directly	 manipulate	 the	 degree	 of	 prior	
knowledge	 associated	 with	 faces,	 to	 further	 investigate	 whether	 and	 how	 it	 affects	
recognition	 memory	 processes.	 A	 pioneer	 study	 from	 had	 already	 established	 the	
superior	 recognition	 memory	 for	 famous	 over	 unknown	 faces,	 and	 provided	 highly	
relevant	 data	 regarding	 the	 cognitive	 substrates	 of	 such	 advantage	 (Klatzky	&	 Forrest,	
1984).	 The	 authors	 first	 reported	 evidence	 that	 better	 recognition	 for	 famous	 over	
unknown	faces	was	not	associated	with	better	memory	for	the	perceptual	attributes	of	
each	 study	episode	 (i.e.	 faces	 features).	 For	example,	when	correctly	endorsing	an	Old	
famous	 face	 as	 “Old”,	 participants	 were	 not	 better	 at	 deciding	whether	 the	 face	 was	
presented	in	the	same	orientation	or	not	by	reference	to	the	study	phase	(Expt.	1).	Similar	
results	were	found	when	subjects	were	questioned	on	ear	or	mouth	details	(Expt.	2).	In	a	
third	 experiment,	 subjects	 were	 explicitly	 asked	 to	 provide	 a	 fame	 judgement	 plus	 a	
category	label	at	study.	At	test,	they	were	administrated	a	recognition	test	for	labels	and	
for	faces.	Here,	 it	was	observed	that	famous	faces	that	were	not	labelled	at	study	were	
still	better	 recognized	 that	non	 famous	 faces.	Moreover,	unlabelled	 famous	 faces	were	
not	better	recognized	that	labelled	ones.	These	findings	along	with	earlier	classic	studies	
(e.g.	Ellis,	Shepherd,	&	Davies,	1979)	prepared	the	grounds	for	the	idea	that	famous	and	
unknown	faces	would	depend	on	distinct	representations.	For	the	current	purposes,	the	
important	 finding	 is	 that	 superior	 memory	 for	 faces	 associated	 with	 prior	 knowledge	
would	seem	to	depend	on	the	formation	of	an	abstract	representation	of	familiar	faces	
distinct	 from	 the	 one	 for	 unknown	 faces,	 but	 not	 necessarily	 yielding	 superior	
recollection	at	test.	 In	 fact,	 in	 showing	the	absence	of	 fame	advantage	 for	memory	of	
physical	 details,	 Klatzky	 &	 Forrest	 (1984)	 results	 could	 suggest	 increased	 familiarity,	
rather	than	recollection.	
Subsequent	 studies	 contrasting	 famous	 and	 unknown	 faces	 have	 unambiguously	
confirmed	 the	 superiority	 of	 famous	 faces	 regarding	 recognition	memory.	 All	 of	 these	
studies	 have	 further	 investigated	 whether	 recollection,	 familiarity,	 or	 both	 processes	
would	be	influenced	by	faces’	status.	To	do	so,	a	Remember	/	Know	paradigm	has	always	
been	 used	 (Bellana	 &	 Moscovitch,	 2019;	 Liu,	 Grady,	 &	 Moscovitch,	 2016;	 Reder	 et	 al.,	
2013b)	but	only	 two	have	combined	 this	with	a	 source	memory	design	 (Liu	et	al.,	 2016;	
Bellana	&	Moscovitch,	 2019).	A	 consistent	 increase	 in	 recollection	estimates,	but	not	 in	
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familiarity	 estimates,	 was	 reported	 for	 famous	 faces.	 Besides,	 source	 memory	 (i.e.	
memory	for	faces-scenes	or	faces-colours	associations)	also	was	found	more	accurate	for	
famous	faces.	
The	 story	might	 be	more	 complex,	 though,	 since	 familiarity	 for	 faces	 does	 not	 result	
from	fame	only.	Faces	of	our	relatives,	for	example,	or	faces	of	people	we	just	met,	also	
carry	 levels	 of	 familiarity.	 Is	 this	 kind	 of	 familiarity	 also	 associated	 with	 increased	
recollection?	
In	 the	 only	 study	 contrasting	 famous	 faces	with	 personally	 known	 faces	 and	 unknown	
faces	 (Trinkler,	 King,	 Doeller,	 Rugg,	 &	 Burgess,	 2009),	 both	 kinds	 of	 faces	 with	 pre-
experimental	 knowledge	 yielded	 increased	 recollection	 and	 decreased	 familiarity.	
However,	 and	 importantly,	 Leveroni	 et	 al.,	 (2000)	 have	 contrasted	 famous	 faces	 with	
familiarized	faces,	that	is,	initially	unknown	faces	that	have	been	shown	prior	to	the	study	
phases.	 They	 found	 equivalent	 recognition	memory	 accuracy	 for	 both	 kinds	 of	 familiar	
faces.	 This	would	 suggest	 that	prior	 exposure,	 rather	 than	 knowledge	 resulting	 from	
semantic	 memory	 about	 a	 celebrity,	 could	 drive	 the	 effect,	 thus	 accounting	 for	 the	
absence	of	difference	between	personally	known	and	famous	faces	in	the	Trinkler	et	al.	
(2009)	 study	 as	 well.	 Unfortunately,	 we	 could	 not	 find	 research	 investigating	 this	
possibility	 further,	 which	 would	 involve	 entirely	 novel	 faces,	 familiarized	 faces	 and	
famous	ones.	Nonetheless,	some	studies	have	contrasted	familiarized	faces	with	famous	
ones,	or	familiarized	faces	with	unknown	ones,	within	Remember/Know	paradigms.	One	
such	study	remained	inconclusive	with	that	respect,	because	of	a	floor	effect	(d’	of	0.38	
and	 0.58	 for	 familiarized	 and	 famous	 faces,	 respectively).	 Yet,	 participants	 gave	 more	
Remember	Hits	for	famous	faces	(Gimbel,	Brewer,	&	Maril,	2017).	Dennis,	Turney,	Webb,	
&	 Overman,	 (2015)	 contrasted	 familiarized	 faces	 with	 unknown	 ones,	 and	 found	
increased	 recollection	 and	 familiarity	 estimates	 for	 familiarized	 faces.	 Finally,	 when	
contrasting	 faces	 that	 are	 personally	 known	 to	 participants	with	 unknown	 faces,	 Bird,	
Davies,	Ward,	&	Burgess,	(2011)	consistently	found	 increased	recollection	and	familiarity	
for	 faces	with	 prior	 knowledge,	 be	 it	 estimated	 from	ROC	 curve	 or	Remember	 /	 Know	
methods.	This	contrasted	with	the	decreased	familiarity	observed	for	personally	known	
vs.	unknown	faces	in	Trinkler	et	al.	(2009,	Fig.	2,	p.	722).	
Noteworthy,	much	of	these	studies	have	used	the	Remember	 /	Know	paradigm,	which	
has	been	put	to	question	on	several	grounds.	Shortly,	the	assumption	of	independency	
between	R	and	K	answers	has	been	strongly	criticized	(Dunn,	2004,	2008),	which	qualifies	
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the	straightforward	interpretations	in	terms	of	recollection	vs.	familiarity	(see	also	Wais,	
Mickes,	&	Wixted,	2008).	Moreover,	findings	of	better	source	memory	for	items	with	pre-
experimental	 knowledge	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 report	 of	 increased	 recollection	 and	
familiarity	 based	 on	 ROCs	 analysis.	 Regarding	 source	 memory	 tasks,	 it	 has	 been	
suggested	 that	 any	 variable	 known	 to	 affect	 item	 memory	 also	 affects	 item-context	
binding	 in	 long-term	memory,	namely	source	memory	 (Glanzer,	Hilford,	&	Kim,	2004).	
Among	the	variables	tested,	the	authors	showed	that	an	encoding	task	focusing	on	the	
meaning	of	the	stimuli	rather	than	its	physical	features	(i.e.	deep	vs	shallow	encoding)	
equally	 affects	 item	 and	 source	 memories.	 In	 other	 words,	 from	 a	 theoretical	
perspective,	prior	knowledge	should	yield	 increased	recollection	and	familiarity	rather	
than	targeting	one	specific	retrieval	process.	One	possible	explanation	for	this	apparent	
contradiction	could	 lie	 in	the	distinct	retrieval	demands	placed	on	recognition	memory	
for	 familiar	vs.	unknown	faces.	When	making	an	Old/New	judgment	for	a	famous	face,	
one	must	discriminate	between	past	occurrences	of	 this	 face	outside	 the	experimental	
setting	 and	 the	 recent	 occurrence	 of	 the	 face,	 during	 the	 experimental	 study	 phase.	
Facing	 unknown	 faces	 at	 test,	 such	 discrimination	 is	 no	 longer	 required,	 and	 unknown	
lure	 faces	can	be	accurately	 rejected	on	 the	basis	of	 the	absence	of	 familiarity.	Correct	
rejection	of	a	famous	lure	face	cannot	be	achieved	on	the	same	basis.	Thus,	recognition	
of	famous	faces	among	famous	foils	is	more	biased	toward	recollection	processes	than	is	
recognition	of	unknown	faces	among	unknown	 lures.	This	could	account	at	 least	partly	
for	the	consistent	finding	of	increased	recollection,	and	unchanged	familiarity,	for	familiar	
faces.	Experiments	3a	&	3b	in	this	thesis	tried	to	circumvent	these	issues	by	contrasting	
familiarized	faces	with	famous	faces,	and	by	using	a	source	memory	paradigm	allowing	to	
equalizing	the	retrieval	demands	at	test.	
To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	so	far	only	one	theoretical	account	has	been	proposed	for	
the	 finding	 of	 better	 recollection,	 not	 familiarity,	 for	 famous	 faces.	 (Reder	 et	 al.,	 2013)	
suggested	that	items	with	pre-existing	representations	at	study	would	be	less	demanding	
in	 terms	 of	 working	 memory	 resources,	 thus	 being	 easier	 to	 bind	 with	 their	 context.	
Although	 this	 could	 explain	 some	 of	 the	 data,	 it	 remains	 unclear	 why	 both	 subjective	
recollection	and	familiarity	(e.g.	estimates	from	R/K	tasks	or	ROC	analysis	of	confidence	
ratings)	can,	on	some	occasions,	be	affected	by	prior	knowledge.	
Moreover,	while	the	 literature	has	mainly	focused	on	retrieval	processes,	 little	 is	known	
on	other	potential	targets	processes	for	prior	knowledge.	For	example,	modifications	of	
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short-term	 memory	 encoding	 due	 to	 prior	 knowledge	 has	 been	 highlighted	 (Curby,	
Glazek,	&	Gauthier,	2009;	Jackson	&	Raymond,	2008).	
Finally,	how	and	whether	prior	knowledge	influences	on	learning	are	affected	by	aging	
remains	largely	uncovered.	This	is	rather	surprising,	given	that	elderly	have	accumulated	
a	lot	of	knowledge	of	various	types,	and	given	that	they	keep	a	largely	intact	access	to	it,	
thus	 making	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 a	 potential	 compensatory	 candidate	 for	 the	 adverse	
effects	of	age	on	episodic	learning	(Umanath	&	March,	2014).	Here,	what	we	know	is	that	
recognition	for	personally	known	faces	is	impressively	efficient	in	healthy	aging	(Bahrick,	
Hall,	&	Da	Costa,	 2008),	which	 fits	with	prior	 findings	of	 better	 performance	 for	 dated	
rather	than	contemporary	famous	faces	(Bäckman	&	Herlitz,	1990;	Lipinska,	Backman,	&	
Herlitz,	1992).	This	is	remarkable	since	several	studies	have	reported	that	elderly	perform	
poorly	 in	 face	 recognition	 memory	 tests	 when	 compared	 with	 youngest	 subjects	
(Bartlett,	Leslie,	Tubbs,	&	Fulton,	1989;	Boutet	&	Faubert,	2006;	Crook	&	Larrabee,	1992;	
Smith	 &	 Winograd,	 2006).	 Only	 one	 recent	 study	 successfully	 demonstrated	 that	
increased	congruency	with	prior	knowledge	for	face-name	associations	resulted	in	better	
memory	 for	 the	association	both	 in	young	and	old	subjects,	with	elderly	subjects	being	
more	susceptible	to	the	effect	that	their	younger	controls	(Badham	&	Maylor,	2015).	This	
added	to	emerging	evidence	 from	the	same	lab	suggesting	that	associative	memory	 in	
elderly	 could	disproportionately	benefits	 from	prior	knowledge	effect,	 in	 the	 form	of	
congruent	or	high	relatedness	between	words	 in	word-pairs	paradigms	(Badham,	Hay,	
Foxon,	 Kaur,	 &	 Maylor,	 2015).	 Predictions	 regarding	 the	 role	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	
further	 recognition	 derived	 from	 the	 models	 of	 recognition	 memory	 presented	 in	 the	
section	 I.8	 consistently	 put	 forward	 the	 role	 of	 the	 hippocampus,	 while	 sometimes	
acknowledging	 a	 possible	 parahippocampal	 learning	 pathway	 when	 relevant	 prior	
knowledge	 is	 present	 at	 encoding.	Now,	given	 that	 aging	 typically	 yields	 decreases	 in	
hippocampal	 volumes	 (see	 for	 review	 Raz	 &	 Rodrigue,	 2006;	 Ries	 et	 al.,	 2008),	while	
leaving	 the	 parahippocampal	 gyrus	 much	 less	 affected	 (and	 especially	 the	 perirhinal	
cortex,	 see	 Insausti	 et	 al.,	 1998),	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 how	 prior	 knowledge	
modulates	memory	 formation	 in	 aging	 is	 therefore	 of	 utmost	 importance.	 This	 is	 the	
core	issue	that	we	will	address	in	Experiments	3a	&	3b.	
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V.3.	Summary	
	
Altogether,	 available	 evidence	 therefore	 shows	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 about	 faces	
available	at	encoding,	resulting	either	from	multiple	encounters	all	over	the	lifetime	(like	
in	 the	case	of	 famous	 faces),	 from	repeated	exposures	and	 real-life	 interactions	 (like	 in	
the	 case	of	 personally	 known	 faces)	 or	 even	 from	experimental	 familiarization	prior	 to	
study,	 is	 a	 powerful	 learning	 enhancer.	 Although	 some	 divergences	 remain	 regarding	
familiarity-based	 retrieval,	 consistent	 findings	 have	 revealed	 the	 involvement	 of	
enhanced	 recollection-based	 processes.	 Thus,	 prior	 knowledge	 may	 improve	 item	
declarative	 learning,	 but	 also	 item-context	 associative	 learning,	 although	 consistent	
evidence	 is	 still	 lacking.	 The	 underlying	 cognitive	 substrates	 are	 largely	 unknown,	 but	
could	involve	differences	in	working	memory	resources,	which	might	be	under-recruited	
in	 the	 case	of	 familiar	 faces,	 thus	 freeing	 up	 attentional	 resources	 for	 binding	 faces	 to	
their	 encoding	context.	We	also	 largely	 ignore	whether	 this	 applies	 similarly	 in	 aging,	
which	 is	 a	 striking	 gap	 in	 our	 knowledge	 since	 there	 is	 evidence	pointing	 towards	 pre-
existing	knowledge	as	disproportionately	enhancing	memory	in	the	elderly,	and	given	the	
importance	of	memory	for	faces	in	social	interactions.	
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Chapter	VI	
Neurocognitive	accounts	for	the	benefits	of	prior	knowledge:	advances	and	
pitfalls	
	
How	do	we	understand	the	 influence	of	prior	knowledge	on	new	 learning?	How	do	we	
account	for	the	semantic-episodic	interactions	during	learning?	Is	the	structural	approach	
to	memory	(i.e.	multiple	memory	stores)	favoured	to	account	for	these	effects?	
Below	we	review	the	most	influential	theoretical	frameworks	that	are	relevant	to	address	
these	issues.	
	
VI.1.	The	levels-of-processing	framework	
	
The	basic	 ideas	behind	the	 levels-of-processing	framework	have	come	 in	sharp	contrast	
with	the	structuralist	view	of	learning	and	memory.	Instead	of	considering	that	memory	
stores	 with	 distinct	 properties	 would	 determine	 the	 fate	 of	 our	 experiences,	 this	
framework	suggested	that	sensory	inputs	are	processes	at	different	levels	of	a	cognitive	
hierarchy.	The	resulting	memory	trace	can	therefore	be	thought	of	“simply	as	a	record	of	
those	 analysis	 that	 had	 been	 carried	 out	 primarily	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 perception	 and	
comprehension”	(Lockhart	&	Craik,	1990).	This	trace	is	assumed	to	be	strengthened	and	
thus	more	durable	 following	 “deeper”	or	 semantic	 processing	 (that	 is,	 higher	 levels	 of	
processing	in	the	cognitive	hierarchy)	than	following	“shallower”	processing.	
Interestingly,	 the	 observation	 that	 everyday	 cognition	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 relying	 on	
either	 perceptual	 or	 conceptual	 processing,	 and	 that	 experimental	manipulation	of	 the	
study	orienting	tasks	towards	either	perceptual	or	conceptual	processing	yielded	robust	
effects	on	subsequent	 remembering	 is	a	 strong	ground	 for	 this	 framework.	Put	 simply,	
our	natural	cognitive	processing	of	unfolding	daily	experiences	seemed	to	result	in	a	low	
(perceptual,	 shallow	 processing)	 or	 high	 (conceptual,	 deep	 processing)	 probability	 of	
memory	formation.	This	observation	matched	apparently	with	the	common	sense	in	that	
not	 all	 of	 our	 experiences	 turn	 into	 long-term	 memories,	 but	 that	 events	 that	 are	
meaningful	 to	 us	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 do	 so.	 Further	 theoretical	 frameworks	 of	 e.g.	
		 148	
autobiographical	memory	 have	 also	 put	 forward	 this	 idea	 in	 suggesting	 that	 only	 self-
relevant	memory	processing	may	result	in	later	conscious	remembering	(Conway,	2009).	
The	concept	of	“depth”	of	processing	however	needed	refinements	to	accurately	derive	
predictions	 from	 the	 levels-of-processing	 (LOP)	 framework,	 which	 states	 that	 the	
durability	 of	 a	 memory	 trace	 is	 a	 positive	 function	 of	 depth	 of	 processing	 (Craik	 &	
Lockhart,	 1972;	 Craik	 &	 Tulving,	 1975).	 The	 original	 formulation	 of	 the	 framework	
distinguished	depth	from	elaboration,	and	further	theoretical	proposals	have	introduced	
key	 aspects	 of	 these	 concepts	 to	 understand	 how	 deeper	 processing	 might	 result	 in	
better	retention.	
First,	elaboration	was	 introduced	to	explain	that,	across	multiple	experiments	when	the	
orienting	 task	 at	 encoding	 took	 the	 form	 of	 “Yes/No”	 questions	 (i.e.	 for	 the	 item	
“BRUSH”:	 “Is	 the	 word	 print	 in	 small	 case?”	 or	 “”Is	 the	 word	 something	 used	 for	
cleaning?”),	 participants	 showed	 better	 retention	 after	 “Yes”	 answers,	 whatever	 the	
“depth”	of	processing	induced	(Craik	&	Tulving,	1975).	The	interpretation	of	this	finding	
was	that	when	a	statement	is	compatible	with	the	item,	it	benefits	encoding	by	virtue	of	
the	activation	of	multiple	associated	representations	that	in	fact	are	congruent	with	the	
stimulus.	 This	 cannot	be	 the	 case	 for	“No”	 responses,	 i.e.	 in	 the	 case	of	“BRUSH”,	 the	
question	 “Does	 the	 word	 rhyme	 with	 cotton?”	 cannot	 trigger	 beneficial	 retrieval	 for	
further	 encoding	 of	 “BRUSH”.	 Elaboration	 can	 thus	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 enriching	
process	 –	 relying	 on	 retrieval	 –	 that	 benefits	 the	 memory	 trace.	 Noteworthy,	 in	 the	
example	 of	 Craik	 &	 Tulving	 (1975)	 experiments,	 beneficial	 elaboration	 is	 supposed	 to	
occur	 when	 the	 context	 (i.e.	 orienting	 question)	 and	 the	 memoranda	 (i.e.	 the	 target	
word)	 are	 in	 fact	 congruent.	 To	 some	 extent,	 the	 concept	 of	 elaboration	 is	 therefore	
closely	 related	 to	 the	 congruency	 effect,	 which	 is	 known	 to	 improve	 episodic	 memory	
formation	 (Maril	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Schulman,	 1974;	 Bernhard	 P.	 Staresina,	 Gray,	 &	 Davachi,	
2009).	 In	 summary,	 one	 dimension	 behind	 the	 concept	 of	 processing	 “depth”	 is	 that	
information	 processed	 within	 a	 context	 that	 is	 congruent	 with	 prior	 knowledge	
associated	with	the	memoranda	will	trigger	beneficial	retrieval	processes	resulting	in	en	
enrichment	of	 the	memory	 trace,	which	 in	 turn	 is	more	 likely	 to	 be	 recalled.	However,	
elaboration	 alone	 leads	 to	 the	 prediction	 that	 better	 retention	 will	 be	 observed	 after	
elaborative	encoding,	irrespectively	of	the	qualitative	nature	of	encoding	(i.e.	perceptual	
vs.	 conceptual	 encoding),	which	 is	 not	 in	 line	with	 the	 LOP	proposals.	 In	 fact,	 “depth”	
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encompasses	not	only	the	concept	of	elaboration,	but	also	the	concept	of	“depth”	itself	
that	captures	the	qualitative	nature	of	encoding	processes.	
Second,	 “depth”	 of	 processing	 itself	 refers	 to	 the	 basic	 assumption	 of	 a	 hierarchically	
organized	 cognitive	 system	 where	 sensory	 processing	 must	 precedes	 conceptual	
processing.	 Thus,	 the	 concept	 of	 depth	 actually	 corresponds	 to	 whether	 the	 item	 has	
been	processed	up	to	a	semantic	 level	of	simply	at	a	perceptual	–	sensory	 level.	 In	fact,	
depth	 of	 processing	 is	 here	 highly	 related	 with	 the	 notion	 of	 distinctiveness,	 i.e.	 the	
deeper	 an	 item	 is	 processed,	 the	more	 likely	 it	 is	 that	 associated	 prior	 knowledge	 has	
been	associated	with	it,	thus	making	it	more	distinctive	and	facilitating	subsequent	recall	
provided	the	presence	of	an	appropriate	cue	(Bransford	et	al.,	 1979;	Stein,	1978	cited	 in	
Lockhart	&	Craik,	1990).	
	
Finally,	a	clear	idea	of	how	“elaboration”	and	“depth”	are	involved	is	given	in	Lockhart	&	
Craik,	(1990).	Elaboration,	as	mentioned	above,	benefits	 later	memory	 independently	of	
processing	depth.	So	why	in	the	end	elaboration	of	surface	features	(i.e.	colour,	texture,	
etc.)	 is	not	as	beneficial	as	elaboration	of	deeper	features	(e.g.	taxonomic	or	functional	
properties)	 for	 later	 memory?	 Considering	 distinctiveness,	 there	 is	 no	 reason	 why	 a	
complex	scene	picture	would	be	less	distinctive	than	a	meaningless	pattern	of	colours.	In	
fact,	 the	 reason	 is	 that	 when	 the	 incoming	 stimulus	 “meets”	 existing	 knowledge	
(schematic	 knowledge,	 see	 below),	 it	 will	 form	 a	 unitary	 representation	 (i.e.	
“landscape”),	whereas	perceptual	processing	of	a	meaningless	stimulus	will	result	in	the	
representation	of	unrelated,	separated,	elements.	
	
The	 LOP	 framework	 thus	 states	 that	 during	 learning,	 stimuli	 processing	 can	 generate	
either	 shallow	or	 deep	 encoding,	 i.e.	 it	 can	 be	 processed	 perceptually	 or	 conceptually,	
which	will	 critically	 result	 in	distinct	degrees	of	distinctiveness.	High	distinctiveness	will	
result	from	conceptual	processing	and	thus	yield	a	better	encoding	precision,	along	with	
a	higher	probability	of	retention.	In	the	meantime,	and	regardless	of	“depth”	itself,	item	
–	 context	 congruency	 effects	 will	 trigger	 more	 or	 less	 elaborative	 encoding.	 Higher	
congruency	would	 lead	 to	 higher	 elaborative	 encoding,	 thus	 to	 a	 richer	memory	 trace	
that	will	be	better	integrated	with	existing	knowledge	and	thus	better	retained.	
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Figure	32.	Memory	for	paintings.	Illustration	of	the	LOP	framework	core	predictions.	On	the	left	are	
displayed	pictures	of	a	painting	from	Willem	De	Kooning	from	the	“landscapes”	series.	On	the	right	
are	displayed	two	pictures	of	a	painting	from	Claude	Monet,	“Impression,	soleil	levant”.	The	LOP	
framework	states	that	both	distinctiveness	(i.e.	“depth”	per	se)	and	elaboration	(i.e.	congruency	
with	the	context)	will	determine	memory	formation.	The	painting	from	De	Kooning	is	a	
meaningless	colourful	pattern	that	can	yield	high	elaborative	encoding	if	presented	in	a	congruent	
(i.e.	museum)	rather	than	incongruent	(swimming	pool)	context.	However,	the	Monet	painting	will	
be	encoded	as	a	more	distinctive	trace	due	to	its	integration	with	pre-existing	knowledge	(i.e.	it	is	a	
harbour	landscape),	while	retaining	elaborative	processing	as	well	if	the	context	is	congruent.	
	
Finally,	the	framework	originally	makes	no	clear	prediction	regarding	whether	processing	
depth	should	benefit	recollection-based,	familiarity-based	or	both	recognition	processes.	
The	 clear	 prediction	 is	 that	memory	 for	 items	 should	 be	 better	 (either	 tested	 through	
recall	 or	 recognition)	 following	 deeper	 encoding.	 One	 can	 also	 predict	 that	 given	 the	
relative	 independence	between	elaboration	and	distinctiveness,	 task	 features	will	be	of	
great	 matter.	 For	 example,	 in	 words	 list	 learning	 paradigm	 using	 unrelated	 items,	
distinctiveness	 should	be	 the	 key	 factor	given	 that	 context	 remains	 constant,	 and	 thus	
helpless.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 associative	 memory	 tasks	 where	 item-context	 congruency	 is	
manipulated,	both	distinctiveness	and	elaboration	will	be	critical.	Finally,	given	that	both	
recall	and	recognition	are	improved	after	deep	encoding,	one	could	speculate	that	both	
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familiarity	 and	 recollection-based	 recognition	 should	 benefit	 from	 higher	 levels	 of	
processing.	
	
Limitations	and	pitfalls	
	
A	strong	challenge	to	the	LOP	framework	has	come	from	studies	showing	that	encoding-
retrieval	 interactions,	 rather	than	the	type	of	encoding	operations	alone,	were	a	critical	
factor	 for	 successful	 learning.	 For	 example,	 Morris	 et	 al.,	 (1977)	 found	 that	 when	
encoding	 and	 retrieval	 tasks	 tapped	 on	 similar	 processes,	 memory	 was	 better	 than	 in	
situations	where	encoding	 and	 retrieval	 tasks	 recruited	distinct	processes.	 Importantly,	
this	 pattern	 was	 true	 even	 when	 encoding	 tasks	 depended	 on	 rather	 “shallow”	
processing,	like	the	judgment	of	whether	or	not	a	target	word	rhymed	with	a	cue.	Such	
findings	have	 led	to	the	 influential	“Transfer-Appropriate-Processing”	(TAP)	framework,	
which	 core	 assumption	 is	 that	 better	 retention	 will	 be	 observed	 to	 the	 extent	 that	
operations	used	during	test	“overlap	or	recapture	the	operations	used	during	encoding”	
(Roediger	et	al.,	2002).	Thus,	a	pitfall	of	the	LOP	approach	would	be	to	account	for	within-
subject	 variability	 in	 learning	 by	 focusing	 only	 on	 levels	 of	 processing	 at	 encoding.	 For	
example,	if	prior	knowledge	is	manipulated	at	encoding	like	explained	in	the	section	V.2.,	
i.e.	 varying	 the	pre-experimental	 familiarity	of	 faces	used	as	memoranda,	 the	nature	of	
the	 test	will	be	critical.	 In	 the	case	of	 recognition,	 asking	 subjects	 to	 recognize	 studied	
famous	 faces	among	unstudied	 famous	 faces	will	 require	source	monitoring	operations	
that	 may	 have	 not	 been	 present	 at	 encoding.	 By	 contrast,	 recognition	 of	 studied	
unknown	 faces	 among	 unstudied	 unknown	 faces	will	 not	 trigger	 the	 same	 operations:	
familiarity	judgments	will	be	sufficient	for	the	task	goal.	Thus,	the	interpretation	of	higher	
memory	for	famous	faces	as	reflecting	a	deeper	processing	level	may	be	incorrect	here,	
since	distinct	demands	and	therefore	distinct	 retrieval	operations	are	placed	at	 test	 for	
familiar	vs.	unknown	stimuli	(see	also	Poppenk,	Köhler,	&	Moscovitch,	2010).	
Finally,	other	limitations	of	the	LOP	framework	is	that	it	does	not	make	explicit	prediction	
on	 how	 prior	 knowledge	may	 specifically	 impact	 the	 processes	 underlying	 recognition	
memory.	 Moreover,	 the	 predictions	 from	 the	 LOP	 regarding	 the	 supporting	 neural	
networks	 are	hard	 to	disentangle	 from	other	 frameworks	 like	 the	 TAP.	 For	 example,	 if	
following	 the	 LOP	memories	 are	 nothing	more	 than	 the	 record	 of	 perceptual	 and	 /	 or	
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conceptual	analyses	that	have	been	carried	out	at	different	levels,	then	one	would	expect	
an	overlap	between	brain	areas	active	at	encoding	and	during	test	(e.g.	Nyberg,	2002),	at	
least	 for	successful	 test	 trials.	However,	 the	same	 is	expected	 in	the	TAP	framework	as	
long	as	encoding	and	retrieval	operations	are	matched	together.	
	
VI.2.	The	Schema-Linked	Interactions	between	Medial	prefrontal	and	Medial	Temporal	
lobes	(SLIMM	framework)	
	
The	concept	of	 schema	has	a	 long	story	 in	psychology	 (Piaget,	 1923;	Bartlett,	 1932)	but	
has	 been	 under	 scrutiny	 in	 neurosciences	 comparatively	 recently.	 A	 schema	 can	 be	
defined	as	an	associative	knowledge	structure,	acquired	along	multiple	episodes,	which	
lacks	 of	 unit	 details	 and	 which	 is	 flexible	 (i.e.	 adaptable	 enough	 to	 integrate	 new	
episodes)	(Ghosh	&	Gilboa,	2014).	Psychology	has	long	established	that	these	knowledge	
structures	are	of	great	influence	in	new	learning.	Since	new	learning	does	not	occur	in	a	
vacuum,	our	past	experiences	guide	learning.	Incoming	events	can	be	either	congruent	or	
incongruent	 with	 existing	 schema,	 which	 may	 result	 in	 distinct	 memory	 fates.	 For	
example,	 when	 learning	 a	 text	 reporting	 on	 the	 biography	 of	 a	 dictator,	 further	
recognition	 memory	 for	 the	 text	 item	 will	 differ	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	 text	 was	
presented	as	 referring	 to	Adolf	Hitler	or	 to	a	 fictitious	dictator	 (Gerald	Martin)	 (Sulin	&	
Dooling,	 1974).	When	presented	with	 recognition	 foils	 absent	 from	 the	 text,	but	highly	
related	 to	Adolf	Hitler	 (e.g.	“He	hated	Jews”),	 these	 foils	were	much	more	 likely	 to	be	
accepted	 (i.e.	 considered	 as	 “Old”)	 when	 the	 passage	 was	 introduced	 as	 referring	 to	
Adolf	 Hitler	 than	 Gerald	 Martin.	 Similarly,	 in	 a	 famous	 series	 of	 experiments,	 Frederic	
Bartlett	(1932)	showed	that	along	multiple	successive	reproductions	from	memory	of	an	
ambiguous	 stimulus,	 retrieval	 was	 progressively	 biased	 towards	 the	 most	 meaningful	
features	identified	in	the	memoranda,	at	the	cost	of	reporting	false	memories.	
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Figure	33.	The	“portrait	d’homme”	series	from	Bartlett	(1932),	showing	that	successive	
reproductions	from	memory	of	an	ambiguous	stimulus	increasingly	resembles	a	prototypical	face.	
(Taken	from	Carbon	&	Albrecht,	2012)	
	
These	pioneer	 experiments	 suggested	 that	 remembering	 is	 a	 constructive	process	 that	
builds	on	pre-experimental	 knowledge:	pre-existing	memories,	 in	 the	 form	of	 schemas,	
would	serve	as	a	scaffold	for	retrieval	processes.	More	recent	neuropsychological	studies	
in	 amnesic	patients	 and	patients	with	 semantic	dementia	have	 similarly	 suggested	 that	
semantic	knowledge	may	provide	a	framework	facilitating	subsequent	episodic	 learning	
(Greenberg	 &	 Verfaellie,	 2010;	 Irish,	 Piguet,	 Staniloiu,	 &	 Szpunar,	 2013).	 While	 this	
“scaffolding	 hypothesis”	 explained	 both	 the	 benefits	 associated	with	 prior	 knowledge	
and	the	shortcomings	due	to	biased	retrieval	(see	also	the	concepts	of	accommodation	
and	assimilation	in	Piaget’s	schemata	theory,	1926,	1929),	further	research	has	shown	that	
schema	 could	 also	 benefit	 encoding	 and	 consolidation	 processes,	 not	 only	 retrieval	
(Fernández	&	Morris,	 2018).	Moreover,	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 ever	 since	 the	 30’s	 that	 not	
only	schema-congruent,	but	also	schema	incongruent	information,	may	benefit	memory	
formation	(e.g.	von	Restorff,	1933).	Finally,	more	recent	research	in	rodents	has	showed	
that	schema-congruent	consolidation	might	be	accelerated	by	comparison	with	schema-
incongruent	 consolidation,	 revealing	 a	 putative	 fast	 and	 hippocampus-independent	
associative	 learning	pathway	 (Tse	 et	 al.,	 2007,	 2011)	 that	 critically	 involves	 areas	 of	 the	
medial	prefrontal	cortex.	These	considerations	led	to	the	proposal	of	the	Schema-Linked	
Interactions	 between	Medial	 prefrontal	 and	Medial	 temporal	 lobe	 framework	 (SLIMM,	
Van	Kesteren	et	al.,	2012).	
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The	 SLIMM	 framework	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 standard	 consolidation	 theory	 that	
considers	how	prior	knowledge	(in	the	form	of	semantic,	or	schematic,	stored	memories)	
will	affect	the	formation	of	new,	hippocampal-independent,	neocortical	representations.	
The	role	of	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	 is	to	detect	whether	 incoming	 information	(i.e.	
an	 event)	 is	 congruent	 with	 existing	 knowledge.	 As	 a	 result,	 two	 consequences	 are	
described	in	the	case	of	congruency.	First,	medial	prefrontal	cortex	activity	is	supposed	to	
increase	 linearly	 with	 congruency,	 which	 in	 turn	 will	 strengthen	 internal	 connections	
between	existing	neocortical	representations	(and	thus,	accelerate	memory	formation).	
Second,	 congruency	 detection	 and	 high	 medial	 prefrontal	 cortex	 activity	 will	 inhibit	
medial	 temporal	 lobe	 activity,	 thus	 bypassing	 its	 usual	 involvement	 in	 consolidation.	 In	
the	case	of	incongruence	detection	however,	mPFC	activity	is	lowered,	which	reduces	its	
direct	 influence	 on	 neocortical	 connections	 and	 releases	 its	 inhibitory	 influence	 on	 the	
MTL	regions.	This	results	in	new	binding	processes	that	will	go	through	the	usual,	slower,	
hippocampo-neocortical	dependent,	consolidation	process.	
	
Figure	34.	Illustration	of	the	SLIMM	framework	predictions	in	the	case	of	a)	congruent	(vision	of	a	
PlasticDuck	model	in	your	bathroom),	b)	less	congruent	(vision	of	a	PlasticDuck	model	in	a	
Toyshop),	c)	incongruent	(vision	of	a	PlasticDuck	model	in	a	Bakery).	In	the	a)	situation,	mPFC	
detects	congruency	due	to	the	existing	knowledge	relating	your	Bath	Toy	and	the	context,	which	
strengthens	direct	connections	between	the	“Bathroom”	and	“PlasticDuck	model”	neocortical	
representations,	while	inhibiting	MTL	activity.	As	a	result,	the	consolidation	of	the	new	association	
“Bathroom”	–	“PlasticDuck	model”	is	accelerated,	with	little	involvement	of	the	MTL.	In	the	c)	
situation,	incongruence	releases	mPFC	inhibition	on	the	MTL,	which	in	turn	binds	together	the	new	
association	“Bakery”	and	“PlasticDuck	model”	for	further	slow	consolidation.	In	the	b)	situation,	
both	MTL-dependent	and	mPFC-dependent	processes	are	involved,	reflecting	the	supposedly	linear	
relationship	between	mPFC	activity	and	congruency.	
	
A	 strong	 advantage	 of	 the	 SLIMM	 framework	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 to	 reconciling	 theories	
highlighting	 novelty	 detection	 as	 a	 promoter	 of	 learning	 (see	 below)	 with	 theories	
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putting	 forward	the	 role	of	existing	knowledge	 in	 improving	memory	 formation.	This	 is	
achieved	in	the	SLIMM	theory	through	the	predictive	coding	models	of	memory	(Friston,	
2005;	 Henson	 &	 Gagnepain,	 2010).	 These	 proposals	 adopt	 a	 Bayesian	 perspective	
whereby	new	efficient	learning	will	depend	on	a	prediction	error	signal:	more	prediction	
error,	more	encoding.	The	SLIMM	theory	suggests	that	congruency	detection	supported	
by	 the	mPFC	 could	 be	 achieved	 through	 similar	 principles.	 The	 idea	 is	 that	 the	 system	
must	update	prior	expectations	 if	 the	prediction	error	 is	 large,	 so	occurs	 learning.	With	
this	 in	 mind,	 one	 can	 consider	 two	 apparently	 opposite	 situations:	 you	 encounter	 a	
familiar	object	in	a	familiar	environment,	or	you	encounter	an	unknown	object	in	a	novel	
environment.	Let’s	take	the	example	of	the	face	of	your	favourite	singer	on	stage	during	
a	concert,	or	an	unknown	individual	met	in	a	field	maze	you	visit	for	the	first	time.	In	both	
situations,	 the	 prediction	 error	 is	 supposedly	 small,	 because	 seeing	 the	 face	 of	 your	
favourite	 singer	 fits	 prior	 probabilities	 given	 the	 context	 of	 the	 concert	 hall;	 likewise,	
prior	probabilities	of	seeing	an	unknown	individual	 in	a	field	maze	are	rather	flat	so	the	
prediction	error	will	be	similarly	small.	In	both	cases,	subsequent	memory	will	be	unlikely,	
except	 if	 a	helpful	 cue	 is	provided	 for	 the	 famous	 singer	event.	 So	 that	events	entirely	
novel,	 or	 associated	with	multiple	prior	 knowledge	 can	both	 result	 in	poor	memory.	 In	
the	 meantime,	 consider	 you	 meet	 your	 favourite	 singer	 in	 the	 field	 maze,	 now	 the	
prediction	error	is	large	and	the	further	recall	probability	is	high.	This	is	not	due	to	novelty	
of	 familiarity	 per	 se,	 but	 rather	 to	 the	 prediction	 error	 generated	 by	 the	 comparison	
between	priors	 and	 actual	 likelihood	of	 the	presence	of	 the	 specific	 object	 (here,	 your	
favourite	 singer).	 The	 SLIMM	 framework	 can	 therefore	 account	 for	 increased	memory	
formation	for	both	novel	(incongruent)	and	familiar	(congruent)	incoming	information.	
	
Limitations	and	pitfalls	
	
Two	 main	 limitations	 arise	 from	 that	 framework.	 First,	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 linear	
relationship	 between	 mPFC	 activity	 and	 congruency	 can	 be	 tested	 only	 with	 a	
quantitative	measure	of	congruency,	which	itself	relies	on	a	clear	definition	of	a	memory	
schema.	 While	 efforts	 have	 been	 made	 in	 that	 direction	 (Ghosh	 &	 Gilboa,	 2014;	 Van	
Kesteren	et	al.,	2013),	a	consensual	definition	has	yet	to	be	found	(Fernandez	&	Morris,	
2018),	and	so	far	much	of	available	evidence	has	contrasted	congruent	with	incongruent	
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stimuli	(Bein,	Reggev,	&	Maril,	2014;	Van	Kesteren,	Rijpkema,	Ruiter,	&	Fernández,	2010).	
Accordingly,	 some	 studies	 have	 used	 words	 pair	 relatedness	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 schema	
congruency	 (e.g.	 Bein	 et	 al.,	 2014)	while	 others	 have	 asked	 subjects	 to	 rate	 subjective	
congruency	(Van	Kesteren	et	al.,	2013),	making	generalization	unlikely	regarding	the	role	
of	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 new	 learning.	 A	 critical	 issue	 here	 is	 to	 conceptually	 distinguish	
between	 semantic	 and	 schematic	 knowledge	 in	 future	 studies.	Moreover,	while	mainly	
tested	with	associative	memory	paradigms	and	thus	often	focusing	on	recollection,	 the	
model	does	not	explicitly	make	predictions	regarding	whether	schema	congruency	may	
impact	familiarity,	recollection,	or	both	recognition	processes.	
	
VI.3.	The	Novelty	Encoding	Hypothesis	
	
While	the	LOP	&	SLIMM	frameworks	emphasize	the	beneficial	role	of	prior	knowledge	in	
memory	 formation,	 the	Novelty	 Encoding	Hypothesis,	 at	 first	 sight,	 pleas	 for	 the	exact	
opposite.	This	hypothesis	was	grounded	on	an	 impressive	amount	of	evidence	showing	
that	human	behaviour	–	and,	to	some	extent,	animals	in	general	–	favours	the	processing	
of	 novel	 over	 routine	 events	 (for	 review,	 see	 Reggev	 et	 al.,	 2017).	Moreover,	 neurons	
responding	 selectively	 to	novelty	have	consistently	been	 found	 in	animal	 research	 (e.g.		
Gabriel	 et	 al.,	 1988;	 Rolls,	 Cahusac,	 Feigenbaum,	 &	Miyashita,	 1993),	 always	 located	 in	
regions	 of	 the	 extended	 limbic	 system.	 Beyond	 the	 obvious	 adaptive	 advantage	
conferred	 by	 novelty	 preference,	 multiple	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 novelty	 detection	
improves	memory	formation.	For	example,	recognition	memory	is	bettered	for	rare	than	
frequent	 words	 (Glanzer	 &	 Adams,	 1985;	 Kinsbourne	 &	 George,	 1974),	 and	 more	
generally,	 memory	 is	 better	 for	 unexpected	 stimuli	 (Von	 Restorff,	 1933).	 Furthermore,	
stimuli	 repetition	 has	 yielded	 robust	 findings	 of	 decreased	 neural	 signal	 in	 the	 medial	
temporal	 lobe	 and	 the	 visual	 ventral	 pathway	 (for	 review,	 see	Grill-Spector,	Henson,	&	
Martin,	2006a;	Kumaran	&	Maguire,	2009),	reinforcing	the	idea	that	novelty	detection	is	a	
key	factor	in	memory	encoding.	
On	 such	 grounds	 was	 proposed	 the	 “Novelty	 Encoding	 Hypothesis”	 (Tulving	 &	 Kroll,	
1995;	 Tulving,	 Markowitsch,	 Craik,	 Habib,	 &	 Houle,	 1996).	 This	 theory	 suggests	 that	
novelty	 assessment	 of	 the	 incoming	 stimuli	 would	 represent	 the	 earliest	 stage	 of	
encoding,	 and	 that	 it	 should	be	 supported	by	 cortical	 and	 subcortical	 structures	of	 the	
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limbic	 system,	 including	 the	 hippocampus.	 These	 early	 encoding	 computations	 would	
trigger	 additional	 elaborative	 processes	 (as	 proposed	 in	 the	 LOP	 framework),	 so	 that,	
keeping	 novelty	 constant,	 the	 probability	 of	 subsequent	 recognition	 or	 recall	 would	
remain	 a	 linear	 function	 of	 processing	 depth.	 However,	 the	 critical	 assumption	 in	 the	
model	is	that	novelty	detection	is	necessary	to	drive	further	encoding	processes.	Thus,	if	
the	 usual	 orienting	 tasks	 are	 kept	 constant	 with	 respect	 to	 depth,	 memory	 for	 novel	
items	will	be	superior	to	memory	for	familiar	items.	
	
Limitations	and	pitfalls	
	
At	first	sight,	such	a	proposal	seems	problematic	given	the	widely	acknowledged	role	of	
repetition	in	learning,	since	repeated	items	should	trigger	high	familiarity	and	certainly	no	
novelty	signals,	and	thus	should	not	lead	to	memory	encoding	in	a	strong	version	of	the	
model.	We	believe	that	the	definition	of	novelty	and	familiarity	here	is	the	key	factor	that	
can	 reconcile	 these	 contradictions.	 Behavioural	 evidence	 for	 the	 Novelty	 encoding	
hypothesis	does	not	rely	on	the	manipulation	of	absolute	familiarity	with	the	memoranda	
(like,	e.g.,	pseudo-words	vs.	words	or	unknown	vs.	famous	faces),	but	rather	used	relative	
familiarity.	That	is,	what	made	an	item	novel	was	that	its	probability	of	occurrence	during	
the	study	phase	was	 low	by	comparison	with	 familiar	 items	(e.g.	Tulving	&	Kroll,	 1995).	
Thus,	what	is	manipulated	here	is	the	context,	rather	than	the	absolute	familiarity	of	the	
items.	Another	relevant	example	is	the	study	conducted	by	Kishiyama	&	Yonelinas	(2003)	
investigating	the	impact	of	novelty	detection	on	recollection	and	familiarity.	The	authors	
found	 superior	 recollection	 and	 familiarity	 estimates	 (R/K	 paradigm)	 for	 novel	 vs.	 non-
novel	objects.	Among	600	objects	presented	during	study,	30	were	considered	non-novel	
because	they	were	black	thumbnail	object	images	on	a	white	background,	while	30	were	
considered	novels	because	they	were	coloured.	The	kind	of	novelty	under	scrutiny	here	is	
in	 fact	 entirely	 captured	 by	 the	 concept	 of	 distinctiveness,	 and	 therefore	 its	 is	 hard	 to	
generalize	the	findings	to	any	kind	of	novelty.	
Showing	 that	 the	 retrieval	 demands	 placed	 on	 recognition	 memory	 for	 “novel”	 vs.	
“familiar”	items	may	differ	widely	has	also	challenged	the	Novelty	encoding	hypothesis.	
For	example,	in	the	Tulving	&	Kroll’s	original	study	(1995),	participants	had	to	discriminate	
between	familiar	words	those	that	were	in	the	study	phase,	and	had	to	avoid	acceptance	
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of	words	presented	 in	 the	 familiarization	phase	but	not	 in	 the	studied	phase.	For	novel	
words	however,	 that	were	presented	only	once	at	 study,	distractors	were	words	never	
presented	in	the	experience.	Therefore,	as	pointed	out	by	Poppenk,	Köhler,	et	al.,	(2010),	
the	 “novelty”	 advantage	may	well	 result	 from	 distinct	 discriminative	 demands	 at	 test,	
being	actually	unrelated	to	Novelty	or	Familiarity	per	se.	
Altogether,	 the	Novelty	 encoding	Hypothesis	 has	 proven	 very	 influential	 in	 the	 field	 of	
neurosciences,	but	its	generalization	seems	largely	insufficient	given	that:	
- only	 relative	 novelty	 is	 considered,	 thus	 ruling	 out	 the	 situations	 requiring	
processing	 of	 entirely	 unknown	 stimuli	 (e.g.	 pseudo-words,	 unknown	 faces	 or	
objects)	
- novel	and	familiar	conditions	generally	trigger	different	retrieval	demands	at	test,	
preventing	from	any	interpretation	in	terms	of	novelty	effect	per	se	
- the	role	of	prior	knowledge	in	the	novelty	assessment	process,	which	is	supposed	
to	trigger	memory	encoding,	is	not	specified	despite	its	unavoidable	involvement	
(i.e.	 how	 to	 conceive	 a	 novelty	 detection	 process	 without	 a	 comparison	 space	
with	 existing	 representations?	 See	 Kafkas	 &	 Montaldi,	 (2018)	 for	 the	 idea	 of	
distinct	types	of	novelty	depending	on	distinct	pre-existing	representations)	
	
VI.4.	The	gatekeeper	hypothesis	
	
A	 theory	 related	 to	 the	 Novelty	 encoding	 hypothesis	 is	 the	 “gatekeeper	 hypothesis”	
(Fernández	&	Tendolkar,	2006),	which	proposes	that	the	rhinal	cortices	(entorhinal	and	
perirhinal	 cortices)	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 both	 encoding	 and	 retrieval	 of	 declarative	
memories,	based	on	their	novelty	or	familiarity.	
Considering	that	our	encoding	capacities	per	time	unit	are	limited,	the	authors	make	the	
assumption	 that	 some	 operation	 must	 optimize	 learning	 by	 allocating	 our	 encoding	
resources	 towards	 novel,	 more	 than	 familiar,	 stimuli.	 This	 operation	 would	 further	
integrate	both	encoding	and	retrieval	processes,	because	the	“gatekeeper”	responsible	
for	it	would	be	involved	in	encoding	and	familiarity	detection.	
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The	gatekeeper	hypothesis	 is	grounded	on	parallel	evidence	that	the	rhinal	cortices	are	
involved	 in	novelty	detection	at	encoding	(Ranganath	&	Rainer,	2003)	and	 in	familiarity-
based	 recognition	 memory	 for	 single	 items	 (Wais,	 2008).	 fMRI	 and	 ERPs	 recording	
literature	indeed	demonstrate	both	an	increased	activity	in	the	rhinal	cortices	at	encoding	
for	items	remembered	later	at	test,	and	conversely	a	decrease	in	activity	is	observed	for	
Old	 relative	 to	 New	 items	 during	 recognition	 (Kafkas	 &	 Montaldi,	 2018).	 These	 sub-
hippocampal	cortical	areas	are	 therefore	well	 suited	to	perform	both	the	encoding	and	
retrieval	operations	required	for	the	“gatekeeper”.	
Based	on	these	findings,	it	is	proposed	that	at	encoding,	the	rhinal	cortices	are	tuned	to	
detect	novelty	(and	familiarity),	 in	the	form	of	an	increased	activity	for	novel	 items,	and	
reduced	activity	for	familiar	(or	repeated)	stimuli.	The	model	states	that	semantic	coding	
is	 used	 to	 do	 so,	 based	on	 the	 position	 of	 the	 rhinal	 cortices	 at	 the	 top	of	 the	 ventral	
stream.	Thus	novel	(unknown	or	unfamiliar)	stimuli	would	trigger	higher	rhinal	activity	at	
encoding,	which	would	allow	more	allocation	of	encoding	resources,	resulting	in	a	more	
“vigorous”	long-term	encoding.	By	contrast,	familiar	stimuli	at	encoding	would	yield	less	
activity	in	the	rhinal	cortex,	limiting	the	resources	devoted	to	encoding	at	the	rhinal	level,	
but	signalling	the	need	for	further	relational	processing	to	the	hippocampus.	
The	 gatekeeper	 hypothesis	 thus	 makes	 strong	 predictions	 regarding	 the	 formation	 of	
long-term	 declarative	 memories.	 Unfamiliar,	 or	 unknown,	 stimuli	 generate	 the	 highest	
rhinal	 activity,	 which	 in	 turn	 increases	 the	 probability	 of	 hippocampal	 encoding.	 By	
contrast,	 familiar,	 or	 repeated,	 stimuli	 generate	 reduced	 rhinal	 activity,	 lowering	 the	
probability	of	hippocampal	encoding	and	enhancing	the	feeling	of	familiarity.	Similarly	at	
retrieval,	the	rhinal	cortices	would	support	familiarity-based	recognition	for	single	familiar	
items,	 while	 unfamiliar	 items	 would	 gather	 additional	 recollection-based	 recognition	
processes	 dependent	 on	 the	 hippocampus.	 Importantly,	 the	 gatekeeper	 hypothesis	
considers	that	familiarity	detection	(i.e.	a	retrieval	mechanism)	and	novelty	detection	(i.e.	
an	encoding	mechanism)	are	“two	sides	of	the	same	coin”	(see	Kafkas	&	Montaldi,	2014,	
for	a	different	view).	
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Limitations	and	pitfalls	
	
The	 gatekeeper	 hypothesis	 focuses	 on	 the	 candidate	mechanism	 and	 candidate	 neural	
structures	 that	 could	 support	 the	 necessary	 optimization	 of	 encoding	 processes.	 It	
therefore	proposes	a	broad	Novelty/Familiarity	dichotomy	but	does	not	account	for	the	
role	 of	 context	 in	 the	 novelty/familiarity	 detection.	 Thus,	 the	 model	 predicts	 that	 a	
familiar	item	in	a	familiar	context	should	have	the	same	status	than	a	familiar	item	in	an	
unknown	context,	 leading	to	decreased	rhinal	processing	in	both	cases.	However,	while	
the	 former	 is	quite	 likely	 (i.e.	 familiarity	detection	of	my	coffee	mug	on	my	office),	 the	
latter	 is	 not	 (i.e.	 familiarity	 detection	 of	 my	 coffee	 mug	 on	 my	 boss’s	 office)	 (for	
discussion,	 see	 Reggev	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 Moreover,	 the	 model	 does	 not	 account	 for	 the	
benefits	of	prior	knowledge	in	general,	not	does	it	provides	explanations	for	the	findings	
of	better	memory	for	schema-congruent	information.	
	
VI.5.	Are	faces	special?	
	
Most	of	the	studies	underlying	the	above-cited	models	have	used	words,	visual	scenes,	or	
object	 pictures	 as	memoranda.	 However,	 as	 already	mentioned,	 one	 of	 the	 oldest	 and	
most	 robust	 finding	 in	memory	 literature	 is	 the	expertise	effect.	 Thus,	 as	we	argued	 in	
chapters	 IV	 &	 V,	 going	 one	 step	 further	 to	 account	 for	 prior	 knowledge	 influence	 on	
subsequent	memory	formation	requires	disentangling	the	effects	due	to	expertise	per	se	
from	the	effects	due	to	pre-existing	representations.	One	way	to	achieve	this	goal	 is	 to	
1/use	 materials	 for	 which	 there	 is	 little	 inter-individual	 variability;	 2/use	 materials	 that	
allows	to	contrast	stimuli	with	no	prior	representations	with	stimuli	carrying	various	kinds	
of	 pre-existing	 representations.	 These	 conditions	 are	 not	 met	 with	 words	 (for	 which	
individual	expertise	cannot	be	controlled	beyond	the	frequency	metrics),	nor	with	objects	
or	scenes,	which	can	hardly	lack	any	pre-existing	knowledge.	One	remaining	candidate	is	
therefore	human	faces:	we	all	have	similar	expertise	for	faces	of	our	contemporaries,	and	
an	unknown	face	 judged	truly	unknown	by	a	subject	cannot	carry	any	pre-experimental	
knowledge.	
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So	 are	 faces	 special	 with	 respect	 of	 prior	 theoretical	 accounts	 for	 the	 impact	 of	 prior	
knowledge	on	learning?	
	
First,	we	are	not	aware	of	any	study	showing	that	novel	faces	are	more	memorable	than	
familiar	 faces.	Available	data	always	 report	an	advantage	 for	 familiar,	or	 famous,	 faces.	
This	 could	at	 first	 sight	 rule	out	 the	 relevance	of	 the	novelty	encoding	hypothesis,	 and	
also	suggest	that	the	gatekeeper	hypothesis	does	not	apply	to	faces.		
Second,	albeit	the	literature	is	very	limited,	the	nature	of	prior	knowledge	seems	to	be	of	
little	 matter.	 Prior	 studies	 have	 shown	 an	 advantage	 for	 famous	 or	 personally	 known	
faces	 over	 unknown	 faces,	 but	 with	 no	 differences	 between	 famous	 and	 personally	
familiar	faces	or	recently	learned	faces	(Trinkler	et	al.,	2009;	Leveroni	2000).	That	is,	one	
possibility	 is	 that	 prior	 exposure	 is	 the	 critical	 factor,	 independently	 of	 whether	 pre-
experimental	 conceptual	 knowledge	 is	 available	 or	 not.	 However,	 this	 remains	 to	 be	
tested	 as	 no	 prior	 study	 directly	 contrasted	 novel	 faces	 with	 faces	 with	 distinct	 pre-
existing	knowledge	(see	below),	and	controlling	for	retrieval	demands.	
Third,	and	at	variance	with	domain-general	accounts	of	hippocampal	processing,	there	is	
considerable	 neuropsychological	 evidence	 that	 recognition	 memory	 for	 faces	 is	
dependent	on	the	hippocampus	only	when	prior	knowledge	is	available	at	encoding.	For	
example,	 it	 has	 been	 reported	 that	 unknown	 faces	 recognition	 as	 probed	 in	 the	
Recognition	 Memory	 Test	 (Warrington,	 1984)	 is	 selectively	 spared	 after	 damage	
restricted	 to	 the	 hippocampus	 (Bird	 &	 Burgess,	 2008;	 Smith	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 This	 test	
however	 lacks	 validity	 for	 the	 assessment	 of	 face	 recognition	 since	 it	 was	 shown	 that	
even	 after	masking	 all	 the	 faces	 features,	 65%	 of	 healthy	 young	 participants	 could	 still	
score	normally	(Duchaine	&	Weidenfeld,	2003).	Nonetheless,	independent	evidence	with	
different	faces	memoranda	appeared	to	confirm	the	sparing	of	unknown	face	recognition	
after	hippocampal	damage	(Bird,	Shallice,	&	Cipolotti,	2007;	Carlesimo,	Fadda,	Turriziani,	
Tomaiuolo,	&	Caltagirone,	2001;	Cipolotti	et	al.,	2006;	Smith	et	al.,	2014;	Taylor,	Henson,	&	
Graham,	 2007;	 for	 review	 see	 Bird,	 2017),	 even	 if	 one	 important	 remaining	 issue	 is	
whether	 recollection	 and	 familiarity,	 or	 only	 familiarity,	 is	 preserved	 (Aly,	 Knight,	 &	
Yonelinas,	2010;	Bird	&	Burgess,	2008;	Bird	et	al.,	2007;	Bird,	Vargha-Khadem,	&	Burgess,	
2008;	Cipolotti	et	al.,	2006).	By	contrast,	recognition	memory	for	famous	faces	–	which,	
as	 already	mentioned	 above,	 is	 superior	 to	memory	 for	 unknown	 faces	 in	 controls	 –	 is	
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impaired	 after	 hippocampal	 damage	 (Smith	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Prior	 knowledge	 about	 faces	
thus	could	drive	hippocampal-dependent	learning,	but	this	remains	poorly	understood,	as	
are	the	reasons	why	familiarity	boosts	recognition	memory	for	faces.	
One	possibility	 suggested	by	Bird	 (2017)	 is	 related	 to	 the	 ideas	of	elaborative	encoding	
discussed	above	(section	VI.1.)	and	discriminative	demands	at	retrieval	 (section	V.2.	and	
VI.3).	The	author	suggests	that	superior	memory	for	famous	faces	would	result	from	the	
activation	of	related	pre-existing	knowledge	at	study,	which	may	provide	additional	cues	
for	 later	 retrieval.	 Moreover,	 given	 that	 famous	 face	 recognition	 involves	 higher	
discriminative	demands	than	for	unknown	faces	(i.e.	“did	I	see	the	face	during	the	study	
phase?”	 vs.	 “did	 I	 ever	 see	 the	 face?”,	 respectively),	 the	 idea	 is	 that	 famous	 faces	
recognition	 would	 therefore	 likely	 involve	 relational	 processing	 an	 thus	 relies	 on	 the	
hippocampus.	 This	 proposal	 is	 in	 line	 with	 other	 material-specific	 views	 of	 MTL	
functioning	(e.g.	Davachi	et	al.,	2006;	Bird	et	al.,	2007;	see	also	Kafkas	et	al.,	2017).	It	also	
broadly	 fits	 with	 the	 proposals	 that	 pattern	 completion	 is	 involved	 in	 the	 retrieval	 of	
conceptual	 knowledge	 associated	 with	 a	 stimulus,	 especially	 for	 across-domains	
knowledge	(e.g.	retrieval	of	the	name,	occupation,	personality	traits	or	usual	contexts	of	
occurrence	for	a	famous	face),	like	the	BIC	model.	As	long	as	superior	memory	for	famous	
faces	 is	 thought	 to	 rely	on	associative	processes	 involved	both	at	 encoding	and	during	
retrieval,	and	not	 taking	place	 for	unknown	faces,	 then	hippocampal	processing	should	
be	critical.	
However,	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 pre-existing	 representations	 for	 faces	 would	 trigger	
hippocampal-dependent	 computations	 for	 further	 memory	 does	 not	 fit	 with	 all	 the	
theoretical	accounts	presented	above.	For	example,	the	CLS	&	the	more	recent	REMERGE	
computational	 models,	 or	 the	 SLIMM	 framework,	 predict	 that	 when	 the	 incoming	
information	 is	 congruent	 with	 prior	 knowledge,	 rapid	 neocortical	 learning	 could	 take	
place,	 bypassing	 the	 hippocampal	 involvement.	 If	 correct,	 the	 recognition	 memory	
advantage	of	familiar	over	unknown	faces	should	1/not	depend	on	the	hippocampus	and	
2/should	be	more	critically	depending	on	congruency	with	past	experiences,	thus	not	only	
on	prior	exposures,	but	on	the	existence	of	stored	(conceptual)	knowledge	structures.	
	
Other	 theoretical	 accounts	 put	 forward	 the	 differential	 involvement	 of	 attentional	 and	
working	memory	resources	in	the	processing	of	famous	vs.	unknown	faces	(Reder	et	al.,	
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2013a).	 Similarly,	 but	 considering	 how	 primed	 items	 show	 a	 memory	 advantage	 over	
unprimed	 items,	 (Gagnepain	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 Gagnepain	 et	 al.,	 2011)	 have	 proposed	 that	
primed	 stimuli	 during	 a	 study	 phase	 could	 free-up	 attentional	 resources,	 that	 could	 be	
reallocated	 to	 context	 processing	 (in	 a	 broad	 sense:	 physical	 background,	 but	 also	
thoughts,	 feelings,	 etc.).	 This	 would	 not	 be	 the	 case	 for	 unprimed	 items,	 for	 which	 a	
learning	task	requires	to	focus	attentional	resources	on	the	stimulus.	We	believe	that	this	
could	 very	well	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 familiar	 /	 unknown	 face	 distinction	 as	well:	 at	 study,	
familiar	faces	but	not	unknown	faces	obviously	benefit	some	priming	effect.	
	
Last,	 we	 have	 previously	 considered	 the	 concept	 of	 unitization,	 acknowledging	 that	 it	
could	be	promoted	by	pre-existing	representations	(see	section	I.8	&	Chapter	IV).	Several	
models	 suggest	 that	 unitized	 representations	 can	 be	 further	 recognized	 based	 on	
familiarity,	with	no	involvement	of	the	hippocampus.	Turning	to	faces,	this	would	predict	
that	 pre-experimental	 familiarity	 for	 faces	 could	 promote	 e.g.	 face-background	
unitization,	which	 in	 turn	could	support	 familiarity-based	 recognition	of	 this	association	
for	familiar,	but	not	unknown,	faces.	Although	there	is	no	direct	evidence	for	this	to	our	
knowledge,	 the	 findings	 from	Reder	 et	 al.,	 (2013a)	 and	 Liu	 et	 al.,	 (2016)	 are	 consistent	
with	 better	 face-background	 associative	 memory	 for	 famous	 than	 unknown	 faces.	
However,	a	very	recent	study	found	increased	recollection	but	unchanged	familiarity	for	
faces-colours	combinations	when	faces	were	famous	(Bellana	&	Moscovitch,	2019),	thus	
suggesting	 that	either	 the	memory	advantage	did	not	 result	 from	unitization,	or	 that	a	
unitized	memory	had	been	retrieved	through	recollection	processes.	
	
VI.6.	Summary	
	
In	summary,	several	models	of	memory	 functioning	have	 in	 common	 to	 consider	how	
existing	memories	may	 interact	with	the	on	going	 learning	processes.	Strikingly,	these	
models	 can	 put	 forward	 novelty	 (i.e.	 absence	 of	 prior	 knowledge),	 familiarity	 (i.e.	
presence	 of	 prior	 knowledge)	 as	 critical	 learning	 enhancers,	 or	 both.	 These	 accounts	
however	do	not	always	provide	clear	definitions	for	novelty	or	familiarity	(but	see	Bastin	
et	al.,	2018,	 regarding	novelty),	making	these	 issues	unclear.	 In	that	context,	 the	use	of	
faces	 as	 memoranda	 has	 brought	 fascinating	 insights	 into	 how	 prior	 knowledge	 may	
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influence	 learning,	 but	 leaving	 us	 with	 various	 and	 sometimes	 contradictory	 accounts.	
The	main	 disagreements	 relate	 to	whether	 or	 not	 conceptual	 knowledge,	 rather	 than	
simple	 pre-exposures,	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 effect;	 whether	 or	 not	 hippocampal-
dependent	 processing	 is	 critical	 for	 the	 effect;	 and	whether	 or	 not	 the	 effect	 rely	 on	
memory-specific	processing	or	may	be	the	result	of	other	cognitive	processes	like	those	
involved	 in	 working	 memory	 and	 selective	 attention.	 Moreover,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
unitization	can	be	involved	also	remains	unclear.	Finally,	we	largely	ignore	whether	aging	
affects	prior	knowledge	influences	on	learning	new	episodes	involving	faces,	despite	the	
high	relevance	of	such	situations	for	everyday	cognition.	
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Chapter	VII	
Objectives	&	Hypotheses	
	
VII.1.	Objectives	
	
As	a	neuropsychologist	for	about	15	years,	questions	without	answers	have	accumulated	
up	 to	 the	point	 that	 this	PhD	 represented	an	opportunity	 to	 simply	contributing	 to	 the	
progress	in	knowledge.	My	goal	was	to	bring	new	data	for	the	refinements	of	the	models	
highlighting	 that	 learning	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 a	 sequential	 and	 static	 series	 of	 cognitive	
processes	 involving	 distinct	 separated	 stores,	 but	 rather	 depends	 on	 highly	 interactive	
and	dynamic	processing	were	the	concepts	of	encoding	and	retrieval	 largely	overlap,	 in	
the	service	of	everyday	cognition.	
	
Specifically,	the	starting	point	of	the	present	work	was	the	meeting	with	the	patient	KA,	
with	 developmental	 amnesia.	 It	 became	 shortly	 obvious	 that	 this	 patient	 had	 some	
extraordinary	features,	and	especially	that	his	ability	to	acquire	and	retain	knowledge	was	
in	many	cases	not	only	fair,	but	well	above	expected	levels	given	his	condition.	Beyond	his	
exceptional	 amount	 of	 semantic	 knowledge,	 a	 striking	 feature	 was	 that	 this	 patient	
apparently	 could	 normally	 acquire	 and	 retrieve	 new	 context-free	 memories	 only	 for	
meaningful,	 not	 meaningless,	 materials.	 That	 is,	 prior	 knowledge	 about	 the	 stimuli	
seemed	to	critically	drive	his	residual	learning	abilities.	
Following	 on	 from	 the	 neuropsychological	 tradition,	 we	 have	 therefore	 pursued	 two	
distinct	but	complementary	experimental	paths	in	this	thesis.	
	
First,	 our	 objective	 was	 to	 characterize	 as	 best	 as	 possible	 the	 preserved	 declarative	
learning	and	memory	aptitudes	of	patient	KA.	In	the	meantime,	we	aimed	at	gathering	as	
detailed	anatomical	 information	on	his	brain	 trough	cutting	edge	 imaging	 techniques,	
to	 enlighten	 which	 pattern	 of	 preserved	 and	 impaired	 learning	 processes	 can	 be	
observed	in	a	case	of	developmental	amnesia.	Beyond	the	case	of	KA,	our	goal	here	was	
to	 fill	 a	 considerable	 gap	 in	 the	 neuropsychology	 of	 human	memory,	 namely	 the	 lack	 of	
demonstration	 that	 normal	 retrieval	 and	 acquisition	 of	 explicit	 memories	 could	 occur	 in	
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amnesia.	 In	 other	words,	 are	 the	models	 predicting	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 rapid	 learning	
pathway	outside	the	hippocampal	system	correct?		
	
Second,	 following	 the	 findings	 of	 a	material-specific	 effect	 in	 patient	 KA,	 our	 objective	
was	to	test	the	idea	that	prior	knowledge	could	play	a	role	in	declarative	learning.	The	
second	 objective	 was	 therefore	 to	 identify	 whether	 novelty,	 prior	 exposure,	 or	 pre-
experimental	prior	knowledge	would	be	critical	 learning	enhancers,	and	 to	gain	 further	
understanding	of	the	underlying	mechanisms.	
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VII.2.	Hypotheses	
	
We	further	present	two	sets	of	theoretically-driven	hypotheses	corresponding	to	the	two	
research	paths	explored	 in	 this	 thesis:	 first,	 the	 issue	of	whether	 rapid	explicit	 learning	
can	 occur	 outside	 the	 hippocampal	 system;	 second,	 the	 question	 of	whether	 and	 how	
pre-existing	knowledge	at	encoding	influences	learning	in	declarative	memory.	
	
	
1-	Towards	evidence	for	rapid	neocortical	explicit	learning?	
We	reasoned	that	if,	as	speculated	ever	since	the	key	publication	from	Vargha-Khadem	et	
al.,	1997,	extra-hippocampal	structures	can	support	new	explicit	learning,	then	we	should	
be	able	to:	
- Demonstrate	 that,	 in	 case	 of	 virtually	 no	 residual	 episodic	 memory	 abilities,	
reaching	a	fully	normal	range	of	semantic	knowledge	is	possible.	
- Demonstrate	 that,	 in	 such	 case,	 acquisition	 and	 retrieval	 of	 explicit	 memories	
should	be	doable	in	the	absence	of	any	dedicated	learning	techniques	or	extensive	
repetitions.	
- Demonstrate	that	no	residual	functional	structures	within	the	hippocampal	system	
could	account	for	the	findings.	
	
Moreover,	 following	 the	 processing	 approach	 to	 recognition	 memory,	 our	 hypothesis	
was	that	in	a	case	of	bilateral	hippocampal	damage,	familiarity-based	recognition	should	
be	 preserved	 independently	 of	 any	 other	 variable	 (e.g.	 delay,	 type	 of	materials).	 Such	
findings	would	lend	support	to	the	models	predicting	that	non-hippocampal,	neocortical	
pathways	can	underlie	rapid	explicit	learning.	
	
	
	
	
		 168	
	
2-	 Towards	 evidence	 that	 pre-existing	 knowledge,	 not	 novelty,	 increases	 declarative	
learning?	
Considering	 evidence	 that	 stimulus	 familiarity,	 rather	 than	 novelty,	 should	 increase	
learning;	considering	the	theoretical	proposals	point	towards	hippocampus-independent	
learning	 pathways	 for	 stimuli	 congruent	 with	 existing	 knowledge,	 we	 further	
hypothesized	that:	
- Contrasting	 novelty	 and	 familiarity	 within	 the	 same	 task	 design	 should	 yield	 an	
advantage	for	familiar	 items	in	subsequent	recognition,	and	this	should	apply	for	
item	and	associative	memory.	Alternatively,	models	 that	put	 forward	 the	 role	of	
novelty	detection	 in	 long-term	memory	encoding	would	predict	at	 least	superior	
item	recognition	for	novel	materials.	
- Conceptual,	 but	 not	 perceptual	 knowledge	 should	 benefit	 associative	 memory.	
This	 hypothesis	 follows	 from	 the	 levels-of-processing	 framework,	 putting	 the	
emphasis	 on	 elaborative	 semantic	 processing	 as	 yielding	 a	 higher	 likelihood	 for	
memory	formation.	
- The	 benefits	 of	 conceptual	 prior	 knowledge	 on	 item	 memory	 should	 be	 age-
resistant.	 Rather	 than	 resulting	 from	 a	 specific	 theoretical	 framework,	 this	
hypothesis	 stems	 from	 emerging	 findings	 that	 elderly	 subjects	 may	
disproportionately	benefits	from	prior	knowledge	at	encoding,	but	this	has	never	
been	explored	with	materials	highly	relevant	to	everyday	cognition	 like	the	face-
scene	associations	that	we	will	use.	Alternatively,	it	could	be	the	case	that	higher	
discriminative	demands	at	retrieval	for	familiar	materials	may	prevent	elderly	from	
showing	such	benefit,	due	to	the	weakening	of	recollection-based	processes	with	
age.	
- Following	 predictions	 from	 the	Remerge	 or	 the	 SLIMM	 frameworks,	 conceptual	
prior	knowledge	benefits	should	be	observed	at	least	for	item	memory	even	after	
hippocampal	damage.	
- Conversely,	 any	 condition	 yielding	 damage	 extending	 to	 the	 subhippocampal	
structures	should	prevent	from	benefiting	conceptual	prior	knowledge.		 	
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Experimental	Section	
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Experiment	1:	Patient	KA,	or	making	the	case	for	normal	explicit	learning	in	
amnesia	
	
	
Scientific	valorisation	
	
	
Poster	presented	at	the	Memory	Mechanisms	in	Machine	&	Man	workshop,	Albi,	France,	
September	2015	
Poster	presented	at	the	Joint	meeting	of	the	British	Neuropsychological	Society	and	the	
Société	de	Neuropsychologie	de	Langue	Française,	London,	UK,	March	2016	
	
Oral	 communication,	 International	 Conference	 on	 Memory	 (ICOM	 6),	 Budapest,	
Hungary,	July	2016	
	
	
Jonin	 PY,	 Besson	 G,	 La	 Joie	 R,	 Pariente	 J,	 Belliard	 S,	 Barillot	 C,	 Barbeau	 EJ.	 (2018)	
Superior	 explicit	memory	 despite	 severe	 developmental	 amnesia:	 In-depth	 case	 study	
and	neural	 correlates.	Hippocampus,	28(12):867-885.	doi:	 10.1002/hipo.23010.	Epub	2018	
Nov	6.	
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Highlights	from	Experiment	1	
	
The	series	of	experiments	with	patient	KA	provide	the	first	evidence	of	efficient	explicit	
learning	despite	severe	amnesia	following	damage	to	the	whole	extended	hippocampal	
system.	The	unique	contribution	of	this	case	report,	 in	our	opinion,	 lies	 in	the	following	
findings:	
-	Patient	KA	has	reached	normal-to-superior	explicit	knowledge	 in	several	domains,	and	
can	 have	 access	 to	 knowledge	 about	 famous	 faces	 as	 fast	 –	 and	 even	 faster	 –	 than	
controls.	
-	 This	 occurred	 in	 the	 context	 of	 close-to-floor	 recall	 performance,	 while	most	 of	 the	
recognition	 tasks	 were	 performed	 successfully,	 replicating	 prior	 findings	 in	
developmental	amnesia.	
-	He	was	able	to	acquire	new	explicit	memories	about	objects	as	accurately	as	controls	
after	one	single	exposure,	and	again	showed	a	normal	speed	at	 further	retrieval	 in	 the	
context	of	a	very	constraining	recognition	paradigm.	That	is,	new	learning	in	amnesia	can	
occur	without	extensive	training	or	dedicated	learning	techniques.	
-	MRI	 findings	 in	 patient	 KA	 points	 towards	 the	possibility	 that	 neocortical	 structures	
outside	the	hippocampus,	and	especially	the	anterior	parahippocampal	gyrus,	may	have	
played	a	role	in	the	preserved	acquisition	of	knowledge.	
-	 Cortical	 thickness	 analyses	 and	 full	 MTL	 segmentation	 replicated	 through	 different	
methods	 brings	 evidence	 for	 deep	 structural	 reorganization	 of	 these	 structures	 after	
neonatal	damage.	
	
Importantly,	we	do	 not	 take	 these	 findings	 as	 evidence	 for	 normal	 semantic	memory	 vs.	
impaired	episodic	memory,	since	we	did	not	investigate	e.g.	the	organization	of	semantic	
knowledge	 in	 KA.	 Rather,	 we	 believe	 that	 this	 case	 report	 brings	 evidence	 for	 the	
existence	 of	 a	 set	 of	 learning	 processes	 resulting	 in	 new	 explicit	 memories	 that	 can	
further	guide	behaviour,	outside	the	hippocampal	system.	
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Introduction	
	
The	 first	 objective	 of	 this	 thesis	was	 to	 test	whether	 new	explicit	 learning	 could	 occur	
despite	 severely	 compromised	memory.	 The	 historical	 debate	 regarding	 the	 distinction	
between	episodic	and	semantic	memory	takes	his	roots	in	experimental	psychology,	but	
the	more	 convincing	 evidence	 has	 come	 from	neuropsychological	 studies.	 Perhaps	 the	
most	 important	 study	 in	 the	 field	was	 the	 one	 from	 Vargha-Khadem	 et	 al.	 (1997)	who	
brought	 robust	evidence	that	child	and	teenagers	suffering	amnesia	 following	neonatal	
or	early	bilateral	damage	 to	 the	hippocampus	have	nonetheless	 reached	 low-to-normal	
levels	 of	 semantic	 knowledge.	 By	 contrast,	 adult-onset	 cases	 of	 amnesia	 have	
consistently	been	 reported	as	unable	 to	acquire	new	knowledge,	or	at	 the	cost	of	very	
intensive	 and	 repeated	 learning	 session,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 dedicated	 and	 supervised	
learning	techniques.	Despite	the	huge	 impact	of	Vargha-Khadem	et	al.	 (1997)	study,	we	
ignore	 how	 these	 patients	 have	 acquired	 this	 fairly	 preserved	 level	 of	 knowledge.	 It	
remains	to	be	shown	that	new	knowledge	can	be	acquired	at	a	normal	rate,	and	retrieved	
at	the	same	speed	as	controls,	 if	one	is	to	look	for	conclusive	evidence	for	 independent	
learning	 pathways	 separating	 knowledge	 (or	 “semantic”)	 from	 event	 (or	 “episodic”)	
learning.	This	 is	 the	main	 issue	we	addressed	 in	 the	following	case	study	of	patient	KA,	
published	in	the	journal	Hippocampus.		 	
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Complementary	analysis	
	
While	in	the	process	of	publication	of	this	case	report,	we	lacked	a	thorough	investigation	
of	the	MTL	structures	volumes	independently	of	the	cortical	thickness	analysis.	Still,	not	
only	this	is	critical	for	further	interpretation	of	KA’s	profile,	but	also	we	need,	as	much	as	
possible,	to	seek	for	replication	of	our	research	findings	across	 independent	methods	 if	
we	are	to	build	new	empirical	knowledge	on	solid	grounds.	It	further	may	bring	another	
advantage,	namely	to	highlight	the	relative	limitations	of	several	methods	now	available	
for,	 e.g.	 automatic	 MTL	 structures	 segmentation.	 We	 therefore	 performed	 such	 an	
analysis	to	add	supplementary	data	regarding	the	highly	relevant	status	of	the	perirhinal	
and	entorhinal	cortices	in	patient	KA.	
	
Figure	35.	Further	MTL	structures	analysis	in	patient	KA.		
Methods	
	
As	 part	 of	 his	 clinical	 follow-up,	 patient	 KA	 underwent	 a	 new	 series	 of	 MR	 images	
acquisitions.	 Images	 were	 acquired	 with	 3-Tesla	 MR	 system	 (Prisma	MR	 B17,	 Siemens,	
Erlangen,	Germany)	using	a	64-channel	array	coil.	The	parameters	of	sequences	were	as	
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follows.	 Three-dimensional	 (3D)	 sagittal	 T1-weighted	 magnetization	 prepared	 rapid	
acquisition	 with	 gradient	 echo	 (MPRAGE)	 images:	 TR/TI/TE=1900/900/2.26ms,	 9°	 flip	
angle,	 FOV=256x256x176mm,	 1x1x1mm	 voxel	 size,	 yielding	 176	 contiguous	 slices.	 T2-
weighted	coronal	2D	Turbo	Spin	Echo:	TR/TE=8020/80ms,	thirty	2mm	slices	with	no	gap,	
150°	flip	angle,	0.4x0.4x2mm	voxel	size.	
Image	 preprocessing	 and	 analysis	 were	 ran	 using	 the	 Automated	 Segmentation	 of	
Hippocampal	 Subfields	 toolbox	 (ASHS,	 Yushkevich	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 that	 automatically	
segments	 regions	 of	 the	 parahippocampal	 gyrus	 (perirhinal	 and	 parahippocampal	
cortices)	 together	with	 the	 entorhinal	 cortex	 and	 hippocampal	 subfield.	 Regarding	 the	
hippocampal	 subfield,	 an	 additional	 analysis	 was	 performed	 using	 the	 volBrain	 HIPS	
pipeline	(Manjón	&	Coupé,	2016;	Romero,	Coupé,	&	Manjón,	2017)	that	follows	a	distinct	
segmentation	algorithm.	For	 the	 sake	of	 comparison	 regarding	 the	 results	of	 the	ASHS	
pipeline,	data	from	35	healthy	controls	matched	with	KA	for	age	was	taken	from	Ota	et	
al.,	 (2017),	 because	 the	 authors	 used	 the	 same	 segmentation	 pipeline	 and	 image	
acquisition	was	performed	on	a	Siemens	MRI	scanner	as	was	the	case	for	the	patient	KA.	
Unfortunately,	MTL	structures	volumes	in	this	study	are	reported	across	hemispheres;	as	
a	consequence,	we	also	used	data	from	45	healthy	controls	also	matched	with	KA	for	age	
(Sone	et	al.,	2016),	but	note	that	images	were	acquired	on	a	Philips	3.0-T	MR	system	with	
a	 32-channel	 coil	 (Philips	Medical	 Systems,	 Best,	 The	Netherlands).	 Bayesian	 t-tests	 for	
single	 case	 studies	 (Crawford	 &	 Garthwaite,	 2007a)	 were	 performed	 to	 further	 assess	
whether	 the	 estimated	 volumes	 computed	 for	 patient	 KA	 differed	 from	 the	 normal	
range,	 as	 sampled	 in	Ota	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 and	 Sone	 et	 al.	 (2016).	 This	 approach	provides	 a	
Point	Estimates	(PE)	of	percentage	of	the	normal	population	falling	below	the	patient’s	
volume,	 together	 with	 a	 95%	 confidence	 interval	 on	 the	 estimation.	 Given	 our	 aim	 of	
independent	replication	of	our	findings	on	hippocampal	subfields	on	the	one	hand,	and	of	
further	 assessment	 of	 the	 perirhinal	 cortices	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 two-sided	 tests	 were	
performed.	 Finally,	 the	 volBrain	 pipeline	 generated	 comparisons	 between	 volume	
estimates	expressed	as	percentage	of	the	intra-cranial	volume	and	expected	volumes	at	a	
given	age,	based	on	 lifespan	estimation	modelling	derived	 from	 several	MRI	databases	
pooled	together	(N=2944)	(Coupé,	Catheline,	Lanuza,	&	Manjón,	2017),	which	we	further	
report.	
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Results	
	
Volumes	 estimates	 of	 the	 hippocampal	 subfields	 as	 computed	 by	 the	 volBrain	 pipeline	
based	on	the	dataset	of	Kulaga-Yoskovitz	et	al.,	(2015)	(N=25	controls,	mean	age=31	+/-	7	
years	old)	confirmed	the	severe	atrophy	of	each	subfield	in	patient	KA	(see	Figure	36).	
	
Figure	36.	Results	from	the	volBrain	pipeline	(Coupé	et	al.,	2016;	Romero	et	al.,	2017).	(A)	
Hippocampal	subfields	segmentation	in	patient	KA	–	dataset	from	(Kulaga-Yoskovitz	et	al.,	2015);	
(B)	Comparisons	between	volume	estimates	in	KA	and	expected	values	(see	Coupé	et	al.,	2017)	
	
The	 volumes	 of	 the	 bilateral	 entorhinal	 and	 perirhinal	 cortices	 (the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 is	
roughly	considered	as	similar	to	Brodmann	Areas	35	&	36)	in	KA	did	not	differ	from	that	
of	controls,	and	this	result	was	similar	with	the	two	independent	control	samples	(Sone	
et	al.,	2016;	Ota	et	al.,	2017)	(see	Figure	37).	However,	hippocampal	subfields	volumes	were	
dramatically	 smaller	 in	KA,	 and	again	here,	 the	 result	did	not	depend	on	one	particular	
sample.	
Considering	 the	Ota	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 reference	 sample,	 for	 the	 hippocampal	 subfields,	 PEs	
ranged	 from	 0	 to	 22e-5,	 with	 a	 maximum	 upper	 credible	 limit	 value	 of	 86e-3.	 The	 only	
exception	was	 for	 CA3	 subfield	 that	 failed	 to	 reach	 significance	 under	 bilateral	 testing	
(p=0.0682;	 PE=3.41;	 %95CI=[0.68	 –	 8.94]),	 but	 still	 fell	 within	 the	 very	 low	 range	 of	
controls.	Regarding	the	entorhinal	cortex,	again	we	found	a	significant	 lower	volume	 in	
KA	(PE=0.17;	%95CI=[0.00	–	0.92]),	while	BA	35	&	BA	36	volumes	were	in	the	normal	range	
(BA	 35:	 PE=39.46;	 %95CI=[27.15	 –	 52.64];	 BA	 36:	 PE=36.00;	 %95CI=[24.02	 –	 49.15])	 (see	
Figure	38).	
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Figure	37.	Illustration	of	the	results	of	the	Automatic	Segmentation	of	Hippocampal	Subfield	
toolbox	performed	with	the	ITK-SNAP	software	(www.itksnap.org,	Yushkevich	et	al.,	2006;	ASHS,	
Yushkevich	et	al.,	2015),	on	a	T2-weighted,	High	Resolution,	image	of	KA’s	brain.	
	
	
Figure	38.	Quantitative	results	from	the	ASHS	segmentation	protocol:	data	from	Ota	et	al.	(2017)	
serves	as	a	control	sample	(35	subjects	aged	38.9	+/-13.4).	Results	for	the	anterior	sub	hippocampal	
structures	are	in	orange,	while	hippocampal	subfields	are	depicted	in	green.	See	text	for	statistical	
testing.	
	
Use	 of	 the	 Sone	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 control	 sample	 essentially	 led	 to	 the	 same	 results,	 but	
provided	 detailed	 results	 for	 left	 vs.	 right	 hemispheres.	 Thus,	 we	 found	 that	 the	 CA3	
subfield	 was	 slightly	 more	 preserved	 on	 the	 left	 hemisphere	 (PE=9.47;	 %95CI=[4.03	 –	
17.41])	 than	on	 the	 right	 (PE=3.45;	 %95CI=[0.89	 –	 8.20]),	 albeit	 both	 sides	 showed	non-
significant	 differences	 (left	 p	 value=0.189;	 right	 p	 value=0.069)	 under	 bilateral	 testing.	
Moreover,	the	findings	of	entorhinal	cortex	atrophy	actually	were	replicated	only	 in	the	
right	hemisphere	(PE=0.02;	%95CI=[0.00	–	0.14]),	not	 in	the	 left	 (PE=16.16;	%95CI=[8.61	–	
25.92]).	 In	 addition,	 hippocampal	 subfields	 (CA1,	 CA2,	 Dentate	 Gyrus	 and	 Subiculum)	
again	showed	significant	levels	of	atrophy,	with	PEs	ranging	from	0.0001	to	0.082,	with	a	
maximum	upper	 credible	 limit	 value	of	 0.44.	 Conversely,	 BA	 35	&	BA	 36	 volumes	were	
again	in	the	normal	range	bilaterally	(left	BA	35:	PE=61.15;	%95CI=[49.54	–	72.07];	right	BA	
35:	PE=64.54;	%95CI=[53.00	–	75.19];	left	BA	36:	PE=89.51;	%95CI=[81.22	–	95.34];	right	BA	
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36:	 PE=76.85;	 %95CI=[66.04	 –	 85.90])	 (see	 Figure	 39).	 Note	 that	 here,	 left	 anterior	
perirhinal	 cortex	 volume	 in	 patient	 KA	 was	 found	 in	 the	 very	 high	 range	 of	 controls,	
actually	close	to	significance,	with	a	maximum	upper	credible	limit	value	of	0.95.	
	
	
Figure	39.	Quantitative	results	from	the	ASHS	segmentation	protocol:	data	from	Sone	et	al.	(2016)	
served	as	a	control	sample	(45	subjects	aged	42.6	+/-16.4).	Results	for	the	anterior	sub	hippocampal	
structures	are	in	orange,	while	hippocampal	subfields	are	depicted	in	green.	See	text	for	statistical	
testing.	
Discussion	
	
These	 supplementary	 analyses	 of	 the	 MTL	 structures	 in	 patient	 KA	 provide	 important	
additional	findings	beyond	those	reported	in	Jonin	et	al.,	(2018).	
First,	 we	 have	 replicated	 the	 findings	 of	 severe	 hippocampal	 atrophy	 across	 each	 and	
every	 subfield,	 using	 a	 different	 MR-scanner,	 a	 different	 T2-weighted,	 high-resolution	
sequence,	 two	 distinct	 segmentation	 protocols	 and	 two	 independent	 control	 samples	
from	 the	 literature.	 These	 results	make	 very	 robust	 our	 claim	 that	 patient	KA	presents	
with	 the	 most	 severe	 bilateral	 hippocampal	 atrophy	 ever	 reported	 in	 developmental	
amnesia.	
Second,	the	findings	of	normal	volumes	in	the	perirhinal	and	entorhinal	cortices	not	only	
confirm	by	means	of	a	different	approach	the	results	from	the	cortical	thickness	analysis,	
but	 they	 add	 to	 the	 limited	 number	 of	 studies	 in	 developmental	 amnesia	 including	 full	
MTL	structures	segmentation	(Bindschaedler	et	al.,	2011;	Olsen	et	al.,	2013).	
Third,	there	is	a	striking	consistence	between	findings	of	a	larger	volume	of	left	BA36	in	
patient	KA	and	our	previous	finding	of	a	thicker	cortex	in	the	vicinity	of	the	left	BA38.	This	
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result	 strengthens	 in	 our	 view	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 a	 deep	 reorganization	 of	 the	 MTL	
following	 neonatal	 damage	 in	 patient	 KA,	 which	 in	 turn	 may	 have	 supported	 the	
preserved	learning	abilities	in	this	patient.	
	
	
Figure	40.	Illustration	of	the	hippocampal	complex	anatomy	in	patient	KA	and	a	healthy	right-
handed	man	matched	for	age.	This	is	a	3D	render	derived	from	a	template-based	shape	analysis	
recently	proposed	within	the	Large	Deformation	Diffeomorphic	Metric	Mapping	framework	(Cury	
et	al.,	2018).	It	therefore	represents	the	shape	features	of	the	hippocampal	subfields	and	of	the	
entorhinal	cortex,	better	highlighting	critical	local	abnormalities	in	KA’s	hippocampal	complex	
(yellow	arrows	depicts	some	of	these	abnormalities	that	do	not	appear	in	typical	3D	renderings).	
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Experiment	2:	Does	normal	explicit	learning	in	KA	generalize	to	meaningless	
memoranda?	
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Highlights	from	Experiment	2	
	
	
The	 demonstration	 in	 patient	 KA	 that	 a	 very	 effective	 explicit	 learning	 system	 exists	
outside	 the	 extended	 hippocampal	 system	 (Experiment	 1)	 is	 shown	 to	 be	 material-
specific	in	Experiment	2.	
New	learning,	largely	based	on	familiarity-based	retrieval,	remains	possible	in	patient	KA	
but	only	for	concrete,	meaningful	stimuli	as	it	is	the	case	for	object	pictures.	However,	KA	
is	severely	impaired	for	abstract	patterns	free	of	prior	conceptual	representations.	
However,	 healthy	 controls	 present	 a	 clear	 benefit	 with	 meaningful	 materials,	 and	 so	
does	KA.	Controls	perform	twice	as	good	with	objects	as	with	abstract	patterns	(d’	index	
moving	 from	 1.14	 to	 2.25	 in	 Controls,	 from	 -0.18	 to	 1.20	 in	 KA),	 with	 little	 impact	 on	
response	bias	overall	(in	Controls,	0.17	vs.	0.11,	and	-0.45	vs.	-0.54	in	KA,	respectively).	
Findings	 of	 Experiment	 2	 do	 not	 fit	 with	 the	 dual	 processes	 models	 of	 recognition	
memory,	and	are	not	in	line	with	prior	reports	of	preserved	abstract	patterns	recognition	
after	bilateral	hippocampal	damage	(patient	FRG,	Barbeau	et	al.,	2005;	Barbeau,	Pariente,	
Felician,	&	Puel,	2011).	
Beyond	 the	 possible	 accounts	 for	 this	 particular	 pattern	 of	 preserved	 and	 altered	
memory	 in	KA,	 that	 could	be	 related	 to	a	 slight	 right	entorhinal	 cortex	atrophy,	 such	a	
dissociation	speaks	for	either	material-specific	view	of	the	role	of	the	MTL	in	recognition	
memory,	or	for	a	(non	exclusive)	view	related	to	the	benefits	of	pre-existing	knowledge	
in	new	learning.	
We	will	further	concentrate	on	the	latter.	
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Introduction	
	
Patient	KA	with	developmental	amnesia	associated	with	extensive	and	selective	damage	to	
the	 whole	 extended	 hippocampal	 system	 has	 acquired	 superior	 levels	 of	 conceptual	
knowledge	 in	 some	 domains.	 Moreover,	 KA	 was	 found	 able	 to	 acquire	 and	 retrieve	
context-free	memories	at	the	same	speed	as	controls.	This	observation	was	made	despite	a	
severe	amnesic	syndrome,	with	virtually	no	residual	episodic	memory.	The	case	of	patient	
KA	therefore	strongly	speaks	for	the	existence	of	a	very	efficient	explicit	learning	system,	
which	does	not	rely	on	the	extended	hippocampal	system.	
How	 in	 the	 first	 place	 KA	 has	 acquired	 such	 knowledge	 remains	 unclear,	 even	 though	
familiarity-based	 learning	 is	 a	 candidate.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	 acquisition	 of	 new	 conceptual	
knowledge	must	 rely	 on	 the	 successful	 extraction	 of	 regularities	 in	 the	 environment,	 in	
order	 to	 represent	 such	 commonalities	 within	 a	 relevant	 general	 category	 (i.e.	 new	
conceptual	 representation).	Extraction	of	 regularities	must	allow	both	discrimination	and	
assimilation	 of	 events	 features,	 so	 that	 across	 episodes,	 features	 that	 are	 common	 to	 a	
single	concept	can	be	assimilated	within	a	conceptual	representation,	while	features	that	
differ	across	concepts	can	be	discriminated	as	well	(e.g.	see	Mack,	Love,	&	Preston,	2018).	
By	 showing	 that	 patient	 KA	 is	 unimpaired	 at	 acquiring	 new	 context-free	 memories	 for	
object	 pictures,	we	 thus	 have	 brought	 evidence	 that	 new	explicit	memories	 for	 existing	
concepts	 can	be	 formed	by	 the	patient.	However,	we	did	not	 address	directly	 how	new	
concepts	could	be	acquired.	If	successive	instances	of	familiarity-based	retrieval	can	lead	to	
the	formation	of	a	new	concept,	it	 implies	that	after	the	inaugural	exposure	to	unknown,	
or	at	 least	very	unfamiliar	stimuli,	 further	related	cues	should	trigger	accurate	familiarity-
based	recognition.	To	explore	this	idea,	what	we	need	is	unknown,	meaningless	materials,	
rather	than	pictures	of	objects	corresponding	to	pre-existing	representations.	
	
In	the	following	experiment,	we	used	abstract	coloured	patterns	as	memoranda	and	asked	
whether	patient	KA	could	acquire	new	context-free	memories	 for	 these	stimuli.	The	task	
was	exactly	the	same	as	the	one	reported	in	Jonin	et	al.	(2018,	Expt.	7),	apart	from	the	use	
of	different	stimuli.	
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Materials	&	Methods	
	
Participants	
14	right-handers	healthy	controls	aged	22-34	years	old	and	more	educated	than	KA	(formal	
years	of	education	 ranged	from	14	 to	21)	participated.	All	participants	provided	 informed	
consent	 for	 the	 experiment,	 and	 were	 instructed	 that	 this	 would	 be	 a	 memory	 test.	 In	
addition	to	the	current	experiment,	they	all	underwent	the	same	task	as	the	one	reported	
in	Jonin	et	al.	(2018,	Expt.	7),	whereby	they	had	to	learn	a	series	of	pictures	of	objects.		
Stimuli	
280	 abstract	 patterns	were	 chosen	 from	 various	 internet	 database.	 They	were	 200x200	
pixels	bitmap	 files	picked	up	 to	be	hard	 to	verbalize	and	 lacking	any	meaningful	pattern	
(see	Besson,	 Ceccaldi,	Didic,	&	Barbeau,	 2012).	Among	 these	 images,	 120	were	 randomly	
chosen	as	targets	and	120	as	stimuli,	the	remaining	items	being	used	for	practice	trials.	
	
	
Figure	41.	Examples	of	the	stimuli	from	Experiment	2.	Abstract	patterns	on	the	left,	real	objects	on	
the	right.	
	
Procedure	
The	Speed	and	Accuracy	Boosting	procedure	was	used	(SAB),	as	described	 in	Jonin	et	al.	
(2018),	 and	 adapted	 from	 Besson	 et	 al.	 (2012).	 Briefly,	 participants	 were	 explicitly	
instructed	 to	 encode	 visual	 stimuli	 in	 a	 self-paced	 study	 phase.	 Then,	 after	 a	 3-minutes	
break	 filled	with	a	 cartoon	video,	 recognition	memory	was	assessed	 through	a	Go/NoGo	
procedure.	Subjects	had	to	make	Go	responses	for	studies	items,	and	NoGo	responses	(i.e.	
doing	nothing)	for	unstudied	items.	Subjects	made	their	Go	responses	by	using	a	dedicated	
infrared	 response	pad	 combined	with	 a	CRT	 screen,	 allowing	 a	high	 fidelity	 recording	of	
		 205	
response	 times.	 Each	 response	was	 followed	by	a	600	ms	audio	 feedback	 informing	 the	
subject	of	whether	his	response	was	a	Hit,	a	False	Alarm	(FA),	a	Correct	Rejection	(CR)	or	a	
Miss	(M).	What	makes	the	SAB	procedure	very	hard	is	the	use	of	a	constraining	response	
deadline	that	was	set	at	600	ms.	Thus,	at	test,	the	item	was	flashed	on	the	screen	for	100	
msec,	then	the	participant	had	only	500	ms.	to	make	his	decision	and	give	his	response.	A	
white	cross	was	displayed	for	a	 jittered	(300-600	ms)	duration	during	Inter-trial	 intervals.	
The	 SAB	 procedure,	 as	 discussed	 elsewhere,	 is	 assumed	 to	 provide	 a	 direct	 estimate	 of	
familiarity-based	 recognition	with	very	 limited	 involvement	of	 recollection	 (Besson	et	al.,	
2012;	Sauvage,	Beer,	&	Eichenbaum,	2010).	
	
Analyses	
Responses	 at	 test	 were	 analysed	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 signal	 detection	 theory,	 with	
computations	 of	 corrected	 Hits,	 FAs,	 CRs	 and	 Ms	 rates	 (Snodgrass	 &	 Corwin,	 1988)	
together	with	the	d’	index	used	as	a	measure	of	discriminability	and	C	index	as	a	measure	
of	response	bias.	Response	times	were	also	analysed,	and	we	were	especially	interested	in	
the	 temporal	 dynamics	 of	 Go	 responses.	 Our	 principal	 analysis	 was	 the	 comparison	 of	
patient	KA’s	performance	(i.e.	d’,	Hits,	FAs)	with	that	of	healthy	controls,	asking	whether	
preserved	 recognition	memory	 in	 KA	with	 the	 SAB	procedure	 as	 previously	 found	 could	
generalize	to	novel,	meaningless,	visual	stimuli.	All	statistical	comparisons	were	performed	
using	Bayesian	t-tests	for	single	case	studies	(Crawford	&	Garthwaite,	2007),	as	described	
in	the	previous	experiment	(p.	170).	
	
Results	
	
The	 patient	 obtained	 a	 negative	 d’	 (-0.184),	 due	 to	 a	 higher	 rate	 of	 FAs	 (36%)	 than	 Hits	
(29%).	When	compared	with	controls’	performance,	this	suggested	a	severe	impairment	in	
KA	since	the	Point	Estimates	for	the	d’	index	was	0.29,	showing	that	only	0.29%	of	normal	
controls	 would	 be	 susceptible	 to	 get	 a	 lower	 score.	 Importantly,	 the	 patient	 was	 very	
conservative	 (patient	KA,	 C=-0.452;	 controls,	 C=0.169;	 PE=0.81,	 %95CI=[0.00	 –	 5.03]).	 This	
reflected	a	normal	FA	rate	(patient	KA,	FAs=36%;	controls,	FAs=35%;	PE=54.06,	%95CI=[33.74	
–	 73.62])	 but	 an	 impaired	 Hit	 rate	 (patient	 KA,	 Hits=29%;	 controls,	 Hits=76%;	 PE=0.02,	
%95CI=[0.00	–	0.13]).	
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Figure	42.	Speed	and	Accuracy	Boosting	procedure	with	abstract	visual	patterns	in	patient	KA	(right)	
and	14	healthy	controls	(left).		
Response	times	analysis	 revealed	that	controls	could	achieve	accurate	recognition	below	
400	ms	 (across	 trials	minRT=390	ms),	while	 in	 patient	 KA,	we	 could	 not	 find	 successive	
time	bins	where	Hit	 rates	 (i.e.	 correct	Go	 responses)	 significantly	exceeded	FA	 rates	 (i.e.	
incorrect	 Go	 responses),	 thus	 making	 impossible	 to	 estimate	 a	 minimal	 reaction	 time	
(minRT).	These	results	were	 in	sharp	contrast	with	the	normal	performance	of	KA	at	 the	
same	task,	but	with	meaningful	(i.e.	pictures	of	objects)	items	(see	Jonin	et	al.,	2018).	
To	further	investigate	this	apparent	dissociation,	we	took	advantage	of	the	data	collected	
in	 the	 same	 control	 sample	 with	 the	 SAB	 procedure	 but	 using	 object	 pictures,	 and	
performed	a	regression	analysis	aimed	at	providing	estimates	of	d’	with	Objects	given	the	
d’	obtained	with	abstract	patterns	(Crawford	&	Garthwaite,	2007b).	In	short,	this	method	
builds	a	bivariate	regression	equation	from	the	controls	sample	summary	statistics	(mean,	
standard	deviation,	 t	 value	 from	a	paired-sample	 t	 test	between	conditions),	which	 then	
can	be	applied	to	one	single	patient.	Basically,	the	method	tests	whether	the	discrepancy	
observed	in	the	patient	falls	within	the	normal	range,	as	reflected	in	a	Point	Estimate	value	
similar	to	the	one	described	above.	
Considering	the	discriminability	index	d’,	the	predicted	score	of	KA	in	the	Object	condition	
given	his	score	in	the	Abstract	patterns	condition	was	0.420.	This	is	a	large	and	significant	
deviation	 from	 the	 actual	 score	 of	 1.198,	 yielding	 a	 PE	 of	 2,52	 (%95CI=[0.00	 –	 23.20]),	
meaning	 that	 less	 than	 3%	 of	 the	 normal	 population	 is	 expected	 to	 present	 a	 larger	
discrepancy.	
Finally,	we	plotted	the	response	times	for	“Go”	responses	of	the	patient	KA	and	controls	in	
both	 conditions	 to	 better	 apprehend	 his	 behaviour	 at	 the	 same	 task,	 but	with	 different	
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stimuli	 (see	Figure	43	&Figure	44).	Response	times	below	200	ms	were	discarded	based	on	
prior	work	with	the	SAB	procedure.	
	
Figure	43.	Speed	and	Accuracy	Boosting	procedure	with	abstract	patterns.	Y-axis	shows	percentage	
of	“Go”	Responses,	X-axis	represents	50	ms	time	bins.	Top	panel	depicts	average	performance	across	
control	subjects;	bottom	panel	illustrates	performance	of	patient	KA.	Dashed	lines	represent	the	3rd	
order	polynomial	fitting	curves	for	Hits	and	FAs.	
	
This	analysis	shows	that	controls	made	more	FAs	around	350	ms	and	up	to	the	time	bins	
where	Hit	rate	started	to	exceed	FA	rates	in	the	abstract	pattern	condition,	whereas	the	FA	
rates	 remained	slightly	 lower	 in	 the	object	 condition.	By	contrast,	patient	KA	gave	many	
more	 “Go”	 (i.e.	 Hits	 and	 FAs)	 responses	 as	 early	 as	 200	 ms	 in	 the	 abstract	 pattern	
condition,	and	he	could	not,	even	in	the	later	time	bins,	reliably	discriminate	targets	from	
lures,	yielding	rather	flat	polynomial	curves.	
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Figure	44.	Speed	and	Accuracy	Boosting	procedure	with	meaningful	objects.	Y-axis	shows	
percentage	of	“Go”	Responses,	X-axis	represents	50	ms	time	bins.	Top	panel	depicts	average	
performance	across	control	subjects;	bottom	panel	illustrates	performance	of	patient	KA.	Dashed	
lines	represent	the	3rd	order	polynomial	fitting	curves	for	Hits	and	FAs.	
	
In	 summary,	 patient	 KA	 presented	 a	 material-specific	 preservation	 of	 familiarity-based	
recognition	 memory.	 While	 he	 could	 acquire	 new	 context-free	 explicit	 memories	 of	
pictures	of	objects,	he	completely	failed	to	do	so	with	abstract	patterns.	Moreover,	while	
the	object	condition	apparently	helped	control	subjects	to	make	less	early	FAs,	it	was	not	
the	case	 in	KA	who	globally	made	more	“Go”	responses	as	early	as	200	ms	post-onset	 in	
the	abstract	pattern	condition.	
Discussion	
	
The	 striking	 dissociation	 observed	 in	 patient	 KA	 between	 preserved	 learning	 of	 object	
pictures	 and	 impaired	 learning	 of	 abstract	 patterns	 is	 not	 consistent	with	most	 process-
based	 theories	 of	 recognition	memory	 (e.g.	 Yonelinas,	 1994).	 These	models	 predict	 that	
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recognition	 of	 single	 items	 can	 be	 achieved	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 familiarity,	 or	 a	 “feeling	 of	
knowing”.	 Familiarity	 would	 in	 turn	 depend	 on	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 but	 not	 on	 the	
hippocampus.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 KA	 with	 preserved	 bilateral	 perirhinal	 cortices,	 the	 model	
would	have	predicted	preserved	performance	 irrespectively	 of	 the	memoranda	used.	 To	
our	 knowledge,	 a	 very	 limited	 number	 of	 studies	 have	 explored	 memory	 for	 abstract	
patterns	in	amnesia.	
In	 a	 series	 of	 amnesic	 patients	with	 damage	 thought	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 hippocampus,	
patients	succeeded	a	visual	span	task	involving	abstract	designs	after	an	empty	delay	of	2	
seconds,	but	were	 impaired	after	delays	of	6	seconds	or	more	(Buffalo,	Reber,	&	Squire,	
1998).	Similarly,	but	with	a	progressive	span	task	requiring	detecting	novel	designs	among	
a	gradually	increased	number	of	targets,	Levy,	Hopkins,	&	Squire,	(2003)	reported	impaired	
performance	in	5	amnesic	patients.	Interestingly,	patients	were	also	impaired	in	the	same	
task	 but	 involving	 line	 drawings	 of	 objects,	 but	 patients	 like	 controls	 performed	 much	
better	 in	 the	 line	drawings	 (i.e.	meaningful	 items)	 condition	 (Levy	 et	 al.,	 2003,	 Figure	 1).	
However,	 long-term	 recognition	 memory	 was	 not	 assessed	 and,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	
Introduction	 section,	 for	 several	 of	 these	 amnesic	 patients	we	miss	 detailed	 anatomical	
information	regarding	extra-hippocampal	structures.	
More	relevant	findings	come	from	the	case	reports	of	two	patients	with	severely	damaged	
left	MTL	structures,	but	a	differential	profile	of	damaged	and	preserved	structures	 in	the	
right	MTL	(Barbeau	et	al.,	2005;	2011).	The	patient	FRG	had	extensive	damage	to	the	right	
hippocampus	 but	 the	 anterior	 right	 parahippocampal	 gyrus	was	 preserved.	 By	 contrast,	
JMG	 (who	was	 not	 amnesic)	 had	 severe	 lesions	 of	 the	 right	 parahippocampal	 gyrus	 but	
preserved	right	hippocampus.	As	expected,	recall	and	recognition	of	verbal	materials	was	
impaired	in	both	patients.	However,	JMG	presented	with	impaired	recognition	of	abstract	
patterns	(similar	to	the	ones	used	in	our	task)	across	4	different	tests	(mean	Z-score=-2.07)	
while	 in	 FRG,	 performance	 was	 in	 the	 full	 normal	 range	 (mean	 Z-score=1.18).	 Such	
dissociation	 provides	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 anterior	 sub	 hippocampal	
structures	play	a	key	role	in	recognition	memory	for	single	items.	Our	results	with	patient	
KA	 are	 therefore	 surprising	 and,	 again,	 not	 predicted	 by	 the	 dual	 processes	 models	 of	
recognition	memory.	What	could	account	for	these	findings?	
An	obvious	possibility	is	related	to	the	findings	of	right	entorhinal	cortex	atrophy	in	KA	(see	
pp.	172-173).	Given	that	abstract	patterns	processing	most	likely	involve	spatial	processing	
(i.e.	spatial	combinations	of	separate	features),	 it	 is	possible	that	the	entorhinal	cortex	 is	
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required	 to	 achieve	 an	 integrated	 representation	 of	 these	 stimuli,	 binding	 together	
parahippocampal	and	perirhinal	 inputs.	Recent	support	 for	 this	hypothesis	has	come	 in	a	
study	 reporting	 that	 intra-item	 configural	 processing	 predicts	 the	 volume	 of	 lateral	
entorhinal	cortex	in	elderly	adults	with	variable	degrees	of	cognitive	decline	(Yeung	et	al.,	
2017).	 The	 prediction	 was	 independent	 of	 the	 object	 novelty,	 suggesting	 that	 the	
entorhinal	cortex	does	play	a	perceptual	 role	at	encoding,	 rather	 than	having	a	memory-
specific	function.	In	our	task,	high	discriminative	demands	are	placed	on	retrieval	processes	
to	discriminate	between	old	and	new	abstract	patterns.	This	can	presumably	be	achieved	
based	 on	 features	 identity	 and	 spatial	 arrangements,	 requiring	 a	 highly	 integrated	
representation	of	the	study	items.	Such	processes	may	be	dependent	on	structures	at	the	
top	of	the	visual	stream	hierarchy.	The	entorhinal	cortex	and	hippocampus	are	thus	good	
candidates,	 and	 both	 were	 impaired	 in	 patient	 KA,	 as	 reflected	 in	 an	 overall	 impaired	
performance,	and	in	the	high	number	of	Hits	and	FAs	he	produced	in	the	earlier	time	bins.	
By	contrast,	healthy	controls	made	more	early	FAs	only	in	the	abstract	patterns	condition,	
suggesting	 a	 more	 conservative	 bias	 in	 early	 responses.	 This	 could	 reflect	 the	 need	 for	
additional	perceptual	processing	to	discriminate	targets	from	lures.	An	account	for	why	KA	
failed	in	the	abstract	patterns	condition	could	therefore	be	found	in	his	inability	to	perform	
intra-item	 configural	 binding	 required	 for	 successful	 retrieval,	 due	 to	 right	 entorhinal	
cortex	damage.	
Furthermore,	 an	 important	 difference	 between	 the	 abstract	 patterns	 and	 the	 object	
pictures	 used	 in	 the	 experiments	 is	 that	 the	 former	 are	meaningless,	 i.e.	 not	 associated	
with	 any	 pre-existing	 semantic	 knowledge,	 while	 it	 is	 the	 case	 for	 the	 latter.	 In	 the	
meantime,	while	both	abstract	patterns	and	objects	are	composed	of	individual	elements,	
it	is	expected	that	only	meaningful	objects	can	be	perceptually	processed	as	single	entities,	
because	 of	 the	 pre-existing	 conceptual	 representations.	 This	 leaves	 us	with	 at	 least	 two	
additional	explanations	for	the	discrepancy	between	abstract	patterns	and	existing	objects	
memory	in	KA.	
First,	existing	prior	knowledge	may	increase	explicit	learning	even	in	the	case	of	amnesia,	
e.g.	through	more	elaborative	encoding	and	/	or	higher	distinctiveness	and	/	or	 increased	
conceptual	fluency	at	retrieval	(e.g.	Geurten	&	Willems,	2017;	Ozubko	&	Yonelinas,	2014).	In	
amnesic	patients	with	damage	 limited	to	the	hippocampus,	 it	has	previously	been	shown	
that	 when	 the	 memorandum	 is	 congruent	 with	 existing	 knowledge,	 close-to-normal	
recognition	 memory	 performance	 can	 be	 achieved	 (Kan	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Interestingly,	 the	
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authors	 reported	 that	 this	 as	 not	 true	 in	 patients	with	 damage	 to	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex.	
Moreover,	 and	 apart	 from	 the	unresolved	debated	 about	whether	 or	 not	 the	 entorhinal	
cortex	is	considered	as	pertaining	to	the	same	system	as	the	perirhinal	cortex	(see	Bastin	
et	al.,	2019	for	discussion),	a	recent	case	study	is	highly	relevant	here.	The	authors	reported	
that	a	selective	damage	to	the	left	entorhinal	cortex	resulted	in	a	selective	impairment	of	
familiarity-based	 recognition	 for	 words,	 but	 not	 pseudo-words	 (patient	 MR,	 Brandt,	
Eysenck,	 Nielsen,	 &	 von	 Oertzen,	 2016).	 This	 fits	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 pre-existing	
representations	may	support	recognition	memory	as	long	as	the	rhinal	cortex	is	preserved,	
irrespectively	 of	 the	 status	 of	 the	 hippocampus,	 which	 was	 no	 longer	 possible	 in	 MR.	
Notably,	 in	patient	KA,	thicker	cortex	and	a	slightly	larger	volume	were	highlighted	in	the	
left	 rhinal	cortices	(see	Jonin	et	al.,	2018	and	pp.	 172-173).	Thus,	one	could	speculate	that	
the	processing	of	existing	objects	up	to	this	region	(at	the	object	entity	level,	see	(Bastin	et	
al.,	 2019;	 Ranganath	 &	 Ritchey,	 2012)	 may	 further	 serve	 as	 a	 scaffold	 for	 subsequent	
retrieval.	 This	 would	 not	 be	 possible	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 pre-existing	 knowledge,	 thus	
accounting	 for	 the	 impaired	 performance	 with	 abstract	 patterns.	 This	 hypothesis	 was	
previously	referred	to	as	the	“scaffolding	account”	(Greenberg	&	Verfaellie,	2010;	 Irish	et	
al.,	2013;	Kan	et	al.,	2009).	
Second,	it	has	recently	been	proposed	that	extra-hippocampal	neocortex	in	the	MTL	could	
support	 memory	 for	 stimuli	 perceived	 as	 a	 single	 entity,	 or	 stimuli	 lacking	 pre-existing	
representations	 (Bird,	 2017).	 This	hypothesis	 is	broadly	 in	 line	with	 the	 idea	 (see	e.g.	BIC	
model)	 that	 whenever	 unitization	 could	 occur	 at	 study,	 allowing	 separate	 items	 to	 be	
processed	 as	 unit,	 further	 familiarity-based	 recognition	 could	 be	 supported	 by	 extra-
hippocampal	structures.	An	 important	prediction	from	this	framework	 is	that	recognition	
memory	for	stimuli	lacking	prior	representations	and	that	can	be	processed	as	a	perceptual	
“whole”	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 hippocampal	 processing.	 Accordingly,	 a	 meta-analysis	 of	
unknown	faces	recognition	after	hippocampal	damage	found	that	it	was	indeed	generally	
preserved	 (Bird	 &	 Burgess,	 2008;	 Bird,	 2017).	 Conversely,	 a	 recent	 study	 showed	 that	
recognition	for	famous	faces	–	and	recognition	for	 inverted	unknown	faces	as	well	–	was	
impaired	 after	 hippocampal	 damage	 (Smith	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 This	 could	 be	 labelled	 as	 the	
“material-specific	framework”.	
However,	apart	from	the	case	reports	from	Barbeau	et	al.	(2005;	2011),	we	are	not	aware	of	
previous	 studies	 directly	 contrasting	 meaningless	 vs.	 meaningful	 memoranda	 within	
recognition	 memory	 tasks	 in	 hippocampal	 amnesia.	 Available	 data	 from	 patient	 FRG	
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suggests	 that	 recognition	memory	 for	 abstract	 patterns	 made	 of	 separate	 components	
and	 free	 of	 any	 pre-existing	 knowledge	 is	 possible	 after	 bilateral	 hippocampal	 damage,	
being	inconsistent	with	both	the	predictions	of	Bird	(2017)	and	our	findings	with	KA,	except	
if	 we	 consider	 the	 right	 entorhinal	 cortex	 hypothesis	 mentioned	 above.	 Moreover,	 as	
extensively	mentioned	in	the	Introduction	section,	one	determinant	of	unitization	may	well	
be	 the	 congruence	with	 existing	 prior	 knowledge.	 So	 if	 pre-existing	 representations	 can	
indeed	serve	as	a	scaffold	for	subsequent	learning	independently	of	hippocampal	function,	
and	if	unitization	processes	supported	by	the	rhinal	cortices	can	support	such	scaffolding,	
our	opinion	is	that	this	scaffolding	hypothesis	provides	a	more	promising	account	for	KA’s	
performance.	
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Experiment	3a:	Does	prior	knowledge	or	novelty	improve	learning?	A	study	in	aging	
	
Scientific	valorisation	
	
	
Prize	 of	 the	 best	 communication,	 “Journées	 de	 Printemps	 de	 la	 Société	 de	
Neuropsychologie	de	Langue	Française”,	Liège,	Belgique,	May	2016.	
	
Oral	communication,	International	Conference	on	Memory	(ICOM	6),	Budapest,	Hungary,	
July	2016	
	
Article	in	preparation	for	the	journal	Psychology	of	Aging	
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Highlights	from	Experiment	3a	
	
	
The	 theoretical	 accounts	 putting	 forward	 the	 role	 of	 novelty	 detection	 in	 memory	
formation	 and	 enhancement	 are	 refuted	 when	 novelty	 is	 operationalized	 as	 stimulus	
novelty	and	contrasted	with	familiar	stimuli.	Models	like	the	Novelty	encoding	hypothesis	
may	 refer	 only	 to	 particular	 class	 of	 novelty,	 namely	 novelty	 resulting	 from	 errors	 of	
prediction,	 like	 in	 most	 isolation	 effect,	 bizarreness	 effect	 (i.e.	 distinctiveness),	 or	
contextual	incongruence	(i.e.	contextual	novelty)	paradigms.	
In	 a	 learning	 task	 tapping	 highly	 common	 and	 relevant	 processes	 for	 everyday	 life,	 that	
involves	 recognition	 memory	 for	 faces	 in	 their	 visual	 context,	 we	 report	 that	 faces	
carrying	prior	knowledge	yields	on	average	a	20%	bonus	for	subsequent	memory.	
Moreover,	Experiment	3a	 reveals	 that	prior	 knowledge	not	only	benefits	 item	memory,	
but	also	that	it	extends	to	memory	for	the	context.		
Importantly,	 aging	 does	 not	 alter	 the	 prior	 knowledge	 bonus,	 a	 result	 that	 needs	
replication,	since	the	finding	of	age-resistant	memory	tasks	is	a	major	concern	with	respect	
to	the	development	of	cognitive	markers	of	aging-related	degenerative	conditions.	
Finally,	 Experiment	 3a	 brings	 evidence	 that	 explicit	 learning	 improvement	 due	 to	 pre-
existing	long-term	representations	could	depend	on	the	kind	of	prior	knowledge,	and	that	
semantic	encoding	might	not	be	necessary	to	enable	enhanced	learning.	
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Introduction	
	
“Learning	 is	 often	 not	 so	much	 a	matter	 of	 acquiring	 new	 behaviour	 as	 it	 is	 a	matter	 of	
organizing	 previously	 acquired	 behaviour	 into	 new	 sequences.	 The	 point	 would	 be	
impossible	to	prove,	but	it	 is	reasonable	that	truly	new	situations	and	truly	new	responses	
seldom	occur	once	people	are	past	childhood.”	
Robert	Crowder,	2015,	p.	408	(first	Ed.	1976)	
	
	
In	 the	 field	 of	 learning	 and	 memory	 research,	 the	 term	 “learning”	 typically	 refers	 to	
memory	 formation	 for	 rather	 new,	 unfamiliar,	 materials.	 In	 the	 earliest	 years	 of	 the	
experimental	 study	 of	 learning	 and	 memory,	 Hermann	 Ebbinghaus	 purposely	 used	
nonsense	 syllables	 as	 memoranda,	 because	 he	 explicitly	 aimed	 at	 investigating	 new	
learning,	 and	 so	 he	 wished	 to	 avoid	 corruption	 by	 prior	 memories	 (Ebbinghaus,	
1885/1964).	 It	 has	 later	 been	 recognized	 that	 Novelty	 detection	 is	 a	 major	 learning	
enhancer,	 and	 this	memory	 advantage	 for	 novel	 stimuli	 is	 now	widely	 accepted	 in	 the	
field	of	 cognitive	neurosciences	 (e.g.	Kinsbourne	&	George,	 1974;	 Tulving	&	Kroll,	 1995;	
Kumaran	&	Maguire,	 2009).	 Still,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 above	epigraph,	much	of	our	daily	
learning	 has	more	 to	 do	with	 highly	 familiar	 items	 than	with	 unfamiliar,	 artificial,	 lab’s	
stimuli.	Given	that	by	definition,	routines	form	a	large	part	of	our	daily	lives,	our	learning	
processes	may	better	be	tuned	to	allow	us	accurate	remembering	of	day-to-day	events,	
so	that	we	can	adapt	ourselves	to	our	environment.	Supporting	this	view,	there	is	a	long	
tradition	 in	 experimental	 psychology	 reporting	 how	 prior	 knowledge	 about	 the	
memoranda	(and	thus,	stimulus	familiarity)	improves	subsequent	memory	formation	(e.g.	
Bartlett,	1932;	Bransford	&	Johnson,	1972;	Chase	&	Simon,	1973a).	Besides,	the	 idea	that	
novelty	detection	 is	more	beneficial	than	familiarity	 in	new	learning	seems	at	odds	with	
the	 classical	 and	 obvious	 role	 of	 repetition	 in	 learning	 (Ebbinghaus,	 1885/1964),	 where	
more	 study	 repetitions	 yields	 more	 memory	 formation.	 Two	 lines	 of	 research	 have	
therefore	yielded	contradictory	findings	regarding	the	beneficial	role	of	stimulus	novelty	
vs.	familiarity	on	declarative	learning.	
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One	 classical	 way	 of	 probing	 learning	 and	 memory	 is	 recognition	 memory	 testing.	
Recognition	memory	refers	to	our	ability	to	detect	prior	occurrence,	i.e.	to	“know	again”	
(Mandler,	 1980),	 and	 it	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	 simple	 form	of	 declarative	memory	 (Squire	&	
Schacter,	2002).	Dual	process	models	postulate	that	accurate	recognition	relies	upon	two	
distinct	 retrieval	 processes,	 namely	 familiarity	 and	 recollection.	 Familiarity	 leads	 to	
successful	 retrieval	 of	 the	memoranda	 alone,	while	 recollection	 yields	 retrieval	 of	 both	
the	memoranda	and	its	context	of	acquisition	(i.e.	retrieval	of	the	learning	episode),	thus	
accounting	 for	 either	 context-free	 or	 context-rich	 memories	 (Atkinson	 &	 Juola,	 1974;	
Mandler,	1980;	Yonelinas,	1994;	Eichenbaum	et	al.,	2007;	Wixted	&	Squire,	2011).	Besides,	
while	 familiarity	 is	considered	an	automatic	and	 fast	process,	 recollection	 is	 supposedly	
slower	and	dependent	on	controlled	processes.	Typical	experimental	methods	have	used	
objective	or	 subjective	measures	 to	 further	 disentangle	 the	 respective	 contributions	of	
these	 two	 processes.	 Subjective	 measures	 include	 the	 Remember	 /	 Know	 paradigm	
(Gardiner),	or	the	use	of	confidence	rating	scales	at	test.	In	both	cases,	the	basic	idea	is	
that	recollection	is	supposedly	associated	with	a	sense	of	reliving	the	study	episode,	thus	
leading	 to	 “R”	 responses	 (for	 “Remember”)	 or	 to	 Hits	 high-confidence	 “Hits”	 (true	
positive).	 Objective	 measures	 generally	 refer	 to	 “source	 memory”	 paradigms,	 where	
retrieval	 of	 the	 contextual	 features	 of	 the	 to-be-remembered	 event	 is	 probed	 at	 test.	
Several	 studies	 have	 explored	 the	 impact	 of	 novelty	 or	 familiarity	 upon	 recognition	
memory,	yielding	mixed	findings	regarding	whether	Novelty	or	Familiarity	are	beneficial,	
and	regarding	which	retrieval	process	is	altered.	
	
Numerous	 reports	 show	 a	 clear	 advantage	 of	 Novelty	 on	 recognition	 accuracy,	 using	
either	words	or	pictures	as	memoranda	(Aberg	&	Nilsson,	2001;	Dobbins,	Kroll,	Yonelinas,	
&	Liu,	1998;	Kinsbourne	&	George,	1974;	Kormi-Nouri,	Nilsson,	&	Ohta,	2005;	Lekeu	et	al.,	
2003;	Tulving	&	Kroll,	1995).	More	limited	effort	has	been	made	to	address	the	question	
of	an	influence	on	recollection,	familiarity,	or	both,	but	available	evidence	suggests	that	
both	 recognition	 processes	 would	 benefit	 novelty	 (Kishiyama	 &	 Yonelinas,	 2003;	
Kishiyama,	Yonelinas,	&	Knight,	2009;	Kishiyama,	Yonelinas,	&	Lazzara,	2004).	In	apparent	
contradiction	 with	 these	 data,	 there	 is	 considerable	 evidence	 for	 the	 advantage	 of	
stimulus	familiarity,	not	novelty,	on	recognition	memory.	For	example,	Reder	et	al.	(2013)	
have	 recently	 reported	 that	 recognition	memory	 for	 face-scene	associations	was	about	
twice	more	accurate	when	famous	vs.	unknown	faces	were	displayed	at	test,	even	when	
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considering	“Remember”	responses	only.	Similar	findings	were	reported	with	faces	(e.g.	
Klatzky	 &	 Forrest,	 1984),	 proverbs	 (Poppenk	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 or	 other	 verbal	 materials	
(Gardiner	&	Java,	1990;	Perfect	&	Dasgupta,	1997;	see	also	Belleville,	Ménard,	&	Lepage,	
2011),	 including	naturalistic	materials	(Castel,	2005).	Generally,	stimulus	with	pre-existing	
representations	has	gathered	a	differential	 benefit	 on	 familiarity-based	 vs.	 recollection-
based	recognition,	with	an	advantage	for	the	latter	(e.g.	Long	&	Pratt,	2002;	but	see	Bird	
et	al.,	2011).	Such	divergent	findings	come	with	the	apparently	contradictory	role	of	the	
medial	 temporal	 lobe	 (MTL)	 structures	 in	novelty	 and	 familiarity	detection.	 Indeed,	 the	
MTL	 has	 a	 well-established	 role	 in	 the	 detection	 of	 prior	 occurrence,	 as	 illustrated	 in	
neuropsychological	studies	of	amnesic	patients,	or	in	the	retrieval	success	effect	reported	
in	 fMRI	 studies	 (e.g.	 Kim,	 2017).	 In	 the	 meantime,	 the	 MTL	 and	 especially	 the	
hippocampus	have	long	been	found	to	play	a	key	role	in	novelty	detection	(e.g.	Halgren	
et	al.,	1980;	Kumaran	&	Maguire,	2009).	
	
Altogether,	 these	elements	 leave	us	with	a	double	paradox.	 First,	 stimulus	novelty	 and	
stimulus	 familiarity	 can	 enhance	 declarative	 memory.	 Second,	 the	 core	 brain	 system	
involved	 in	 declarative	 learning	 (i.e.	 the	 MTL)	 seems	 responsible	 for	 both	 novelty	
detection	 and	 familiarity	 detection.	 Methodological	 and	 conceptual	 differences	 across	
studies	may	account	for	such	puzzling	findings.	
	
One	 important	 asymmetry	 between	 Novelty	 and	 Familiarity	 assessment	 lies	 in	 the	
experimental	 manipulations	 used	 to	 induce	 novelty.	 A	 typical	 feature	 of	 experiments	
reporting	 a	 novelty	 advantage	 is	 that	 they	 generally	 induce	 an	 isolation	 effect:	 while	
“familiar”	 items	were	 familiarized	 through	 extensive	 pre-study	 repetitions,	 novel	 items	
are	presented	only	once	at	study.	Thus,	at	study,	subjects	 learn	novel,	 isolated	 items	 in	
that	they	are	presented	among	items	that	were	made	experimentally	highly	familiar.	This	
has	 led	 some	 authors	 to	 suggest	 that	 novel	 stimuli	 have	 superior	 distinctiveness	 at	
encoding,	making	 them	more	 likely	 to	 be	 remembered	 (e.g.	 Dobbins	 et	 al.,	 1998).	 The	
benefit	of	distinctiveness,	or	isolation	effect,	has	long	been	demonstrated	in	psychology	
(Von	 Restorff,	 1933).	 Similarly,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 across	 the	 typical	 novelty	
experiments,	different	 retrieval	demands	are	placed	on	novel	 vs.	 familiar	 stimuli	during	
recognition.	As	Poppenk,	Köhler,	et	al.,	(2010)	pointed	out,	correct	rejection	of	a	familiar	
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lure	 involves	 more	 discriminative	 demands	 than	 correct	 rejection	 of	 a	 novel	 lure.	 For	
example,	in	a	classical	three-steps	procedure	using	words	as	memoranda	(familiarization	
phase,	 study	phase	and	 test	phase),	Aberg	et	 al.	 (2001)	 (Expt.	 1)	 replicated	 the	novelty	
effect	and	showed	that	false	alarms	rates	for	familiar	words	(i.e.	words	presented	during	
familiarization	 but	 not	 at	 study)	 linearly	 increased	 with	 the	 number	 of	 presentations	
during	 familiarization.	 The	 Novelty	 effect	 can	 therefore	 be	 accounted	 for,	 at	 least	 to	
some	 extent,	 differential	 source	 discrimination	 demands	 placed	 on	 familiar	 vs.	 novel	
stimuli	during	recognition.	
Interestingly,	 the	memory	advantage	 for	novel	 items	has	not	been	 replicated	 in	elderly	
subjects.	Here,	an	advantage	of	prior	knowledge,	and	thus	stimulus	familiarity,	has	been	
found.	For	example,	Badham	&	Maylor	(2015)	showed	that	when	face-name	associations	
were	 congruent	 with	 prior	 knowledge,	 better	 subsequent	 memory	 was	 observed	 in	
young	and	elderly	subjects,	the	latter	being	more	sensitive	to	the	effect.	Similar	findings	
were	 reported	 with	 word	 pairs	 (Badham	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 These	 results	 are	 of	 utmost	
importance	since	aging	is	considered	as	disproportionally	targeting	associative	memory,	
which	has	been	also	demonstrated	with	 face-name	associations	 (i.e.	Associative	Deficit	
Hypothesis,	Naveh-Benjamin,	2000;	Naveh-Benjamin,	Guez,	Kilb,	&	Reedy,	2004).	
Surprisingly,	very	little	data	is	available	regarding	how	aging	alters	familiarity-	vs.	novelty-
based	 learning,	 whereas	 prior	 knowledge	 has	 been	 acknowledged	 as	 a	 powerful	
candidate	 to	 compensate	 the	 negative	 effects	 of	 aging	 on	 memory	 (e.g.	 Umanath	 &	
Marsh,	2014;	see	also	Bahrick,	Hall	&	Da	Costa,	2008).	Given	that	regions	of	the	MTL	have	
a	 differential	 susceptibility	 to	 aging,	with	 the	 hippocampus	 being	much	more	 affected	
that	 the	 parahippocampal	 gyrus	 in	 aging,	 and	 especially	 of	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 (e.g.	
Insausti	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 Raz	&	Rodrigue,	 2006),	 an	 interesting	 possibility	 is	 that	 familiarity	
detection	may	 prove	more	 age-resistant.	 In	 fact,	 some	 authors	 consider	 the	 perirhinal	
cortex	as	pertaining	to	an	explicit	learning	system	that	could	act	independently	from	the	
hippocampus,	as	long	as	the	memoranda	is	congruent	with	existing	knowledge	(Kumaran	
et	al.,	2016;	but	see	Fernández	&	Tendolkar,	2006).	Note	that	similar	proposals	have	been	
made	 for	 regions	 outside	 the	 MTL	 that	 are	 also	 less	 affected	 by	 aging,	 like	 the	
ventromedial	 prefrontal	 cortex	 (e.g.	 Van	 Kesteren	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 How	 prior	 knowledge	
could	 boost	 memory	 formation	 remains	 nonetheless	 poorly	 understood.	 For	 example,	
the	Levels-Of-Processing	account	(Craik	&	Lockhart,	 1972;	Lockhart	&	Craik,	 1991)	would	
predict	that	memory	for	items	should	increase	after	deeper	(i.e.	semantic)	processing	at	
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encoding,	 which	 would	 thus	 account	 for	 superior	 memory	 in	 the	 case	 of	 pre-existing	
conceptual	knowledge.	However,	the	extent	to	which	it	is	conceptual	processing	per	se	at	
encoding	that	is	responsible	for	the	effect,	or	simply	the	effect	of	superior	prior	exposure	
in	the	case	of	pre-existing	representations	(e.g.	Poppenk,	McIntosh,	Craik,	&	Moscovitch,	
2010b),	 or	 how	 well	 encoding	 and	 retrieval	 processes	 match	 together	 (i.e.	 along	 the	
Transfer	Appropriate	Processing	framework,	Morris	et	al.,	1977),	or	some	combination	of	
these	alternatives,	remains	unclear.	
In	summary,	separated	lines	of	research	have	established	that	both	stimulus	novelty	and	
stimulus	 familiarity	 are	 important	 learning	 enhancers.	 Importantly,	 novelty	 is	 often	
confounded	with	distinctiveness	or	isolation	effects,	and	familiarity	generally	comes	with	
additional	source	retrieval	demands	at	retrieval.	Little	effort	has	been	made	to	contrast	
novelty	 and	 familiarity	 in	 the	 same	 learning	 task,	 and	 available	 reports	 suggest	 an	
advantage	for	familiarity.	Whether	familiarity	or	novelty	benefits	are	preserved	in	aging,	
and	whether	 the	 effects	 extend	 to	 associative	memory	 is	 currently	 poorly	 understood.	
While	 some	 studies	 point	 towards	 a	 disproportionate	 benefit	 of	 familiarity	 (i.e.	 prior	
knowledge)	in	elderly,	the	underlying	mechanisms	are	largely	unknown.	In	addition,	since	
everyday	 memory	 formation	 and	 most	 of	 our	 social	 interactions	 critically	 rely	 on	
recognition	memory	for	people	across	various	contexts,	this	study	used	faces	and	visual	
scenes	as	stimuli.	Moreover,	because	human	beings	have	a	high	degree	of	expertise	for	
face	 recognition,	 the	use	of	 faces	 allowed	us	 to	 avoid	 inter-individual	 variability	 due	 to	
distinct	 levels	 of	 pre-experimental	 familiarity	 with	 other	 materials	 such	 as	 objects,	 or	
words.	 Given	 the	 available	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 both	 familiarity	 and	 novelty	 could	
enhance	recollection-based	recognition	memory,	we	particularly	focused	on	this	process	
by	using	a	source	memory	paradigm.	
	
In	 the	 present	 study,	 our	 aims	were	 therefore	 three-folds.	 First,	we	 aimed	 to	 contrast	
novel	or	familiar	materials	within	the	same	associative	learning	task	to	find	out	which	one	
better	 improve	 long-term	 memory	 formation.	 Second,	 the	 question	 we	 addressed	 is	
whether	 Novelty	 /	 Familiarity	 effects	 are	 age-resistant,	 mainly	 focusing	 on	 associative	
memory	 formation.	 Third,	 we	 aimed	 at	 testing	 the	 hypothesis	 derived	 from	 the	 LOP	
framework	 that	 memory	 advantage	 for	 familiar	 stimuli	 would	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	
semantic	 processing	 at	 encoding.	 To	 this	 end,	 we	 contrasted	 two	 kinds	 of	 prior	
knowledge:	 experimental	 prior	 knowledge	 resulting	 from	 repeated	 familiarization	with	
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the	material	 and	 pre-experimental	 prior	 knowledge	 resulting	 from	 long-term	 semantic	
knowledge	about	famous	faces.	
	
Materials	&	methods	
	
Participants	
	
66	 healthy	 participants	were	 screened	 to	 participate.	 The	 inclusion	 criteria	were	 i)	 age	
between	 25-75	 years	 old;	 ii)	 right-handedness;	 iii)	 French	native	 speaking;	 iv)	 education	
level	corresponding	to	at	 least	8	years	of	 formal	schooling;	v)	able	to	provide	a	written	
informed	 consent.	 The	 exclusion	 criteria	 were	 i)	 any	 medical	 condition	 susceptible	 to	
interfere	with	cognition;	ii)	any	medical	history	of	neurological	or	psychiatric	condition;	iii)	
any	active	medication	susceptible	to	interfere	with	cognition;	 iv)	any	sensorial	 limitation	
incompatible	 with	 the	 experimental	 tasks;	 v)	 presence	 of	 any	 legal	 protection;	 vi)	
impaired	 global	 cognition	 as	 assessed	 with	 the	 Mattis	 Dementia	 Rating	 Scale	 (Mattis,	
1973)	 and	 the	 MMSE	 (Folstein,	 1975)	 by	 reference	 with	 available	 normative	 data;	 vii)	
impaired	episodic	memory	as	assessed	by	the	delayed	recall	part	of	the	Logical	Memory	
subtest	 of	 the	Wechsler	Memory	 scale	 (3rd	 Ed.);	 viii)	 scores	 above	 the	 age-	 and	 genre-
adjusted	available	cut-offs	at	the	Beck	Depression	Inventory	(BDI-II,	Beck	et	al.,	1996)	or	
at	the	State-Trait	Anxiety	 Inventory	(STAI,	A&B,	Spielberger	et	al.,	 1983).	The	study	was	
approved	by	the	ethics	committee	of	Rennes	University	Hospital,	and	was	registered	 in	
the	 Clinical	 Trial	 Database	 (EPMR-MA	 study	 2014-A01123-44).	 11	 participants	 had	 to	 be	
excluded	 due	 to	 abnormal	 subjective	 levels	 of	 anxiety	 (2)	 or	 depression	 (3);	 abnormal	
global	 cognition	 (4);	 or	 impaired	 memory	 (2),	 thus	 leaving	 with	 55	 participants	 finally	
included	 in	 the	 study.	 Importantly,	 as	 detailed	 below,	 every	 participant	 underwent	 an	
extensive	 neuropsychological	 assessment	 lasting	 3	 hours,	 thus	 allowing	 to	 ensure	 that	
none	 presented	 with	 detectable	 cognitive	 deficits.	 All	 participants	 were	 paid	 for	 their	
time.	
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Stimuli	
	
Selection	of	faces	stimuli	
Given	the	high	 inter-individual	variability	when	 it	comes	to	knowledge	about	celebrities,	
an	extensive	pilot	phase	was	 required.	A	 series	of	 357	unique	pictures	of	 famous	 faces	
and	208	pictures	of	unknown	faces	was	taken	from	the	web.	A	particular	attention	was	
paid	to	the	unknown	pictures	so	that	they	“looked”	like	famous	faces	pictures	in	terms	of	
resolution,	 light,	 and	global	appearance.	Considering	 that	a	 large	variability	 is	expected	
again	 for	which	 view	 of	 a	 given	 celebrity	 can	 be	most	 likely	 to	 yield	 identification,	we	
further	selected	from	2	to	5	different	pictures	for	each	famous	face.	This	yielded	a	total	of	
1109	 photographs	 of	 faces.	 Each	 pictures	was	 cropped	 to	 keep	 only	 the	 face	 features,	
then	 converted	 to	 greyscale	 image	 and	 normalized	 for	 size	 (250	 pixels	 width)	 and	
luminance	 with	 house	 made	MatLab	 scripts.	 Then,	 a	 Google	 form	was	 built	 to	 gather	
familiarity	 judgments	 for	 each	 face	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 4-alternate	 forced	 choice	
questionnaire:	1=	“I	have	never	seen	that	face”;	2=	“I	think	I	have	seen	that	face	before,	
but	I’m	not	sure”;	3=	“I	have	already	seen	that	face”;	4=	“I	have	already	seen	that	face,	
and	I	know	the	name,	the	occupation	or	both”.	86	subjects	answered	the	form,	and	none	
participated	 in	 the	present	 experiment.	 Famous	 faces	 yielding	 ratings	of	 1,	 2	 or	 3	were	
discarded,	as	were	Unknown	faces	with	 ratings	of	2,	3	or	4.	We	considered	a	cut-off	of	
90%	 for	 the	 across-subjects	 consistency.	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 selection	of	N=132	 famous	
faces	and	N=187	unknown	faces	after	matching	as	closely	as	possible	for	sex,	estimated	
age,	 race,	 emotional	 expression,	 hair	 colour,	 and	 the	 presence	 /	 absence	 of	 glasses	 or	
earrings.	Furthermore,	we	considered	the	findings	of	distinct	 fame	 judgments	for	some	
famous	faces	depending	on	the	subjects’	age,	yielding	a	subset	of	famous	faces	fulfilling	
the	above	criteria	 in	participants	aged	50	years	old	or	more,	 another	 subset	of	 famous	
faces	 correctly	 identified	 by	 participants	 aged	 under	 50	 years	 old,	 and	 a	 last	 subset	 of	
famous	faces	that	did	not	depend	on	age.	
From	this	pool,	we	 randomly	drew	6	series	of	58	 famous	and	 116	unknown	 faces	 to	be	
used	 as	 target	 and	 distractor	 items	 in	 the	 experiment.	 Then,	 two	 landscape	 coloured	
photographs	 were	 gathered	 from	 the	 web	 (720x484	 pixels),	 one	 representing	 the	
countryside	 and	 the	 other	 one	 a	 beach.	 They	 were	 free	 of	 any	 human	 character	 or	
manufactured	or	 living	object.	We	then	used	custom	scripts	to	generate	all	the	possible	
combinations	 between	 a	 face	 and	 one	 of	 the	 two	 landscapes	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 visual	
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stimuli	with	the	face	displayed	at	the	centre	of	the	landscape.	For	each	participant	of	the	
study,	 one	 of	 the	 six	 series	 was	 randomly	 drew,	 and	 32	 famous	 faces	 as	 well	 as	 64	
unknown	faces	were	randomly	chosen	to	serve	as	targets,	while	26	famous	faces	and	52	
unknown	faces	were	chosen	as	distractors.	
	
General	study	design	
	
Each	 participant	 underwent	 two	 testing	 sessions,	 separated	 by	 a	 maximum	 30	 days	
interval.	 The	 first	 session	 was	 a	 screening	 session	 involving	 an	 extensive	
neuropsychological	 assessment.	 The	 second	 session	 was	 the	 experimental	 session	
divided	in	4	distinct	phases.	
List	of	tests	from	the	screening	session	 Description/Reference	
f-NART	 French	version	of	the	National	Adult	Reading	Test;	
Mackinnon	&	Mulligan,	2005	
MDRS,	max=144	 Mattis	Dementia	Rating	Scale	
MMSE	 Mini	Mental	State	Examination	
Logical	Memory,	I	 Wechsler	Memory	Scale,	3rd	Ed.	
Logical	Memory,	II	 Wechsler	Memory	Scale,	3rd	Ed.	
DMS-48,	Pictures	 2	alternate	forced	choice	recognition	memory	for	colourful	meaningless	(16)	&	
meaningful	(32)	clip	arts	after	a	3-minutes	delay	Barbeau	et	al.,	2004	
DMS-48,	Words	 2	alternate	forced	choice	recognition	memory	for	words	(32)	and	
pseudowords	(16)	after	a	3-minutes	delay	
WMF	(50	faces)	 2	alternate	forced	choice	Immediate	recognition	memory	for	50	unknown	
faces	
Verbal	Fluency,	Letter	R,	90	sec.	 Cardebat	et	al.,	1990	
Verbal	Fluency,	Category	Fruits,	90	sec.	 “	
Graphical	Fluency	(Nb	unique	drawings,	3	min.)	 -	
Stroop	Test,	Naming	(sec.)	 Chatelois	et	al.,	1993	
Stroop	Test,	Reading	(sec.)	 “	
Stroop	Test,	Inhibition	(sec.)	 “	
Stroop	Test,	Flexibility	(sec.)	 “	
TMT-A	(sec.)	 Tombaugh	et	al.,	2004	
TMT-B	(sec.)	 “	
Oral	naming	(max	=	80)	 80	line	drawings;	Deloche	&	Hannequin,	19	
Limb	praxis	(max=	23	gestures)	 Mahieux	et	al.,	2011	
QAM	(mean	score)	 Memory	Self	Assessment	Questionnaire,	
Van	der	Linden	&	Coyette,	1997	
STAY-A	 Spielberger	et	al.,	1983	
STAY-B	 “	
BDI-II	 Beck	et	al.,	1996	
Table	1.	List	of	tests	used	in	the	screening	session.	DMS=Delayed-matching-to-sample;	
WMF=Warrington	Memory	for	Faces;	QAM=	“Questionnaire	d’Autoévaluation	de	la	Mémoire”.	
The	 first	 phase	 aimed	 at	 familiarizing	 participants	 with	 a	 series	 of	 32	 unknown	 faces,	
which	were	repeatedly	presented	associated	with	an	occupation.	
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Participants	 then	chose	one	8-minutes	cartoon	 (among	3)	 for	 immediate	viewing.	Then	
they	 had	 to	 complete	 the	 “Questionnaire	 d’Auto-Evaluation	 de	 la	 Mémoire”	 (Van	 der	
Linden,	Wyns	&	Coyette,	1997)	lasting	15	minutes.	
The	 second	 phase	 then	 started.	 It	 was	 an	 explicit	 encoding	 phase	 where	 participants	
were	asked	to	learn	face-scene	associations	for	32	famous	faces,	32	familiarized	unknown	
faces	 (seen	 in	 the	 first	 phase),	 and	 32	 unknown	 faces	 never	 presented	 before.	 As	
mentioned	above,	each	face	was	randomly	paired	with	the	“countryside”	or	the	“beach”	
landscape	photograph,	with	an	equal	probability	for	each	subset	of	faces	(i.e.	16	beach,	16	
countryside	pairings).	
Participants	 then	 chose	one	8-minutes	 cartoon	 (among	 3)	 for	 immediate	 viewing,	with	
the	instruction	of	choosing	a	different	video	than	the	previous	one.	
The	third	phase	started	and	involved	the	recognition	memory	test	detailed	below.	
After	 the	 memory	 test,	 participants	 watched	 the	 last	 8-minutes	 cartoon	 before	
completing	the	fourth	phase.	
The	 fourth	 phase	 was	 a	 familiarity	 judgment	 task	 where	 all	 the	 stimuli	 used	 in	 the	
experiment	were	shown	again	to	the	participants.	They	had	to	decide	whether	each	face	
was	famous	or	not,	being	instructed	to	respond	“Yes”	only	when	they	could	give	at	least	
the	name	and	the	occupation	of	the	person.	
	
Procedure	
	
The	 tests	 used	 in	 the	 first	 session	 are	 listed	 in	 Table	 1.	 Figure	 illustrates	 the	 general	
procedure	for	the	second	session.	
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Figure	45.	Overview	of	the	memory	task	design.	In	the	familiarization	phase,	participants	were	
instructed	to	judge	whether	the	occupation	was	plausible	for	the	face	displayed,	each	face-
occupation	combination	was	repeated	three	times;	in	the	Study	phase,	subjects	had	to	imagine	a	
situation	where	they	would	meet	the	person	in	the	background	scene,	then	judge	the	pleasantness	
of	the	situation;	in	the	Recognition	phase,	each	face	was	presented	first	for	Old/New	judgment	
followed	by	a	confidence	rating,	then	for	each	“Old”	response,	subjects	had	to	make	a	2	alternate	
forced	choice	source	judgment	followed	by	a	confidence	rating;	during	the	Familiarity	judgment	
phase	(not	shown)	all	the	faces	(i.e.	targets	and	foils)	where	presented	one	at	a	time	and	the	
subjects	had	to	make	a	“famous/unknown”	judgment.	PEK=	Pre-Experimental	Knowledge	(Princess	
Diana	is	depicted	on	the	middle	top	picture);	EK=Experimental	Knowledge;	Nov=Novelty.	
During	the	experimental	session,	participants	were	installed	comfortably	in	a	quiet	room,	
approximately	 80	 cm	 from	 a	 laptop	 screen,	 and	 provided	 their	 responses	 with	 the	
keyboard.	 Stimuli	 were	 presented	 electronically	 using	 the	 E-Prime	 2.0	 software	
(Psychology	Software	Tools,	Pittsburgh,	PA).	
For	 the	 familiarization	 phase,	 each	 unknown	 face	 was	 displayed	 at	 the	 center	 of	 the	
screen	 on	 a	 black	 background,	 and	 the	 name	 of	 an	 occupation	 chosen	 randomly	 (but	
face-occupation	 associations	 were	 pre-determined,	 so	 that	 they	 remained	 constant	
across	participants)	was	written	on	the	top	of	the	screen.	Participants	were	instructed	to	
provide	 a	plausibility	 judgment	 for	 the	 face-occupation	 combination	 (i.e.	 can	 you	easily	
imagine	this	person	being	a	Teacher?).	Each	stimulus	was	presented	three	times,	with	a	
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minimum	lag	of	5	items	between	two	repeated	trials.	A	trial	started	with	a	white	fixation	
cross	 for	 500	 ms,	 that	 became	 red	 for	 250	 ms	 (warning	 the	 subject	 about	 the	
presentation	of	the	next	stimulus),	then	the	face-occupation	pair	was	presented	for	2500	
ms.	The	response	options	then	appeared	and	remained	below	the	face	for	2000	ms,	and	
the	 subject	 had	 to	 make	 his	 response	 during	 this	 interval,	 pressing	 one	 key.	 A	 white	
fixation	 cross	 then	 was	 displayed	 during	 250	ms	 before	 the	 next	 trial	 started.	 The	 96	
critical	 trials,	 plus	 4	 buffer	 trials	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 session	 (discarded	 for	 further	
analysis),	were	therefore	administrated	for	a	total	duration	time	of	about	6	minutes.	
For	 the	 study	 phase,	 participants	 were	 instructed	 that	 they	 would	 see	 faces	 upon	 a	
landscape	depicting	a	countryside	or	a	beach,	and	that	they	would	have	to	 imagine	the	
situation	where,	while	walking	in	the	presented	scene,	they	would	encounter	the	person.	
Subjects	were	asked	to	rate	the	pleasantness	of	such	situation,	on	a	4-points	rating	scale	
from	1=	“very	pleasant”	to	4=	“very	unpleasant”.	Each	trial	started	with	a	500	+	250	ms	
fixation	 cross	 as	 above,	 then	 the	 face-scene	 association	 was	 displayed	 for	 3000	 ms,	
before	the	rating	scale	appeared	below	the	face	for	another	3000	ms,	which	was	the	time	
deadline	to	give	an	answer	by	pressing	the	corresponding	key	(i.e.	1,	2,	3	or	4).	Then,	a	250	
ms	 Inter	 Stimulus	 Interval	was	 displayed	 as	 above,	 before	 the	 next	 trial.	 A	 total	 of	 96	
trials	 were	 presented,	 pertaining	 to	 one	 of	 three	 experimental	 conditions:	 1)	 in	 the	
“Novelty”	 (Nov)	 condition,	 32	 unknown,	 completely	 novel	 faces	 were	 used;	 2)	 in	 the	
“Experimental	Knowledge”	(EK)	condition,	 the	32	unknown	faces	previously	 repeatedly	
presented	 in	 the	 familiarization	 phase	 were	 used;	 3)	 in	 the	 “Pre-Experimental	
Knowledge”	(PEK)	condition,	32	famous	faces	were	used.	5	buffer	trials	were	used	at	the	
beginning	 of	 the	 session	 and	were	 not	 analyzed.	 This	 phase	 of	 the	 experiment	 lasted	
about	7	minutes.	
	
For	 the	 test	phase,	participants	were	 instructed	that	 they	would	have	to	 recognize	 the	
face-scene	associations	presented	 in	 the	 study	phase	 in	a	 four-steps	 testing	procedure.	
First,	they	were	explained	that	they	would	see	a	face	that	could	be	either	Old	or	New	by	
reference	to	the	study	phase.	They	were	asked	to	provide	first	an	Old/New	judgment	on	
that	 face.	 Then,	 they	 had	 to	 rate	 their	 confidence	 for	 their	 Old/New	 response	 on	 a	 3-
points	scale:	1=	“I	am	certain	the	face	was	/	was	not	in	the	study	phase”;	2=	“I	think	the	
face	was	/	was	not	in	the	study	phase,	but	I	am	not	sure”;	3=	“My	response	was	a	guess”.	
For	 each	 “Old”	 response,	 subjects	were	 showed	 the	 face	 again	 together	with	 the	 two	
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landscapes	 used	 in	 the	 study	 phase.	 They	 had	 to	make	 a	 source	 judgment	 by	 pressing	
either	“1”	of	they	thought	the	face	was	presented	in	the	countryside	landscape	or	“2”	for	
the	beach	landscape.	Finally,	they	were	again	asked	to	provide	a	confidence	judgment	on	
their	 source	 memory	 response.	 This	 phase	 of	 the	 experiment	 lasted	 from	 35	 to	 50	
minutes.	
For	the	last	“familiarity	 judgment”	phase,	participants	were	instructed	that	they	would	
be	presented	all	 the	 faces	used	 in	 the	experiment.	 For	 each	 face,	 they	had	 to	 respond	
whether	or	not	the	face	was	famous.	They	were	explicitly	told	that	much	more	unknown	
than	famous	faces	would	be	presented.	They	also	were	asked	to	respond	“Famous”	only	
if	they	1)	were	sure	the	person	was	a	celebrity;	2)	could	provide	some	details	like,	at	least,	
the	name	and	the	occupation	of	the	person.	Stimulus	presentation	and	responses	were	
self-paced.	The	experimenter	 randomly	controlled	 this	after	“Famous”	 responses	along	
the	test.	Whenever	a	“famous”	response	was	in	fact	not	associated	with	accurate	details,	
this	 was	 considered	 as	 an	 “unknown”	 response.	 Importantly,	 every	 item	 incorrectly	
sorted	was	excluded	from	further	analysis,	thus	leaving	only	“truly”	unknown	and	“truly”	
familiar	faces.	This	phase	generally	lasted	5-10	minutes.	
Importantly,	only	two	experimenters	administrated	all	tests,	and	the	same	experimenter	
always	administrated	the	two	test	sessions	for	a	given	participant.	
	
Analyses	
	
Recognition	memory	measures	
Item	 recognition	memory	 performance	 indices	 (faces	 only,	 Hits	 and	 False	 Alarm	 rates)	
were	 computed	 within	 the	 signal	 detection	 theory	 framework.	 Following	 Verde,	
Macmillan,	&	Rotello,	(2006),	Az	was	computed	to	estimate	sensitivity,	namely,	how	well	
participants	discriminated	between	targets	and	distractors.	Accordingly,	we	computed	a	
non-parametric	 index	of	bias	B"	 after	Grier,	 (1971).	 These	 indices	were	preferred	 to	 the	
parametric	 d’	 and	 C	 indices	 of	 sensitivity	 and	 bias,	 respectively,	 for	 their	 superior	
robustness	to	the	underlying	assumptions	regarding	responses	distributions	(Stanislaw	&	
Todorov,	1999;	Verde	et	al.,	2006),	and	corresponding	formulae	were	implemented	using	
		 227	
a	dedicated	Excel	workbook	(Gaetano,	J.	M.	(2017).	Signal	detection	theory	calculator	1.2	
[Excel	 workbook	 downloaded	 from	
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Justin_Gaetano2/]).	
Moreover,	we	will	 assess	 the	 subjective	 aspects	of	 recognition	memory	by	dissociating	
between	Hit	 rates	 associated	with	 High,	Middle	 or	 Low	 (guess)	 confidence	 levels.	 The	
first	are	typically	used	as	proxies	for	recollection	(Yonelinas,	2002).	
Associative	 learning	 performance	 was	 estimated	 through	 source	 memory	 accuracy.	
Source	memory	refers	to	the	ability	to	correctly	recall	the	context	that	was	associated	to	
the	 target	 item	 at	 study.	 Here,	 we	 measured	 source	 memory	 as	 the	 conditional	
probability	of	a	Source	Hit	 (i.e.	giving	a	correct	source	 response)	given	an	 Item	Hit	 (i.e.	
giving	a	correct	“Old”	response	to	a	 target	 face),	which	 is	a	classical	behavioural	proxy	
for	associative	memory	accuracy	(Cooper,	Greve,	&	Henson,	2017).	
	
Statistical	analyses	
Repeated-measures	ANOVAs	were	ran	to	explore	whether	prior	knowledge	(EK	vs.	PEK)	
or	Novelty	 altered	 sensitivity	 (item	memory),	 bias,	 associative	memory	 (item	+	 context	
memory),	both	across	and	between	age	groups.	Parametric	statistical	 testing	was	used	
when	 the	 assumptions	 of	 normality	 and	 variance	 equality	 were	 met.	 Otherwise,	 non-
parametric	methods	were	used.	In	addition	to	null	hypothesis	significance	testing,	we	ran	
our	 inferential	statistical	analyses	with	a	Bayesian	framework.	This	choice	was	made	on	
the	following	grounds.	Given	our	first	aim	of	discriminating	whether	novelty	or	familiarity	
improves	 learning,	 the	 Bayesian	 approach	 allowed	 interpreting	 the	 alternative	
hypothesis.	Moreover,	 the	acknowledged	 limitations	 in	 the	use	and	 interpretation	of	p-
values	(see	Jarosz	&	Wiley,	2014;	Krawczyk,	2015;	Wagenmakers,	2007)	were	a	concern	to	
us,	 and	 we	 aimed	 at	 favouring	 the	 methods	 that	 are	 increasingly	 recommended	 in	
psychological	 sciences	 and	 that	 are	 less	 dependent	 on	 the	 underlying	 assumptions	
regarding	sampling	distribution.	For	each	relevant	statistical	testing,	a	Bayes	Factor	(BF)	
was	 thus	 computed.	 The	 BF10	 provides	 an	 odds	 ratio	 for	 the	 alternative	 vs.	 null	
hypotheses,	with	 values	 <	 1	 favouring	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 and	 values	 >	 1	 favouring	 the	
alternative	 hypothesis.	 To	 give	 a	 concrete	 example,	 an	 estimated	 BF10	 of	 0.4	 would	
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indicate	that	data	are	2.5	times	more	likely	to	occur	under	the	null	hypothesis	than	under	
the	alternate	hypothesis,	and	 it	 is	generally	agreed	that	BF10	values	above	3	favours	the	
alternative	hypothesis,	while	BF10	values	above	30	are	 taken	as	very	 strong	support	 for	
the	 alternative	 hypothesis	 (Jeffreys,	 1961;	 Rouder,	 Speckman,	 Sun,	 Morey,	 &	 Iverson,	
2009).	To	alleviate	the	text,	the	report	of	Bayesian	statistical	values	was	favoured.	
All	 statistical	 analyses	 were	 performed	 using	 the	 JASP	 software	 (https://jasp-stats.org,	
JASP	Team	(2018).	JASP	(Version	0.9)	[Computer	software]).	
	
Results	
	
Table	2	presents	all	the	background	data	for	the	three	groups	of	participants,	showing	a	
close	matching	across	age	groups	for	sex,	education,	and	global	cognition.	The	extensive	
neuropsychological	 assessment	 confirmed	 the	 absence	 of	 impairment	 in	 memory,	
executive	 functions,	 language,	 limb	 praxis,	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 significant	 levels	 of	
anxiety,	depression	or	memory	complaints.	As	expected,	we	found	that	elderly	subjects	
presented	 impaired	 verbal	 memory	 and	 speed	 of	 processing,	 by	 comparison	 with	 the	
youngest	 subjects.	 These	 results	 suggest	 that	 our	 samples	 were	 well	 matched	 across	
several	 cognitive,	 mood	 and	 meta-memory	 measures	 as	 well	 as	 global	 cognition	 and	
background	education.	Furthermore,	these	data	make	it	unlikely	that	our	elderly	sample	
include	subjects	with	subtle	cognitive	decline.	
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Young	
N=21	
Middle-
Aged	
N=15	
Elderly	
N=15	
BF10	 p	value	
Demographics	
Age	 32.1	(5.0)	 47.6	(6.7)	 65.5	(3.4)	 7.1e19	 <0.001	
Education	(years)	 14.8	(2.5)	 13.3	(1.4)	 13.4	(3.2)	 0.639	 0.153	
Female:Male	 9:12	 9:6	 8:6	 0.272	 0.584	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Global	cognition	
VIQ	(f-NART)	 108.5	(8.0)	 107.5	(5.9)	 107.5	(6.6)	 0.169	 0.871	
MDRS,	max=144	 142.3	(1.6)	 142.5	(1.3)	 141.9	(1.6)	 0.240	 0.526	
MMSE	 29.2	(0.9)	 28.7	(1.5)	 28.7	(0.9)	 0.369	 0.307	
Memory	
Logical	Memory,	I	 47.1	(8.8)	 45.7	(7.0)	 39.3	(8.9)	 2.472	 0.025	
Logical	Memory,	II	 30.0	(5.7)	 28.0	(4.9)	 20.9	(7.6)	 101.733	 <0.001	
DMS-48,	Pictures	 47.4	(1.0)	 47.0	(1.6)	 46.3	(1.8)	 0.844	 0.101	
DMS-48,	Words	 42.8	(3.3)	 42.1	(2.9)	 40.7	(5.1)	 0.406	 0.266	
WMF	(50	faces)	 43.7	(4.4)	 45.1	(2.8)	 42.6	(3.5)	 0.525	 0.181	
Executive	Functions	
Verbal	Fluency,	Letter	R,	90	sec.	 18.3	(5.9)	 18.2	(6.1)	 18.3	(6.0)	 0.154	 0.999	
Verbal	Fluency,	Category	Fruits,	90	sec.	 22.5	(5.3)	 20.7	(4.6)	 18.1	(4.5)	 1.629	 0.040	
Graphical	Fluency	(Nb	unique	drawings,	3	min.)	 24.2	(12.1)	 41.3	(26.7)	 28.9	(24.2)	 1.098	 0.071	
Stroop	Test,	Naming	(sec.)	 59.9	(13.7)	 57.7	(10.0)	 64.4	(14.8)	 0.375	 0.292	
Stroop	Test,	Reading	(sec.)	 41.2	(5.7)	 42.3	(12.7)	 42.9	(5.4)	 0.204	 0.688	
Stroop	Test,	Inhibition	(sec.)	 93.3	(29.1)	 97.3	(26.1)	 108.6	(28.3)	 0.515	 0.195	
Stroop	Test,	Flexibility	(sec.)	 105.3	(21.5)	 108.8	(32.6)	 127.7	(35.5)	 1.509	 0.047	
TMT-A	(sec.)	 23.6	(9.4)	 26.2	(7.8)	 35.8	(17.0)	 7.373	 0.007	
TMT-B	(sec.)	 48.9	(17.8)	 59.4	(18.7)	 79.4	(37.1)	 23.774	 0.002	
Language	&	limb	praxis	
Oral	naming	(max	=	80)	 79.3	(2.2)	 79.8	(0.6)	 79.3	(0.8)	 0.236	 0.548	
Limb	praxies	(max=	23	gestures)	 22.6	(0.6)	 22.4	(1.1)	 22.1	(0.9)	 0.491	 0.207	
Questionnaires	
QAM	(mean	score)	 2.2	(0.4)	 2.1	(0.4)	 2.3	(0.4)	 0.456	 0.268	
STAY-A	 28.1	(7.2)	 25.0	(5.0)	 28.0	(6.0)	 0.370	 0.293	
STAY-B	 37.6	(7.6)	 32.4	(7.3)	 35.6	(8.6)	 0.600	 0.158	
BDI-II	 4.4	(3.2)	 3.8	(3.8)	 5.1	(4.7)	 0.209	 0.639	
	
Table	2.	Demographics	&	Neuropsychological	background	of	the	51	participants	finally	included	in	
the	EPMR-MA	trial.	Acronyms	and	tests	description	are	detailed	in	Table	1.	
Among	the	55	subjects	who	were	successfully	screened,	4	were	further	excluded	due	to	
outlier	 scores	 (i.e.	 <-3	 s.d.)	 at	 the	 familiarity	 judgment	 test,	 thus	 leaving	 a	 total	 of	 51	
participants.	The	familiarity	judgment	phase	yielded	highly	accurate	scores	ranging	from	
80	to	99%	correct,	and	similarly	famous	faces	were	overall	well	 identified	as	famous	(81-
100%).	Importantly,	the	number	of	PEK	target	stimuli	did	not	differ	between	age	groups	
(BF10=0.349).	
Turning	 to	 recognition	memory,	global	accuracy	(Az)	across	prior	knowledge	conditions	
was	very	good,	ranging	from	0.77	to	0.99,	with	a	 large	variability	of	response	bias	(B”),	
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ranging	from	-0.76	to	0.62.	However,	Source	memory	assessment	yielded	performances	
ranging	from	38	to	71%	across	prior	knowledge	conditions,	suggesting	a	floor	effect	(i.e.	
chance	level	at	50%).	
Novelty	vs.	familiarity	effects	on	recognition	memory	
A	 main	 effect	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 was	 found	 on	 Az	 (BF10=2.148e25)	 but	 not	 on	 Source	
memory	 (BF10=0.110).	 This	 reflected	 the	 floor	 effect	 reported	 above,	 indeed	 a	 binomial	
test	 ran	 for	 each	 participant	 revealed	 that	 only	 10	 subjects	 (across	 prior	 knowledge	
conditions)	 performed	 significantly	 above	 chance.	 We	 will	 therefore	 focus	 on	 correct	
source	memory	 responses	 associated	with	 a	 high	 confidence	 level.	 Regarding	Az,	 post-
hoc	 testing	 showed	 that	 all	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions	 differed,	with	Novelty	 yielding	
the	 worst	 performance	 and	 PEK	 the	 best	 (Nov	 vs.	 EK,	 BF10=9.032e10;	 Nov	 vs.	 PEK,	
BF10=4.033e12;	 EK	 vs	 PEK,	 BF10=37.600)	 (see	 Figure	 46).	More	 Hits	were	 observed	 in	 the	
conditions	 with	 pre-existing	 knowledge	 (one-factor	 within-subjects	 ANOVA,	
BF10=3.929e30),	with	no	difference	between	PEK	and	EK	(BF10=0.159),	but	much	less	Hits	in	
the	Novelty	condition	(Nov	vs.	EK,	BF10=6.996e17;	Nov	vs.	PEK,	BF10=3.272e13).	By	contrast,	
EK	 and	Nov	 conditions	 yielded	more	 FAs	 than	 PEK	 (one-factor	within-subjects	 ANOVA,	
BF10>356000),	with	no	difference	between	Nov	and	EK	(BF10=0.154).	Finally,	response	bias	
also	 differed	 across	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions	 (one-factor	 within-subjects	 ANOVA,	
BF10=2.711e7),	mainly	due	to	a	more	liberal	bias	in	the	EK	vs.	Nov	conditions	(BF10=3.602e8),	
with	much	less	strong	evidence	for	difference	between	EK	&	PEK	(BF10=13.99)	and	Nov	&	
PEK	conditions	(BF10=15.91).	
	
	
Figure	46.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	recognition	memory,	across	all	participants.	%95ICs	are	
displayed.	
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Turning	to	source	memory,	again	we	found	a	strong	effect	of	prior	knowledge	conditions	
across	 participants	 (BF10=1.701e8).	 Here,	 PEK	 yielded	 the	 best	 performance	 but	 EK	 and	
Nov	 did	 not	 differ	 following	 post-hoc	 testing	 (Nov	 vs.	 EK,	 BF10=0.471;	 Nov	 vs.	 PEK,	
BF10=4.925e6;	 EK	 vs	 PEK,	 BF10>14300)	 (see	 Figure	 47).	 Importantly,	 this	 effect	 was	 not	
supported	when	considering	Middle-confidence	ratings	associated	with	accurate	source	
memory	responses	(BF10=1.979).	
	
	
Figure	47.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	source	memory,	across	all	participants.	Y-axis	shows	high-
confidence	correct	source	responses.	%95ICs	are	displayed.	
	
Finally,	we	considered	whether	prior	 knowledge	conditions	also	altered	 the	confidence	
associated	 with	 Hit	 responses	 (see	 Figure	 48	 &Figure	 49).	 High	 confidence	 Hits	 were	
strongly	 impacted	 by	 the	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions	 (BF10=3.798e21),	 and	 all	 post-hoc	
tests	favoured	the	alternative	hypothesis	(Nov<EK<PEK;	Nov	vs.	EK,	BF10=2.198e8;	Nov	vs.	
PEK,	BF10=3.489e15;	EK	vs	PEK,	BF10=3745).	Accordingly,	a	coherent	pattern	was	found	for	
Middle-confidence	 Hits,	 which	 were	 more	 frequent	 in	 the	 Novelty	 condition	
(BF10=2.388e19;	Nov>EK>PEK;	Nov	vs.	EK,	BF10=1.187e6;	Nov	vs.	PEK,	BF10=6.697e15;	EK	vs	
PEK,	BF10=3025).	Finally,	Low-confidence	Hits	similarly	were	more	frequent	for	Novel	than	
PEK	items,	with	much	milder	evidence	for	the	alternative	hypothesis	for	the	Novel	vs.	EK	
comparison,	 and	 evidence	 for	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 regarding	 the	 EK	 vs.	 PEK	 contrast	
(BF10=1090.311;	 Nov>EK=PEK;	 Nov	 vs.	 EK,	 BF10=23.655;	 Nov	 vs.	 PEK,	 BF10=30.852;	 EK	 vs	
PEK,	BF10=0.366).		
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Figure	48.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	the	subjective	aspects	of	recognition	memory	(confidence	
ratings),	across	all	participants.	%95ICs	are	displayed.	
	
This	 resulted	 in	 strong	 evidence	 for	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 an	 interaction	 between	 prior	
knowledge	 effect	 and	 confidence	 ratings	 (BF10=3.504e174):	 while	 the	 frequency	 of	 low-
confidence	 ratings	 did	 not	 differ	 across	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions,	middle-confidence	
and	high-confidence	ratings	were	differentially	affected	by	prior	knowledge.	Items	in	the	
Novelty	 condition	 yielded	 slightly	more	 high-	 than	middle-confidence	Hits	 (BF10=3.048),	
while	strong	evidence	was	found	for	more	high-	than	middle-confidence	Hits	 in	the	PEK	
(BF10=4.521e37)	 and	 EK	 (BF10=5.167e10)	 conditions.	 Moreover,	 EK	 yielded	 more	 middle-
confidence	ratings	than	PEK	(BF10>3000)	and	conversely,	PEK	yield	more	high-confidence	
ratings	than	EK	(BF10>3700).	
	
	
Figure	49.	Interaction	between	prior	knowledge	and	confidence	ratings	for	Hit	rates.	%95IC	are	
displayed.	
	
In	summary,	our	data	can	be	accounted	for	by	a	strong	effect	of	prior	knowledge	on	all	
the	 aspects	 of	 recognition	 memory.	 Existence	 of	 prior	 representations	 massively	
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improved	 item	 memory,	 confidence,	 and	 memory	 for	 the	 context	 as	 long	 as	 high-
confidence	 responses	 were	 considered	 for	 the	 latter.	 However,	 the	 raw	 measure	 of	
conditional	source	memory	showed	a	floor	effect	preventing	from	further	interpretation.	
Finally,	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions	 mattered	 for	 item	 memory,	 but	 not	 for	 source	
memory.	Indeed,	PEK	yielded	better	sensitivity	than	EK	due	to	lower	FAs	rates,	and	Hits	
were	 associated	 with	 far	 more	 high-confidence	 ratings	 and	 far	 less	 middle-	 or	 low-	
confidence	ratings	in	the	PEK	than	in	the	EK	condition.	
Age	effects	
In	 the	 next	 results	 section,	 we	will	 report	 on	 aging	 effects	 upon	 the	 prior	 knowledge	
impacts	described	above.	Regarding	sensitivity	(Az),	a	model	including	the	main	effect	of	
prior	knowledge	(BF10=2.142e25)	accounted	for	the	data	the	best,	since	models	using	Age,	
Age	and	Prior	knowledge	or	an	 interaction	did	not	 yield	higher	BF10	 (a	model	with	Age	
and	Prior	knowledge	yielded	a	BF10	of	5.943e24)	 (see	Figure	50).	 Importantly,	Age	on	 its	
own	was	unlikely	 to	have	any	 influence	 (BF10=0.138).	 The	pattern	of	 results	 reported	 in	
the	previous	section	for	the	Hit	&	FAs	rates	was	not	influenced	by	age	either	(BF10=0.106	
and	BF10=0.338,	 respectively),	while	 the	main	 effect	 of	 prior	 knowledge	was	 confirmed	
(BF10=3.507e30	 and	 BF10>358000,	 respectively).	 Finally,	 as	 before,	 response	 bias	 was	
influenced	 by	 prior	 knowledge	 (BF10=2.855e7)	 but	 age	 did	 not	 alter	 this	 result	
(BF10=0.100).	
	
Figure	50.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	recognition	memory	within	each	age	group.	%95ICs	are	
displayed.	
	
Elderly	 Middle-Aged	 Young	
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Turning	to	correct	source	memory	responses	associated	with	a	high	confidence,	we	also	
confirmed	 the	 main	 effect	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 (BF10=1.715e8)	 without	 effect	 of	 age	
(BF10=0.631).	The	pattern	was	again	similar	to	the	one	described	in	the	previous	section,	
after	post-hoc	testing	(see	Figure	51).	
	
Figure	51.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	source	memory,	within	each	age	group.	Y-axis	shows	high-
confidence	correct	source	responses.	%95ICs	are	displayed.	
	
Considering	 whether	 age	 affected	 the	 pattern	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 effects	 on	 the	
confidence	 associated	with	 Hit	 responses,	 we	 again	 found	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 null	
model,	 be	 it	 for	 High-,	 Middle-	 or	 Low-confidence	 Hits	 (BF10=0.117;	 BF10=0.108	 and	
BF10=0.172,	respectively)	(see	Figure	52).	
	
Figure	52.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	the	subjective	aspects	of	recognition	memory	(confidence	
ratings),	within	each	age	group.	%95ICs	are	displayed.	
	
Elderly	 Middle-Aged	 Young	
Elderly	 Middle-Aged	 Young	
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In	summary,	we	found	consistent	evidence	for	an	age-resistant	effect	of	prior	knowledge	
on	all	aspects	of	recognition	memory.	Due	to	a	floor	effect	for	source	memory	however,	
we	cannot	interpret	raw	performance	in	associative	memory	(i.e.	correct	source	memory	
responses),	but	it	is	worth	noting	that	such	responses,	when	associated	with	high	levels	
of	 confidence,	 were	 distributed	 similarly	 across	 Age	 groups	 and	 Conditions	 of	 prior	
knowledge.	Furthermore,	regarding	memory	for	 items	(i.e.,	 faces),	we	found	that	high-,	
middle-	 and	 low-confidence	 hits	 also	 were	 distributed	 similarly	 across	 Age	 groups	 and	
prior	 knowledge	 conditions.	 Finally,	 we	 could	 not	 find	 evidence	 for	 an	 interaction	
between	Age	and	Prior	knowledge	conditions	on	recognition.	
Correlation	analyses	
Finally,	 we	 were	 interested	 in	 how	 recognition	 memory	 performance	 for	 each	 prior	
knowledge	condition	was	related	to	more	standard	recognition	memory	measurements	
(e.g.	Warrington	Memory	 for	 Faces,	 “WMF”,	 and	 delayed	 logical	memory	 subtest,	 see	
Figure	53Figure	54).	This	was	because,	as	stated	in	the	Introduction	section,	we	believe	that	
when	 the	 amount	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 is	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 typical	 memory	
assessments,	we	might	miss	 an	 important	 aspect	of	patients’	 complaints	within	 clinical	
settings.		
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Figure	53.	Correlation	analysis.	Upper	panel	depicts	the	distribution	(notches	represent	%95CI	for	
the	median)	of	sensitivity	(Az)	scores	for	each	prior	knowledge	condition,	plotted	against	
performance	at	the	Warrington	Memory	for	Faces	test	as	shown	in	the	colormap.	Lower	panel	
shows	the	corresponding	regression	function,	yellow	asterisk	indicate	strong	evidence	for	a	
positive	correlation.	“WMF”=Warrington	Memory	test	for	Faces.	
	
We	 therefore	 computed	 Bayes	 factors	 associated	 to	 Pearson’s	 correlation	 coefficients	
under	an	alternative	hypothesis	of	a	positive	 relationship.	We	 found	strong	evidence	 in	
favour	 of	 the	 alternative	 hypothesis	 linking	 WMF	 to	 Az	 scores	 in	 the	 EK	 (r=0.547	
BF10>1200)	 condition,	 but	 evidence	 remained	much	weaker	 regarding	 Novelty	 and	 PEK	
conditions	 (r=0.362;	 BF10=8.965	 and	 r=0.355;	 BF10=7.821;	 respectively).	 By	 contrast,	 the	
delayed	score	at	the	logical	memory	subtest	was	related	to	EK	(r=0.524;	BF10=581.59)	and	
PEK	 (r=0.426;	 BF10=35.485)	 conditions,	 while	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 was	 supported	 in	 the	
Novelty	condition	(r=0.075;	BF10=0.280).	
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Figure	54.	Correlation	analysis.	Upper	panel	depicts	the	distribution	(notches	represent	%95CI	for	
the	median)	of	sensitivity	(Az)	scores	for	each	prior	knowledge	condition,	plotted	against	
performance	at	the	Logical	Memory	(Delayed)	subtest	of	the	Wechsler	Memory	Scale	as	shown	in	
the	colormap.	Lower	panel	shows	the	corresponding	regression	function,	yellow	asterisk	indicate	
strong	evidence	for	a	positive	correlation.	“LM”=	Logical	Memory.	
	
Discussion	
	
In	the	present	study,	we	investigated	the	explicit	learning	of	faces	in	visual	contexts	in	a	
lifespan	 perspective.	 Our	 aims	 were	 three-folds.	 First,	 we	 aimed	 at	 finding	 whether	
novelty	 or	 prior	 knowledge	 would	 improve	 recognition	 memory	 for	 items	 (faces)	 and	
items	 in	 context	 (face-scene	 combinations).	 Our	 second	 goal	 was	 to	 test	 how	 aging	
would	affect	the	findings.	Finally,	a	third	goal	was	to	test	a	core	prediction	from	the	LOP	
framework,	 namely	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 improves	 learning	 because	 of	 conceptual	
(semantic)	processing	at	encoding.	Our	main	 findings	can	be	summarized	as	 follows:	 1)	
recognition	 memory	 is	 improved	 for	 items	 carrying	 pre-existing	 representations	 by	
comparison	with	novel	stimuli;	2)	this	pattern	of	memory	improvement	is	age-resistant;	3)	
the	 nature	 of	 pre-existing	 representations	 matters,	 since	 faces	 carrying	 conceptual	
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representations	 yielded	 better	 memory	 for	 items	 than	 faces	 lacking	 conceptual	
representations	 but	 associated	 to	 experimental	 familiarity	 due	 to	 recent	 exposure.	We	
will	first	discuss	our	findings	across	participants,	before	the	impact	of	aging.	
	
Familiarity,	 not	 novelty,	 increases	 recognition	 memory	 for	 faces	 and	 face-scene	
associations	
Our	findings	that	familiarity	for	faces	increases	recognition	memory	are	in	line	with	prior	
studies	 (e.g.	Klatzky	&	Forrest,	 1984;	Bird	et	al.,	 2011;	Reder	et	al.,	 2013).	 In	 the	present	
experiment,	accuracy	was	improved	by	around	20%	on	average	when	contrasting	stimuli	
with	 or	 without	 prior	 knowledge.	 These	 results	 confirm	 that	 stimulus	 novelty	 per	 se	
cannot	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 learning	 enhancer,	 rather,	 in	 theories	 highlighting	 the	 role	 of	
novelty	detection,	the	key	factor	may	be	contextual	novelty,	 incongruence	or	 isolation	/	
distinctiveness	effects.	In	the	case	under	scrutiny	here	where	subjects	had	to	learn	new	
face-scene	 associations,	 the	 “Novelty	 encoding	 hypothesis”	 would	 have	 predicted	 an	
advantage	for	novel	stimuli,	thought	to	trigger	encoding	processes	in	long-term	memory.	
While	this	can	be	the	case	when	stimulus	novelty	is	defined	as	an	item	which	occurrence	
breaks	 prior	 expectations,	 it	 seems	 to	 be	 no	 longer	 verified	 for	 absolute,	 rather	 than	
relative,	 stimulus	novelty.	These	 results	are	of	great	matter	since	our	 task	design	could	
have	predicted	lower	performance	due	to	more	FAs	in	the	PEK	condition.	Indeed,	a	high	
degree	 of	 familiarity	 with	 famous	 faces	 together	 with	 the	 use	 of	 famous	 faces	 as	
distractors	could	have	led	to	more	false	alarms	in	the	PEK	condition	than	in	the	novelty	or	
EK	conditions.	At	test,	famous	faces	used	as	targets	and	foils	all	have	been	experienced	
before,	by	definition,	thus	requiring	at	least	some	source	monitoring	processing	(i.e.	did	I	
see	that	face	in	the	study	phase?	vs.	did	I	ever	see	that	face?).	By	contrast,	the	unknown	
faces	used	as	foils	 in	the	EK	and	Novelty	conditions	have	never	been	presented	before.	
This	 could	 have	 led	 subjects	 to	 increase	 their	 FAs	 rates	 for	 PEK	 items.	 Actually,	 we	
observed	the	opposite:	participants	made	much	less	FAs	for	famous	than	unknown	faces,	
which	accounted	 for	 their	higher	 sensitivity	 in	 that	condition.	One	possibility	 to	explain	
this	result	lies	in	the	idea	of	“elaborative	encoding”	(see	Baddeley,	2009)	and	“depth	of	
processing”,	as	suggested	in	the	LOP	framework	(Craik	&	Lockhart,	1972;	Craik	&	Tulving,	
1975;	 Lockhart	 &	 Craik,	 1990).	 At	 study,	 famous	 faces	 have	 triggered	 elaborative	
encoding,	 namely	 encoding	 of	 prior	 associations	 related	 to	 the	 famous	 faces,	 like	
previous	backgrounds	(scenes	or	other),	which	strengthens	the	memory	trace	by	making	
it	richer.	Furthermore,	famous	faces	should	have	been	processed	deeper	than	unknown	
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faces,	in	that	conceptual	(rather	than	perceptual)	processing	of	famous	faces	at	encoding	
results	 in	the	retrieval	of	multiple	facts,	attributes,	feelings,	etc.	related	to	the	subjects’	
knowledge	about	the	famous	face.	This	 is	thought	to	increase	the	distinctiveness	of	the	
trace,	 making	 it	 more	 resistant	 to	 interference	 (e.g.	 see	 Wixted,	 2004).	 Thus,	 better	
memory	 for	 stimuli	 associated	 with	 prior	 knowledge	 would	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 the	
cumulative	 benefits	 of	 elaborative	 encoding	 –	 enriching	 the	 trace	 –	 and	 deeper	
processing	 –	 increasing	 distinctiveness.	 Our	 findings	 of	 a	 lower	 FAs	 rate	 in	 the	 PEK	
condition	fits	well	with	the	idea	of	higher	distinctiveness	for	famous	faces.	
However,	at	variance	with	most	prior	studies	that	did	not	investigate	the	nature	of	prior	
knowledge	(but	see	Leveroni	et	al.,	2000;	Poppenk	et	al.,	2010;	Trinkler	et	al.,	2009),	here	
we	 contrasted	 entirely	 new	 faces	 to	 familiar	 faces	 resulting	 from	 either	 celebrity	 or	
experimental	 familiarization.	 Importantly,	 we	 found	 that	 items	 memory	 was	 also	
improved	for	items	carrying	“experimental	knowledge”	by	comparison	with	novel	stimuli.	
Moreover,	this	condition	yielded	the	same	degree	of	improvement	regarding	the	Hits	rate	
than	the	PEK	condition,	but	also	resulted	 in	more	FAs	than	for	the	famous	faces.	These	
findings	suggest	that	conceptual	processing	during	encoding	should	not	to	be	considered	
as	 the	 sole	 factor	 responsible	 for	 the	 familiarity	 advantage	 on	 recognition	 memory.	
Indeed,	 we	 believe	 that	 familiarization	 to	 unknown	 faces	 is	 unlikely	 to	 have	 triggered	
conceptual	(semantic)	processing	at	study.	The	familiarization	phase	 involved	 incidental	
repeated	 encoding	 of	 completely	 unknown	 faces,	 with	 no	 learning	 instructions.	 The	
subjects	had	to	make	subjective	judgments	regarding	whether	random	occupations	were	
plausible	 for	 unknown	 faces.	 Of	 course,	 the	 task	 itself	 may	 have	 involved	 some	
conceptual	processing,	but	 it	was	more	 likely	 related	 to	 the	subjects’	knowledge	about	
the	occupation,	 than	 to	 the	unknown	 faces	 further	 serving	as	memoranda	 in	 the	 study	
phase.	 Thus,	 we	 would	 argue	 that	 these	 faces	 have	 most	 likely	 been	 perceptually	
encoded	 during	 the	 familiarization	 phase,	 and	 again	 mainly	 perceptually	 encoded	 at	
study,	 rather	 than	 conceptually.	 Still,	 they	 yielded	 similar	Hits	 rates	 than	 famous	 faces,	
thus	extending	prior	work	with	different	materials	like	proverbs	(Poppenk	et	al.,	2010)	or	
personally	 known	 faces	 (Trinkler	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Obviously,	 the	 benefits	 of	 repetition	 on	
learning	 are	 expected	 here,	 but	what	 is	 less	 expected	 is	 that	 prior	 exposure	 results	 in	
similar	 improvement	 as	prior	 semantic	 knowledge.	 This	 is	 because	prior	 knowledge	 for	
famous	 faces	 results	 from	 countless	 exposures	 all	 along	 the	 lifetime,	 within	 countless	
contexts,	while	 prior	 knowledge	due	 to	 experimental	 familiarization	 results	 from	 three	
successive	presentations	in	the	same	context,	25	minutes	before	study.	
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The	 LOP	 framework	 would	 predict	 that	 since	 depth	 of	 processing	 is	 not	 equivalent	
between	 PEK	 and	 EK	 condition,	 the	 former	 should	 yield	 superior	 performance.	 In	 the	
theory,	this	is	because	semantic	processing	can	result	in	a	more	distinctive	memory	trace,	
as	 suggested	 above.	 However,	 still	 according	 to	 in	 the	 LOP	 framework,	 elaborative	
encoding	–	which	is	thought	to	act	independently	from	depth	of	processing	(Lockhart	&	
Craik,	1990)	–	can	occur	when	the	sensory	input	is	congruent	with	the	study	context	(in	a	
broad	 sense).	 In	 our	 study,	 subjects	were	 asked	 to	make	 a	 subjective	 judgment	 about	
how	well	a	background	scene	“fitted”	with	a	face.	Critically,	in	the	familiarization	phase,	
subjects	 were	 asked	 to	 make	 a	 subjective	 judgment	 about	 whether	 an	 occupation	
“fitted”	with	a	face.	Thus,	and	this	only	holds	for	the	EK	condition,	elaborative	encoding	
may	have	occurred	because	of	this	high	congruency	between	the	orienting	task	at	study	
and	previous	 knowledge	 about	 the	 familiarized	 faces.	 Then,	 an	 interpretation	 could	 be	
that	 both	 familiarized	 and	 famous	 faces	 have	 triggered	 elaborative	 encoding,	 but	 for	
different	reasons.	In	the	case	of	PEK,	it	may	have	resulted	from	the	congruency	between	
the	 orienting	 task	 and	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 previous	 situations	 were	 famous	 faces	 are	
encountered	 in	 several	 different	 background	 scenes.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 EK,	 elaborative	
encoding	 would	 have	 resulted	 from	 the	 congruency	 between	 the	 study	 and	 the	
familiarization	 phases.	 By	 contrast,	 only	 famous	 faces	 should	 have	 been	 deeply	
processed,	 resulting	 in	 higher	 distinctiveness	 as	 stated	 above.	 In	 fact,	 FAs	 rates	 were	
indeed	higher	for	EK	than	PEK	stimuli,	and	importantly,	it	did	not	differ	between	EK	and	
Novelty	condition,	strengthening	the	idea	that	processing	of	these	items	at	encoding	was	
rather	shallow.	
Thus,	the	LOP	framework	can	account	for	our	findings	as	long	as	one	assumes	that	PEK	
and	 EK	 differentially	 affect	 depth	 of	 processing,	 which	many	would	 acknowledge,	 but	
also	 that	 these	 kinds	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 similarly	 yields	 some	 degrees	 of	 elaborative	
encoding.	This	last	assumption	seems	harder	to	sustain	since	we	miss	a	way	to	measure	
the	concept	of	“elaborative	encoding”.	
One	 way	 to	 move	 forward	 would	 therefore	 be	 to	 consider	 whether	 prior	 knowledge	
affects	 not	 only	 memory	 for	 items,	 but	 memory	 for	 the	 context	 as	 well.	 In	 fact,	
elaborative	 encoding	 is	 supposed	 to	 enrich	 the	 memory	 trace,	 so	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	
famous	 faces	 that	have	been	experienced	within	countless	prior	experiences,	 the	 trace	
should	be	far	more	strengthened	than	for	familiarized	faces	with	only	one	single	previous	
context	 (e.g.	 see	 Zion-Golumbic,	 Kutas,	 &	 Bentin,	 2010).	 If	 we	 accept	 that	 trace	
enrichment	improves	memory	by	providing	additional	cues	for	retrieval,	we	can	suppose	
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that	the	study	context	should	have	been	better	integrated	to	the	memory	in	the	case	of	
famous	 faces.	 This	 in	 turn	 would	 predict	 better	 source	 memory,	 as	 previously	 shown	
(Reder	et	al.,	2013).	However,	we	found	mixed	evidence	for	this	hypothesis.	On	the	one	
hand,	it	was	not	supported	by	the	findings	of	equivalent	high-confidence	source	memory	
accuracy	 in	 EK	 and	 PEK	 conditions.	 While	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 prior	
knowledge	do	extend	to	memory	for	the	context,	not	only	to	item	memory,	it	does	not	
support	the	idea	that	more	elaborative	encoding	is	expected	for	famous	than	familiarized	
faces.	 Unfortunately,	 our	 task	 proved	 too	 hard	 and	 yielded	 a	 floor	 effect	 for	 source	
memory,	 which	 is	 a	 main	 limitation	 of	 this	 experiment	 and	 prevents	 from	 further	
interpretation	of	source	memory	accuracy	findings.	On	the	other	hand,	support	 for	this	
account	 in	 our	 experiment	 comes	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 confidence	 ratings	 for	 Hits	 and	
correct	source	memory	judgments.	Many	prior	studies	have	used	high-confidence	Hits	as	
a	proxy	for	recollection-based	recognition	(see	Yonelinas,	2002).	Here,	we	found	that	PEK	
and	 EK	 generally	 yielded	 more	 confident	 Hits,	 and	 more	 specifically	 we	 reported	 an	
interaction	 between	 confidence	 and	 prior	 knowledge	whereby	 PEK	 yielded	more	 high-
confidence	 Hits	 than	 EK,	 while	 the	 reverse	 was	 true	 for	 middle-confidence	 Hits.	 It	
therefore	 seems	 possible	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 matters	 regarding	
subjective	recollection-based	retrieval,	with	a	more	specific	advantage	of	PEK.	How	this	
differential	impact	of	PEK	vs.	EK	on	subjective	recollection	could	be	accounted	for?	
An	interesting	possibility	here	is	related	to	the	idea	that	binding	a	face	to	a	context	could	
be	easier	when	pre-existing	representations	are	associated	with	the	face	than	when	the	
face	is	entirely	novel.	This	would	be	due	to	a	differential	involvement	of	working	memory	
resources	 for	 unknown	 vs.	 familiar	 stimuli	 (Reder	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Reder,	 Paynter,	 Diana,	
Ngiam,	 &	 Dickison,	 2007).	 Stimuli	 with	 long-term	 memory	 representations	 would	 be	
easier	to	bind	to	a	new	context	because	such	relational	binding	would	need	less	working	
memory	 resources.	 This	 hypothesis	 also	 echoes	prior	 proposals	 to	 explain	 the	memory	
advantage	of	primed	vs.	unprimed	words	in	a	recognition	memory	task	(Gagnepain	et	al.,	
2008;	 2011).	 Here,	 the	 idea	was	 that	 priming	would	 result	 in	 the	 free	 up	 of	 attentional	
resources,	 in	turn	allowing	for	a	more	thorough	processing	of	the	context.	In	that	case,	
like	 in	 the	Reder	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 study,	 prior	 representations	 in	 long-term	memory	 (either	
due	 to	 priming	 or	 to	 explicit	 prior	 knowledge)	 thus	 yielded	 a	 higher	 probability	 of	
recollection-based	 retrieval.	 It	 could	 therefore	be	 the	case	 that	 in	our	 task,	a	 large	pre-
existing	 associative	network	of	 knowledge	 (i.e.	 PEK)	has	 allowed	more	 attentional	 and	
working	memory	 resources	 to	 be	 allocated	 to	 binding	 operations	 than	 a	more	 limited,	
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mainly	 perceptually-based,	 knowledge	 resulting	 from	 experimental	 familiarization.	 We	
will	aim	at	addressing	this	possibility	in	the	next	experiment.	
	
Prior	knowledge	benefits	are	age-resistant	
One	 important	 goal	 of	 this	 study	was	 to	 test	 whether	 aging	would	 alter	 the	 subjects’	
sensitivity	to	prior	knowledge	in	new	learning.	Prior	studies	have	generally	agreed	on	the	
findings	of	a	decline	in	recognition	memory	for	faces	with	age,	essentially	due	to	higher	
false	 alarms	 rates	 (e.g.	 Boutet	 &	 Faubert,	 2006;	 Ferris,	 Crook,	 Clark,	McCarthy,	 &	 Rae,	
1980;	Fulton	&	Bartlett,	1991;	Lamont,	Stewart-Williams,	&	Podd,	2005;	Searcy	&	Bartlett,	
1999).	 Thus	 our	 findings	 that	 age	 did	 not	 alter	 recognition	 memory	 for	 faces	 are	
surprising.	A	closer	 look	at	prior	studies	 in	the	field	actually	reveals	that	the	majority	of	
past	studies	have	used	novel,	unknown	faces,	and	that	young	faces	were	mostly	used	as	
stimuli.	However,	when	familiar	 faces	were	used	as	stimuli,	 the	age-related	decline	was	
greatly	reduced	(i.e.	Bäckman	et	al.,	1991)	and,	similarly,	when	old	and	young	faces	were	
used,	 again	 the	 elderly	 performed	 better	 with	 own-age	 faces	 (e.g.	 Firestone,	 Turk-
Browne,	 &	 Ryan,	 2007;	 Fulton	 &	 Bartlett,	 1991;	 Lamont	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 Thus,	 available	
evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 age-related	 decline	 in	 recognition	 memory	 for	 faces	 can	
actually	be	alleviated	based	on	either	stimuli	conceptual	or	perceptual	familiarity,	rather	
than	showing	a	uniform	and	unavoidable	decline.	Our	results	therefore	extend	this	 idea	
by	 showing	 that	 a	 carefully	 selected	 set	 of	 unknown,	 familiarized	 and	 famous	 faces,	
corrected	on	an	individual	basis	for	the	subjects’	familiarity	with	each	stimulus,	can	yield	
accurate	performance	from	25	to	75	years	old.	Of	course,	 the	small	size	of	our	samples	
must	 lead	 to	 cautious	 interpretations	 and	 strongly	 prevents	 from	 generalization.	
Moreover,	given	that	 the	memory	 load	was	 relatively	high	 in	our	experiment	 (i.e.	N=96	
target	 items),	 participants	 obtained	 low	 performances,	 especially	 in	 the	 Novelty	
condition.	This	might	explain	why	we	failed	to	replicate	prior	results	of	lower	recognition	
memory	for	unknown	faces	 in	our	elderly	sample.	Another	 important	point	 is	 that	prior	
studies	 involving	 elderly	 subjects	 not	 always	 have	 the	means	 to	 exclude	 subjects	with	
subtle	 cognitive	 impairments,	 or	 with	 significant	 concerns	 about	 memory.	 Similarly,	 a	
close	matching	for	education,	VIQ,	and	levels	of	anxiety	and	depression	is	not	the	rule.	In	
doing	so	in	the	present	experiment,	we	found	that	in	the	PEK	and	EK	conditions,	elderly	
participants	 presented	 with	 the	 same	 patterns	 of	 performance	 than	 their	 younger	
counterparts.	 Pre-existing	 representations	 seemed	 to	 increase	 the	 Hit	 rates,	 but	 also	
confidence	 ratings	 associated	 with	 accurate	 responses,	 and	 high	 confidence	 source	
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memory	 as	 well,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 interaction	 between	 age	 and	 prior	
knowledge	effects.	The	results	thus	require	further	replication,	since	these	findings	could	
lend	support	 to	 the	hypothesis	 that	 the	mechanisms	underlying	prior	knowledge-based	
explicit	learning	may	not	depend	upon	the	brain	structures	particularly	sensitive	to	ageing	
like	the	prefrontal	cortex	and	the	hippocampus.	
Furthermore,	 given	 the	 absence	 of	 age	 effects,	we	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 investigate	
whether	 recognition	 memory	 for	 stimuli	 with	 or	 without	 long-term	 memory	
representations	is	equally	related	to	more	standard	measures	of	memory	used	in	clinical	
settings.	This	revealed	that	recognition	memory	for	famous	and	familiarized	stimuli,	but	
not	novel	stimuli,	was	strongly	positively	related	to	the	delayed	recall	score	of	the	Logical	
Memory	 subtest.	 By	 contrast,	 performances	 at	 the	Warrington	memory	 test	 for	 faces	
(Warrington,	 1984)	 were	 strongly	 related	 to	 recognition	 of	 familiarized	 faces,	 while	
evidence	was	weaker	–	but	was	clearly	present	-	for	famous	and	novel	faces.	The	findings	
of	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	 our	 recognition	 memory	 test	 involving	 faces	 and	 a	
standard	recognition	memory	test	for	faces	were	expected,	and	reinforce	the	construct	
validity	 of	 our	 task	 design.	 The	 Logical	 Memory	 subtest	 involves	 meaningful	 verbal	
materials	 (i.e.	 short	 narratives)	 carrying	 pre-experimental	 knowledge,	 not	 only	 about	
words	 but	 also	 about	 general	 schemas	 (e.g.	 the	 robbery	 part	 in	 the	 first	 story).	 The	
Warrington	memory	test	 for	 faces	 requires	participants	 to	make	a	 two-alternate	 forced	
choice	at	test	between	a	foil	and	a	target	face	photograph.	While	the	materials	consist	of	
unknown	faces,	stimuli	actually	depict	not	only	the	face	features	but	also	a	large	part	of	
the	 top	 of	 the	 body	 with	 different	 clothes.	 Subjects	 may	 rely	 upon	 this	 extra-face	
information	as	prior	 research	has	 shown	 that	 the	 task	 could	be	 successfully	performed	
even	 after	 masking	 the	 face	 itself	 (Duchaine	 &	 Weidenfeld,	 2003).	 Thus,	 both	 tasks	
include	 materials	 (words,	 clothes)	 for	 which	 multiple	 prior	 exposures	 have	 yielded	 at	
least	perceptual	 familiarity,	and	 it	seems	meaningful	 to	us	that	they	correlate	positively	
with	 recognition	 of	 faces	 carrying	 experimental	 (perceptual)	 knowledge.	 The	 fact	 that	
only	 the	 Logical	Memory	 subtest	 correlates	with	 recognition	memory	 of	 famous	 faces	
again	makes	sense,	given	that	conceptual,	not	only	perceptual	knowledge	is	 involved	at	
encoding	in	each	task.	
These	 data	 do	 suggest	 that	 current	 psychological	 testing	 does	 not	 capture	 the	 role	 of	
prior	 knowledge	 and	 novelty	 in	 new	 learning,	 which	 may	 lead	 to	 over-	 or	
underestimations	 of	 memory	 abilities	 in	 the	 clinical	 settings.	 Considering	 that	 an	
improvement	of	more	than	20%	was	observed	on	average	for	items	with	prior	knowledge	
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in	our	task,	we	believe	that	these	results	call	for	a	thorough	consideration	of	how	current	
memory	tests	tap	or	not	on	prior	knowledge-related	mechanisms,	and	to	further	include	
this	dimension	in	the	future	development	of	assessment	tools.	
	
Conclusion	
The	present	experiment	has	brought	additional	evidence	for	the	role	of	prior	knowledge	
as	a	powerful	enhancer	of	memory	 formation,	 against	 stimulus	novelty.	 It	 further	adds	
some	new	contributions	 in	 that	prior	 knowledge	benefits	 extended	 to	memory	 for	 the	
context,	 and	we	could	demonstrate	 for	 the	 first	 time	 that	 1)	 item	 recognition	and	high	
confidence	 memory	 for	 the	 context	 may	 be	 improved	 up	 to	 very	 similar	 levels	 by	
conceptual	 but	 also	 perceptual	 prior	 knowledge;	 2)	 these	 positive	 effects	 on	 learning	
were	age-resistant.	Thus,	while	 the	benefits	of	prior	knowledge	have	 traditionally	been	
accounted	 for	 by	 semantic	 processing	 at	 encoding,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 levels-of-
processing	 framework,	 our	 findings	 suggest	 that	 similar	 improvements	 can	be	 reached	
through	experimental	exposures	only.	A	promising	candidate	mechanism	to	account	for	
the	 advantage	 of	 both	 kinds	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 could	 be	 that	 perceptually	 primed	 or	
conceptually	 familiar	 faces	may	 release	 attentional	 and	working	memory	 resources	 for	
context	 processing.	 This	 in	 turn	 would	 facilitate	 binding	 operations,	 allowing	 a	 more	
distinctive	representation	to	be	built.	Due	to	a	limited	sample	size	and	to	floor	effects	for	
our	source	memory	measure,	such	conclusions	however	remain	speculative	and	require	
replication.	
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Experiment	3b:	Can	we	replicate	experiment	3a	while	increasing	the	distinctiveness	
of	the	study	events?	
	
	
Scientific	valorization	
	
	
	
Article	in	preparation	for	the	journal	Psychology	of	Aging	
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Highlights	from	Experiment	3b	
	
	
Faces	 carrying	prior	 knowledge	 strongly	 benefit	 subsequent	 recognition	memory,	not	
only	for	the	face,	but	also	for	the	context.	
Such	benefits	seem	to	be	 immune	to	aging,	even	considering	associative	memory,	thus	
providing	new	perspectives	 to	 alleviate	 age-related	memory	 deficits	 and	develop	new	
markers	of	early	cognitive	decline	associated	with	degenerative	diseases.	
Recollection-based	 retrieval	 of	 faces	 seems	 to	 be	 particularly	 sensitive	 to	 long-term	
memory	 representations	 resulting	 from	 lifelong	 exposures,	 but	 recent	 exposures	 also	
improves	memory	formation.	While	most	prior	studies	considered	prior	knowledge	as	a	
homogenous	 variable	 (i.e.	 present	 or	 absent),	 findings	 from	 Experiment	 3b	 plea	 for	 a	
differential	impact	of	experimental	vs.	pre-experimental	prior	knowledge.	
The	 superior	 memory	 bonus	 obtained	 for	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 could	 be	
accounted	for	by	the	cumulative	effects	of	increased	distinctiveness	and	facilitated	long-
term	 memory	 binding	 due	 to	 conceptual	 processing	 together	 with	 the	 free	 up	 of	
attentional	and	working	memory	resources.	
A	 speculation	 that	 needs	 further	 investigation	 is	 that	 memory	 facilitation	 (including	
associative	memory)	 due	 to	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 could	 be	 independent	 from	
brain	structures	highly	sensitive	to	aging,	like	the	hippocampus.		
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Introduction	
	
Stimuli	 with	 pre-existing	 long-term	 memory	 representations	 enable	 more	 memory	
formation	 than	novel	 stimuli.	 In	 the	case	of	 face-scene	associations,	Experiment	3a	has	
shown	 that	 this	was	 true	 for	 both	memory	 for	 faces	 and	memory	 for	 the	 association.	
However,	 evidence	 for	 improved	associative	memory	was	 very	 limited	due	 to	 the	 floor	
effect	 observed	 across	 participants	 who	 hardly	 performed	 better	 than	 chance.	 Still,	
subjective	 recollection	 as	 assessed	 through	 confidence	 ratings	 seemed	 to	 benefit	 prior	
knowledge,	 with	 a	 more	 subsequent	 benefit	 from	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 (PEK,	
famous	 faces)	 than	 experimental	 knowledge	 (EK,	 familiarized	 faces).	 In	 the	meantime,	
accurate	source	memory	associated	with	 the	highest	confidence	 ratings	was	similar	 for	
stimuli	 carrying	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 pre-experimental	 conceptual	 knowledge	 and	 for	
unknown	 items	familiarized	across	some	exposures	before	to	the	study	phase.	This	 last	
result	 was	 rather	 surprising,	 and	 did	 not	 fit	 with	 the	 classical	 levels-of-processing	
framework.	Strikingly,	despite	the	acknowledged	frailty	of	recollection-based	retrieval	in	
aging	(Koen	&	Yonelinas,	2016)	and	the	 related	 influential	associative	deficit	hypothesis	
(Naveh-Benjamin,	 2000),	 Experiment	 3a	 brought	 preliminary	 evidence	 that	 the	 prior	
knowledge	effect	could	be	age-resistant.	
These	 findings	 require	 to	 further	 address	 two	 outstanding	 issues,	 namely	 1)	 can	 we	
replicate	 the	 findings	 of	 an	 age-resistant	 benefit	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 on	 item	 and	
associative	 memory?	 and	 2)	 what	 are	 the	 underlying	 mechanisms	 responsible	 for	 the	
massive	increase	in	memory	formation	resulting	from	either	immediate	prior	exposure	or	
lifelong	 accumulated	 knowledge	 about	 the	 memoranda?	 Experiment	 3b	 was	 aimed	 at	
addressing	these	concerns.	
One	hypothesis	that	has	been	put	forward	to	explain	how	prior	knowledge	can	improve	
memory	 formation	 is	 related	 to	working	memory	 and	 attentional	 resources	 allocation.	
Familiar	 stimuli	 would	 trigger	 conceptual	 and/or	 perceptual	 fluency	 (i.e.	 ease	 of	
processing)	at	study,	which	in	turn	would	facilitate	context	processing,	and	context-item	
binding	 (Gagnepain	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 2011;	 Reder	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 One	 possibility	 is	 that	 such	
facilitation	may	 help	 the	 building	 of	 a	more	 distinctive	 representation	 (namely,	 able	 to	
resist	 interference),	which	naturally	 follows	deep	processing	 in	 the	 levels-of-processing	
framework.	
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Figure	55.	One	possible	account	for	the	benefits	of	prior	knowledge	on	memory	for	face-scene	
associations	as	suggested	by	Expt.	3a.	Faces	trigger	either	no	fluency	(Novelty),	perceptual	(EK)	or	
perceptual	+	conceptual	(PEK)	fluency	at	study.	As	a	consequence,	more	or	less	attentional	and	
working	memory	resources	are	available	for	face-scene	binding.	Novelty	may	thus	be	more	
demanding	than	Pre-Experimental	Knowledge,	thus	leaving	more	resources	for	scene	processing	
behind	e.g.	Princess	Diana.	As	a	consequence	of	decreased	attentional	and	working	memory	
resources	for	relational	binding,	increased	trace	distinctiveness	further	improve	memory	
formation.	
	
If	 correct,	 this	 account	 would	 predict	 that	 more	 intrinsically	 distinctive	 stimuli	 should	
improve	 source	 memory	 for	 all	 conditions.	 Moreover,	 any	 manipulation	 aimed	 at	
increasing	 context	 processing	 similarly	 should	 increase	 source	 memory.	 However	 and	
importantly,	 this	 should	 have	 either	 no	 impact	 on	 item	 memory,	 or	 even	 impair	 item	
memory,	due	to	 increased	attention	to	context	processing,	thus	reducing	the	resources	
allocated	to	the	face.	
In	 the	 present	 experiment,	 we	 aimed	 at	 testing	 this	 hypothesis	 through	 a	 replication	
study	 of	 Experiment	 3a,	 where	 we	 introduced	 only	 one	 change.	 Instead	 of	 using	 two	
unique	photographs	of	landscape	(one	representing	a	beach,	the	other	the	countryside),	
we	 associated	 one	 unique	 landscape	 photograph	 to	 each	 target	 face	 at	 study.	 We	
reasoned	that	 in	Expt	3a,	the	use	of	the	same	two	distinct	backgrounds	for	all	96	faces	
might	have	shortly	shaped	the	subjects’	expectations	 in	the	study	phase.	Subjects	were	
actually	 shown	96	 face-scene	associations.	However,	 only	 the	 face	was	unique	 to	 each	
trial,	 while	 the	 scenes	 were	 common	 to	 half	 the	 trials	 (i.e.	 48	 “beach”	 scenes,	 48	
“countryside”	 scenes).	 While	 this	 is	 the	 standard	 way	 of	 building	 a	 source	 memory	
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paradigm,	we	would	argue	that	this	choice	is	not	without	consequences.	In	fact,	subjects	
should	 shortly	 expect	 the	 display	 of	 a	 given	 background,	 with	 little	 opportunity	 of	
prediction	 error	 to	 occur	 for	 the	 scenes.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 much	 likely	 that,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	
associative	learning	instruction,	the	subject	focus	much	more	on	the	changing	face	rather	
than	 on	 the	 constant	 background.	 By	 using	 a	 unique	 face-scene	 combination	 for	 each	
trial,	we	aimed	at	 increasing	the	 intrinsic	distinctiveness	of	the	stimuli	on	the	one	hand,	
and	 to	 enable	 better	 contextual	 processing	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 As	 stated	 above,	 we	
hypothesized	 that	 this	 manipulation	 to	 decrease	 memory	 accuracy	 for	 faces,	 but	 to	
increase	 memory	 for	 face-scene	 associations.	 Moreover,	 if	 the	 attentional	 –	 working	
memory	 account	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 effect	 on	 learning	 is	 correct,	 these	 changes	 in	
performance	 might	 differ	 depending	 on	 whether	 stimuli	 carry	 experimental,	 pre-
experimental,	 or	 no	 prior	 knowledge.	 More	 specifically,	 increased	 memory	 for	
associations	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 occur	 for	 items	 with	 pre-experimental	 knowledge,	 since	
these	 are	 expected	 to	 trigger	 the	 most	 distinctive	 memory	 representations,	 following	
conceptual	processing.	
Our	aims	 in	Experiment	3b	were	 therefore	 two	 folds.	First,	we	aimed	at	 replicating	 the	
main	findings	from	Experiment	3a,	and	second,	we	aimed	at	verifying	the	hypothesis	that	
increasing	 stimuli	 distinctiveness	 should	 improve	 source	 memory,	 but	 impair	 or	 leave	
unchanged	item	(face)	memory.	
	
Materials	&	methods	
	
Participants	
	
106	right-handed	participants	aged	20	to	87	years	old	provided	an	informed	consent,	and	
the	 ethics	 committee	 of	 the	 University	 of	 Rennes	 approved	 the	 study.	 The	 scientific	
advisory	board	of	the	psychology	department	further	funded	this	experiment,	which	was	
promoted	by	the	University	of	Rennes	(Dr	Audrey	Noël),	and	ran	in	cooperation	with	the	
Memory	 Clinic	 of	 Rennes	 University	 Hospital	 (Dr	 S.	 Belliard).	 Screening	 was	 meant	 to	
check	for	 the	absence	of	any	present	or	past	medical	condition	susceptible	to	 interfere	
with	cognition,	and	to	control	for	normal	memory	performance	(Logical	Memory	subtest	
of	 the	Wechsler	Memory	 scale,	 3rd	 Ed.)	 and	 absence	 of	 significant	 subjective	 cognitive	
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difficulty	 (Cognitive	Difficulty	 Scale,	McNair	&	Kahn,	 1984).	 This	 led	 to	 the	 exclusion	of	
N=23	 subjects	 (active	 anti-depressant	 medication	 in	 4;	 history	 of	 neurological	 or	
psychiatric	diseases	in	19).	Of	the	83	remaining	subjects,	9	were	further	excluded	due	to	
impaired	 scores	 at	 the	 Logical	 Memory	 subtest,	 and	 12	 were	 excluded	 because	 they	
obtained	 outliers	 scores	 during	 the	 familiarity	 judgment	 phase	 (<-3	 s.d.),	 thus	 leaving	
N=62	participants	finally	included.	
	
Stimuli	
	
The	 only	 difference	 between	 Experiment	 3a	 and	 3b	 concerned	 background	 scenes	
photographs.	For	the	purpose	of	the	present	experiment,	48	coloured	photographs	of	a	
scene	 depicting	 a	 countryside	 landscape	 and	 48	 depicting	 a	 beach	 landscape	 were	
gathered	 from	 the	 web.	 These	 pictures	 were	 normalized	 in	 size	 (720x484	 pixels)	 and	
were	free	of	any	human	character	or	manufactured	or	living	object.	Custom	scripts	were	
then	used	to	generate	all	 the	possible	combinations	between	a	 face	and	one	of	 the	96	
landscapes	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 visual	 stimuli	with	 the	 face	 displayed	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
landscape.	Randomization	was	similar	to	the	method	described	in	Experiment	3b,	except	
for	 the	addition	of	 random	face-scene	combinations	across	prior	knowledge	conditions	
and	between	subjects.	This	resulted	in	a	completely	random	set	of	target	stimuli	for	each	
subject.	
	
	
		 251	
	
Figure	56.	Examples	of	stimuli	used	in	Experiment	3b.	Each	face	was	randomly	combined	with	one	
unique	background.	(Top	left:	former	French	president	Nicolas	Sarkozy;	Middle	left:	French	singer	
Charles	Aznavour;	Top	right:	Princess	Diana)	
	
Procedure	
	
Each	participant	underwent	one	single	session	lasting	about	3.5	hours.	After	completing	
the	screening	measures,	the	experimental	procedure	were	identical	to	the	one	described	
in	Experiment	3b.	 Importantly,	during	 the	 recognition	memory	 test,	 the	procedure	was	
also	 identical,	 and	 alternate	 forced	 choice	 recognition	memory	 for	 the	 context	 did	 not	
use	unstudied	scene	photographs	as	distractors.	The	subjects	had	to	decide	which	one	of	
two	 scene	 photographs	 was	 paired	 with	 the	 target	 face,	 and	 both	 scenes	 had	 been	
experienced	during	the	study	phase.	This	replicated	the	testing	format	of	Experiment	3a,	
where	 source	 memory	 decision	 could	 not	 be	 made	 either	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 familiarity	
judgment.	
	
Analyses	
	
Given	the	aim	of	replicating	the	findings	of	Experiment	3a	in	an	independent	sample,	we	
performed	exactly	the	same	analyses,	again	favouring	a	Bayesian	approach	for	inferential	
statistics.	Repeated-measures	Bayesian	ANOVAs	were	therefore	performed	on	indexes	of	
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item	memory	 (i.e.	 Sensitivity	 “Az”,	 Hits,	 dans	 FAs)	 as	 well	 as	 associative	memory	 (i.e.	
Conditional	 source	memory	 index,	 as	 in	 Experiment	 3a).	 Furthermore,	 similar	 analyses	
were	ran	for	confidence	ratings	associated	with	item	and	source	memory.	Finally,	we	ran	
the	 exact	 same	 analyses	 (i.e.	 mixed	 or	 “Split-Splot”	 Bayesian	 ANOVAs)	 to	 investigate	
whether	the	findings	were	modulated	by	age.	
To	explore	 the	hypothesis	 that	 increasing	 stimuli	 distinctiveness	would	 improve	 source	
memory	but	worsen	item	memory,	we	further	contrasted	the	datasets	from	Experiments	
3a	and	3b.	That	is,	the	study	(3a	or	3b)	was	used	as	a	between-subjects	factor	to	further	
assess	 the	 impact	 of	 “constant”	 vs.	 “variable”	 faces’	 background	 on	 subsequent	
memory.	
	
Results	
	
General	 characteristics	 of	 the	 participants	 are	 shown	 in	 Table	 3.	 The	 three	 groups	 of	
subjects	 did	 not	 differ	 on	 sex	 ratio,	 estimated	 verbal	 IQ,	 immediate	 verbal	memory	 or	
reported	 cognitive	difficulties.	However,	 a	mild	difference	was	observed	 for	 education,	
the	 youngest	 subjects	 having	 completed	more	 years	 of	 formal	 schooling	 than	 the	 two	
other	groups.	
	
	
Young	
N=33	
Middle-
Aged	
N=12	
Elderly	
N=17	
BF10	 p	value	
Demographics	
Age	 27.6	(5.9)	 53.7	(4.8)	 70.2	(6.6)	 5.014e28	 <.001	
Education	(years)	 14.2	(2.1)	 11.8	(2.3)	 11.4	(4.1)	 15.347	 0.003	
Female:Male	 18:15	 9:3	 13:4	 0.500	 0.215	
Global	cognition	
VIQ	(f-NART)	 104.5	(8.7)	 105.2	(5.0)	 109.1	(6.9)	 0.666	 0.135	
Memory	
Logical	Memory,	I	 43.3	(10.4)	 41.3	(7.1)	 40.8	(9.4)	 0.203	 0.644	
Logical	Memory,	II	 27.3	(6.5)	 25.8	(6.9)	 20.8	(9.6)	 2.949	 0.022	
Questionnaires	
Cognitive	Difficulty	Scale	(total	score)	 46.3	(17.0)	 38.8	(11.1)	 38.5	(18.8)	 0.491	 0.215	
	
Table	3.	Demographics	&	Neuropsychological	background	of	the	62	participants	included.	f-
NART=French	version	of	the	National	Adult	Reading	Test.	
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Familiarity	judgment	for	all	the	faces	used	in	the	experiment	yielded	high	accuracy,	with	
an	 average	 of	 91%	 (ranging	 from	 76	 to	 100%),	 and	 importantly,	 accuracy	 did	 not	 differ	
between	age	groups	(BF10=0.393).	Recognition	memory	also	yielded	accurate	scores,	with	
sensitivity	(Az)	ranging	from	0.71	to	0.99	(mean=0.87).	Response	bias,	like	in	Experiment	
3a,	was	highly	variable,	ranging	from	-0.93	to	0.50.	Finally,	and	critically,	the	floor	effect	
observed	in	the	previous	experiment	was	reduced	for	source	memory	accuracy,	but	only	
32	 subjects	 performed	 beyond	 chance	 level,	 with	 a	 huge	 inter-individual	 variability	
(ranging	from	34	to	87%),	and	as	we	will	see	below,	important	differences	between	prior	
knowledge	conditions.	
Can	we	replicate	findings	from	Experiment	3a?	
We	replicated	the	main	effect	of	prior	knowledge	on	Az	(BF10=8.337e29)	and	extended	this	
finding	to	Source	memory	(BF10>260000).	Post-hoc	testing	revealed	very	strong	evidence	
for	better	sensitivity	in	PEK	and	EK	conditions	by	comparison	with	Novelty	(BF10=6.457e17;	
BF10=1.416e15,	 respectively),	while	 less	conclusive	evidence	was	 reported	 for	 the	PEK	vs.	
EK	comparison	(BF10=7.621).	PEK	condition	yielded	more	Hits	and	fewer	FAs	than	Novelty	
condition	 (BF10=1.288e19;	 BF10=1085.969,	 respectively);	 and	 only	 less	 FAs	 rates	 than	 EK	
(BF10=9419.152),	with	no	difference	for	Hits	rate	(BF10=0.179).	Finally,	EK	stimuli	triggered	
more	Hits	(BF10=1.844e23)	but	a	similar	FAs	rate	(BF10=0.139)	than	Novelty	(see	Figure	57).	
	
	
Figure	57.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	recognition	memory,	across	all	participants.	%95ICs	are	
displayed.	
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Turning	to	source	memory,	we	found	evidence	supporting	the	null	hypothesis	for	the	EK	
vs.	 Novelty	 comparison,	 and	 both	 conditions	 yielded	 much	 less	 accuracy	 than	 PEK	
(BF10>769e3;	BF10=402.211,	 respectively).	 However,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 this	 was	 like	 in	
Experiment	 3a	 associated	 with	 a	 floor	 effect	 in	 the	 EK	 and	 Novelty	 conditions.	 By	
contrast,	most	of	 the	participants	performed	above	 chance	 in	 the	PEK	 condition.	Note	
that	 these	 results	 mimic	 the	 findings	 of	 Experiments	 3a	 for	 high-confidence	 accurate	
source	memory	responses	(see	Figure	58).	 Indeed,	the	same	analysis	here	yielded	similar	
findings,	 with	 a	main	 effect	 of	 Prior	 Knowledge	 (BF10=4.54e13),	 where	 only	 PEK	 stimuli	
yielded	higher	performance	(vs.	Novelty,	BF10=1.529e10;	vs.	EK,	BF10=2.812e7).	
	
	 	
Figure	58.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	source	memory,	across	all	participants.	The	left	graph	depicts	
source	memory	accuracy,	and	the	right	shows	correct	source	responses	associated	with	high	
confidence	ratings.	%95ICs	are	displayed.	
	
Finally,	we	replicated	previous	 findings	regarding	how	prior	knowledge	also	altered	the	
confidence	associated	with	Hit	responses.	High	confidence	Hits	were	strongly	 impacted	
by	 the	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions	 (BF10=2.836e22),	 and	 all	 post-hoc	 tests	 favoured	 the	
alternative	hypothesis	(Nov<EK<PEK;	Nov	vs.	EK,	BF10=5.922e6;	Nov	vs.	PEK,	BF10=3.124e17;	
EK	vs	PEK,	BF10>315e3).	Accordingly,	a	coherent	pattern	was	found	for	Middle-confidence	
Hits,	 which	were	more	 frequent	 in	 the	 Novelty	 condition	 (BF10=5.899e21;	 Nov>EK>PEK;	
Nov	 vs.	 EK,	 BF10>565e3;	Nov	 vs.	 PEK,	 BF10=1.726e17;	 EK	 vs	 PEK,	 BF10=1.612e6).	 Finally,	we	
extended	prior	findings	for	low-confidence	Hits:	they	were	more	frequent	for	Novel	than	
PEK	and	EK	conditions,	and	we	confirmed	evidence	for	the	null	hypothesis	regarding	the	
EK	 vs.	 PEK	 contrast	 (main	 effect,	 BF10=1.609e15;	Nov>EK=PEK;	Nov	 vs.	 EK,	 BF10=3.243e6;	
Nov	vs.	PEK,	BF10=3.111e6;	EK	vs	PEK,	BF10=0.158)	(see	Figure	59).	
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Figure	59.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	the	subjective	aspects	of	recognition	memory	(confidence	
ratings),	across	all	participants.	%95ICs	are	displayed.	
	
Again,	this	resulted	in	strong	evidence	for	the	hypothesis	of	an	interaction	between	prior	
knowledge	 effect	 and	 confidence	 ratings	 (BF10=6.564e196):	 while	 the	 frequency	 of	 low-
confidence	 ratings	 did	 not	 differ	 across	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions,	middle-confidence	
and	high-confidence	ratings	were	differentially	affected	by	prior	knowledge.	Items	in	the	
Novelty	 condition	 yielded	 slightly	more	high-	 than	middle-confidence	Hits,	while	 strong	
evidence	 was	 found	 for	 more	 high-	 than	 middle-confidence	 Hits	 in	 the	 PEK	 and	 EK	
conditions.	 Moreover,	 EK	 yielded	 more	 middle-confidence	 ratings	 than	 PEK	 and	
conversely,	PEK	yield	more	high-confidence	ratings	than	EK	(all	BF10>30).	
	
In	 summary,	we	 could	 replicate	 on	 an	 independent	 sample	 the	 findings	 of	 very	 strong	
evidence	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 enhances	 recognition	memory	 for	 individual	 items,	 but	
also	 associative	 (source)	memory	 for	 face-scene	 associations.	Moreover,	we	 replicated	
our	prior	 findings	that	the	nature	of	prior	knowledge	seems	to	matter	 for	 item	but	not	
source	memory.	In	fact,	in	the	PEK	condition,	we	replicated	the	finding	of	fewer	FAs	than	
in	 the	 EK	 condition,	 with	 no	 differences	 regarding	 the	 Hits	 rates.	 Furthermore,	 prior	
results	suggesting	that	 item	recognition	memory	based	on	subjective	recollection	could	
be	differentially	affected	by	PEK	vs.	EK	was	also	replicated:	PEK	led	to	a	higher	probability	
of	High-confidence	Hits	than	EK.	Finally,	this	replication	experiment	has	seemingly	raised	
source	 memory	 accuracy	 overall,	 and	 we	 found	 similar	 degrees	 of	 improvements	
following	PEK	and	EK	by	comparison	with	Novelty.	
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In	the	next	section,	we	report	on	the	attempt	to	replicate	the	findings	of	Experiment	3a	
regarding	aging	effects.	
Regarding	sensitivity	(Az),	the	best	model	for	the	data	included	a	Prior	Knowledge	X	Age	
interaction	(BF10=3.345e31,	the	interaction	model	was	2.8	times	more	likely	to	account	for	
the	 data	 than	 a	 model	 including	 the	 two	 main	 effects	 without	 interaction).	 This	
interaction	 reflected	 the	 fact	 that	 elderly	 participants	 performed	 below	 young	 and	
middle-aged	subjects	in	the	Novelty	condition	(Elderly	vs.	Middle-Aged,	BF10=2.421;	Elderly	
vs.	Young,	BF10=34.584),	while	their	performance	gradually	increased	in	the	EK	condition	
(Elderly	vs.	Middle-Aged,	BF10=1.650;	Elderly	vs.	Young,	BF10=11.590)	to	finally	reach	that	of	
the	other	participants	 in	 the	PEK	condition	 (Elderly	vs.	Middle-Aged,	BF10=0.558;	Elderly	
vs.	 Young,	 BF10=0.410).	 Note	 that	 very	 strong	 evidence	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 age	was	 only	
found	when	comparing	elderly	with	young	subjects	for	novel	stimuli,	while	moderate	to	
strong	evidence	only	was	reported	for	the	other	contrasts.	However,	and	importantly,	in	
the	PEK	condition	we	found	clear	evidence	favouring	the	null	hypothesis	that	aging	does	
not	alter	PEK-based	recognition	memory	for	faces.	
	
	
Figure	60.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	recognition	memory	within	each	age	group.	%95ICs	are	
displayed.	
	
Like	 in	 the	 previous	 experiment,	 we	 did	 not	 find	 any	 evidence	 favouring	 the	 Prior	
Knowledge	X	Age	interaction	for	the	Hits	and	FAs	rates.	In	each	case,	the	main	effect	of	
prior	 knowledge	 was	 sufficient	 to	 account	 for	 the	 data	 (Hits,	 BF10=8.468e36;	 FAs,	
BF10>122e3).	 Nonetheless,	 we	 observed	 that	 regarding	 the	 Hits	 rates	 Age	 and	 Prior	
Elderly	 Middle-Aged	 Young	
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Knowledge	 X	 Age	 interaction	 may	 contribute	 the	 data	 since	 the	 corresponding	 Bayes	
factors	 were	 very	 close	 to	 the	 one	 computed	 for	 the	 best	 model	 (Age,	 BF10=7.530e36;	
Interaction,	BF10=1.584e36).	This	 suggested	a	 trend	 for	 fewer	Hits	 in	 the	Novelty	and	EK	
condition	in	the	elderly.	Similarly,	we	observed	some	evidence	for	an	increased	FAs	rate	in	
elderly	in	the	Novelty,	again	with	an	inconclusive	level	of	evidence	(BF10=1.716),	especially	
in	the	context	of	the	absence	of	interaction	(B10	for	the	interaction>185e2	but	B10	for	the	
main	effect	of	Prior	Knowledge>122e3).	These	subtle	effects	were	in	the	end	responsible	
for	the	strong	evidence	favouring	an	 interaction	between	Prior	Knowledge	and	Age	for	
item	memory	(i.e.	sensitivity).	
	
Figure	61.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	source	memory,	across	all	participants.	The	left	graph	depicts	
source	memory	accuracy,	and	the	right	shows	correct	source	responses	associated	with	high	
confidence	ratings.	%95ICs	are	displayed.	
	
Turning	 to	 Source	 memory,	 the	 repeated-measures	 ANOVA	 with	 Prior	 Knowledge	 as	
within-subject	factor	and	Age	as	between-subjects	factor	yielded	strong	evidence	for	an	
interaction	 (BF10=7.955e6).	However,	 the	 floor	effect	observed	 for	 all	 conditions	except	
PEK	prevented	from	further	interpreting	this	result.	Focusing	on	high-confidence	source	
accuracy,	we	found	a	main	effect	of	Prior	Knowledge	(BF10=2.787e22)	that	best	accounted	
for	the	data.	PEK	yielded	more	frequent	high-confidence	accurate	source	responses	than	
EK	(BF10>315e3),	which	 in	turn	were	more	frequent	than	for	Novelty	(BF10=5.922e17).	Age	
did	not	account	for	the	data	(BF10=0.310),	thus	replicating	the	findings	of	Experiment	3a.	
Finally,	we	also	confirmed	prior	results	regarding	the	confidence	ratings	for	Hits,	with	an	
effect	of	Prior	Knowledge	(BF10=2.8e22),	but	no	effect	of	Age	(BF10=0.316)	or	 interaction	
(BF10=4.818e21).	The	same	pattern	as	before	was	replicated,	i.e.	PEK>EK>Novelty	(PEK	vs.	
EK,	BF10>315e3;	EK	vs.	Novelty,	BF10=5.922e6).	
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Figure	62.	Prior	Knowledge	effect	on	the	subjective	aspects	of	recognition	memory	(confidence	
ratings),	within	each	age	group.	%95ICs	are	displayed.	
	
In	 summary,	 this	 replication	 study	 confirmed	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 equally	 enhances	
explicit	 learning	of	face-scenes	associations	in	young	and	elderly	subjects.	However,	the	
interaction	observed	for	recognition	memory	for	faces	only	suggests	that	elderly	subjects	
may	disproportionately	benefit	from	pre-experimental	knowledge.	
In	 the	next	section,	we	then	address	 the	second	aim	of	 this	experiment,	namely	asking	
whether	 increased	distinctiveness	of	 the	 stimuli	would	 affect	 item	memory	 and	 source	
memory	in	different	ways.	
	
Constant	vs.	variable	background	contexts:	the	role	of	distinctiveness	
Considering	 the	 above	 findings	 suggesting	 that	 Age	 plays	 a	 marginal	 role	 in	 prior	
knowledge-dependent	 learning,	 subsequent	 analyses	 were	 ran	 with	 all	 participants	
(Expts	3a	&	Expt	3b,	N=113),	but	with	age	as	covariate.	
Across	prior	knowledge	conditions,	we	found	evidence	that	variable	contexts	introduced	
in	 Experiment	 3b	 hindered	 sensitivity	 (Az,	 BF10=	 21.02)	 but	 enhanced	 Source	 memory	
accuracy	(%,	BF10=607.63),	which	overall	supports	our	hypothesis.	
Elderly	 Middle-Aged	 Young	
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Figure	63.	Impact	of	using	variable	background	scenes	(Expt.	3b)	rather	than	constant	background	
scenes	(Expt.	3a)	on	recognition	memory	for	the	faces	(sensitivity	index)	and	for	face-scene	
associations	(Source	memory).	Error	bars	display	standard	error	of	the	mean.		
Considering	 sensitivity	 index	 (Az),	 repeated-measures	 ANOVA	 with	 Context	 (Constant,	
Variable)	as	between-subjects	 factor	and	Prior	Knowledge	(Novelty,	EK,	PEK)	as	within-
subjects	factors	(plus	age	as	a	covariate)	yielded	strongest	evidence	for	a	model	including	
Context,	 Prior	 Knowledge	 and	 Age	 (BF10=1.273e59),	 with	 no	 interaction.	 The	 effects	 of	
Prior	 Knowledge	 and	Age	 have	 been	 described	 before,	 so	what	 is	 relevant	 here	 is	 the	
post-hoc	 analysis	 for	 the	 Context	 effect.	 Evidence	 favoured	 the	 alternative	 hypothesis	
that	Variable	contexts	decreased	sensitivity	overall	 (BF10=10.46),	although	this	remained	
below	 the	 conventional	 threshold	 for	 very	 strong	 evidence	 (Rouder	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 As	 a	
reminder,	 this	 value	 of	 the	 Bayes	 factor	 suggests	 that	 an	 effect	 of	 Context	 on	 data	 is	
10.46	times	more	likely	than	its	absence.	
By	 contrast,	 Source	 memory	 scores	 were	 better	 explained	 by	 an	 interaction	 model	
(BF10=2.763e6)	 resulting	 from	 a	 boost	 of	 performance	 under	 the	 Variable	 contexts	
condition,	only	for	the	PEK	condition	(BF10=6853).	
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Figure	64.	Impact	of	using	variable	background	scenes	(Expt.	3b)	rather	than	constant	background	
scenes	(Expt.	3a)	on	recognition	memory	for	the	faces	(sensitivity	index)	and	for	face-scene	
associations	(Source	memory)	in	each	Prior	Knowledge	condition.	Error	bars	display	%95CIs.	
	
	
Discussion	
	
Experiment	 3b	 allowed	 us	 to	 replicate	 the	 main	 findings	 from	 Experiment	 3A,	 thus	
strengthening	the	fact	that	recognition	memory	performance	largely	varies	depending	on	
the	 long-term	 representations	 associated	 to	 the	materials	 prior	 to	 study,	 and	 that	 the	
effects	are	relatively	immune	to	aging.	
First,	we	replicated	the	findings,	in	an	independent	sample,	of	better	recognition	memory	
for	faces	with	long-term	memory	representations	than	novel	faces.	Second,	we	extended	
findings	 from	 Experiment	 3a	 in	 that	 elderly	 participants	 seemed	 to	 benefit	
disproportionately	from	PEK,	not	EK	condition	regarding	memory	for	faces.	These	results	
add	 to	 the	 growing	 evidence	 that,	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	 prior	 knowledge	may	
disproportionately	 help	 elderly	 subjects	 (Badham	et	 al.,	 2015;	 Badham	&	Maylor,	 2015),	
extending	 the	 effect	 to	 face-scene	 associations,	 which	 are	 particularly	 relevant	 in	
everyday	 life.	 Moreover,	 they	 introduce	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 prior	 knowledge	
matters.	 Prior	 knowledge	 resulting	 from	 lifelong	 accumulated	 exposures	 led	 to	 fewer	
Constant	 Variable	
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false	alarms	than	prior	knowledge	derived	from	a	single	recent	exposure	25	minutes	prior	
to	 study.	 This	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 proposal	 that	 conceptual	 and	 perceptual	 fluency	may	
have	different	 contribution	 to	 recognition	memory	 (Lanska,	Olds,	&	Westerman,	 2014).	
When	 conceptual	 together	 with	 perceptual	 fluency	 is	 present	 at	 encoding	 (like	 for	
famous	faces),	the	memory	trace	may	be	strengthened	to	a	greater	extent	than	when	the	
stimulus	 triggers	 either	 no	 fluency	 (i.e.	 novel	 face)	 or	 perceptual	 fluency	 only	 (i.e.	 EK	
face).	Furthermore,	this	pattern	is	also	consistent	with	the	concept	of	“encoding	depth”	
(LOP	framework,	Craik	&	Lockhart,	1972),	resulting	in	more	distinctive	representations	of	
the	faces	after	conceptual	processing.	One	future	avenue	for	research	could	therefore	be	
to	more	 directly	manipulate	 conceptual	 fluency	 to	 increase	 item	memory	 in	 studies	 of	
memory	aging	and	in	early	neurodegenerative	conditions	like	Alzheimer’s	disease.	If	the	
benefits	 of	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 on	 recognition	 memory	 are	 truly	 immune	 to	
aging,	 this	 could	 represent	 an	 interesting	 opportunity	 for	 further	 cognitive	markers	 of	
early	 neurodegenerative	 diseases.	 Finally,	 such	 findings	 reinforce	 the	 idea	 that	 prior-
knowledge	based	learning	should	rely	on	neural	networks	that	are	more-age	resistant,	an	
outstanding	issue	that	we	will	address	in	the	next	experiment.	
Beyond	 recognition	 memory	 for	 the	 faces,	 the	 present	 study	 could	 also	 replicate	 the	
benefits	 of	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 on	 memory	 for	 the	 face-scene	 associations,	
which	 again	 was	 immune	 to	 aging.	 Importantly,	 estimates	 of	 subjective	 recollection	
(confidence	 ratings	 for	 Hits	 responses)	 also	 were	 consistent	 with	 a	 benefit	 of	 pre-
experimental	knowledge,	but	also	revealed	that	experimental	knowledge	triggered	more	
high-confidence	 Hits	 than	 Novelty,	 across	 Age	 groups.	 This	 dissociation	 between	
“subjective”	 and	 “objective”	 recollection	 could	 reflect	 the	 acknowledged	 fact	 that	
source	 memory	 paradigms	 do	 not	 capture	 all	 possible	 sources	 of	 recollection.	 For	
example,	one	can	make	an	accurate	recollection-based	 judgment	based	on	the	retrieval	
of	a	particular	thought	or	feeling	triggered	by	the	stimulus	at	study,	while	failing	to	recall	
the	 correct	 background.	 These	 measures	 are	 therefore	 complementary	 rather	 than	
contradictory.	 What	 they	 suggest	 here	 is	 that	 when	 prior	 knowledge	 is	 present	 at	
encoding,	it	facilitates	face-scene	binding	operations	independently	of	the	nature	of	prior	
knowledge	(i.e.	mainly	perceptual	 in	EK,	or	conceptual	 in	PEK).	However,	more	retrieval	
cues	 might	 be	 generated	 in	 the	 case	 of	 conceptual	 processing	 of	 famous	 faces	 than	
following	perceptual	processing	of	familiarized	faces,	thus	leading	to	a	differential	impact	
on	Confidence	ratings.	Interestingly,	this	interpretation	would	offer	new	perspectives	for	
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the	 assessment	 of	 how	 elaborative	 encoding	 and	 processing	 depth	 could	 dissociate	
(Lockhart	&	Craik,	 1990):	while	EK	and	PEK	stimuli	 should	 trigger	elaborative	encoding,	
PEK	 only	 should	 yield	 deep	 (semantic)	 processing.	 One	 could	 therefore	 argue	 that	
experimental	manipulations	yielding	distinct	e.g.	neural	or	cognitive	correlates	for	EK	vs.	
PEK-based	 memory	 encoding	 would	 strongly	 speak	 for	 a	 dissociation	 between	 these	
processes	thought	as	major	learning	enhancers.	
Finally,	we	aimed	at	testing	the	idea	that	increased	stimuli	distinctiveness	(by	using	face-
scene	 trials)	 should	 improve	memory	 for	 the	 association	 but	 degrade	memory	 for	 the	
items.	 This	 hypothesis	 was	 largely	 confirmed	 by	 a	 crossover	 pattern	 whereby	 the	
introduction	of	variable	background	contexts	impaired	sensitivity	across	prior	knowledge	
conditions,	 but	 enabled	 better	 source	 memory	 only	 in	 the	 PEK	 condition.	 Thus,	 the	
present	 study	 brought	 indirect	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 attentional/working	 memory	
account	 of	memory	 enhancement	 through	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 (Gagnepain	 et	
al.,	2008;	2011;	Reder	et	al.,	2013).	Our	view	 is	 that	 increasing	stimuli	distinctiveness	has	
reduced	 the	 processing	 demands	 for	 the	 face,	 thus	 facilitating	 face-context	 long-term	
memory	binding.	The	specific	boost	observed	for	associative	memory	with	famous	faces	
may	have	resulted	from	the	additional	benefits	of	conceptual	processing	(i.e.	conceptual	
fluency	and	semantic	encoding	at	study)	and	increased	distinctiveness,	the	former	lacking	
for	 familiarized	 or	 novel	 faces.	 Further	 studies	 are	 required	 to	 confirm	 that	 pre-
experimental	 knowledge	 can	 alleviate	 the	 associative	 memory	 deficit	 associated	 with	
aging,	and	to	test	the	present	hypothesis	against	alternative	accounts	(see	e.g.	Delhaye,	
Tibon,	 Gronau,	 Levy,	 &	 Bastin,	 2018).	 In	 any	 case,	 it	 seems	 that	 associative	 memory	
formation	 supported	 by	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 may	 depend	 on	 brain	 structures	
that	 are	 relatively	 more	 preserved	 in	 aging,	 which	 would	 rule	 out	 the	 hippocampal	
formation.	 This	 possibility	 should	 be	 investigated	 further	 either	 through	
neuropsychological	or	imaging	studies.	
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Experiment	4:	Does	prior	knowledge	play	a	role	in	the	cognitive	and	neural	
substrates	for	associative	memory	impairment	in	early	Alzheimer’s	Disease?	
	
Scientific	valorisation	
	
	
Poster	accepted	for	the	2019	OHBM	conference,	Roma,	Italy,	June	2019	
Poster	accepted	for	the	2019	AAIC	conference,	Los	Angeles,	CA,	USA,	July	2019	
	
Article	in	preparation	for	the	journal	Neurobiology	of	Aging	
	 	
		 264	
Highlights	from	Experiment	4	
	
	
Before	 the	 following	study,	we	 ignored	whether	prior	knowledge	available	at	encoding	
could	alter	new	learning	in	prodromal	AD.	We	bring	evidence	that	patients	with	early	AD	
fail	 to	 benefit	 from	 pre-experimental	 prior	 knowledge	 (famous	 faces)	 by	 comparison	
with	 experimental	 knowledge	 (unknown	 but	 familiarized	 faces)	 for	 subsequent	 source	
memory	(face-scene	associations).	
FMRI	 responses	 at	 study	 reveal	distinct	 networks	 underlying	 associative	 encoding	 for	
these	two	kinds	of	prior	knowledge.	
A	 subsequent	 memory	 effect	 for	 associations	 with	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 is	
reported	 in	 subhippocampal	 structures	 for	 Controls,	 not	 patients.	 Conversely,	
experimental	 knowledge	 yields	 similar	 memory	 effects	 across	 groups	 in	 the	
hippocampus.	
We	 might	 underestimate	 the	 associative	 learning	 impairment	 when	 using	 unfamiliar	
materials	to	probe	memory	in	early	AD.	
Pre-experimental	knowledge-based	associative	encoding	may	depend	on	brain	regions	
specifically	targeted	by	early	tau	pathology,	like	the	perirhinal	cortex.	
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Abstract		
Impaired	 associative	 memory	 is	 a	 hallmark	 of	 prodromal	 Alzheimer’s	 Disease	 (AD).	
However,	 prior	 knowledge	 associated	 with	 the	 memoranda	 is	 hardly	 considered.	 We	
designed	an	 fMRI	 task	 to	 test	whether	prior	knowledge-based	associative	 learning	was	
preserved	in	early	AD,	and	whether	brain	substrates	could	differ	depending	on	the	kind	of	
prior	 knowledge	 involved.	 17	 Patients	with	 early	 AD	were	 scanned	while	 learning	 face-
scene	associations.	Prior	knowledge	was	manipulated	by	presenting	either	famous	faces	
(Pre-Experimental	Knowledge,	PEK)	or	unknown	faces	that	were	repeatedly	familiarized	
prior	 to	 the	 study	 phase	 (Experimental	 Knowledge,	 EK).	We	 found	 that	 PEK	 increased	
subsequent	 associative	 memory	 in	 Controls	 (19),	 but	 not	 in	 patients.	 Partly	 non-
overlapping	 brain	 networks	 supported	 PEK	 vs.	 EK	 associative	 encoding.	 Moreover,	
patients	 lacked	 the	 subsequent	 associative	 memory	 effect	 for	 PEK	 in	 right	
subhippocampal	 structures,	 observed	 in	 Controls.	 These	 findings	 call	 for	 a	 thorough	
consideration	of	how	prior	knowledge	alters	learning.	They	bring	new	perspectives	both	
for	early	detection	of	AD	and	neural	basis	of	declarative	learning.	
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Introduction	
The	hallmark	of	 the	prodromal	 stage	of	Alzheimer’s	disease	 (AD)	 is	 impaired	episodic	
memory,	 observable	 up	 to	 18	 years	 before	 dementia	 (	 Albert	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Rajan	 et	 al.,	
2015).	 The	 inability	 to	 form	 new	 associations	 in	 long-term	memory,	 namely	 associative	
learning,	is	consistently	reported	(Chen	&	Chang,	2016;	Fowler,	Saling,	Conway,	Semple,	&	
Louis,	 2002;	Lowndes	&	Savage,	2007).	Patient	concerns	 typically	 refer	 to	 forgetfulness	
during	 their	 daily	 routine,	 thus	 learning	 failures	 occur	 when	 highly	 familiar	 stimuli	 are	
involved	within	a	given	 life	event.	These	stimuli	 therefore	carry	“pre-experimental	prior	
knowledge”	(PEK),	because	a	large	amount	of	knowledge	is	available	about	the	individual	
event	 features.	 Since,	 memory	 testing	 of	 patients	 usually	 involves	 much	 less	 familiar	
stimuli	 (i.e.	 isolated	 words),	 presented	 repeatedly	 (multiple-trials	 learning	 tests).	 Such	
stimuli	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 associated	 with	 “experimental	 prior	 knowledge”	 (EK),	
namely	 familiarity	 resulting	 from	repeated	exposures	 (see	Poppenk	et	al.,	 2010a).	Thus,	
while	 subjective	 symptoms	 have	 to	 do	 with	 the	 inability	 to	 form	 new	 associative	
representations	 about	well-known	 stimuli	 (PEK,	 e.g.	 familiar	 faces),	 the	 proxies	we	 are	
using	 tap	 on	 processes	 involved	 in	 the	 gradual	 formation	 of	 new	 associative	
representations	 about	much	 less	 familiar	 stimuli	 (EK,	 e.g.	 recent	encounter	with	 a	new	
person).	 It	 follows	 that	 little	 is	 known	 about	 prior	 knowledge-dependent	 associative	
memory	 in	 patients	 with	 early	 AD.	 Here,	 we	 aimed	 at	 investigating	 whether	 prior	
knowledge	alters	associative	memory	formation	 in	early	AD,	both	at	the	behavioral	and	
neural	levels.	
Evidence	from	behavioral	studies	has	supported	the	role	of	PEK	in	enhancing	associative	
learning	 in	healthy	adults	 (Bird	et	 al.,	 2011;	Carbon,	 2008;	Castel,	 2005;	Ellis	 et	 al.,	 1979;	
Greve,	 van	 Rossum,	&	 Donaldson,	 2007;	 Jackson	&	 Raymond,	 2008;	 Klatzky	&	 Forrest,	
1984;	 Long	&	 Prat,	 2002;	 Poppenk,	 Köhler,	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 L.	M.	 Reder	 et	 al.,	 2013a;	 Voss,	
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2006;	 Zion-Golumbic	et	 al.,	 2010),	 including	 the	elderly	 (Badham	et	 al.,	 2015;	Badham	&	
Maylor,	2015;	McGillivray	&	Castel,	2010).	Still,	this	has	received	little	attention	in	AD,	with	
available	 data	 suggesting	 a	 lesser	 degree	 of	 PEK	 advantage	 (Bäckman	&	Herlitz,	 1990;	
Lipinska	 et	 al.,	 1992).	 Turning	 to	 the	 role	 of	 EK,	we	 could	 not	 find	 prior	 studies	 in	 AD,	
however	behavioral	evidence	in	young	adults	supports	the	benefits	of	EK	for	associative	
learning.	Gagnepain	et	al.,	(2008)	found	that	primed	(i.e.	recently	repeated)	words	were	
more	likely	to	be	further	recollected	than	non-primed	words	(see	also	Dennis	et	al.,	2015;	
Poppenk	 et	 al.,	 2010a,	 2010b	 for	 similar	 results	 with	 different	 stimuli).	 Interestingly,	
incidental	 instructions	 were	 provided	 during	 the	 familiarization	 phase,	 and	 repeated	
incidental	 encoding	 is	 acknowledged	 to	 advantage	 amnesic	 patients	 (Bayley	 &	 Squire,	
2002,	2005).	It	is	therefore	expected	that,	when	assessing	associative	memory	in	patients	
in	early	AD	with	multiple-trials	 learning	tests,	EK	accumulated	across	trials	may	enhance	
performance.	
To	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge,	 the	 neural	 correlates	 underlying	 the	 role	 of	 prior	
knowledge	 in	 associative	 learning	have	not	 been	 investigated	 in	AD.	On	 the	one	hand,	
task-based	 fMRI	 studies	 in	 young	 adults	 have	 put	 forward	 the	 role	 of	medial	 temporal	
lobe	and	temporal	pole,	together	with	the	ventromedial	and	inferior	/	middle	prefrontal	
cortex	in	PEK-based	learning	when	compared	with	either	novel	stimuli	or	recently	learned	
stimuli	(Leveroni	et	al.,	2000;	Liu	et	al.,	2016;	Marlieke	T	R	Van	Kesteren	et	al.,	2012).	EK-
based	 learning	 was	 associated	 to	 activity	 in	 parietal	 regions	 and	 the	 posterior	
hippocampus,	as	reflecting	the	role	of	retrieval	processes	and	attentional	enhancement	
effects	(Dennis	et	al.,	2015;	Poppenk,	Köhler,	et	al.,	2010;	Poppenk,	McIntosh,	et	al.,	2010;	
Poppenk	 &	 Norman,	 2012).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 neural	 adaptation	 fMRI	 studies	 have	
successfully	 mapped	 functional	 encoding	 networks	 in	 AD	 patients.	 Neural	 adaptation	
refers	to	the	decrease	(suppression)	or	increase	(enhancement)	of	the	BOLD	signal	with	
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repeated	 presentations	 of	 stimuli	 (Grill-Spector	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 Noteworthy,	 neural	
adaptation	was	preserved	in	elderly	controls	but	impaired	in	AD	patients,	notably	within	
medial	temporal	lobe	and	regions	from	the	default	mode	network	(Johnson	et	al.,	2004;	
Pihlajamäki	et	al.,	2011;	Vannini	et	al.,	2013;	but	see	Lustig	and	Buckner,	2004).	Yet,	here,	
the	role	of	prior	knowledge	has	never	been	considered.	
In	 the	 present	 study,	 we	 asked	 early	 AD	 and	 controls	 subjects	 to	 encode	 face-scene	
associations	within	an	event-related	fMRI	task	design,	prior	to	a	recognition	memory	test.	
Prior	knowledge	about	the	stimuli	was	manipulated	to	induce	either	EK	or	PEK,	and	study	
events	 were	 presented	 twice.	 We	 hypothesized	 that	 in	 early	 AD,	 associative	 learning	
would	 be	 less	 impaired	 for	 EK	 than	 PEK,	 and	 we	 combined	 the	 analyses	 of	 fMRI	
responses	 to	 repetition	 and	 to	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 identifying	 the	
corresponding	neural	correlates.	
Material	and	methods	
Participants	
All	 participants	 provided	 a	 written	 consent,	 and	 the	 ethics	 committee	 of	 Rennes	
University	 Hospital	 approved	 the	 study.	 The	 study	 is	 registered	 in	 the	 Clinical	 Trials	
database	 (EPMR-MA	Study	 2014-A01123-44).	 22	 patients	 fulfilling	 the	NIA-AA	 criteria	 for	
Mild	 Cognitive	 Impairment	 due	 to	 Alzheimer’s	 disease	 (AD-MCI)	 (Albert	 et	 al.,	 2011)	
together	with	25	healthy	controls	were	screened	to	participate.	Patients	were	recruited	
as	part	of	the	“Centre	Mémoire	de	Ressources	et	de	Recherches	de	Haute-Bretagne”	at	
Rennes	University	Hospital,	a	Memory	Clinic	with	over	20	years	of	clinical	expertise	in	the	
field,	where	a	 senior	neurologist	 (SB)	made	 the	diagnosis.	 Inclusion	 criteria	 for	AD-MCI	
patients	 were:	 i)	 evidence	 of	 a	 concern	 regarding	 a	 change	 in	 cognition;	 ii)	 impaired	
episodic	memory	confirmed	through	neuropsychological	assessment	by	reference	to	the	
available	 normative	 data;	 iii)	 fully	 preserved	 independence	 in	 functional	 abilities;	 iv)	
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evidence	 for	 hippocampal	 atrophy;	 v)	 evidence	 for	 amyloidopathy	 either	 through	
cerebrospinal	 fluid	 (CSF)	 measures	 of	 lower	 Ab42	 levels	 or	 via	 positron-emission	
tomography	(PET)	evidence	of	Ab	deposition.	Further	inclusion	criteria	were	i)	aged	60-75	
years;	ii)	>7	years	of	education;	iii)	native	french	speaking;	iv)	right-handedness.	Exclusion	
criteria	 were	 i)	 any	 history	 of	 alcoholism,	 drug	 abuse,	 head	 trauma	 or	 psychiatric	
condition;	 ii)	 7-items	 modified	 Hachinski	 ischemic	 score>2	 (Hachinski,	 Oveisgharan,	
Romney,	&	Shankle,	2012);	iii)	scores	above	the	age-	and	genre-adjusted	available	cut-off	
at	 the	Beck	Depression	 Inventory	(BDI-II,	Beck	et	al.,	 1996)	or	at	 the	State-Trait	Anxiety	
Inventory	 (STAI,	 A&B,	 Spielberger	 et	 al.,	 1983);	 iv)	 dementia	 (Mckhann	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 All	
subjects	 underwent	 two	 testing	 sessions.	 They	 first	 underwent	 an	 extensive	
neuropsychological	assessment	(for	details	see	Supplementary	Materials)	which	allowed	
to	(1)	rule	out	any	subtle	cognitive	impairment	among	control	subjects;	(2)	rule	out	severe	
impairments	 in	 AD-MCI	 patients	 that	 would	 be	 incompatible	 with	 the	 second	
experimental	session;	(3)	avoid	the	 inclusion	of	atypical	Alzheimer’s	disease	profiles	 like	
progressive	focal	degenerative	phenotypes	among	our	experimental	group	(Alladi	et	al.,	
2007).	 The	 second	 visit	 included	 the	 imaging	 and	 behavioral	 experiments.	 Five	 AD-MCI	
were	 excluded	 (two	 presented	 with	 severely	 impaired	 cognition	 preventing	 them	 to	
underwent	 the	experiments,	one	scored	above	 the	cut-off	at	 the	depression	 inventory,	
one	 gave-up	 during	 the	 second	 visit,	 and	 one	 proved	 to	 suffer	 claustrophobia	 in	 the	
scanner),	as	well	as	six	Controls	(two	due	to	technical	issues	at	MRI	acquisition,	one	due	
to	cognitive	scores	below	the	norms,	one	due	to	back	pain	complaint	in	the	scanner,	one	
due	to	above-the-cut-off	score	at	the	depression	inventory,	and	one	due	to	the	discovery	
of	a	pituitary	adenoma),	resulting	in	the	final	inclusion	of	19	Controls	and	17	AD-MCI.	
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Design	&	general	procedure	
Once	 the	 first	 testing	 session	 (including	 an	 extensive	 3-hours	 neuropsychological	
assessment)	was	completed,	participants	came	back	to	the	lab	within	one	month	for	the	
second	 session.	 The	whole	 procedure	of	 the	 second	 session	 is	 illustrated	 in	Figure	 1.	 It	
was	 divided	 in	 four	 phases:	 1)	 familiarization	 with	 the	 MRI	 environment	 in	 a	 mock-
scanner;	2)	actual	MRI	acquisition	during	study;	3)	recognition	testing	outside	the	scanner	
and	4)	fame	judgment	for	all	the	items	involved	in	the	study	phase.	An	extensive	training	
was	 provided	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 scanner	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 participants	
understood	and	performed	the	tasks	as	expected.	
	
Figure	1.	Experimental	design.	(A)	During	Familiarization,	unknown	faces	were	repeatedly	presented	inside	a	Mock	
scanner.	Participants	were	instructed	to	make	a	congruency	judgment	for	the	face-occupation	association.	Then,	an	
immediate	Old/New	recognition	test	was	administered.	(B)	Study	phase	inside	the	MR	scanner	involved	the	explicit	
encoding	of	face-scene	associations	of	two	types:	EK	trials	(blue	outline),	involved	a	face	from	the	familiarization	phase;	
PEK	trials	(yellow	outline)	involved	a	famous	face.	(C)	After	a	15	minutes	delay,	the	Test	phase	took	place	outside	
scanner.	Participants	had	to	make	Old/New	judgments	for	individual	faces.	For	each	Hit	(i.e.	true	positive)	response,	a	
two-alternate	forced	choice	test	asked	subjects	to	recall	the	correct	source	(i.e.	which	scene	was	associated	with	the	face	
at	study).	Finally,	after	a	5	minutes	delay,	a	Fame	judgment	test	(not	depicted)	involved	the	whole	set	of	faces	(i.e.	
targets	and	distractors).	
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Cognitive	tasks	
Stimuli.	Unique	associations	between	a	scene	(landscape	picture)	and	a	face	were	used	
as	stimuli	(see	Figure	1).	PEK	stimuli	were	modeled	with	famous	faces	whereas	EK	stimuli	
were	modeled	with	unknown	 faces.	 The	 faces	and	 the	 landscapes	were	gathered	 from	
the	 Internet.	 Faces	 images	were	 converted	 to	greyscale	pictures,	 cropped	within	 a	 250	
px-width	 oval-shape,	 and	 normalized	 for	 contrast.	 Extensive	 pre-testing	 of	 fame	
judgment	 in	healthy	elderly	 resulted	 in	 the	selection	of	 two	sets	of	N=132	famous	faces	
and	N=184	unknown	 faces,	 that	were	matched	as	closely	as	possible	 for	 sex	 ratio,	age,	
ethnicity,	 hair	 colors,	 emotional	 expression	 and	 accessories	 like	 glasses	 or	 earrings.	 98	
colored	 landscape	 images	 were	 selected	 so	 that	 half	 represented	 a	 beach,	 half	 a	
countryside,	 and	 none	 included	 any	 human	 or	 any	 artifact,	 and	 were	 normalized	 to	
720x484	px.	Two	sets	of	48	famous	and	48	unknown	faces	were	chosen	by	drawing	lots,	
each	 being	 randomly	 associated	with	 24	 countryside	 and	 24	 beach	 landscapes	 images,	
resulting	 in	96	PEK	stimuli	 (i.e.	 famous	 faces	 -	 landscape	association)	and	96	EK	stimuli	
(i.e.	 unknown	 face	 -	 landscape	 association),	 half	 being	 used	 as	 targets	 and	 half	 as	
distractors.	 An	 additional	 set	 of	 26	 unknown	 faces	 was	 randomly	 chosen	 for	 use	 as	
distractors	in	the	recognition	test	during	the	familiarization	phase	(see	below	&	Figure	1).	
The	 order	 of	 presentation,	 the	 set	 of	 pictures	 as	 well	 as	 the	 face-scene	 combinations	
were	fully	randomized	across	participants.	
Familiarization	 phase	 (pre-scan).	 Participants	 were	 installed	 in	 a	 factice	 MRI-scanner	
designed	to	familiarize	them	with	the	real	MRI	scanner	environment,	including	the	space,	
noise,	 luminosity,	 handgrip	 used	 as	 response	 device,	 and	 computer	 screen	 viewed	
through	 a	mirror.	 They	 were	 presented	 a	 series	 of	 faces	 randomly	 associated	 with	 an	
occupation,	and	were	instructed	to	make	a	congruency	judgment	about	that	association.	
48	 unknown	 faces	 were	 repeatedly	 presented	 3	 times	 across	 6	 blocks,	 with	 face-
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occupation	 combinations	 remaining	 constant	 across	 repetitions.	 For	 each	participant,	 a	
pseudo-random	order	 of	 presentation	was	 used	 so	 that	 at	 least	 3	 trials	 separated	 two	
identical	 stimuli.	 Each	 stimulus	was	 presented	 for	 2.5	 seconds	 followed	 by	 a	 1.5	 s	 time	
response	 windows.	 No	 memory	 instruction	 was	 given.	 Immediately	 after	 that	
familiarization	 phase,	 participants	 were	 administered	 a	 surprise	 Old/New	 recognition	
memory	test	 involving	the	48	targets	together	with	26	new,	unstudied,	unknown	faces.	
The	purpose	of	this	short	testing	session	was	to	assert	that	each	participant	had	correctly	
incidentally	 encoded	 the	 48	 unknown	 target	 faces.	 Following	 the	 recognition	 test,	
participants	 remained	 in	 the	 Mock	 scanner	 and	 received	 the	 instructions	 and	 some	
practice	trials	for	the	real-fMRI	study	phase.	Importantly,	groups	did	not	differ	regarding	
their	 fame	 judgment	 performance,	 with	 similar	 accuracy	 across	 all	 items	 (U=132;	
p=0.357;d=-0.183;	95%CI:	 [-0.514;	0.196])	as	well	as	considering	more	specifically	 the	PEK	
faces	(U=122;p=0.215;d=-0.245;	95%CI:	[-0.560;	0.133]).	
Study	phase	(inside	the	scanner).	45	minutes	after	the	familiarization	phase,	participants	
again	 underwent	 a	 short	 practice	 session	 of	 the	 study	 task.	 The	 critical	 trials	 required	
subjects	 to	explicitly	 learn	 face-scene	associations.	Each	stimulus	was	presented	 for	3.5	
seconds,	 and	 then	 the	 participant	 had	 1.5	 second	 to	 decide	 whether	 the	 background	
scene	was	congruent	or	not	with	the	face.	The	congruency	task	was	designed	to	ensure	
that	 enough	 attention	 was	 paid	 to	 both	 the	 face	 and	 the	 scene	 at	 encoding,	 and	
participants	were	explicitly	instructed	that	they	would	be	further	tested	for	their	memory	
of	the	associations.	The	arrow	task	(C.	E.	L.	Stark	&	Squire,	2001)	was	adapted	and	used	as	
an	active	baseline,	and	jittered	white	fixation	crosses	were	displayed	between	trials.	The	
schedule	 of	 events	 was	 optimized	 via	 Optseq2	 (Dale		 M.,	 1999).	 Each	 run	 started	 and	
ended	 with	 a	 4	 seconds	 fixation	 cross,	 and	 included	 44	 events:	 16	 EK,	 16	 PEK	 and	 12	
Arrow.	In	total,	48	EK	and	48	PEK	trials	were	repeated	once	so	that	each	study	event	was	
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presented	twice	across	6	runs.	Median	lag	between	two	identical	events	was	8	minutes,	
without	 repetitions	within	 a	 run.	 Lag	 durations	 between	 two	 occurrences	 of	 the	 same	
stimulus	 were	 similar	 for	 PEK	 and	 EK	 events	 (670	 vs.	 630	 seconds	 for	 EK	 &	 PEK,	
respectively,	U=5035;	p=0.268;	d=0.093;	95%CI:	[-0.071;	0.251]).	The	order	of	the	runs	was	
counterbalanced	across	participants.	
Test	 phase	 (outside	 the	 scanner).	20	minutes	 after	 the	 study	phase,	 participants	were	
administered	 a	 recognition	 memory	 test	 in	 a	 quiet	 room	 close	 to	 the	 scanner.	 Target	
faces	were	randomly	mixed	with	foils,	and	participants	had	to	make	an	Old/New	decision	
by	 reference	 to	 the	 study	 phase.	 This	 provided	 a	 measurement	 of	 item	 memory,	 i.e.	
memory	 for	 faces	only.	After	Hit	 responses	 (i.e.	 “Old”	 responses	 to	 a	 target	 face),	 the	
face	was	presented	again	together	with	two	scenes,	one	featuring	a	beach	and	the	other	
one	countryside,	both	corresponding	to	scenes	used	during	the	study	phase.	Participants	
were	instructed	to	choose	the	correct	source,	namely	the	scene	associated	with	the	face	
at	study.	This	provided	a	behavioral	proxy	for	associative	memory	accuracy.	The	order	of	
presentation	was	fully	randomized	across	participants.	
Fame	 judgment	 phase	 (oustide	 the	 scanner).	 5	minutes	 after	 the	 test	 phase,	 subjects	
were	 shown	 again	 all	 the	 faces	 from	 the	 test	 phase	 and	 asked	 to	 make	 a	
“Famous/Unknown”	 judgment.	 As	 a	 result,	 any	 PEK	 or	 EK	 stimulus	 yielding	 inaccurate	
responses	 at	 that	 step	was	 removed	 from	 further	 analysis.	 This	 allowed	us	 to	 contrast	
truly	famous	(i.e.	items	associated	with	PEK)	vs.	truly	unknown	(i.e.	items	associated	with	
EK	 due	 to	 the	 familiarization	 phase	 only)	 on	 an	 individual	 basis.	 The	 participants	were	
very	accurate,	ranging	from	77	to	100%.	
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Behavioral	data	analysis	
Item	recognition	memory	performance	 indices	(faces	only,	Hits	and	False	Alarm	rates)	
were	 computed	 within	 the	 signal	 detection	 theory	 framework.	 Following	 Verde	 et	 al.,	
(2006),	 Az	 was	 computed	 to	 estimate	 sensitivity,	 namely,	 how	 well	 participants	
discriminated	 between	 targets	 and	 distractors.	 Accordingly,	 we	 computed	 a	 non-
parametric	 indice	 of	 bias	B"	 after	 Grier,	 (1971).	 These	 indices	 were	 preferred	 to	 the	
parametric	d’	 and	C	 indices	 of	 sensitivity	 and	 bias,	 respectively,	 for	 their	 superior	
robustness	to	the	underlying	assumptions	regarding	responses	distributions	(Stanislaw	&	
Todorov,	1999;	Verde	et	al.,	2006),	and	corresponding	formulae	were	implemented	using	
a	dedicated	Excel	workbook	(Gaetano,	J.	M.	(2017).	Signal	detection	theory	calculator	1.2	
[Excel	 workbook	 downloaded	 from	
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Justin_Gaetano2/]).	 Associative	 learning	
performance	was	estimated	through	source	memory	accuracy.	Source	memory	refers	to	
the	ability	to	correctly	recall	the	context	that	was	associated	to	the	target	item	at	study.	
Here,	 we	measured	 source	memory	 as	 the	 conditional	 probability	 of	 a	 Source	 Hit	 (i.e.	
giving	a	correct	source	response)	given	an	Item	Hit	(i.e.	giving	a	correct	“Old”	response	
to	a	 target	 face),	which	 is	 a	 classical	behavioral	proxy	 for	associative	memory	accuracy	
(Cooper	et	al.,	2017).	Repeated-measures	ANOVAs	were	ran	to	explore	whether	the	kind	
of	 prior	 knowledge	 (EK	 vs.	 PEK)	 altered	 sensitivity	 (item	 memory),	 bias,	 associative	
memory	 (item	 +	 context	 memory),	 both	 within	 and	 between	 groups.	 Parametric	
statistical	 testing	 was	 used	 when	 the	 assumptions	 of	 normality	 and	 variance	 equality	
were	 met.	 Otherwise,	 non-parametric	 methods	 were	 used.	 Analyses	 were	 performed	
using	 the	 JASP	 software	 (https://jasp-stats.org,	 JASP	 Team	 (2018).	 JASP	 (Version	 0.9)	
[Computer	software]).	
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Structural	and	functional	imaging	
Image	acquisition	
Participants	were	 scanned	 using	 a	 3-T	 Siemens	 Verio	MRI	 system	 equipped	with	 a	 32	
channels	 phased-array	 whole-head	 coil.	 High-resolution	 (1x1x1	 mm3)	 MPRAGE	 T1-
weighted	 images	were	 collected	 for	 anatomical	 visualization	 and	 normalization.	 Blood-
oxygen	 level	dependent	(BOLD)	 functional	 images	were	collected	using	a	T2*-weighted	
single-shot	 spin-echo	 EPI	 sequence	 with	 the	 following	 parameters:	 repetition	 time	 =	
2,000	ms,	echo	time	=	30	ms,	3x3x3.6	mm3	voxel	size,	192x192mm3	field-of-view,	64x64	
matrix,	 slice	 thickness	 =	 3.6mm,	 36	 slices,	 parallel	 imaging	 (GRAPPA)	 factor	 2,	 echo-
spacing	 0.51ms,	 bandwith	 2368Hz/Px,	 spacing	 between	 slices	 =	 3.6	mm.	A	 total	 of	 840	
volumes	divided	 in	6	sessions	(runs)	of	140	volumes	were	acquired	for	each	participant.	
Each	session	lasted	4	minutes	and	40	seconds.	The	task	was	run	in	EPrime	2.0	on	a	PC.	A	
mirror	device	allowed	participants	to	see	the	stimuli,	and	they	gave	their	responses	using	
a	two-button	response	handgrip.			
fMRI	data	preprocessing	
Image	preprocessing	was	performed	using	SPM	12	(https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).	
For	 each	 participant,	 a	 subset	 of	 T2-weighted	 images	was	 randomly	 selected	 for	 visual	
checking.	Functional	images	were	then	corrected	for	slice	acquisition	temporal	delay	and	
spatially	 realigned	 to	 the	 across-run	mean	 image	 to	 correct	 for	 subject’s	motion.	 Then,	
they	 were	 coregistered	 to	 the	 T1-weighted	 anatomical	 image	 and	 normalized	 to	 the	
Montreal	 Neurological	 Institute	 (MNI)	 stereotactic	 space	 at	 a	 2x2x2	 mm³	 resolution	
before	 being	 spatially	 smoothed	 using	 an	 8	mm3	 full	width	 at	 half	maximum	Gaussian	
kernel.	
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fMRI	data	analysis	
For	 each	 participant,	 a	 general	 linear	 model	 (GLM)	 was	 estimated	 voxelwise.	 The	
experimental	 design	 for	 the	 individual	 statistical	 analysis	 was	 modelled	 with	 thirteen	
regressors:	a	3x2x2	factorial	design	plus	a	regressor	for	the	active	baseline	condition.	The	
regressors	of	interest	referred	to	subsequent	memory	(Source	Hit	(SH),	Source	Miss	(SM)	
and	Miss	(M)),	prior	knowledge	status	(EK,	PEK)	and	the	occurrence	of	a	stimulus	(first,	
second).	 Events	 of	 interest	 (face-scene	 associations)	 were	 modelled	 with	 3.5s	 boxcar	
functions	and	a	3s	boxcar	function	was	used	to	model	the	active	baseline	task,	but	null	
events	 (i.e.	 jittered	 fixation)	 were	 not	modelled	 (Pernet,	 2014;	 C.	 E.	 L.	 Stark	 &	 Squire,	
2001)	 The	 regressors	 of	 interest	 were	 convolved	 with	 the	 canonical	 hemodynamic	
response	 function.	 Head	motion	 (6	 parameters	 estimated	 during	 the	 realignment	 pre-
processing	 step)	 and	 magnetic	 field	 drift	 were	 also	 modelled	 and	 included	 as	
confounding	factors.	At	the	group	level,	contrast	images	from	the	subject-level	analyses	
were	used	to	perform	a	one-sample	t-test	and	evaluate	the	contrasts	of	 interest	group-
wise.	Two	sample	t-tests	were	also	performed	to	probe	differences	between	groups.	An	
individual	 voxel	 threshold	 of	 p<0.005	 was	 used	 with	 a	 cluster	 extent	 threshold	 of	 57	
contiguous	voxels	to	correct	for	multiple	comparisons	(FWE)	at	p	<	0.05.	This	cluster	size	
extent	 was	 computed	 using	 Monte	 Carlo	 simulations	 (N=10,000	 iterations)	 (Slotnick,	
2017;	Slotnick,	Moo,	Segal,	&	Hart,	2003).	For	a	recent	example	of	a	similar	thresholding	
approach,	see	(Thakral,	Wang,	&	Rugg,	2017).	
This	factorial	design	setup	allowed	to	estimate	our	main	contrast	of	interest,	namely	the	
interaction	 between	 the	 effect	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 and	 of	 Repetition	 (Presentation1	 –	
Presentation2):	 {PEKp1	–	PEKp2	–	EKp1	+	EKp2},	where	PEK	and	EK	 include	SH,	SM	&	M	
regressors	 for	 each	 prior	 knowledge	 type.	 The	 other	 contrasts	 of	 interest	 were	 the	
“Encoding”	 contrast	 (i.e.	 all	 regressors	 of	 interest	 minus	 active	 baseline)	 and	 the	
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“Repetition	 Suppression”	 contrast	 across	 memory	 and	 prior	 knowledge	 type	 (i.e.	 all	
regressors	 corresponding	 to	 the	 first	 presentation	 set	 at	 1	 vs.	 -1	 for	 the	 regressors	
corresponding	 to	 the	 second	 presentation).	 Our	 analysis	 workflow	 thereafter	 involved	
the	following	three	steps.	
First,	 we	 investigated	 whether	 repetition	 effects	 did	 allow	 us	 to	 identify	 the	 brain	
networks	 involved	 in	 explicit	 encoding	 of	 our	 stimuli.	 It	 is	 well	 acknowledged	 that	
repetition	 of	 stimuli	 can	 result	 in	 decreased	 (“Repetition	 Suppression”)	 or	 increased	
(“Repetition	 Enhancement”)	 of	 the	 BOLD	 signal,	 in	 brain	 areas	 consistent	 with	 the	
ongoing	processing,	an	observation	also	referred	to	as	“Neural	adaptation”	(Grill-Spector	
et	 al.,	 2006).	 Neural	 adaptation	 have	 been	 successfully	 used	 to	 map	 functional	 brain	
networks,	 notably	 memory	 encoding	 (Rand-Giovannetti	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Reggev,	 Bein,	 &	
Maril,	2016)	and	especially	 face	encoding	(R.	N.	Henson,	2016;	R.	N.	A.	Henson,	Shallice,	
Gorno-Tempini,	&	Dolan,	2002).	We	therefore	performed	a	conjunction	analysis	between	
the	 Encoding	 and	 Repetition	 Suppression	 contrasts,	 and	 expected	 this	 to	 highlight	
common	activations	within	the	bilateral	visual	ventral	streams.	Second,	we	computed	the	
Prior	 Knowledge	 x	 Repetition	 interaction	 contrast	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 prior	
knowledge	may	modulate	brain	activity	corresponding	to	associative	encoding.	Clusters	
identified	through	this	contrast	were	further	explored	with	repeated-measures	ANOVAs	
on	 the	 extracted	 beta	 weights.	 Third,	 beta-weights	 corresponding	 to	 the	 memory	
regressors	 were	 extracted	 within	 the	 above-defined	 clusters	 to	 further	 look	 for	
subsequent	 associative	memory	 effects.	 For	 that	 purpose,	 repeated-measures	ANOVAs	
were	computed	with	the	following	4	regressors	of	 interest:	EK-SH;	EK-SM;	PEK-SH;	PEK-
SM.	Here,	we	focused	on	whether	SH	and	SM	differed	for	EK,	PEK,	or	both.	Importantly,	
only	 beta	 weights	 associated	 with	 the	 first	 occurrence	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	
regressors	were	 taken	 into	account	 for	 the	subsequent	memory	analysis,	 thus	avoiding	
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confusion	 between	 memory	 and	 repetition	 effects,	 and	 keeping	 the	 interaction	 and	
subsequent	memory	 analyses	 orthogonal.	 One	 can	 refer	 to	 (Reggev	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 for	 a	
recent	similar	approach	coupling	repetition	and	subsequent	memory	effects.	
Results	
Behavioral	results	
Neuropsychological	and	AD	biomarkers	findings	
See	 Table	 1	 for	 the	 sociodemographic,	 global	 cognition	 and	 biomarkers	 data.	 AD-MCI	
patients	matched	Controls	for	age,	gender,	education,	and	premorbid	Verbal	IQ,	but	their	
mean	MMSE	scores	were	significantly	 lower.	Measurements	of	hippocampal	volumes	 in	
both	groups	confirmed	the	expected	atrophy	in	the	patient	group.	
	 Healthy	Controls	 AD-MCI	 p	values	
N	 19	 17	 -	
Age,	years,	mean	(SD)	[range]		 68.3	(4.4)	[61-75]	 69.7	(4.1)	[63-76]	 0.435	
Gender,	F:M	 9	:	10	 8	:	9	 0.985	
Education,	years,	mean	(SD)	[range]	 12.8	(3.3)	[8-19]	 11.1	(3.1)	[8-18]	 0.129	
Premorbid	VIQ,	mean	(SD)	[range]	 110	(7.8)	[91-119]	 105	(8.7)	[91-123]	 0.083	
MMSE,	mean	(SD)	[range]	 28.5	(1.3)	[26-30]	 25.5	(2.0)	[23-29]	 <0.001	
Hippocampal	volumes,	normalized	%	of	TIV,	mean	(SD)	[range]		 	 	 	
Right	 0.28	(0.03)	[0.20-0.33]		 0.24	(0.03)	[0.17-0.30]	 <0.001	
Left	 0.27	(0.02)	[0.23-0.32]	 0.23	(0.03)	[0.17-0.28]	 <0.001	
Total	 0.55	(0.04)	[0.47-0.65]	 0.46	(0.06)	[0.34-0.58]	 <0.001	
Biomarkers	of	Amyloidopathy	 	 	 	
CSF-Abeta42,	mean	(SD)	[range],	cut-off	=	700	 -	 569.3	(128.4)	[426-735]	 -	
Florbetapir-AV45	 -	 All	positive	 -	
Table	1.	Demographic,	clinical	and	AD	biomarkers	characteristics	of	the	participants.	
	
Finally,	biomarkers	of	amyloidopathy	were	obtained	for	14/17	patients	(Abeta42	dosage	
in	 CSF,	 or	 abnormal	 amyloid	 retention	 using	 18F-AV-45-PET	 Scanner).	 Albeit	 missing	
evidence	 of	 amyloidopathy	 for	 3	 patients,	 our	 AD-MCI	 sample	 therefore	 fulfills	 the	
research	diagnostic	criteria	for	AD	as	the	etiology	of	their	cognitive	impairments	(Albert	
et	al.,	2011).	The	detailed	neuropsychological	background	of	the	participants	 is	provided	
as	 Supplementary	 Materials.	 AD-MCI	 patients	 matched	 Controls	 for	 anxiety	 and	
depression,	 however	 they	 reported	 significantly	 more	 forgetfulness	 than	 controls.	
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Similarly,	as	a	group,	AD-MCI	essentially	presented	impairments	in	recall	and	recognition	
tests.	
Familiarization	and	Study	phases	
Detailed	 results	 are	 provided	 in	 Supplementary	 Materials.	 Briefly,	 congruency	
judgments	were	similar	across	groups	during	 the	 familiarization	phase,	and	 importantly	
accuracy	and	forgetting	rates	(i.e.	%	Misses)	did	not	differentiate	between	Controls	and	
AD-MCI	at	 immediate	 recognition.	During	the	scanning	phase	 (i.e.	at	study),	we	did	not	
observe	 any	 difference	 between	 groups	 for	 face-scene	 congruency	 judgments,	 and	
within-groups	 analyses	 revealed	 that	 PEK	 and	 EK	 stimuli	 yielded	 similar	 congruency	
ratings.	As	expected,	 fastening	of	 responses	 times	with	 repetition	was	observed	within	
each	group,	despite	AD-MCI	being	overall	 slower	 than	Controls.	 This	 repetition	priming	
effect	was	 influenced	by	 the	 kind	of	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 Controls,	 being	 larger	 for	 PEK	
stimuli.	In	AD-MCI	however,	priming	effects	were	similar	for	PEK	and	EK.	
Test	and	fame	judgment	phases	
Figure	 2	 illustrates	 the	 main	 results	 from	 the	 test	 phase.	 The	 same	 pattern	 of	
behavioural	 results	 was	 found	 for	 sensitivity	 and	 source	 memory:	 PEK	 stimuli	 led	 to	
higher	 sensitivity	 and	 source	 memory	 than	 EK	 stimuli	 in	 Controls,	 but	 not	 in	 AD-MCI	
patients,	 resulting	 in	 significant	 Group	 x	 PK	 interactions	 (Sensitivity:	 F(1,34)=5.771;	
p=0.022;	 η2=0.141;	 Source	 memory:	 F(1,34)=13.05;	 p<0.001;	 η2=0.189).	 However,	 Prior	
Knowledge	 did	 not	 alter	 response	 bias	 in	 either	 group	 (Controls:	 t(18)=1.703;	 p=0.106;	
d=0.391;	 95%CI:[-0.081	 ;	 0.853];	 AD-MCI:	 t(16)	 =-1.030;	 p=0.318;	 d=0.250;	 95%CI:[-0.237	 ;	
0.729]).	
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Figure	2.	Controls	and	AD-MCI	performance	during	at	test.	Memory	for	faces	only	(left)	and	for	face-scenes	
associations	(right)	was	improved	for	PEK	stimuli	in	Controls,	but	not	in	AD-MCI.	*	=	p<.05	
	
Imaging	results	
	
A	conjunction	analysis	between	the	Repetition	Suppression	and	the	Encoding	contrasts	
yielded	activations	within	occipital	and	occipito-temporal	regions,	along	the	visual	ventral	
pathways	 (see	 illustration	 in	 Supplementary	 Materials),	 in	 both	 groups.	 Thus,	 as	
expected,	 neural	 adaptation	 (in	 that	 case,	 repetition	 suppression)	 allows	 the	
identification	of	functional	networks	involved	in	our	visual	encoding	task.	
Prior	Knowledge	X	Repetition	interaction	
Figure	 3	 summarizes	 the	 imaging	 findings	 for	 the	 Prior	 Knowledge	 x	 Repetition	
interaction	 contrast.	 For	 the	 sake	of	 concision,	 the	 results	 for	 simple	 contrasts	 are	 not	
displayed	here,	and	the	reader	is	referred	to	the	Supplementary	Materials	for	the	list	of	
supra-threshold	clusters	identified	for	the	main	effects	of	Prior	Knowledge	[i.e.	PEK	vs	EK	
stimuli	 encoding]	 and	 of	 Repetition	 [i.e.	 Neural	 adaptation	 for	 PEK	 and	 EK	 stimuli	
repetition].	
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In	 Controls,	 the	 interaction	 contrast	 revealed	 activations	within	 three	 sets	 of	 regions:	
bilateral	inferior	temporal	lobes	and	occipito-temporal	cortices,	including	MTL	structures;	
bilateral	 medial	 and	 lateral	 parietal	 structures;	 left	 ventromedial	 and	 dorsolateral	
prefrontal	 cortices.	 Multiple	 ANOVAs	 revealed	 four	 distinct	 patterns	 of	 activations	
resulting	 in	 these	 interactions	 (see	 Figure	 3).	Overall,	we	 found	 that	 PEK	 stimuli	 led	 to	
repetition	 enhancement	 while	 EK	 stimuli	 yielded	 repetition	 suppression.	 One	 notable	
exception	 was	 the	 finding	 of	 a	 left	 posterior	 hippocampal	 and	 a	 right	 temporal	 pole	
clusters,	where	decreased	signal	in	response	to	PEK	was	observed.	By	contrast,	EK	stimuli	
always	led	to	repetition	suppression	effects.	Thus,	fMRI	response	to	repeated	face-scene	
associative	encoding	 is	clearly	altered	by	 the	prior	knowledge	associated	with	 the	 face.	
We	 found	 that	 in	 ventral	 and	 dorsal	 prefrontal	 cortices,	 but	 also	 bilateral	 occipito-
temporal	regions,	up	to	the	perirhinal	cortex	in	the	right	hemisphere,	PEK	and	EK	yielded	
repetition	 enhancement	 and	 repetition	 suppression,	 respectively.	 But	 we	 also	 found	
regions	where	neural	adaptation	was	specific	to	either	prior	knowledge.	So	was	it	for	the	
parietal	 clusters,	 showing	 repetition	 enhancement	 for	 PEK,	 while	 bilateral	 occipital	
regions	showed	suppression	effects	for	EK	only.	In	Controls,	our	results	thus	support	the	
idea	 that	 partly	 non-overlapping	 networks	 underlie	 PEK-	 and	 EK-based	 associative	
encoding,	but	also	that	distinct	prior	knowledge	generate	opposite	neural	adaptation.	
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Figure	3.	fMRI	Prior	Knowledge	x	Repetition	interaction	contrast.	(A1-4)	Distinct	patterns	of	fMRI	responses	in	Controls.	
For	each	pattern	one	plot	illustrates	the	neural	adaptation	effects	found	within	a	given	cluster.	For	example,	the	first	
plot	shows	that	within	the	left	vmPFC,	opposite	neural	adaptation	effects	were	found	for	PEK	vs.	EK	stimuli,	resulting	in	a	
significant	interaction	that	was	similar	within	all	the	orange	clusters.	(B)	Significant	clusters	resulting	from	two	samples	
t-test	with	Group	as	between-subjects	variable	for	the	interaction	contrast.	Plots	illustrate	the	fMRI	responses	in	each	
group.	Asterisks	indicate	p<0.05.	
In	 AD-MCI	 participants,	 the	 interaction	 contrast	 did	 not	 yield	 any	 significant	 cluster.	
However,	two	samples	t-tests	yielded	differences	between	the	groups	for	this	interaction	
contrast	 within	 two	main	 clusters	 located	 in	 the	 bilateral	 inferior	 temporal	 lobes	 (see	
Figure	3).	Two	smaller	 clusters	within	 the	 right	medial	 temporal	 lobe	did	not	 reach	our	
clustering	 threshold,	 but	 proved	 significant	 after	 small	 volume	 correction	 for	 medial	
temporal	lobe	structures	(as	defined	with	the	AAL	template	(Tzourio-Mazoyer	2002	REF),	
p<.05;	 FWE-corrected):	 right	 hippocampus	 (k=	 22;	main	 peak	 18	 -8	 -12)	 and	 right	 lateral	
perirhinal	 cortex	 (k=	 21;	main	peak	 34	 -16	 -36).	 To	 further	 investigate	 this	 effect,	mixed	
ANOVAs	 with	 Group	 as	 between-subjects	 factor,	 Prior	 Knowledge	 and	 Repetition	 as	
within-subjects	 factors	were	 conducted	 on	 the	mean	 beta	weights	 extracted	 from	 the	
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group	 differences	 clusters	 (see	 Figure	 3).	 These	 analyses	 revealed	 the	 absence	 of	
repetition	 effects	 in	 the	 AD-MCI	 group,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 PEK	 stimuli,	 yielding	
repetition	 suppression	 in	 the	 right	 hippocampus.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 the	 same	 cluster,	
controls	also	presented	a	suppression	effect,	but	for	EK	stimuli.	In	Controls,	the	bilateral	
fusiform	gyrus	and	right	 lateral	perirhinal	cortex	displayed	enhanced	signal	 for	PEK	and	
suppressed	signal	for	EK.	These	findings	suggest	that	early	AD	impairs	neural	adaptation	
effects,	more	specifically	in	the	regions	showing	repetition	enhancement	for	PEK	stimuli.	
However,	 these	 results	 only	 relate	 to	 the	 cognitive	 processes	 involved	 in	 explicit	
associative	 encoding.	 We	 further	 investigated	 whether	 these	 findings	 also	 hold	 for	
successful	associative	encoding	in	the	next	section.	
Subsequent	Associative	Memory	effects	
We	extracted	the	beta	weights	associated	with	the	subsequent	memory	events	at	study	
within	 the	 data-driven	 ROIs	 highlighted	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 (Source	Hits,	 reflecting	
accurate	 associative	 memory,	 Source	 Misses,	 reflecting	 accurate	 item,	 but	 inaccurate	
associative	 memory,	 and	 Misses,	 reflecting	 forgetfulness	 of	 the	 face,	 see	 Methods	
section).	 We	 then	 looked	 for	 subsequent	 associative	 memory	 effects	 (i.e.	 significant	
differences	between	Source	Hits	and	Source	Misses).	First,	we	did	so	within	the	clusters	
derived	 from	 Controls;	 second,	 we	 applied	 the	 same	 approach	 in	 the	 clusters	 derived	
from	the	effect	of	group	on	 the	 interaction	contrast	 (see	previous	section).	The	aim	of	
these	 analyses	was	 twofold:	 1)	 Do	 the	 regions	 involved	 during	 associative	 encoding	 of	
PEK	 vs.	 EK	 stimuli	 also	 play	 a	 role	 for	 successful	 associative	 memory	 formation	 in	
Controls?	 2)	 Do	 the	 regions	 exhibiting	 between-groups	 differences	 for	 the	 Prior	
Knowledge	 x	 Repetition	 interaction	 contrast	 also	 display	 differential	 subsequent	
associative	memory	effects	between	groups?	
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In	 Controls,	 we	 found	 subsequent	 associative	 memory	 effects	 for	 both	 PEK	 and	 EK	
stimuli	within	the	left	middle	occipital	and	occipito-temporal	areas,	as	well	as	within	the	
left	vmPFC.	However,	a	series	of	regions	showed	selective	associative	memory	effects	for	
PEK,	 or	 EK	 stimuli	 (see	 Supplementary	 materials	 for	 illustration).	 Activity	 in	 the	 left	
DLPFC	and	in	the	right	medial	temporal	lobe,	including	the	perirhinal	cortex,	were	higher	
for	PEK	Source	Hits	than	PEK	Source	Misses,	but	did	not	discriminate	source	memory	for	
EK	 stimuli.	 Conversely,	 bilateral	 precuneus,	 left	 fusiform	 gyrus,	 left	 posterior	
hippocampus,	 and	 a	 right-sided	 area	 including	 the	 posterior	 angular	 gyrus	 were	 more	
activated	for	EK	Source	Hits	than	EK	Source	Misses.	
Between	groups	comparisons	are	 illustrated	 in	Figure	4,	and	yielded	two	main	results.	
Controls	 and	 AD-MCI	 showed	 similar	 subsequent	 associative	 memory	 effects	 for	 EK	
stimuli	within	the	right	hippocampus	(albeit	only	reaching	p	=	0.051	in	the	patient	group).	
However,	the	cluster	including	the	right	perirhinal	cortex	and	the	fusiform	gyrus	showed	
higher	fMRI	response	for	PEK	Source	Hits	than	Misses,	but	only	in	Controls.	Moreover,	we	
found	 that	 the	 subsequent	 associative	 memory	 contrast	 estimates	 (i.e.	 beta	 weights	
difference	 between	 Source	 Hits	 and	 Source	Misses)	 in	 that	 region	 correlated	with	 the	
behavioural	source	accuracy	measure	for	PEK	stimuli	across	participants	(r=0.344;	p=0.02;	
95%IC	[0.072	–	1.000]).	Interestingly,	in	Controls,	the	same	area	displayed	opposite	neural	
adaptation	depending	on	the	kind	of	prior	knowledge:	 repetition	enhancement	for	PEK	
stimuli,	and	repetition	suppression	for	EK	stimuli	(see	also	Supplementary	Materials	 for	
the	list	of	the	main	effects	behind	the	Repetition	x	Prior	Knowledge	interaction	contrast).	
Thus,	we	found	that	in	AD-MCI,	critical	regions	within	the	right	medial	temporal	lobes,	as	
defined	through	the	interaction	contrast	between	repetition	and	prior	knowledge,	could	
either	normally	 contribute	 to	associative	memory	 formation	 for	EK,	or	 fail	 to	 show	 the	
normal	 activation	 involved	 in	 associative	memory	 for	 PEK.	As	 a	 reminder,	 this	must	 be	
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considered	in	the	context	of	our	behavioural	findings	that	AD-MCI	patients	fail	to	present	
PEK-related	 improvement	 of	 associative	 learning,	 which	 we	 now	 address	 in	 the	
discussion.	
	
Figure	4.	Subsequent	associative	memory	effects	within	data-driven	ROIs	resulting	from	group	differences	for	the	Prior	
Knowledge	x	Repetition	interaction	contrast.	
Discussion	
	
Here,	we	aimed	at	 investigating	associative	 learning	 supported	by	prior	 knowledge	 in	
early	AD,	and	its	neural	underpinnings.	For	that	purpose,	we	asked	controls	and	AD-MCI	
patients	to	 learn	new	face-scene	associations	where	the	face	could	be	either	famous	or	
unknown	 but	 repeatedly	 presented	 to	 the	 participants	 prior	 to	 study.	 We	 found	 that	
associative	 learning	 depending	 on	 PEK	 (i.e.,	 famous	 face)	was	 impaired	 in	 our	 AD-MCI	
sample	whereas	it	increased	by	28%	in	controls,	by	comparison	with	learning	of	EK	stimuli	
(i.e.	 unknown	 faces).	 Imaging	 data	 revealed	 that	 in	 AD-MCI,	 neural	 adaptation	 across	
face-scene	encoding	trials	was	impaired,	and	did	not	interact	with	prior	knowledge,	while	
the	pattern	of	fMRI	responses	in	controls	showed	a	differential	recruitment	of	encoding	
		 286	
networks	depending	on	the	kind	of	prior	knowledge.	Subsequent	memory	analyses	finally	
showed	that	right	medial	temporal	lobe	structures	were	critical	for	the	formation	of	new	
associative	 memories.	 However,	 AD-MCI	 displayed	 impaired	 activation	 within	 a	 right	
subhippocampal	region	found	to	correlate	with	subsequent	memory	for	PEK	in	Controls.	
As	 we	 further	 discuss,	 these	 findings	 needs	 further	 confirmation	 but	 they	 may	 have	
important	 consequences	 on	 early	 AD	 assessment,	 and	 they	 bring	 new	 insights	 on	 the	
nature	of	the	early	memory	impairment	in	prodromal	AD.	More	generally,	they	call	for	a	
thorough	consideration	of	the	role	of	prior	knowledge	in	new	learning.	
Associative	learning	impairment	in	early	AD	is	underestimated	
The	idea	that	prior	knowledge	available	at	encoding	enables	better	learning	is	not	new	
(see	 Bartlett,	 1932;	 Tolman,	 1948).	 The	 advantage	 of	 famous	 over	 unknown	 faces	 in	
subsequent	recognition	memory	had	been	put	forward	before	(Ellis	et	al.,	 1979;	Klatzky	
and	Forrest,	1984;	Leveroni	et	al.,	2000;	Reder	et	al.,	2013).	However,	past	studies	typically	
contrasted	 encoding	 of	 novel	 (unknown)	 stimuli	 with	 familiar	 ones,	 thus	 leading	 to	
confusion	as	to	whether	the	benefits	of	prior	knowledge	simply	arise	from	a	bonus	due	to	
multiple	prior	exposures.	Here,	we	contrasted	unknown	faces	repeatedly	presented	right	
before	 explicit	 encoding	with	 famous	 faces,	 thus	 ensuring	 that	both	PEK	and	EK	 items	
were	 familiar	 at	 study.	 Moreover,	 we	 used	 a	 source	 memory	 paradigm	 to	 estimate	
associative	 learning	 to	 further	 focusing	on	 the	specific	 influence	of	prior	knowledge	on	
memory	 at	 encoding,	 greatly	 minimized	 its	 influence	 at	 retrieval	 (see	 Poppenk	 et	 al.,	
2010a).	 Our	 results	 thus	 strengthen	 the	 idea	 that	 in	 healthy	 aging,	 when	 lifelong	
accumulated	knowledge	about	a	face	is	available	at	encoding,	it	enhances	the	formation	
of	a	new	long-term	memory,	far	beyond	what	could	be	expected	due	to	multiple	recent	
exposures.	Recently,	it	has	been	reported	that	the	reliance	upon	semantic	knowledge	to	
enhance	 episodic	 learning	 could	 alleviate	 the	 decline	 of	 associative	 memory	 with	 age	
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(Badham,	 Estes,	 &	 Maylor,	 2012;	 Badham	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Bastin	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Umanath	 &	
March,	 2014).	 Our	 sample	 of	 AD-MCI	 patients	 clearly	 failed	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 such	
semantic	knowledge,	which	could	therefore	reflect	a	critical	feature	dissociating	healthy	
aging	 from	 early	 AD.	 This	 deserves	 further	 investigation	 within	 a	 longitudinal	 study	
framework.	Another	 important	consequence	of	 the	present	study	stems	from	the	early	
diagnosis	perspective.	Repeated	unfamiliar	stimuli	are	typically	used	to	probe	memory	in	
clinical	settings.	Such	tests	closely	match	the	EK	condition	used	here	(multiple	exposures	
of	 unfamiliar	 items),	where	AD-MCI	patients	performed	 fairly	well.	One	must	 therefore	
consider	that	we	might	well	underestimate	the	actual	associative	memory	impairments	in	
early	AD	patients.	
Prior	knowledge,	new	learning	and	the	level-of-processing	framework	
Such	findings	are	more	generally	consistent	with	the	level-of-processing	framework	(F.	
I.	 M.	 Craik	 &	 Lockhart,	 1972),	 predicting	 that	 deeper	 processing	 at	 encoding,	 resulting	
from	semantic	knowledge	activation	for	famous	faces,	will	be	more	likely	associated	with	
the	 formation	of	 a	new	 long-term	memory	 than	more	 shallow	encoding	 resulting	 from	
the	absence	of	 any	prior	 knowledge.	 In	 the	present	 study,	 the	 finding	 that	 in	Controls,	
response	fastening	due	to	repetition	priming	was	higher	 for	PEK	than	EK	stimuli	 seems	
consistent	 with	 an	 interpretation	 in	 terms	 of	 semantic	 knowledge	 activation	 during	
learning.	Such	activation	of	pre-experimental	semantic	knowledge	may	not	be	feasible	in	
early	 AD,	 a	 hypothesis	 that	 is	 consistent	 with	 reports	 of	 early	 person	 knowledge	
impairment	in	the	course	of	AD	(e.g.	Barbeau	et	al.,	2012;	Brambati	et	al.,	2012;	Joubert	et	
al.,	 2010,	2008).	The	 findings	 that	 in	AD-MCI	patients,	 repetition	priming	was	similar	 for	
PEK	and	EK	stimuli	would	fit	with	this	interpretation.	Yet,	while	this	could	explain	the	PEK	
advantage	for	item	memory,	it	hardly	accounts	for	the	finding	of	28%	increased	accuracy	
for	item	in	context,	i.e.	associative,	memory	in	controls.	
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This	 finding	 is	 in	 line	with	 recent	 reports	 of	 a	 “familiarity	 bonus”	 on	 source	memory	
(Poppenk	 et	 al.,	 2010a,	 2010b;	 Poppenk	 and	 Norman,	 2012),	 albeit	 more	 rarely	
investigated	in	older	adults	(Badham	et	al.,	2012;	Naveh-Benjamin,	Hussain,	Guez,	&	Bar-
On,	 2003).	 Two	main	 accounts	 have	 been	 proposed	 so	 far.	 First,	 it	 has	 been	 proposed	
that	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 (corresponding	 to	 PEK	 stimuli	 here)	 reduces	 the	
attentional	resources	required	at	encoding	to	build	up	a	new	association	(e.g.	see	Castel	
and	 Craik,	 2003;	 Naveh-benjamin	 and	 Craik,	 1998),	 by	 comparison	 with	 novel	 stimuli.	
Given	that	here,	both	PEK	&	EK	stimuli	were	familiar	to	participants	at	study,	this	account	
seems	 unlikely.	 Second,	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 level-of-processing	 framework	 would	
suggest	 that	 famous	 faces	 should	 generate	 more	 elaborative	 processing	 at	 encoding,	
enriching	the	events	representation	(Bein	et	al.,	2015).	 In	turn,	enriched	representations	
would	become	more	distinctive	and	therefore	less	prone	to	interference	at	retrieval.	This	
second	 possibility	 better	 fits	 our	 data,	 again	 suggesting	 that	 disrupted	 semantic	
knowledge	 about	 persons	 in	 early	 AD	 can	 impair	 elaborative	 encoding.	 However,	
preserved	repetition	priming	effect	in	AD-MCI	(LaVoie	&	Faulkner,	2008;	O’Shea,	De	Wit,	
Yutsis,	Castro,	&	Smith,	2018),	 increased	by	repeated	exposure	prior	to	the	study	phase,	
may	explain	their	fair	performance	for	EK	stimuli.	What	remains	to	be	elucidated	in	future	
studies,	is	the	nature	of	such	“elaborative	encoding”.	We	can	speculate	on	one	promising	
candidate	here.	It	has	been	suggested	that	unitization	strategies	at	encoding	can	alleviate	
the	associative	 learning	deficit	 in	aging	(Bastin	et	al.,	2013;	Delhaye	&	Bastin,	2016),	but	
not	in	early	AD	(D’Angelo	et	al.,	2016),	possibly	due	to	perirhinal	cortex	atrophy	(Delhaye	
et	al.,	2019,	2018).	The	role	of	the	perirhinal	cortex	in	the	computational	requirements	of	
such	 unitization	 have	 already	 been	 highlighted	 in	 healthy	 subjects	 (Diana	 et	 al.,	 2010;	
Haskins,	Yonelinas,	Quamme,	&	Ranganath,	2008).	Following	this	hypothesis,	one	would	
predict	 that	 face-scene	 associations	 could	 have	 benefited	 unitization	 strategies	 more	
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easily	for	PEK	than	EK	stimuli,	at	least	in	controls,	but	not	in	AD-MCI.	This	PEK	advantage,	
in	 turn,	 should	 critically	 rely	 upon	 the	 subhippocampal	 structures	 involved	 in	 visual	
associative	learning.	As	we	discuss	below,	our	imaging	data	speak	for	this	interpretation.	
Recent	and	remote	prior	knowledge	dissociates	encoding	brain	networks	
Our	finding	that	 in	controls,	a	series	of	brain	regions	displayed	a	significant	interaction	
between	 neural	 adaptation	 and	 prior	 knowledge	 suggests	 that	 encoding	 networks	 are	
sensitive	 to	 the	nature	of	pre-existing	representations	associated	with	 the	memoranda.	
The	 fact	 that	a	common	set	of	 regions	displayed	opposite	 repetition	effects	depending	
on	 the	 kind	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	 neural	 adaptation	 is	 not	 an	
automatic	brain	response	to	stimulus	repetition	(Henson	et	al.,	2002)	and	further	extends	
it	 in	 elderly	 subjects.	 Repetition	 enhancement	 has	 been	 recently	 thought	 to	 reflect	
explicit	 or	 implicit	 successful	 retrieval,	 while	 repetition	 suppression	 would	 reflect	 the	
reduced	 involvement	 of	 an	 encoding	 network	 (Kim,	 2017).	 Noteworthy,	 the	 regions	
displaying	 opposite	 neural	 adaptation	 effects	 for	 PEK	 vs.	 EK	 stimuli	 in	 controls	 are	
consistently	reported	in	subsequent	memory	and	/	or	successful	retrieval	studies	(Ventral	
and	 dorsal	 prefrontal	 cortices,	 bilateral	 occipito-temporal	 regions,	 up	 to	 the	 perirhinal	
cortex;	 Kim,	 2013,	 2011;	 Maillet	 and	 Rajah,	 2014;	 Spaniol	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Thus,	 repetition	
suppression	found	for	EK	stimuli	along	the	visual	ventral	stream	may	reflect	the	reduced	
engagement	 of	 a	 visual	 encoding	 network	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 pre-existing	 semantic	
knowledge.	By	contrast,	repetition	enhancement	for	PEK	stimuli	in	the	same	regions	may	
reflect	 successful	 retrieval	 of	 pre-existing	 knowledge,	 along	 with	 the	 involvement	 of	
congruency	 detection	 processes,	 as	 reflected	 by	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 vmPFC.	 This	
region	 indeed	 plays	 a	 critical	 role	 in	 the	 detection	 of	 congruency	 between	 incoming	
perceptual	 processing	 and	 pre-existing	 knowledge,	 or	 “schemas”	 (Van	 Kesteren	 et	 al.,	
2012;	 see	 also	 Bein	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 The	 observation	 of	 repetition	 enhancement	 for	 PEK	
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stimuli	within	the	right	angular	gyrus,	with	no	repetition	effect	on	EK	stimuli,	also	 lends	
support	to	this	interpretation,	since	this	area	forms	a	hub	for	the	representation	of	prior	
knowledge	(Gilboa	&	Marlatte,	2017;	Wagner	et	al.,	2015).	Similarly,	repetition	suppression	
observed	for	EK	stimuli	in	bilateral	occipital	gyri,	with	no	effect	for	PEK,	could	reflect	the	
simple	 detection	 of	 prior	 occurrence,	 as	 it	 is	 usually	 reported	 in	 subsequent	 memory	
studies	 for	 visual	 materials.	 Finally,	 our	 finding	 of	 suppressed	 fMRI	 response	 for	 PEK	
stimuli	 in	 the	 posterior	 medial	 temporal	 lobe	 is	 consistent	 with	 its	 role	 in	 associative	
encoding,	especially	when	pre-existing	knowledge	 is	available	(de	Chastelaine,	Mattson,	
Wang,	 Donley,	 &	 Rugg,	 2016).	 Taken	 together,	 our	 findings	 therefore	 underlines	 the	
dynamic	 nature	 of	 new	 associative	 encoding	 in	 elderly,	 which	 seems	 to	 entail	 distinct	
mechanisms	along	with	partly	non-overlapping	neural	networks	depending	on	the	kind	of	
prior	knowledge	 involved.	More	 specifically,	 in	 the	presence	of	 remote,	 semantic,	prior	
knowledge,	 enhanced	 activity	 is	 observed	 in	 regions	 involved	 in	 memory	 retrieval,	
schema	detection,	and	visual	encoding.	However,	when	recent,	episodic-like,	pre-existing	
representations	are	available,	due	to	recent	multiple	exposures,	repetition	suppression	is	
observed	 in	 a	 visual	 encoding	 network,	 including	 regions	 involved	 in	 the	 detection	 of	
prior	occurrence	across	the	successive	learning	trials.	
This	 pattern	 of	 interactions	 between	 prior	 knowledge	 and	 neural	 adaptation	 was	
severely	 impaired	 in	 AD-MCI.	 The	 direct	 comparison	 between	 patients	 and	 controls	
revealed	 that	 regions	 pertaining	 to	 the	 anterior	 ventral	 stream	 showed	 the	 above-
mentioned	pattern	 in	controls,	 i.e.	signal	suppression	for	EK	and	enhancement	for	PEK,	
while	 no	 neural	 adaptation	 was	 found	 in	 AD-MCI.	 The	 only	 exception	 being	 a	 right	
hippocampal	cluster	where	patients	displayed	suppressed	fMRI	response	for	PEK,	while	
this	effect	was	observed	for	EK	stimuli	in	controls.	Thus,	repetition	enhancement	for	PEK	
stimuli	 observed	 in	 controls	 was	 apparently	 absent,	 or	 aberrant	 in	 AD-MCI	 (i.e.	
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suppression	instead	of	enhancement,	see	also	Supplementary	Materials	for	the	detailed	
within-groups	repetition	effects).	Our	results	therefore	extends	prior	findings	of	impaired	
neural	adaptation	in	early	AD	(Pihlajamäki,	Depeau,	Blacker,	&	Sperling,	2008;	Pihlajamäki	
et	al.,	2011),	and	further	suggest	that	stimulus	repetition	during	 learning	yields	aberrant	
neural	 adaptation	 in	 AD	 when	 remote,	 semantic,	 prior	 knowledge	 is	 available	 at	
encoding.	We	further	discuss	whether	these	results	are	informative	regarding	associative	
memory	formation.	
Lack	of	semantic	retrieval	 in	early	AD	critically	contributes	to	the	associative	encoding	
impairment	
A	 core	 finding	 of	 the	 present	 study	may	 at	 first	 sight	 look	 counter-intuitive.	 Namely,	
subsequent	 associative	 memory	 effects	 for	 EK	 stimuli	 were	 found	 in	 the	 right	
hippocampus	in	both	groups,	while	the	effect	was	found	in	the	right	perirhinal	/	fusiform	
area	for	PEK	stimuli	only	 in	controls.	This	might	look	surprising	given	the	acknowledged	
role	of	 the	hippocampal	shrinkage	 in	early	memory	 impairments	 in	AD.	However,	 it	has	
been	suggested	that	some	forms	of	declarative	learning	could	only	minimally	rely	on	the	
hippocampal	system,	as	long	as	pre-existing	representations	are	available	and	congruent	
with	 the	 memoranda	 (e.g.	 Fernández	 and	 Morris,	 2018;	 Van	 Kesteren	 et	 al.,	 2012).	
Interestingly,	 amnesic	 patients	with	 damage	 limited	 to	 the	 hippocampal	 formation	 can	
benefit	this	congruency	effect	at	a	close-to-normal	level,	whereas	amnesic	patients	with	
damage	 extended	 to	 the	 subhippocampal	 structures	 do	 not	 display	 any	 congruency	
benefit	in	new	learning	(Kan	et	al.,	2009).	Considering	that	tau	pathology	in	AD	primarily	
targets	these	subhippocampal	structures	(entorhinal	and	perirhinal	cortices),	rather	than	
the	hippocampal	formation	itself	(Braak	&	Braak,	1995),	it	has	been	suggested	that	at	the	
early	 stages	 of	 the	 disease,	 context-free	 memories	 and	 specifically	 knowledge	 about	
unique	 entities	 like	 faces,	 could	 be	 amongst	 the	 first	 memory	 representations	 to	 be	
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damaged	 (Didic	et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	AD-MCI	 sample	 in	 the	present	 study	 included	patients	
with	 quite	 mild	 cognitive	 impairments,	 mostly	 limited	 to	 impaired	 performances	 in	
memory	 tests.	 An	 interesting	 possibility	 here	 is	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 subsequent	
associative	 memory	 effect	 for	 PEK	 stimuli	 within	 the	 right	 anterior	 subhippocampal	
structures	in	our	AD-MCI	sample	could	reflect	the	early	disruption	of	semantic	knowledge	
retrieval	 about	 famous	 faces.	 Support	 for	 this	 interpretation	 comes	 from	 our	 findings	
that	 in	 controls,	 activity	within	 right	 subhippocampal	 structures	 and	 left	middle	 frontal	
gyrus	predicts	successful	associative	encoding	for	PEK,	not	EK	stimuli.	These	frontal	and	
temporal	areas	have	consistently	been	associated	with	semantic	retrieval	(Barbeau	et	al.,	
2012;	 Joubert	 et	 al.,	 2008,	 2010;	 Kapur	 et	 al.,	 1994;	Martin,	 2007;	 Pineault	 et	 al.,	 2018).	
Moreover,	we	 found	 that	 activity	 in	 this	 subhippocampal	 cluster	 in	 controls	 correlated	
with	associative	memory	for	PEK,	not	EK,	stimuli.	Consequently,	 it	may	well	be	the	case	
that	semantic	retrieval	at	study	is	critical	for	the	successful	formation	of	new	face-scene	
associations	in	controls,	a	process	impaired	in	AD-MCI.	
Conclusion	
The	 present	 findings	 bring	 new	 evidence	 for	 a	 critical	 difference	 in	 the	way	 early	 AD	
patients	 and	 healthy	 elderly	 form	 new	 associative	 memories.	 Pre-experimental	 prior	
knowledge	proved	beneficial	for	subsequent	memory	formation	in	normal	aging,	in	a	way	
suggesting	 higher	 encoding	 elaboration	 resulting	 from	 accurate	 semantic	 memory	
retrieval.	 Importantly,	 prior	 knowledge	 associated	with	 remote	 semantic	 knowledge	or	
prior	 knowledge	 resulting	 from	 recent	 repeated	 exposures	 dissociated	 the	 neural	
correlates	of	 associative	encoding.	 In	early	AD	however,	 tau	pathology	may	 specifically	
target	brain	networks	involved	in	associative	encoding	when	prior	semantic	knowledge	is	
involved,	 which	 opens	 new	 perspectives	 in	 the	 assessment	 and	 early	 detection	 of	 the	
disease.	
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Supplementary	Materials	
	
1. List	of	the	tests	used	and	neuropsychological	background	
	
	
Healthy	Controls	 AD-MCI	 p	values	
mean	(sd)	 mean	(sd)	 	
Global	cognition	
	 	 	
MDRS	
	 	 	
	
Global	score,	max=144	 141.2	(1.8)	 130.8	(6.5)	 <0.001	
	
Attention,	max=37	 36.2	(1.0)	 36.1	(0.9)	 0.696	
	
Initiation,	max=37	 36.7	(0.7)	 31.5	(4.3)	 <0.001	
	
Construction,	max=6	 6.0	(0.0)	 6.0	(0.0)	 -	
	
Concepts,	max=39	 37.7	(1.7)	 37.3	(1.6)	 0.308	
	
Memory,	max=25	 24.6	(0.7)	 20.7	(3.6)	 <0.001	
Memory	 	 	 	
	 Logical	Memory,	WMS-III,	Immediate	recall	 41.9	(6.8)	 18.1	(7.6)	 <0.001	
	 Logical	Memory,	WMS-III,	Delayed	recall	 25.8	(5.0)	 3.8	(4.1)	 <0.001	
	 DMS-48,	pictures,	max=48	 46.2	(2.2)	 41.2	(4.3)	 <0.001	
	 DMS-48,	words,	max=48	 40.1	(3.9)	 31.9	(4.8)	 <0.001	
	 Warrington	Memory	Test	(Faces),	max=50	 41.2	(4.5)	 35.6	(6.5)	 0.005	
Naming	 	 	 	
	 D.O.	80,	max=80	 78.3	(1.5)	 76.2	(3.5)	 0.046	
Limb	praxis	 	 	 	
	 Symbolic	gestures,	max=5	 4.9	(0.2)	 4.6	(0.6)	 0.056	
	
Tools	pantomimes,	max=10	 9.5	(0.8)	 9.1	(1.2)	 0.253	
	
Imitation	of	abstract	gestures,	max=8	 7.6	(0.8)	 6.7	(1.0)	 0.003	
Executive	functions	
	 	 	
	
Trail	Making	Test	Part	A	(seconds)	 33.5	(9.0)	 42.5	(10.0)	 0.007	
	
Trail	Making	Test	Part	B	(seconds)	 70.2	(21.6)	 133.0	(55.9)	 <0.001	
	
Trail	Making	Test	Part	B	(errors)	 0.5	(1.0)	 0.9	(0.9)	 0.043	
	
Stroop	test	
	 	 	
	
Naming	(seconds)	 61.1	(8.1)	 79.6	(16.4)	 <0.001	
	 Naming	(errors)	 0.6	(1.2)	 2.3	(2.7)	 0.009	
	 Reading	(seconds)	 43.3	(5.0)	 48.4	(7.7)	 0.045	
	 Reading	(errors)	 0.3	(0.7)	 0.06	(0.3)	 0.339	
	 Interference	(seconds)	 106.7	(14.0)	 165.4	(65.2)	 <0.001	
	 Interference	(errors)	 1.5	(3.3)	 4.8	(4.2)	 0.003	
	 Flexibility	(seconds)	 123.1	(20.3)	 211.8	(80.8)	 <0.001	
	 Flexibility	(errors)	 5.4	(5.4)	 11.2	(6.8)	 0.002	
	 Verbal	Fluency	 	 	 	
	 Letter	"R",	90	seconds,	nb.	Correct	 	 	 0.012	
	 Category	"Fruits",	90	seconds,	nb.	Correct	 	 	 <0.001	
Anxiety	&	Depression	 	 	 	
	
Spielberger	STAY-B,	raw	score	 35.5	(6.9)	 38.9	(8.7)	 0.214	
	
Beck	Depression	Inventory-II,	raw	score	 4.8	(5.7)	 7.4	(6.6)	 0.296	
Subjective	forgetting	
	 	 	
	
Memory	Self-Evaluation	Questionnaire,	mean	score	 2.2	(0.5)	 2.7	(0.5)	 0.003	
	
Supplementary	Table	1.	Neuropsychological	background	of	the	participants.	MDRS=Mattis	Dementia	
Rating	Scale;	DMS=Delayed	Matching	to	Sample	procedure	(Barbeau	et	al.,	2004)	consisting	in	a	3	
minutes	delayed	2-alternate	forced	choice	recognition	memory	test;	D.O.	80=“Test	de	denomination	
orale	de	80	images”,	Deloche	&	Hannequin,	1997;	Stroop	test	was	taken	from	Chatelois	et	al.,	1993;	
Verbal	fluency	test:	Cardebat	et	al.,	1990.	
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2. Behavioral	results	from	the	familiarization	and	study	phases	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Supplementary	Table	2.	Response	times	during	the	study	phase.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Supplementary	Figure	1.	Repetition	priming	effects	on	Response	Times	in	Controls	(left)	and	AD-MCI	
(right).	Black	circles	=	PEK;	White	circles	=	EK.	Error	bars	show	%95	IC	around	the	mean.	AD-MCI	
displayed	slower	RTs	overall,	but	presented	a	significant	priming	effect	(i.e.	RT	fastening	for	both	
PEK	&	EK	stimuli).	However,	the	amplitude	of	priming	in	Controls	was	higher	for	PEK	than	for	EK	
stimuli	(significant	PK	x	Repetition	interaction,	F=13.388;	p<0.001;	η²=0.014),	while	it	did	not	differ	
with	the	kind	of	PK	in	AD-MCI	(non-significant	PK	x	Repetition	interaction,	F=0.667;	p=0.414;	
η²=0.001).	
	
	 	
	 	 Controls	 AD-MCI	
Presentation	 Prior	Knowledge	
Response	times	
Mean	(sd)	
Response	times	
Mean	(sd)	
First	 EK	 653.7	(223.4)	 775.2	(294.9)	
First	 PEK	 681.3	(254.9)	 781.2	(291.1)	
Second	 EK	 628.0	(219.6)	 726.2	(275.3)	
Second	 PEK	 611.6	(200.8)	 716.5	(263.9)	
Controls AD-MCI 
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3. Conjunction	analysis:	Repetition	Suppression	and	Encoding	contrasts	
	
	
Supplementary	Figure	2.	Significant	overlaps	between	{Encoding}	and	{Repetition	suppression}	
contrasts	maps	in	Controls,	p<0.005	corrected.	The	right-sided	3D	view	illustrates	the	significant	
clusters	from	the	conjunction	analysis;	the	left-sided	coronal	view	focuses	on	two	subregions	of	the	
conjunction	map,	located	in	the	vicinity	of	FFA	and	PPA.	Note	that	in	AD-MCI	patients,	the	same	
analysis	yielded	activation	in	the	Left	Parahippocampal	Place	Area	only,	albeit	at	an	uncorrected	
p=0.005	threshold	(k=19	voxels,	peak	mni	coordinates=	-26;	-48;	-12).	
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4. List	of	supra-threshold	clusters	for	the	main	effects	of	Prior	Knowledge	and	Repetition	
	
Group	 Contrast	 x	 y	 z	 k	 T	 Label	
Co
nt
ro
ls
	
PEK>EK	
-58	 -8	 -10	 5510	 10,47	 Temporal_Mid_L	
-32	 36	 -6	 12144	 8,99	 Frontal_Inf_Orb_L	
-6	 -52	 12	 2277	 8,78	 Precuneus_L	
30	 40	 -8	 1102	 7,42	 Frontal_Inf_Orb_R	
50	 -66	 36	 825	 6,68	 Angular_R	
66	 -4	 -18	 663	 6,58	 Temporal_Mid_R	
66	 -10	 26	 61	 6,48	 Postcentral_R	
28	 -14	 -10	 1599	 6,37	 Hippocampus_R	
-14	 -4	 -6	 117	 5,51	 Pallidum_L	
20	 8	 22	 300	 5,45	 Caudate_R	
-16	 8	 10	 176	 5,05	 Caudate_L	
-8	 0	 46	 62	 4,66	 Cingulum_Mid_L	
-18	 -78	 8	 95	 4,56	 Calcarine_L	
-24	 -14	 34	 102	 4,51	 Caudate_L	
20	 -96	 20	 81	 4,32	 Occipital_Sup_R	
0	 -88	 4	 198	 3,88	 Calcarine_L	
10	 -14	 54	 89	 3,71	 Supp_Motor_Area_R	
28	 -30	 -14	 23	 4,57	 ParaHippocampal_R	
EK>PEK	 58	 -34	 50	 179	 5,33	 Parietal_Inf_R	
RS	EK	
12	 -6	 48	 62	 6,52	 Supp_Motor_Area_R	
42	 -16	 -36	 687	 6,44	 Fusiform_R	
-42	 -16	 -42	 200	 6,29	 Temporal_Inf_L	
-12	 -90	 20	 438	 5,64	 Occipital_Sup_L	
56	 -72	 18	 991	 5,56	 Temporal_Mid_R	
-28	 -50	 -6	 128	 5,51	 Lingual_L	
-52	 -14	 -2	 76	 4,92	 Temporal_Sup_L	
-40	 14	 -34	 158	 4,42	 Temporal_Pole_Mid_L	
22	 -50	 -12	 126	 4,28	 Fusiform_R	
50	 44	 -16	 85	 4,13	 Frontal_Inf_Orb_R	
RS	PEK	
-34	 -88	 30	 674	 7,29	 Occipital_Mid_L	
-12	 -58	 -4	 180	 5,44	 Lingual_L	
-62	 -4	 -6	 88	 5,39	 Temporal_Mid_L	
46	 -78	 2	 1256	 5,27	 Occipital_Mid_R	
-44	 16	 -32	 117	 4,81	 Temporal_Pole_Mid_L	
38	 -42	 -22	 62	 4,69	 Fusiform_R	
16	 -76	 18	 75	 4,33	 Calcarine_R	
48	 18	 -28	 93	 4,26	 Temporal_Pole_Mid_R	
8	 70	 16	 83	 4,22	 Frontal_Sup_Medial_R	
-54	 -66	 34	 102	 3,79	 Angular_L	
RE	PEK	
70	 -24	 -12	 426	 6,58	 Temporal_Mid_R	
62	 -50	 42	 1400	 6,54	 Parietal_Inf_R	
4	 -18	 36	 371	 5,47	 Cingulum_Mid_R	
42	 50	 8	 506	 5,33	 Frontal_Mid_R	
-64	 -28	 -12	 126	 5,1	 Temporal_Mid_L	
-42	 -62	 58	 276	 5,07	 Parietal_Sup_L	
34	 -14	 -38	 78	 4,72	 Fusiform_R	
10	 -56	 36	 350	 4,72	 Precuneus_R	
-38	 46	 36	 201	 4,43	 Frontal_Mid_L	
-40	 58	 18	 153	 4,13	 Frontal_Mid_L	
-20	 54	 -10	 99	 3,88	 Frontal_Sup_Orb_L	
	
Supplementary	Table	3.	List	of	suprathreshold	clusters	for	the	main	effects	of	Repetition	and	Prior	
Knowledge.	PEK=Pre-Experimental	Knowledge;	EK=Experimental	Knowledge;	RS=Repetition	
Suppression;	RE=Repetition	Enhancement	
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M
CI
	
PEK	>	EK	
30	 -12	 -12	 343	 6,94	 Hippocampus_R	
-58	 -8	 -16	 429	 6,13	 Temporal_Mid_L	
-18	 18	 40	 1101	 5,95	 Frontal_Sup_L	
26	 42	 50	 197	 5,48	 Frontal_Sup_R	
54	 -8	 -12	 288	 5	 Temporal_Sup_R	
0	 -56	 22	 698	 4,99	 Precuneus_L	
-34	 -30	 -30	 138	 4,83	 Cerebelum_4_5_L	
-48	 10	 -44	 94	 4,71	 Temporal_Inf_L	
30	 -36	 4	 153	 4,3	 Hippocampus_R	
54	 26	 28	 72	 4,17	 Frontal_Inf_Tri_R	
-48	 -40	 -2	 68	 3,9	 Temporal_Mid_L	
-2	 62	 38	 203	 3,9	 Frontal_Sup_Medial_L	
70	 -36	 0	 57	 3,78	 Temporal_Mid_R	
62	 -64	 16	 131	 3,6	 Temporal_Mid_R	
-14	 0	 -32	 51	 4,67	 ParaHippocampal_L	
36	 -16	 -40	 46	 3,73	 Fusiform_R	
EK	>	PEK	 20	 -68	 40	 96	 3,93	 Occipital_Sup_R	
RS	PEK	 20	 -6	 -12	 82	 5,48	 Hippocampus_R	28	 -36	 4	 101	 4,01	 Hippocampus_R	
RE	PEK	
18	 48	 -8	 75	 5,21	 Frontal_Sup_Orb_R	
-38	 -72	 54	 67	 4,67	 Angular_L	
-18	 16	 -10	 77	 4,11	 Putamen_L	
HC>MCI	
PKE	
-14	 -6	 -4	 57	 4,36	 Thalamus_L	
-48	 40	 26	 88	 4,26	 Frontal_Mid_L	
-44	 6	 30	 535	 4,19	 Frontal_Inf_Oper_L	
4	 72	 2	 103	 3,86	 Frontal_Sup_Medial_R	
10	 -78	 56	 65	 3,62	 Precuneus_R	
RepPEK	 -62	 -4	 -6	 126	 6,04	 Temporal_Mid_L	-46	 14	 -32	 69	 4,45	 Temporal_Pole_Mid_L	
MCI>HC	 RepPEK	
32	 -14	 -40	 74	 3,88	 Fusiform_R	
-40	 46	 34	 129	 3,78	 Frontal_Mid_L	
68	 -24	 -14	 57	 3,44	 Temporal_Mid_R	
20	 -6	 -12	 8	 3,55	 Hippocampus_R	
	
Supplementary	Table	3	(next).	List	of	suprathreshold	clusters	for	the	main	effects	of	Repetition	
and	Prior	Knowledge.	PEK=Pre-Experimental	Knowledge;	EK=Experimental	Knowledge;	
RS=Repetition	Suppression;	RE=Repetition	Enhancement	
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5. 
Subsequent	associative	m
em
ory	in	Controls	
	
	
Supplem
entary	Figure	3.	Subsequent	associative	m
em
ory	effects	w
ithin	data-driven	RO
Is	resulting	from
	the	Prior	Know
ledge	x	Repetition	interaction	contrast	in	
Controls.	Blue	circles	depict	Subsequent	Associative	M
em
ory	effects	for	EK	stim
uli	only;	Yellow
	circles	signal	Subsequent	Associative	M
em
ory	effects	for	PEK	stim
uli	only.	
Regions	show
ing	associative	m
em
ory	effects	for	both	PEK	and	EK	stim
uli	are	not	show
n	(see	text).	
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Experiment	5:	Back	to	patient	KA.	Does	prior	knowledge	increase	new	learning	
despite	severe	amnesia?	
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Highlights	from	Experiment	5	
	
	
There	 is	 a	 dearth	 of	 studies	 investigating	 whether	 prior	 knowledge	 can	 benefit	
recognition	 memory	 in	 patients	 with	 hippocampal	 damage.	 Considering	 memory	 for	
faces,	 available	 evidence	 actually	 suggests	 that	 familiar	 memoranda	 would	 hinder	
memory,	leaving	unaffected	memory	for	unfamiliar	items	processed	as	a	single	entity.	
In	 the	 following	 Experiment,	 patient	 KA	 with	 extensive	 and	 selective	 damage	 to	 the	
extended	 hippocampal	 system	 shows	 preserved	 recognition	 memory	 for	 unknown,	
familiarized	and	famous	faces.	
	
He	also	performs	at	a	fair	level	for	face-scene	associations	in	the	case	of	famous	faces,	
and	displays	similar	high-confidence	Hits	as	controls.	
	
These	 findings	 suggest	 that	 item	 conceptual	 processing	 at	 encoding	 may	 enable	
successful	context-free	and	context-rich	learning,	even	when	the	hippocampal	system	is	
severely	compromised.	
	
Whether	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 promotes	 unitization,	 thus	 enhancing	 familiarity-
based	 recognition	 of	 novel	 associations,	 or	 fastens	 consolidation	 in	 a	 hippocampus-
independent	manner	needs	further	investigation.	
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Introduction	
	
One	of	 the	greatest	 challenge	 for	 the	neuropsychology	 and	 cognitive	neurosciences	of	
memory	is	to	provide	a	consensual	account	for	preserved	declarative	learning	abilities	in	
amnesia.	While	the	description	of	the	syndrome	of	developmental	amnesia	has	provided	
evidence	 for	 this	 preservation	 (Vargha-Khadem	 et	 al.,	 1997),	 in	 this	 thesis	 we	 have	
contributed	to	strengthen	this	observation	with	the	case	report	of	patient	KA	(Jonin	et	
al.,	2018).	Rather	than	bringing	additional	evidence	for	the	view	of	separate	episodic	and	
semantic	 stores	 (for	 evidence	 against	 normal	 semantic	 memory	 in	 developmental	
amnesia,	see	Blumenthal	et	al.,	2017),	the	case	of	patient	KA	suggests	that	very	efficient	
declarative	 learning	 processes	 can	 take	 place	 even	 after	 severe	 damage	 to	 the	 whole	
extended	 hippocampal	 system.	 Here	 we	 argue	 for	 “very	 efficient”	 processes	 because	
patient	 KA,	 in	 striking	 contrast	 with	 previous	 cases,	 proved	 to	 have	 supra-normal	
semantic	knowledge	in	some	domains.	
However,	the	question	remains	as	to	how	new	declarative	memories	have	been	learned,	
and	actually	no	consensual	account	has	shown	up	so	far.	Even	worse,	 recent	ambitions	
regarding	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 rapid	 neocortical	 learning	 could	 benefit	 patients	 with	
developmental	amnesia	under	“fast-mapping”	learning	conditions	have	just	turned	into	a	
dashed	hope	(Cooper,	Greve,	&	Henson,	2018;	Elward,	Dzieciol,	&	Vargha-Khadem,	2019).	
Still,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 regions	of	 the	 temporal	 pole	 as	well	 as	 rhinal	 cortices	
could	 support	new	declarative	 learning,	even	after	damage	 to	 the	hippocampal	 system	
(e.g.	Vargha-Khadem	et	al.,	1997).	Moreover,	some	models	of	cognitive	learning	suggest	
that	 these	 structures	 could	 support	 rapid	 learning	 as	 long	 as	 the	 sensory	 input	 is	
congruent	 with	 prior	 knowledge	 (e.g.	 REMERGE;	 Kumaran	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 2016),	 or	 that	
congruency	 with	 existing	 memory	 schemas	 could	 fasten	 system	 consolidation	 (Van	
Kesteren	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Similarly,	 the	 PMAT	 framework	 underlines	 the	 role	 of	 prior	
experiences	 (i.e.	 “situation	 models”	 for	 context	 representations,	 and	 conceptual	
knowledge	for	items	representations)	in	the	formation	of	new	memories	(Ritchey	et	al.,	
2015).	These	theoretical	accounts	generally	put	forward	the	rhinal	cortices,	and	especially	
the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 as	 a	 core	 structure	 that	 could	 support	 hippocampal-independent	
explicit	learning.	
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For	 example,	 several	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 unitization	 strategies	 at	 encoding	 (i.e.	
encoding	instructions	emphasizing	the	integration	of	separate	elements	in	a	single	entity)	
can	benefit	recognition	memory,	and	that	such	benefit	is	related	to	the	activity	or	volume	
of	the	perirhinal	cortex	(e.g.	Delhaye	et	al.,	2019;	Diana	et	al.,	2010;	Haskins	et	al.,	2008).	
Interestingly,	 this	 line	 of	 research	 has	 also	 provided	 evidence	 that	 associative	memory	
could	be	increased	for	unitized	vs.	non-unitized	word	pairs	in	amnesic	patients,	but	only	
with	 presumably	 preserved	 perirhinal	 cortices	 (Quamme	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 A	 consistent	
feature	 in	 these	studies	 is	 that	 the	unitization	condition	 involves	conceptual	processing	
that	 allows	 the	 attribution	 of	 a	 single	 meaning	 to	 separate	 elements.	 In	 the	 typical	
paradigm,	a	pair	of	unrelated	words,	e.g.	“Cloud	–	Lawn”	is	presented	in	a	unitization	or	
standard	 condition.	 In	 the	 standard	 condition,	 the	 word	 pair	 is	 presented	 with	 the	
sentence	“The_____	could	be	seen	from	the	_____”,	and	the	subjects	have	to	rate	how	
well	 each	 item	 in	 the	 pair	 fits	 with	 the	 corresponding	 blank	 in	 the	 sentence.	 In	 the	
unitized	condition,	the	pair	is	presented	together	with	the	definition	“A	yard	used	for	sky-
gazing”,	and	participants	have	to	rate	how	well	the	pair	fits	with	the	definition	(Quamme	
et	al.,	2007;	Haskins	et	al.,	2008;	Delhaye	et	al.,	208).	Similarly,	 the	unitization	condition	
used	 in	 Diana	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 required	 participants	 to	 imagine	 a	 study	 item	 (words	 were	
used)	as	if	it	were	coloured	with	a	colour	displayed	as	an	external	feature	(background),	
then	 to	 read	 a	 short	 sentence	 explaining	 why	 the	 item	 is	 that	 colour,	 and	 rate	 the	
difficulty	of	the	imagery	task.	Again	here,	“unitization”	actually	involves	some	conceptual	
integration	 between	 separate	 features.	 Our	 view	 is	 that	 the	 conceptual	 processing	
involved	 in	 these	paradigms	might	be	 an	 important	 factor	 for	 successful	 unitization.	 In	
support	of	 this	view,	Staresina	&	Davachi,	 (2010)	 found	 that	when	unitization	demands	
are	varied	by	use	of	perceptual	rather	than	conceptual	integration,	it	is	not	modulated	by	
perirhinal	cortex	activity,	but	rather	can	be	achieved	earlier	in	the	ventral	stream.	
An	 interesting	 possibility	 therefore	 is	 that	 conceptual	 processing	 triggered	 by	 prior	
knowledge	 available	 at	 encoding	 may	 enable	 perirhinal-dependent	 (or,	 “Anterior	
Temporal”	AT	system-dependent)	explicit	learning.	So	far,	the	experiments	performed	in	
the	present	thesis	have	brought	some	relevant	findings	to	this	issue.	
First,	in	patient	KA,	we	have	brought	evidence	for	left	MTL	reorganization	in	that	the	left	
temporal	pole	and	left	perirhinal	cortices	were	either	preserved,	or	thicker	than	matched	
controls.	Paralleling	these	findings,	patient	KA	proved	faster	than	controls	in	some	tasks	
requiring	 time-constraint	 familiarity	 detection,	 and	performed	better	 than	 controls	 in	 a	
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few	semantic	 tasks.	 It	 is	 therefore	 tempting	 to	 speculate	 that	 such	MTL	 reorganization	
“favouring”	grey	matter	density	within	the	 left	anterior	and	subhippocampal	structures	
might	be	involved	in	preserved	learning	abilities.	
Second,	we	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 prior	 knowledge,	 and	 especially	 pre-experimental	
knowledge	 resulting	 from	 multiple,	 lifelong	 exposures,	 is	 a	 very	 powerful	 learning	
enhancer.	Strikingly,	our	results	along	with	emerging	studies	(Badham	et	al.,	2012,	2015;	
Badham	&	Maylor,	2015;	see	also	Umanath	&	Marsh,	2014)	suggest	that	this	effect	could	
be	immune	to	aging.	Moreover,	elderly	could	disproportionately	benefit	from	that	kind	of	
prior	 knowledge	 by	 comparison	 with	 their	 younger	 counterparts.	 Thus,	 it	 might	 be	
reasonable	to	argue	that	brain	structures	highly	sensitive	to	aging	 like	the	hippocampal	
formation	would	not	be	critical	to	underlie	these	prior	knowledge	benefits	in	learning.	
Third,	Experiment	4	 in	the	present	thesis	has	confirmed	that	the	elderly	benefited	from	
pre-experimental	prior	knowledge	far	more	than	experimental	knowledge	(namely,	pre-
study	familiarization	with	the	memoranda),	and	this	was	true	for	associative	memory	as	
well.	 In	 sharp	 contrast	 however,	 patients	 with	 early	 AD	 could	 not	 benefit	 from	 pre-
experimental	 knowledge,	 and	 we	 found	 that	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 was	 involved	 here.	
Indeed,	patients	with	early	AD	did	not	show	any	subsequent	associative	memory	effect	
for	pre-experimental	memoranda	in	that	region.	
We	 therefore	 reasoned	 that	 patient	 KA	 could	 rely	 on	 prior	 knowledge	 accumulated	
across	countless	previous	episodes	to	scaffold	new	explicit	 learning,	and	that	this	could	
be	critically	 related	to	his	preserved	extra-hippocampal	structures	 in	the	temporal	 lobe.	
Indirect	support	for	this	idea	came	from	the	dissociation	observed	in	patient	KA	between	
intact	 context-free	 learning	 for	 meaningful	 objects	 and	 severely	 impaired	 context-free	
learning	for	abstract,	meaningless	visual	patterns	(see	Experiment	2).	Thus,	the	material-
specific	effect	observed	in	preserved	learning	abilities	for	patient	KA	(see	also	Cipolotti	et	
al.,	2006;	Bird	et	al.,	2007)	could	be	related	to	the	semantic	status	of	the	materials	 (for	
recent	evidence	along	this	line,	see	(Brady,	Alvarez,	&	Sto,	2019;	MacKenzie,	Alexandrou,	
Hancock,	&	Donaldson,	2018).	We	investigated	this	hypothesis	by	adapting	the	design	of	
Experiment	3b	for	patient	KA.	
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Materials	&	methods	
	
Participants	
	
Patient	 KA	 and	 16	 healthy	 controls	 provided	 their	 informed	 consent	 to	 participate.	
Controls	data	were	taken	from	Experiment	3b,	to	match	as	closely	as	possible	regarding	
age,	gender	(all	males)	and	education	with	the	patient.	
Procedure	
	
The	procedure	was	the	same	as	described	in	Experiment	3b.	Briefly,	in	the	familiarization	
phase,	participants	were	 first	presented	with	a	set	of	unknown	faces	associated	with	a	
random	occupation,	 and	 had	 to	 rate	whether	 the	 association	was	 plausible	 or	 not.	 No	
learning	instruction	was	given	and	subjects	were	told	that	the	test	investigated	subjective	
aspects	of	face	perception.	Each	face-occupation	association	(N=32)	was	presented	three	
times	 in	a	 fully	 randomized	order.	After	a	25	minutes	break,	 the	study	 task	 involved	96	
face-scene	 association	 trials,	 again	 presented	 in	 a	 random	 order.	 Along	 with	 the	 32	
familiarized	 faces	 (Experimental	 Knowledge	 or	 EK	 condition),	 the	 64	 remaining	 trials	
involved	 32	 entirely	 unknown	 faces	 (Novelty	 condition)	 and	 32	 famous	 faces	 (Pre-
Experimental	 Knowledge	 or	 PEK	 condition).	 For	 each	 face-scene	 association,	 subjects	
were	 asked	 to	 imagine	 that	 they	were	walking	 into	 the	 scene	 and	meeting	 the	person	
depicted	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 screen,	 then	 to	 rate	 how	 pleasant	 or	 unpleasant	 this	
situation	would	be.	Emphasis	was	put	on	the	need	to	answering	on	the	basis	of	both	the	
scene	 and	 the	 face,	 not	 only	 on	 either	 element	 of	 the	 “episode”.	 After	 a	 10	 minutes	
break,	 the	 recognition	 memory	 test	 started.	 It	 involved	 23	 distractor	 faces	 for	 each	
condition,	namely	46	unknown	faces	and	23	famous	faces	that	had	not	been	presented	
before.	 Subjects	 first	 made	 an	 Old/New	 judgment	 on	 the	 face,	 then	 to	 rate	 their	
confidence	 for	 the	Old/New	 response.	 For	 each	 correct	 “Old”	 response,	 subjects	were	
then	presented	with	the	face	together	with	two	scene	pictures,	the	target	scene	that	was	
previously	paired	with	the	face,	and	a	scene	previously	associated	with	a	different	face.	
Participants	had	 to	make	a	 source	memory	 judgment,	 then	 to	 rate	 their	 confidence	 for	
this	judgment.	Finally,	after	a	10	minutes	break,	subjects	performed	a	fame	judgment	task	
involving	all	the	faces	stimuli	used	in	the	recognition	test.	For	each	item,	they	were	asked	
to	 decide	 whether	 the	 face	 was	 famous	 or	 not.	 Items	 yielding	 an	 incorrect	 response	
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(famous	face	judged	unknown	or	unknown	faces	judged	famous)	were	further	discarded	
from	the	analyses,	on	an	individual	basis.	
	
Statistics	
	
Our	 interest	was	 in	comparing	the	performance	of	one	single	patient	with	the	group	of	
matched	healthy	 controls,	 on	 recognition	memory	performance	 for	 faces	 and	 for	 face-
scene	associations.	We	thus	focused	on	the	indexes	of	Accuracy,	Hits	&	FAs	rates,	Source	
Memory	 and	 we	 further	 reported	 on	 high-confidence	 ratings	 Hits	 as	 an	 estimate	 of	
subjective	recollection.	A	Bayesian	approach	developed	for	single	cases	study	was	used	
and	provided	a	Point	Estimate	(PE)	with	95%CI	of	the	likelihood	of	the	patient’s	scores	in	
the	 normal	 population	 (Crawford	 &	 Garthwaite,	 2007a).	 This	 approach	 was	 used	 to	
directly	 compare	 patient	 KA	 with	 controls.	 Moreover,	 given	 our	 hypothesis	 that	 prior	
knowledge	 resulting	 from	 conceptual	 processing	 may	 trigger	 similar	 improvement	 in	
patient	 KA	 than	 in	 controls,	 we	 used	 the	 regression	method	 proposed	 by	 Crawford	 &	
Garthwaite,	(2005)	to	provide	a	regression-based	predicted	score	in	the	PEK	condition	in	
patient	 KA	 based	 on	 his	 score	 in	 the	 Novelty	 condition.	 Our	 reasoning	was	 that	 if	 the	
patient	benefits	from	PEK	at	 least	as	well	as	controls,	then	we	should	find	evidence	for	
the	null	hypothesis	when	contrasting	his	actual	score	with	the	predicted	score	in	the	PEK	
condition.	
	
Results	
	
Patient	 KA	 was	 slightly	 older	 than	 controls	 (35	 years	 old	 vs.	 27.8	 +/-	 6.9),	 but	 the	
difference	was	 not	 significant	 (p=0.08;	 PE=83.9%;	 %95IC=[66.5	 –	 95.1]);	 similarly	 patient	
KA	 underwent	 fewer	 years	 of	 formal	 schooling	 than	 controls	 (9	 vs.	 13.7	 +/-	 2.4),	which	
again	did	not	reach	convincing	evidence	for	the	alternative	hypothesis	(p=0.32;	PE=4.16%;	
%95IC=[0.3	–	14.3]).	
Across	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions,	 patient	 KA	 performed	 at	 the	 level	 of	 controls	
regarding	recognition	accuracy	for	faces	(p=0.40;	PE=19.9%;	%95IC=[7.1	–	38.2]),	response	
bias	 (p=0.22;	 PE=88.9%;	 %95IC=[73.4	 –	 97.6])	 or	 Source	 Memory	 (p=0.38;	 PE=19.2%;	
%95IC=[6.7	–	37.3]).	
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We	could	not	find	evidence	supporting	any	difference	between	KA	and	controls,	be	it	for	
Novelty,	 EK	 or	 PEK	 conditions,	 including	 when	 considering	 Source	 Memory	 and	 High-
confidence	 Hits	 (see	 Figure	 65	 &	 Figure	 66).	 No	 comparison	 reached	 significance	 (two-
sided,	alpha=5%).	Note	however	that	regarding	FAs,	patient	KA	was	in	the	upper	range	of	
controls.	
	
Figure	65.	Performance	of	patient	KA	and	16	matched	controls	for	the	Hits	and	FAs	rates.		
Consistently	with	prior	 findings	 from	Experiments	 3a	&	 3b,	 healthy	 controls	 performed	
better	 in	 PEK	 than	 Novelty	 conditions,	 be	 it	 for	 recognition	 accuracy	 for	 faces	
(BF10=1.433e7),	 Source	 memory	 (BF10=9.811),	 or	 high-confidence	 Hits	 responses	
(BF10=1498.4).	 Spearman’s	 correlation	 coefficient	 between	 Novelty	 and	 PEK	was	 0.094	
(p=0.718)	 for	 accuracy	 scores,	0.331	 (p=0.210)	 for	 Source	Memory,	 and	0.665	 (p=0.005)	
for	High	confidence	Hits.	This	yielded	predicted	scores	for	KA	of	0.92,	0.70,	and	0.90	for	
recognition	 accuracy,	 source	 memory	 and	 high-confidence	 Hits,	 respectively,	 given	 his	
performance	during	the	Novelty	condition.	He	actually	obtained	corresponding	scores	of	
0.855,	0.58	and	0.92,	which	did	not	differ	 from	 the	prediction	 (corresponding	PEs=18.1,	
20.3	and	36.7%,	with	respective	%95ICs	of	[5.0	–	38.3],	[5.9	–	41.8]	and	[16.0	–	60.9]).		
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Figure	66.	Performance	of	patient	KA	and	16	matched	controls	for	Source	Memory	and	Hits	
responses	with	High	confidence.	
	
Discussion	
	
In	 this	 study,	we	 compared	 patient	 KA	with	 severe	 developmental	 amnesia	 to	 healthy	
controls	in	a	recognition	memory	task	for	faces	and	face-scene	associations.	Faces	were	
either	entirely	unknown	to	the	participants	(Novelty	condition),	unknown	but	familiarized	
before	 the	 study	 phase	 (EK	 condition),	 or	 famous	 (PEK	 condition).	We	 replicated	prior	
findings	 of	 normal	 item	 recognition	 memory	 in	 developmental	 amnesia	 (e.g.	 Vargha-
Khadem	 et	 al.,	 1997),	 since	 patient	 KA	 performed	 in	 the	 full	 normal	 range	 with	 this	
respect.	Moreover,	 this	adds	 to	several	 studies	showing	preserved	recognition	memory	
for	faces	after	bilateral	damage	to	the	hippocampal	formation	(Cipolotti	et	al.,	2006;	Bird	
et	al.,	2007;	Bird	et	al.,	2008;	Bird	&	Burgess,	2008;	Smith	et	al.,	2014;	see	also	Bird,	2017).	
However,	we	also	found	that	patient	KA	could	benefit	PEK	as	much	as	healthy	controls	
regarding	 faces	 recognition,	 and	 we	 extended	 this	 pattern	 to	 source	 memory	 and	 to	
subjective	 recollection	 as	 estimated	 through	 high-confidence	 Hits.	 These	 findings	 are	
broadly	 consistent	with	 the	 idea	 that	prior	 knowledge	at	 encoding	can	 trigger	 learning	
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processes	that	largely	operate	independently	of	the	hippocampus.	Nonetheless,	they	also	
differ	from	several	prior	reports,	as	we	will	discuss	below.	
	
Our	 findings	 of	 preserved	 recognition	memory	 for	 unknown	 faces	 in	 KA	 fit	 with	 prior	
reports,	including	in	developmental	amnesia	(Smith	et	al.,	2014;	Cipolotti	et	al.,	2006;	Bird	
et	 al.,	 2008;	 see	 Bird,	 2017	 for	 review,	 but	 see	 patient	 JC,	 Bird	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 However,	
findings	of	preserved	recognition	memory	for	famous	(and	familiarized)	faces	in	KA	are	at	
odds	with	the	prediction	that	 recognition	of	 familiar	materials	should	be	 impaired	after	
hippocampal	 damage	 (Bird,	 2017).	 The	 author	 grounded	 this	 prediction	 notably	 upon	 a	
study	by	Smith	et	al.	(2014)	who	thoroughly	investigated	recognition	memory	for	famous	
vs.	 unknown	 faces	 in	 a	 sample	 of	 5	 amnesic	 patients.	 In	 sharp	 contrast	 with	 our	 own	
findings,	they	reported	that	Old/New	recognition	memory	for	famous	faces	was	impaired,	
and	only	for	the	faces	correctly	identified	as	famous	by	the	patients.	In	our	view,	several	
differences	in	our	study	vs.	Smith	et	al.’s	(2014)	are	relevant	here.	
First,	 we	 must	 mention	 that	 the	 authors	 compared	 5	 amnesic	 patients	 with	 a	 smaller	
sample	 of	 controls	 (8)	 than	 ours	 (16).	Moreover,	 the	 authors	 had	 to	 exclude	 2	 control	
subjects	 who	 did	 not	 identify	 a	 sufficient	 number	 of	 famous	 faces	 as	 famous	 in	 a	
familiarity	judgment	task,	thus	leaving	with	6	controls.	Figure	4B	from	their	article	further	
suggests	 that	 the	amnesic	patients	actually	performed	very	well	 (around	80%	accuracy)	
by	comparison	with	the	controls	(around	94%).	Despite	a	larger	number	of	items	in	their	
experiment	 (50	 targets	 vs.	 32	 in	 our	 study),	 our	 controls	 reached	 a	 similar	 level	 of	
accuracy	(92%),	and	so	was	the	case	for	patient	KA	(85%).	Given	the	high	inter-individual	
variability	reported	in	the	Smith	et	al.	(2014)	study	(estimated	through	the	standard	error	
of	 the	mean	displayed	 in	 figure	 4B),	 and	our	 use	 of	 a	 different	 and	more	 conservative	
statistical	approach,	this	could	partly	explain	the	discrepancies.	
Second,	as	already	mentioned	in	the	 introduction	section,	detailed	MRI	analyses	for	the	
hippocampus	 and	 extra-hippocampal	 structures	 are	 not	 available	 for	 these	 5	 patients,	
and	the	aetiology	of	the	amnesic	syndromes	also	remained	unclear	 in	some	cases	(i.e.	2	
cases	of	drug	overdose,	1	case	of	ischemia	plus	toxic	shock,	1	case	lacking	any	identifiable	
cause,	 1	 case	 of	 anoxia	 following	 cardiac	 arrest).	Moreover,	 slight	 volume	 reduction	 in	
parahippocampal	gyrus	is	reported	in	at	least	4	patients.	Finally,	all	5	patients	were	aged	
50-75	 years	 old,	 and	 no	 detailed	 neuropsychological	 background	 is	 reported.	 One	
possibility	therefore	that	cannot	be	ruled	out	is	that	at	least	some	of	these	patients	may	
have	 presented	 with	 some	 extra-hippocampal	 abnormalities,	 and	 /	 or	 some	 level	 of	
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cognitive	decline,	since	they	have	been	tested	years	after	serious	medical	conditions.	By	
contrast,	here	we	contrasted	performance	of	patient	KA	with	a	larger	sample	of	healthy	
controls,	without	 any	medical	 history	 and	 free	of	 any	memory	 impairment.	 In	 addition,	
the	 selective	 damage	 to	 the	 hippocampal	 system	 with	 clear	 preservation	 of	 extra-
hippocampal	 structures	 in	 KA	 was	 established	 with	 several	 independent	 imaging	
techniques.	
Considering	source	memory	and	estimates	of	subjective	recollection,	we	also	found	that	
patient	KA	was	unimpaired.	However,	an	important	limitation	of	the	present	study	lies	in	
the	floor	effect	observed	in	controls	for	source	memory	in	the	Novelty	and	EK	conditions,	
therefore	making	 impossible	 further	 interpretation	of	 the	patient’s	performance.	 In	 the	
PEK	condition	however,	KA	performed	in	the	low	but	normal	range,	and	importantly,	the	
discrepancy	between	his	scores	in	the	Novelty	and	PEK	conditions	also	fell	in	the	normal	
range.	 Moreover,	 we	 found	 that	 KA’s	 high-confidence	 ratings	 for	 Hits	 responses	 to	
famous	target	faces	were	similar	to	controls.	Our	task	design	does	not	however	allow	to	
stating	 on	 whether	 true	 recollection	 or	 familiarity	 contributed	 to	 the	 patients’	
performance.	
Altogether,	these	findings	therefore	support	the	idea	that	extra-hippocampal	structures	
can	 support	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 guided	 memory,	 including	 memory	 for	 face-
scene	associations.	While	unitization	could	be	a	 candidate	process,	especially	given	 the	
study	 instructions	emphasizing	 the	 integration	of	 the	 face	and	 the	background,	 further	
investigation	 is	 needed	 to	 address	 this	 outstanding	 issue.	 Another	 possibility	 could	 be	
that	high	face-scene	congruency	with	existing	memory	schemas	about	the	famous	faces	
would	 have	 triggered	 faster	 consolidation,	 independently	 of	 the	 hippocampus,	 as	
proposed	 in	 the	SLIMM	 framework	 (Van	Kesteren	et	 al.,	 2012).	 For	now,	 an	 interesting	
perspective	 could	be	 to	 assess	whether	 familiarity-based	 recognition	memory,	which	 is	
preserved	in	KA,	can	support	recognition	memory	for	famous	faces.	While	some	authors	
have	argued	that	this	could	hardly	be	the	case	(e.g.	Smith	et	al.,	2014),	it	has	never	been	
tested	 to	 the	best	 of	 our	 knowledge.	 The	 Speed	 and	Accuracy	Boosting	procedure	we	
used	 in	 Experiment	 1	 could	 be	 particularly	 well	 suited	 for	 that	 purpose,	 and	 we	 have	
started	pilot	experiments	with	patient	KA.	
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General	Discussion	
Foreword:	A	thesis	as	a	professional	journey,	personal	summary	
	
Before	discussing	the	findings	reported	during	this	this,	I	wish	to	make	an	assessment	of	
my	own	goals	through	this	work,	both	for	those	who	made	it	possible	and	for	myself.	As	
a	neuropsychologist	for	around	15	years,	 I	have	run	several	researches	mainly	grounded	
on	the	atypical	profiles	of	brain-damaged	patients,	together	with	their	unsatisfied	needs	
regarding	 cognitive	 disabilities.	 The	 main	 goal	 of	 this	 work,	 to	 me,	 was	 to	 get	 the	
opportunity	to	focus	on	a	series	of	questions,	all	related	to	patient	KA,	and	try	to	move	
some	steps	forward.	This	is	hardly	doable	when	you	work	as	a	full	time	neuropsychologist	
with	limited	time	devoted	to	research.	The	other	goal	for	me	was	basically	to	learn	about	
one	 neuroimaging	 technique,	which	 finally	 happened	 to	 be	 task-based	 functional	MRI.	
This	was	because	we	have	the	privilege	at	the	Rennes	University	Hospital	to	host	a	MRI	
scanner	that	is	dedicated	to	research,	and	what	we	need	is	sufficient	knowledge	and	skills	
to	 use	 it.	 So	my	 hope	was	 that	 this	 thesis	might	 give	me	 the	 required	 background	 to	
further	apply	for	grants,	and	thus	keep	on	running	neuroimaging	studies.	
	
About	four	years	 later	and	345	participants	 involved	 in	the	experiments	reported	 in	this	
work,	I	have	to	say	that	these	goals	were	largely	exceeded.	
First	 and	 as	 I	 discuss	 below,	 I	 think	 this	 work	 will	 contribute	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	
memory	disorders,	their	neural	and	cognitive	substrates.	
Second,	 working	 with	 patient	 KA	 has	 led	 to	 several	 new	 projects,	 many	 of	 which	 are	
reported	 in	 the	 following	 discussion.	 I	 plan	 to	 continue	 seeking	 for	 preserved	 learning	
processes	 in	 patient	 KA,	 and	 I	will	 hopefully	 start	 next	 summer	 a	 project	 involving	 the	
Neurinfo	imaging	platform	of	Rennes	University	Hospital,	the	Empenn	research	unit	that	
hosted	me	for	the	neuroimaging	part	of	my	thesis	in	Rennes,	and	a	post-doc	student	from	
the	 Liège	 Cyclotron	 research	 group,	 Gabriel	 Besson.	 We	 will	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
contribution	 of	 within-MTL	 functional	 connectivity	 to	 familiarity-based	 recognition.	
Another	 project	 that	 should	 start	 shortly	 relates	 to	 how	 the	work	 presented	 here	 can	
contribute	 to	 a	 better	 diagnosis	 and	 rehabilitation	 of	 patients	 with	 developmental	
amnesia.	 This	 condition	 is	 likely	 underestimated,	 as	 the	 story	 of	 KA	 dramatically	
illustrates.	Jointly	with	patient	KA,	we	decided	a	short	movie	inspired	by	his	everyday	life,	
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with	 the	 intention	 to	 raise	 awareness	 among	medical	 doctors	 and	 professionals	 in	 the	
field	of	education	about	this	syndrome.	
Third,	I	have	acquired	several	critical	skills	for	scientific	research.	
For	 example,	 I	 learned	 a	 lot	 not	 only	 on	 task-based	 fMRI,	 but	 also	 on	 various	 MRI	
techniques	 and	 their	 limitations	 as	 well,	 so	 that	 I	 feel	 confident	 in	 designing	 new	
experiences,	 and	 especially	 regarding	 the	 difficulties	 associated	with	 imaging	 the	MTL.	
Similarly,	I	have	acquired	some	basic	coding	skills	(MatLab),	and	also	how	to	use	several	
imaging	 or	 statistical	 tools	 (ITK-snap,	 xjview,	 ASHS,	 volBrain,	 JASP,	 GIMP,	 SPM,	 FSL,	
GPower,	among	others).	
Finally,	 I	also	have	 learned	a	 lot	about	how	to	share	results	 in	the	scientific	community,	
with	 great	 opportunities	 to	 attend	 to	 important	 international	 conferences	 like	 ICOM-6	
(Budapest,	2016)	or	“LearnMem”	(Irvine,	CA,	2018).	
Together	 with	 intensive	 teaching	 for	 undergraduate	 students	 as	 well	 as	 numerous	
conferences	 for	 the	 general	 public	 (around	 300	 hours	 during	my	 thesis	 and	 over	 1000	
hours	since	I	started	in	2002),	I	think	that	I	have	gained	further	legitimacy	to	apply	for	a	
university	 position	 (in	 psychology	 or	 in	 neurosciences	 departments).	 However,	 I	would	
like	to	keep	a	clinical	position	as	well,	since	clinical	neuropsychology	remains	to	me	at	the	
heart	of	my	scientific	interests.	
	
---	
Let’s	now	discuss	our	main	findings	 	
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Our	 objectives	 in	 this	 thesis	 were	 twofold.	 First,	 we	 aimed	 at	 investigating	 whether	
explicit	memory	 acquisition	 and	 retrieval	 could	occur	despite	 severe	 amnesia	 following	
bilateral	damage	to	the	hippocampal	system.	We	have	argued	that	one	critical	gap	in	the	
current	 state-of-the-art	was	 the	 lack	of	demonstration	 that	 such	 learning	abilities	 could	
occur	 in	 conditions	 similar	 to	 controls,	 i.e.	 as	 fast	 as	 healthy	 subjects,	 rather	 than	
following	 dedicated	 learning	 techniques.	 Second,	 based	 on	 the	 surprising	 findings	 of	 a	
material-specific	effect	in	new	learning	abilities	after	hippocampal	amnesia,	we	aimed	at	
investigating	 the	 role	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 declarative	 learning.	With	 this	 respect,	we	
have	underlined	the	inconsistencies	across	models	putting	forward	the	role	of	novelty	or	
of	 familiarity	 detection	 in	 triggering	 long-term	 memory	 encoding.	 Similarly,	 we	 have	
outlined	the	surprising	 lack	of	knowledge	regarding	how	aging	and	Alzheimer’s	disease	
could	affect	novelty	or	familiarity-based	declarative	learning.	
Following	 on	 from	 the	 neuropsychological	 tradition,	 the	 present	 work	 has	 therefore	
unfolded	 along	 the	 findings	 brought	 by	 the	 case	 study	 of	 patient	 KA.	 Basically,	 our	
findings	can	be	divided	 in	 two	 sections,	 following	our	objectives	 and	hypotheses.	One	
section	is	more	focused	on	the	results	with	patient	KA	and	relates	to	how	learning	can	
occur	without	remembering.	 Issues	to	be	discussed	are	the	cognitive	and	neural	routes	
for	such	learning,	which	should	account	for	both	the	acquisition	of	new	explicit	memories	
and	 the	 large	 amount	 of	 knowledge	 KA	 has	 built.	 The	 other	 section	 relates	 to	 the	
question	of	how	prior	knowledge	 impacts	new	 learning.	Critical	 issues	to	be	discussed	
are	 the	 candidate	 cognitive	 processes	 and	 neural	 substrates	 for	 prior	 knowledge-
dependent	learning,	the	impact	of	aging	and	of	Alzheimer’s	disease	on	such	learning.	We	
further	discuss	these	two	lines	of	issues	in	turn.	
	
All	along	the	discussion,	we	have	highlighted	 in	green	some	of	the	key	contributions	of	
this	 thesis,	 in	 our	 opinion,	 and	 the	 text	 highlighted	 in	 red	 illustrates	 experimental	
perspectives,	some	of	which	had	already	been	addressed	(see	Appendixes	A	&	B).	
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Patient	KA:	The	case	for	learning	without	remembering	
	
The	 series	 of	 experiments	 reported	 with	 patient	 KA	 (Jonin	 et	 al.,	 2018)	 have	 brought	
strong	evidence	for	little,	if	any,	residual	episodic	learning	abilities.	KA	presents	with	one	
of	the	lower	scores	ever	reported	at	the	Rivermead	Behavioural	Memory	Test,	and	scores	
below	 the	 first	 centile	 for	 virtually	 any	 long-term	 episodic	 standard	 measure.	 Besides,	
consistent	evidence	for	his	inability	to	acquire	new	associations	in	long-term	memory	was	
also	 reported	 (e.g.	 arbitrary	associative	 learning	 in	 the	paired	associates	 subtest	of	 the	
Wechsler	scale,	object-location	combinations	in	a	recognition	test).	Thus,	apart	from	item	
recognition	 memory	 and	 standard	 measures	 of	 short-term	 memory,	 patient	 KA	 looks	
totally	unable	to	recall	new	information	from	episodic	memory	or	to	form	new	arbitrary	
associations	in	long-term	memory,	which	are	defining	features	of	amnesia.	
These	findings	are	of	utmost	importance,	since	explicit	learning	and	memory	of	new	facts	
or	of	new	episodes	(i.e.	self-experienced	events)	constantly	interact	together	in	everyday	
cognition.	 It	 follows	 that	 as	 put	 forward	 by	 Squire	 &	 Zola,	 (1998),	 provided	 sufficient,	
residual	episodic	abilities	may	well	support	new	semantic	learning,	although	with	enough	
repetition	 and	efforts.	 In	 the	 case	of	 patient	KA,	 the	 findings	of	 supranormal	 semantic	
knowledge	 are	 therefore	 unlikely	 to	 result	 from	 residual	 episodic	 abilities.	 Of	 equal	
importance	 are	 our	 results	 of	 superior	 semantic,	 or	 context-free,	 knowledge	 stored	 in	
KA’s	 long-term	memory.	 From	 a	 cognitive	 perspective,	 prior	 cases	with	 developmental	
amnesia	(DA)	could	not	rule	out	the	“residual	episodic	memory”	account	either	because	
of	the	existence	of	some	residual	episodic	learning	capacities,	or	because	of	the	findings	
of	 low-to-normal	semantic	memory	aptitudes.	Given	that	we	cannot	predict	the	 level	of	
semantic	knowledge	that	is	supposed	to	be	reached	for	a	given	level	of	episodic	learning	
abilities,	 Squire	 &	 Zola	 (1998)	 argued	 that	 this	 low-to-normal	 achievement	 regarding	
semantic	 memory	 could	 well,	 again,	 have	 resulted	 from	 slow	 and	 effortful	 learning	
resulting	from	the	residual	episodic	abilities.	
Strikingly,	 this	core	 issue	for	the	neuropsychological	models	of	declarative	memory	and	
the	 episodic-semantic	 distinction	 had	 not	 been	 directly	 addressed	 before.	 Following	
Squire	&	 Zola	 (1998)’s	 point,	what	would	 be	 unexpected	 under	 the	 unitary	 declarative	
memory	 account	 is	 a	 situation	 where	 semantic	 performance	 would	 exceed	 that	 of	
healthy	 controls	 despite	 compromised	 episodic	 memory.	 Yet,	 this	 is	 exactly	 what	 we	
found	in	patient	KA	who,	as	an	example,	can	discourse	extensively	on	French	History,	and	
even	more	specifically	on	 the	Napoleonian	period,	or	giving	you	by	heart	 the	 titles	and	
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corresponding	years	–	including	sometimes	the	album	title	–	of	famous	French	music	hits.	
In	our	opinion,	an	important	contribution	of	this	thesis	is	that	we	provide	the	first	strong	
evidence	for	“learning	without	remembering”.	
	
Box	 1.	The	 residual	 episodic	memory	 account	 of	 learning	 preservation	 in	 developmental	
amnesia	does	not	hold	in	patient	KA	
Probably	 the	most	 robust	evidence	 that	 semantic	 learning	can	occur	despite	a	 severely	
compromised	episodic	system	comes	from	cases	reports	of	developmental	amnesia.	Still,	
prior	 reports	 have	 mostly	 limited	 the	 assessment	 of	 semantic	 memory	 to	 academic	
achievements	tests,	and	have	shown	low-to-normal	performances,	and	sometimes	slight	
impairments.	Moreover,	prior	cases	reports	have	also	outlined	some	preserved	episodic	
learning	 abilities	 in	 typical	 standardized	 tests.	 The	 “residual	 episodic	memory”	 account	
therefore	 states	 that,	 with	 sufficient	 time	 and	 efforts,	 some	 fair	 level	 of	 semantic	
memory	performance	could	have	been	achieved	(Squire	&	Zola,	1998).	This	would	remain	
compatible	with	 the	 unitary,	 declarative	memory	 view.	 In	 this	 thesis,	we	 have	 brought	
strong	 arguments	 against	 this	 view.	 Patient	 KA	 presents	 with	 little,	 if	 any,	 residual	
episodic	learning	abilities,	and	still	outperforms	controls	in	some	semantic	memory	tasks,	
as	 extensively	 assessed	 far	 beyond	 the	 domains	 of	 academic	 achievements	 (i.e.	
vocabulary	 or	 information	 subtests	 of	 the	 Wechsler	 scales).	 Our	 report	 thus	 strongly	
supports	the	idea	that	learning	can	occur	without	remembering.	
	
Candidates	mechanisms	for	learning	without	remembering:	cognitive	processes	
	
The	multiple	system	view:	preserved	semantic	memory	system?	
	
The	typical	 interpretation	of	 the	cognitive	profile	of	patients	with	DA	relates	 to	 the	SPI	
model	 from	 Endel	 Tulving	 (1995).	 Namely,	 DA	 was	 taken	 as	 strong	 evidence	 for	 the	
existence	of	two	separate	memory	systems	within	declarative	memory,	i.e.	semantic	and	
episodic	 memory.	 Along	 this	 view,	 early	 bilateral	 damage	 to	 the	 hippocampus	 would	
prevent	 the	 episodic	 memory	 system	 from	 normally	 developing	 but	 preserved	
subhippocampal	 structures	would	 still	 support	 semantic	memory.	 Thus,	 the	 learning	of	
new	 facts,	 the	 acquisition	 of	 conceptual	 knowledge	 would	 entirely	 rely	 upon	 the	
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semantic	 store,	 viewed	 as	 a	 separate	 biological	 entity.	 Several	 arguments	 against	 this	
view	must	be	put	forward	here.	
First,	 as	 we	 have	 extensively	 argued	 in	 the	 introduction	 section	 (see	 Chapter	 II	 &	 III)	
evidence	from	experimental	psychology	and	cognitive	neuropsychology	rather	speaks	for	
distinct	encoding	and	retrieval	processes	 in	the	service	of	different	knowledge	systems	
(e.g.	Nadel,	2008).	For	example,	relational	processes	are	considered	by	some	authors	to	
be	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 episodic	 memories,	 and	 episodic	 remembering	 will	 result	 from	
relational	 processing.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 imply	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	
representations	with	specific	properties	(i.e.	episodic).	This	only	suggests	that	relational	
processing	 will	 bind	 together	 separate	 elements	 to	 allow	 reconstructing	 an	 episodic	
memory.	
Second,	our	results	do	not	allow	to	state	that	KA’s	semantic	memory	(i.e.	context-free	
memory	 representations)	 is	 normal.	 The	 fact	 that	 KA	 shows	 supranormal	 semantic	
knowledge	 in	 some	domains,	 and	 that	 under	 certain	 circumstances	he	 can	 access	 such	
knowledge	 faster	 than	 controls,	 may	 indicate	 that	 either	 he	 is	 more	 efficient	 than	
controls	in	the	use	of	retrieval	processes,	or	that	the	organization	of	semantic	knowledge	
in	KA	differs	from	that	of	controls.	In	fact,	recent	evidence	has	supported	the	view	that	
semantic	knowledge	organization	is	not	normal	 in	DA,	both	in	terms	of	contents	and	of	
structure	(Blumenthal	et	al.,	2017).	The	authors	have	studied	the	well-documented	case	
of	patient	HC,	and	showed	that	she	generated	less	extrinsic	features	for	object	concepts	
than	 matched	 controls.	 Importantly,	 they	 suggested	 that	 this	 might	 result	 from	
hippocampal	injury,	since	the	acquisition	of	concepts	that	are	tightly	dependent	upon	the	
integration	of	external	 features	would	be	more	 relying	on	 relational	binding	processes.	
For	example,	to	acquire	the	concept	“knife”,	you	might	need	to	bind	separate	contexts	
and	 usages	 across	 time	 (i.e.,	 along	 several	 distinct	 life	 events),	 which	 allows	 the	
integration	of	distinct	extrinsic	features	(i.e.	can	be	used	at	the	butcher’s,	during	a	picnic,	
by	 an	 artist	 in	 a	 circus,	 etc.).	 By	 contrast,	 patient	NB	with	 selective	damage	 to	 the	 left	
rhinal	 cortices	 (perirhinal	 and	 entorhinal	 cortices)	 due	 to	 surgery	 underwent	 at	 age	 26	
(Bowles,	Duke,	Rosenbaum,	McRae,	&	Köhler,	2016)	was	unimpaired.	
Third,	recent	theoretical	frameworks	of	concept	acquisition	emphasize	the	convergence	
between	 concept	 formation	 and	 episodic	 memory.	 Concept	 acquisition	 requires	 that	
across	multiple	occurrences	of	unique	episodes,	we	are	able	to	extract	the	features	that	
are	 common	 to	 a	 given	 concept	 and	 also	 the	 features	 that	 differentiate	 between	
concepts	 (Mack	 et	 al.,	 2018).	 This	 requires	 pattern	 separation,	 pattern	 completion	 and	
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integration	processes,	to	allow	formation	of	new	concepts	in	semantic	memory.	Yet,	such	
processes	 are	 tightly	 linked	 to	 episodic	 memory,	 and	 highly	 dependent	 upon	 the	
hippocampus.	 The	 building	 of	 distinct	 representations	 for	 similar	 experiences	 is	
associated	 with	 pattern	 separation,	 and	 the	 retrieval	 of	 an	 entire	 episode	 given	 an	
appropriate	cue	is	associated	to	pattern	completion.	It	 is	therefore	hard	to	see	how	the	
processes	 underlying	 the	 formation	 of	 new	 conceptual	 knowledge	 could	 occur	 in	 an	
independent	 system	 (semantic),	 isolated	 from	 the	 system	 supposedly	 supporting	
memory	 for	 individual	 experiences.	 In	 controls,	 each	 and	 every	 interaction	 between	
recollected	life	events	and	existing	conceptual	knowledge	can	support	new	learning	and	
memory-guided	 behaviour.	 However,	 in	 patients	 like	 KA,	 a	 more	 restricted	 number	 of	
efficient	 learning	 processes	 is	 available,	 and	 they	 always	 lacked	 the	 experience	 of	
remembering	 to	 do	 so.	 It	 is	 therefore	 unsurprising	 that	 their	 semantic	 organization	 is	
found	 abnormal,	 reflecting	 the	 close	 relationships	 between	 conceptual	 knowledge	
acquisition	 and	 episodic	 learning.	 Overall,	 the	 results	 we	 obtained	 with	 patient	 KA	
regarding	a	striking	contrast	between	episodic	memory	and	semantic	knowledge	should	
point	 towards	 preserved	 explicit	 learning	 processes,	 rather	 than	 preserved	 memory	
system,	which	nature	needs	to	be	determined.	
	
What	 kind	 of	 learning	 processes	 could	 account	 for	 the	 pattern	 of	 preserved	 functions	
reported	 in	 KA?	 These	 processes	 should	meet	 at	 least	 three	 criteria.	 First,	 they	 should	
allow	 rapid	 learning	 and	 retrieval,	 since	we	 found	 that	 KA	did	 not	 differ	 from	 controls	
when	he	had	to	acquire	and	retrieve	new	explicit	knowledge	about	prior	occurrence	of	
object	 pictures.	 Second,	 they	 should	 allow	 binding	 together	 different	 elements	 of	
information.	This	is	because	the	impressive	amount	of	conceptual	knowledge	available	in	
patient	 KA	 has	 unlikely	 been	 learned	 without	 associative	 –	 and	 generalization	 –	
processes.	Typically,	reporting	on	the	Battle	of	the	Pyramids	featuring	Napoleon	in	1798	
requires	 stored	 associations	 within	 long-term	memory.	 Finally,	 these	 processes	 should	
operate	without	an	efficient	hippocampal	system.	
	
The	contribution	of	familiarity	and	unitization	
	
Which	 kind	 of	 cognitive	 process	 may	 allow	 rapid	 learning	 and	 binding	 in	 long-term	
memory?	Familiarity-based	retrieval,	or	the	sense	of	prior	exposure,	could	be	pointed	out	
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since	 it	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 critically	 rely	 upon	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 that	 is	 clearly	
preserved	 in	KA	as	 in	previous	patients	with	DA.	 This	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	dual	 processes	
approach	 as	well,	 and	 also	would	 fit	with	 the	 assumption	 that	 familiarity	 is	 a	 fast	 and	
automatic	 process	 (Yonelinas,	 2002).	 However,	 long-term	memory	 binding	 of	 separate	
information	 is	 typically	assumed	to	depend	on	hippocampal	computations,	as	 long	as	 it	
involves	 associative	 processes.	 It	 therefore	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 familiarity-based	
retrieval	on	its	own	may	support	concept	formation.	
Yet,	some	models	have	pointed	out	situations	where	associative	encoding	could	actually	
be	achieved	at	a	subhippocampal	level.	For	example,	the	relational	theory	suggests	that	
perceptual	 “blends”	 could	 be	 acquired	 and	 retained	 without	 hippocampal	 processing,	
but	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 an	 inability	 to	 further	 update	 these	 rigid	 representations.	 A	 related	
proposal	 is	 the	 idea	 of	 unitization.	 The	 BIC	 model	 assumes	 that	 under	 circumstances	
where	separate	elements	can	be	processed	as	a	whole,	further	retrieval	does	not	require	
pattern	completion	and	can	therefore	be	performed	through	subhippocampal	structures	
(perirhinal	 and	 lateral	 entorhinal	 cortices,	 or	 parahippocampal	 and	 medial	 entorhinal	
cortices).	Therefore,	one	could	speculate	that	patients	like	KA	use	unitization	strategies	
at	 encoding,	which	 allow	 them	 to	 further	 recognize	 new	 associations	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
familiarity.	 Along	 the	 repetition	 of	 single	 episodes,	 this	 might	 lead	 to	 actual	 concept	
formation.	
As	a	consequence,	one	would	expect	unitization	to	be	a	possible	candidate	to	account	for	
concepts	acquisition	 in	DA,	and	recent	 reports	 in	patient	NC	have	 indeed	shown	how	a	
unitization	 strategy	 could	 circumvent	 relational	 memory	 impairments	 (D’Angelo	 et	 al.,	
2015).	
	
Box	 2.	 Unitization	 as	 a	 candidate	 mechanism	 for	 preserved	 learning	 in	 developmental	
amnesia.	
To	account	 for	preserved	acquisition	of	conceptual	knowledge	 in	patient	KA,	candidate	
mechanisms	must	meet	at	least	the	following	requirements:	1)	allow	rapid	acquisition	and	
retrieval;	 2)	 allow	 the	 binding	 of	 separate	 elements	 to	 form	 new	 associations;	 3)	 be	
independent	 of	 the	 extended	 hippocampal	 system.	 One	 such	 candidate	 could	 be	
unitization,	 which	 allows	 separate	 elements	 to	 be	 processed	 as	 a	 whole,	 and	 further	
retrieval	to	be	based	on	familiarity.	
	
		 353	
However,	the	boundaries	of	unitization	are	unclear	(i.e.	why	and	how	unitization	can	take	
place,	and	whether	“top-down”	or	“bottom-up”	unitization	is	effective,	see	Tibon	et	al.,	
2014).	Unitization	may	 also	 depend	on	 the	 representational	 domain	 of	 the	 information	
processed	as	suggested	by	the	representational	account	from	Davachi	et	al.	(2006).	Here,	
it	 is	 suggested	 that	 unitization-based	 learning	 would	 remain	 doable	 as	 long	 as	 within-
domain	representations	must	be	bound,	not	 in	the	case	of	between-domains	binding.	A	
related	 proposal	 comes	 from	 the	 Domain	 Dichotomy	 framework	 (Mayes	 et	 al.,	 2007)	
stating	 that	 associative	 encoding	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	 perirhinal	 computations	 as	
long	as	the	representations	of	the	individual	features	to	be	bound	are	close	enough	in	the	
ventral	 stream.	Close	 representations	would	better	converge	at	 the	perirhinal	 level	and	
thus	be	bound	without	 further	hippocampal	 involvement	at	 retrieval	 (e.g.	object	entity	
involving,	 say,	 a	 red	apple).	By	 contrast,	 representations	more	distant	 from	each	other	
would	 require	 hippocampal	 computation	 to	 be	 bound	 within	 long-term	 memory	 (e.g.	
object-location	 association).	 Thus,	 here,	 unitization	may	 occur	 in	 the	 case	 of	 close,	 but	
not	distant,	representations	of	the	individual	features	at	encoding.	
These	 possible	 boundaries	 for	 unitization	 can	 be	 related	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 abnormal	
organization	of	semantic	knowledge	in	patients	with	DA.	As	stated	above,	patient	HC	was	
especially	impaired	for	extrinsic,	not	intrinsic,	concept	features	(generation	task),	and	for	
non-living	as	opposed	to	living	objects	(typicality	ratings),	the	former	being	more	related	
to	 extrinsic	 features	 (Blumenthal	 et	 al.,	 2017).	 It	 could	 be	 the	 case	 that	 extrinsic	 vs.	
intrinsic	 features	of	object	concepts	 is	an	 instance	of	 impossible	vs.	possible	unitization	
strategy.	 Indeed,	 the	 formation	 of	 concepts	 with	 high	 extrinsic	 features	 would	 more	
likely	 involve	across-domains	binding,	while	 concepts	with	high	 intrinsic	 features	would	
conversely	 require	 more	 within-domain	 binding.	 If	 we	 take	 the	 above	 example	 of	 the	
“knife”	 concept,	 acquiring	 this	 concept	 might	 require	 the	 accrual	 of	 various	 features	
across	several	episodes	that	are	extrinsic	to	the	object	(where,	how	we	use	it,	with	which	
other	objects,	 etc.),	 thus	 requiring	between-domains	 features	binding.	By	 contrast,	 the	
acquisition	 of	 the	 concept	 “Zebra”	might	 essentially	 involve	within-domain	 (i.e.	within-
object)	 features,	 most	 being	 intrinsic	 to	 the	 object	 (e.g.	 its	 shape,	 colour,	 etc.).	 Thus,	
unitization	in	DA	could	support	concept	formation	only	when	within-domain	associations	
are	 critical.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 semantic	 knowledge	 might	 be	 preserved	 only	 for	 the	
concepts	which	formation	did	not	critically	depend	on	binding	separate	elements	across	
domains,	i.e.	elements	that	are	encoded	distantly	in	the	visual	stream.	
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Perspective	 1.	 Highlighting	 dissociations	 within	 semantic	 memory	 in	 developmental	
amnesia	
To	what	 extent	 unitization	 can	 support	 concept	 formation	 in	DA	 therefore	 remains	 an	
open	question.	One	testable	prediction	 is	that	conceptual	knowledge	depending	on	the	
integration	of	spatial	and	verbal	features,	for	example,	should	be	much	less	preserved,	or	
even	 impaired,	by	comparison	with	conceptual	knowledge	depending	on	within-domain	
features.	For	example,	patients	with	DA	should	show	poor	performance	when	asked	to	
retrieve	geographical	landmarks	on	maps,	whereas	they	may	well	have	a	normal	amount	
of	knowledge	about	the	countries	depicted	on	the	same	map.	
	
In	 any	 case,	we	 need	 further	 research	 to	 identify	 the	 circumstances	 that	 could	 trigger	
effective	 unitization.	What	we	 know	 is	 that	 damage	 extended	 to	 the	 neocortex	might	
prevent	from	benefiting	unitization	(Ryan	et	al.,	2013),	which	reinforces	the	possibility	for	
KA	 who	 has	 preserved	 bilateral	 perirhinal	 cortices	 to	 use	 such	 encoding	 strategy.	
However,	as	we	further	discuss,	our	findings	of	a	material-specific	effect	for	new	learning	
in	KA	may	contribute	addressing	this	issue.	
	
Material-specific	learning	in	KA:	prior	knowledge	as	a	boundary	for	unitization?	
	
A	striking	 finding	of	 the	present	 thesis	 is	 that	KA	totally	 failed	at	 learning	new	abstract	
shapes,	while	he	performed	just	fine	with	objects.	In	our	opinion,	this	finding	might	shed	
some	light	on	the	circumstances	where	unitization	might	or	not	take	place	at	encoding.	
Material-specific	 effects	 have	 already	 been	 reported	 in	 several	 cases	 of	 amnesia.	 A	
consistent	 pattern	 that	 emerged	 was	 the	 impairment	 of	 topographical	 and	 words	
memory	 while	 recognition	 of	 unknown	 faces	 remained	 preserved.	 Importantly,	 this	
pattern	was	 similar	 considering	 either	 recollection	 or	 familiarity	 estimates.	 The	 famous	
patient	Jon,	for	example,	was	unable	to	perform	recognition	tasks	involving	scenes	while	
he	 did	 well	 with	 unknown	 faces	 (Bird,	 2017;	 Bird,	 Vargha-Khadem,	 &	 Burgess,	 2008;	
Cipolotti	et	al.,	2006;	see	also	Lacot	et	al.,	2017	for	a	contrast	between	single	 items	and	
scenes).	 Moreover,	 ROCs	 curve	 analyses	 of	 Jon’s	 performance	 suggested	 that	 both	
familiarity	 and	 recollection	 estimates	 were	 unremarkable	 for	 faces,	 but	 an	 aberrant	
model	 involving	 two	 recollection	 parameters	 uniquely	 accounted	 for	 ROCs	 data	 for	
scenes	 recognition,	 suggestive	 of	 idiosyncratic	 strategies.	 Here	 we	 contribute	 this	
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literature	 in	 showing	 that	 a	 speeded	 recognition	 memory	 task	 that	 mainly	 taps	 on	
familiarity-based	retrieval	(see	Besson	et	al.,	2012)	yields	a	clear	dissociation	depending	on	
the	stimuli	used.	Thus,	the	perspective	grounded	on	dual	processes	views	that	successful	
recognition	 for	 any	 kind	 of	 materials	 should	 be	 possible,	 even	 after	 hippocampal	
damage,	as	long	as	the	task	can	be	performed	on	the	basis	of	familiarity,	is	not	supported	
in	patient	KA.	
One	possibility	to	account	for	this	material-specific	effect	would	be	to	consider	that	the	
building	 of	 long-term	 representations	 for	 abstract	 shapes	 may	 require	 additional	
relational,	or	associative	processing	that	are	not	needed	for	familiar	objects.	
Our	 speeded	 recognition	 tasks	 required	 subjects	 to	 decide	 whether	 an	 item	 was	
presented	or	not	during	 the	study	phase.	 In	 the	case	of	 real	objects,	 it	 implies	 that	 the	
particular	object	displayed	had	been	processed	up	to	the	conceptual	level,	so	that	when	
shown	a	target	picture	(e.g.,	a	balloon),	the	subject	can	decide	whether	this	concept	was	
recently	 experienced	 or	 not.	 Here,	 conceptual	 fluency	 may	 help	 to	 make	 fast	 and	
accurate	response	as	the	ones	provided	by	KA.	In	the	case	of	abstract	patterns,	however,	
three	 critical	 differences	 arise.	 First,	 there	 is	 no	 prior	 knowledge,	 or	 pre-existing	
representations,	for	abstract	patterns.	Second,	as	a	consequence,	conceptual	processing	
is	not	possible.	Third,	and	similarly,	distractors	cannot	be	 rejected	based	on	conceptual	
processing,	so	that	accurate	discrimination	between	targets	and	 lures	critically	relies	on	
the	 resolution	of	 the	 representation	built	at	encoding.	Conceptual	 fluency	won’t	occur,	
and	 perceptual	 fluency	 might	 not	 be	 sufficient	 either.	 Indeed,	 considering	 that	 the	
abstract	shapes	we	used	were	more	perceptually	similar	than	the	real	objects,	one	would	
expect	a	high-resolution	binding	to	be	required	for	correct	memory	discrimination	(see	p.	
Erreur	!	Signet	non	défini.).	Such	high-resolution	binding	in	the	case	of	our	stimuli	clearly	
involves	 configural	 integration	of	 shapes,	 colours	 and	 spatial	 features,	 and	we	 suggest	
that	 such	 integration	 may	 rely	 on	 computations	 performed	 at	 the	 entorhinal	 or	
hippocampal	 level	(e.g.	Barense,	2005;	Bussey,	Saksida,	&	Murray,	2003;	Cowell,	Bussey,	
&	Saksida,	 2006;	 Lee	et	 al.,	 2005;	 Yonelinas,	 2013).	 Importantly,	 since	we	have	brought	
evidence	for	atrophy	of	the	right	entorhinal	cortex	in	KA,	the	patient	would	be	unable	to	
encode	these	stimuli	with	the	resolution	required	for	further	retrieval.	
Thus,	 this	 is	 an	 instance	 where	 unitization	 may	 not	 occur,	 because	 of	 the	 level	 of	
perceptual	 integration	 required	by	 the	 task,	 and	because,	 as	already	 suggested	before,	
unitization	 might	 need	 conceptual	 processing	 to	 occur	 (e.g.	 see	 Tibon,	 Gronau,	
Scheuplein,	 Mecklinger,	 &	 Levy,	 2014).	 Indeed,	 prior	 reports	 have	 suggested	 that	
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conceptual	 processing	 at	 encoding	 may	 favour	 integration	 or	 unitization	 processes	
(Ahmad,	Fernandes,	&	Hockley,	2015;	Graf	&	Schacter,	1989;	Tibon	et	al.,	2014).	
	
Box	3.	Material-specific	familiarity-based	recognition	in	developmental	amnesia:	the	limits	
of	unitization.	
Evidence	for	a	material-specific	effect	on	familiarity-based	recognition	memory	in	patient	
KA	 may	 point	 towards	 an	 important	 boundary	 for	 the	 process	 of	 unitization.	 When	
targets	and	lures	cannot	be	discriminated	on	the	basis	of	conceptual	processing,	and	are	
perceptually	very	similar,	high-resolution	intra-item	binding	might	be	required	to	achieve	
accurate	 recognition.	 Such	 binding	 might	 not	 be	 supported	 by	 unitization,	 since	
unitization	may	require	conceptual	processing	to	take	place.	
	
Perspective	2.	Modulation	of	 familiarity-based	 recognition	memory	after	hippocampal	
damage.	
Along	 this	 line,	 one	 would	 predict	 this	 material-specific	 effect	 to	 disappear	 if,	 for	
example,	perceptually	and	conceptually	similar	objects	would	have	been	used	in	the	“real	
objects”	condition.	Conversely,	the	use	of	perceptually	dissimilar	abstract	patterns	should	
also	 reduce,	 if	 not	 cancel,	 the	material-specific	 effect.	 Alternatively,	 using	 a	 2-alternate	
forced	 choice	 testing	 format	 should	 also	 alleviate	 the	 deficit,	 since	 at	 least	 perceptual	
fluency	 could	 be	 helpful	 here.	 However,	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 lures	 should	 act	 as	
increasing	 the	 perceptual	 similarity	 between	 targets	 and	 lure	 and	 thus	 would	 not	 be	
beneficial.	
	
Support	 for	 these	 ideas	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 recent	 case	 study	 of	 patient	 JMG,	 with	
damage	to	bilateral	MTL	with	the	notable	exception	of	the	right	hippocampus	(Barbeau	
et	al.,	2011;	Lacot	et	al.,	2017).	JMG	was	impaired	in	a	Old/New	recognition	test	involving	
abstract	 patterns,	 which	 is	 presumably	 due	 to	 damage	 to	 the	 right	 subhippocampal	
structures.	 Importantly,	 JMG	was	 also	 impaired	 in	 a	 recognition	 test	 involving	 abstract	
patterns	but	 in	 a	 5-alternate	 forced	 choice	 format.	 This	 can	be	 contrasted	with	normal	
performance	 of	 KA	 for	 abstract	 shapes	within	 a	 3-alternate	 forced	 choice	 format	 (see	
Jonin	 et	 al.,	 2018,	 Table	 4).	 Finally,	 performance	 of	 the	 patient	 FRG,	 with	 intact	 right	
entorhinal,	 perirhinal	 and	 parahippocampal	 cortices	 but	 destroyed	 right	 hippocampus	
and	 left	MTL	 is	also	relevant,	since	this	patient	successfully	performed	a	series	of	 three	
Old/New	 recognition	 memory	 tasks	 involving	 abstract	 patterns	 (Barbeau	 et	 al.,	 2005;	
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Barbeau	 et	 al.,	 2011,	 Table	 2).	 A	 recent	 study	 also	 used	 abstract	 patterns	 and	 found	 a	
positive	 relationship	 between	 intra-item	 configural	 processing	 and	 the	 volume	 of	 the	
lateral	entorhinal	cortex	(Yeung	et	al.,	2017).	This	strengthens	the	idea	that	encoding	of	
previously	unknown	stimuli,	made	of	separate	elements	and	thus	requiring	some	level	of	
binding	across	several	features	(i.e.	shape,	colour,	spatial)	might	not	be	achieved	through	
perirhinal	computations,	but	rather	might	need	at	least	the	involvement	of	the	entorhinal	
cortex.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 stimuli	 for	 which	 existing	 conceptual	 knowledge	 is	
available,	 such	 level	 of	 binding	 may	 not	 be	 necessary	 to	 allow	 further	 accurate	
recognition.	
	
Box	4.	Material-specific	 familiarity-based	 recognition	 in	developmental	amnesia:	 support	
for	the	representational-hierarchical	view	of	the	MTL	
Our	suggestion	is	therefore	that	the	material-specific	effect	observed	in	patient	KA	may	
be	interpreted	within	the	representational-hierarchical	models	whereby	recognition	tests	
that	 require	 items	 to	 be	 processed	 as	 single	 entities	 can	 be	 successfully	 performed	
through	rather	early	computations	 in	the	ventral	stream	(actually	preserved	 in	KA).	The	
representation	 of	 abstract	 patterns,	 however,	 would	 require	 additional,	 later	
computations	presumably	sustained	by	the	entorhinal	cortex,	or	even	the	hippocampus,	
depending	on	the	discrimination	demands	placed	on	the	test.	
	
In	the	case	of	KA,	evidence	for	damage	to	the	right	entorhinal	cortex	and	hippocampus	
could	therefore	account	for	this	pattern	of	results,	and	also	point	towards	a	boundary	for	
unitization.	 Unitization	 at	 encoding	 could	 take	 place	 as	 long	 as	 prior	 knowledge	 is	
available,	 allowing	 conceptual	 processing	 at	 encoding.	 In	 these	 situations,	 as	 stated	
before,	unitization	might	be	an	 interesting	candidate	 to	account	 for	preserved	concept	
formation	in	KA.	However,	when	prior	knowledge	is	not	available	at	encoding,	like	in	the	
case	 of	 unknown	 stimuli	 made	 of	 separate	 elements	 (arbitrary	 associations	 could	 be	
another	 instance	 of	 stimuli	 lacking	 prior	 knowledge),	 relational	 processing	 would	 be	
mandatory	for	the	binding	operations.	
If	 true,	 a	 way	 to	 move	 forward	 would	 be	 to	 investigate	 whether	 distinct	 binding	
processes	that	operate	at	encoding	could	be	differentially	affected	following	damage	to	
the	hippocampus	or	to	subhippocampal	structures.	
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Perspective	3.	Does	short-term	memory	binding	at	encoding	dissociate	within	the	MTL?	
An	interesting	possibility	would	be	to	contrast	binding	of	features	that	are	intrinsic	to	the	
object	 (i.e.	 “conjunctive	 binding”)	 with	 binding	 of	 extrinsic	 features	 (i.e.	 “relational	
binding”).	 These	 forms	 of	 binding	 have	 already	 been	 contrasted	 in	 long-term	memory	
(Mayes	et	al.,	2007),	however,	an	interesting	possibility	would	be	to	investigate	whether	
they	also	dissociate	within	working	memory,	i.e.	during	the	study	phase	of	a	recognition	
paradigm.	Following	our	proposal,	it	could	be	the	case	that	preserved	conjunctive	binding	
processes	may	support	preserved	explicit	 learning	 in	KA,	 in	spite	of	disrupted	relational	
binding.	We	have	explored	this	 idea	in	a	fruitful	collaboration	with	Dr	Mario	A.	Parra,	as	
presented	in	Appendix	B	(Jonin	et	al.,	2018).	
	
	
In	 summary,	 we	 have	 suggested	 that	 unitization	 might	 be	 a	 candidate	 mechanism	
susceptible	to	account	for	the	preservation	of	semantic	learning	in	patient	KA.	However,	
we	 have	 acknowledged	 that	 unitization	 might	 take	 place	 at	 encoding	 only	 when	 pre-
existing	representations,	or	prior	knowledge,	is	available.	This	of	course	leaves	us	with	an	
unresolved	issue,	namely	how	KA	could	have	acquired	conceptual	knowledge	in	the	first	
place?	
	
Towards	an	account	for	the	acquisition	of	knowledge	despite	amnesia	
	
A	 relevant	 clinical	 observation	 here	 in	 KA	 is	 that	 he	 has	 consistently	 shown	 intense	
interests	 for	 some	domains	 of	 knowledge,	 and,	 as	 stated	before,	 he	 has	 likely	 became	
kind	of	an	“expert”	 in	 it.	We	have	cited	the	example	of	his	 intense	 interest	 for	History,	
but	he	also	has	an	 impressive	amount	of	knowledge	regarding	firemen	and	all	 the	stuff	
associated	with	 this	domain.	This	and	other	domains	of	 relative	“expertise”	 in	KA	 (e.g.	
French	music	hits),	according	to	his	relatives,	often	takes	the	form	of	obsessions,	in	that	
KA	 seems	 to	 lack	 curiosity	 for	 things	 that	 differ	 from	 his	 major	 interests.	 This	 kind	 of	
behaviour	 was	 termed	 “intense	 conceptual	 interests”,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 increasingly	
described	 and	 investigated	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 becoming	 a	 central	 topic	 in	
educational-psychology	 and	 cognitive	 development	 literature	 (Alexander,	 Johnson,	
Leibham	&	Kelley,	2008;	DeLoache	&	Simcock,	2007;	O’Keefe	&	Garcia,	2014;	Rotgans	&	
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Schmidt,	 2017;	 2014;).	 About	 one-third	 of	 young	 children	 would	 present	 that	 kind	 of	
intense	 interests,	 associated	 with	 the	 development	 of	 an	 impressive	 amount	 of	
knowledge	in	children	below	6	years	old,	and	it	might	be	more	frequent	in	boys.	Intense	
interests	 are	 supposedly	beneficial	 for	 the	 cognitive	development,	 regarding	 attention,	
increased	learning	and	deeper	levels	of	processing	(Alexander	et	al.,	2008).	Interestingly,	
retrospective	studies	 in	adults	experts	show	how	early	 in	 life	 their	 interest	grew	up	for	
the	 domain	 of	 expertise	 (Ericsson	 &	 Crutcher,	 1990).	 Intriguingly,	 intense	 conceptual	
interests	do	not	 last	 for	many	years.	Rather,	 after	 a	period	 typically	 lasting	 from	a	 few	
months	 to	 a	 few	 years,	 children	 seem	 to	 forget	 a	 large	part	 of	 this	 (or	 these)	domain-
specific	 knowledge	 (e.g.	 Chi	 &	 Koeske,	 1983).	 The	 typical	 age	 range	 for	 children	 to	
develop	 these	 intense	 interests	 is	generally	 around	3	 years	old,	 according	 to	 studies	of	
parents’	 reports	 (DeLoache,	 Simcock,	&	Macari,	 2007).	 Interestingly,	 by	 age	6,	 children	
master	thousands	of	words	and	their	meanings,	and	this	is	achieved	in	a	very	limited	time	
windows	 in	 the	 development,	 an	 observation	 often	 attributed	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
“fast-mapping”	 (Carey,	 2010).	 Fast-mapping	 refers	 to	 an	 incidental	 associative	 learning	
procedure	that	allows	to	create	“novel	word-referent	 links	 in	as	 little	as	one	exposure”	
(Samuelson	 &	 McMurray,	 2017).	 However,	 and	 importantly,	 these	 novel	 associations	
learned	through	“fast-mapping”	incidental	procedures	do	not	seem	to	be	retained	on	the	
long-run,	 unless	 novel	 exposures	 or	 “extended	mapping”	 can	 take	 place	 (for	 a	 recent	
review,	 see	 also	 Cooper	 et	 al.,	 2018).	 Recently,	 a	 study	 has	 shown	 that	 adults	 with	
acquired	 amnesia	 could	 perform	 better	 than	 controls	 in	 an	 associative	 learning	 task	
(picture	–	name	associations)	under	a	“fast-mapping”	procedure	(Sharon,	Moscovitch,	&	
Gilboa,	2011).	Note	however	that	this	result	has	never	been	replicated	so	far	either	in	late-
onset	amnesia	 (Cooper	et	al.,	 2018)	or	 in	a	 series	of	 three	patients	with	developmental	
amnesia	(Elward	et	al.,	2019).	
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Perspective	 4.	 Do	 fast-mapping,	 extended-mapping	 and	 intense	 conceptual	 interests	
relate	each	other	in	early	cognitive	development?	
An	exciting	possibility,	 that	has	never	been	 investigated	as	 far	as	we	know,	 is	 that	 fast-
mapping,	 extended-mapping	 and	 intense	 conceptual	 interests	 could	 be	 related	 in	 the	
service	of	the	early	development	of	learning	abilities.	In	the	case	of	patient	KA,	we	could	
speculate	 that,	 like	many	other	children,	he	may	have	developed	such	 intense	 interests	
quite	early	in	life,	as	suggested	by	the	clinical	reports	with	him	and	his	relatives.	Whether	
fast-mapping	could	have	been	 involved	 in	the	development	of	these	 interests	of	course	
remains	to	be	 investigated.	This	should	be	easily	doable	by	contrasting	children	with	an	
without	 “intense	 conceptual	 interests”	 on	 fast-mapping	 learning	 procedures	 for	 items	
belonging	to	their	domains	of	interest	or	not,	for	example.	
	
One	could	nonetheless	speculate	that	the	reason	for	the	absence	of	convincing	evidence	
for	rapid	learning	through	fast-mapping	in	cases	of	DA	so	far	(i.e.	only	one	study)	could	be	
that	 patients	 are	 tested	 two	 late:	 so	 far,	 fast-mapping	 studies	 in	 healthy	 adults	
consistently	 revealed	 that	 this	 procedure	 was	 less	 efficient	 than	 the	 typical	 “episodic	
encoding”	condition	for	subsequent	memory	(Cooper	et	al.,	2018).	
	
Now,	considering	our	proposal	that	prior	knowledge	available	at	encoding	may	be	critical	
to	 trigger	 unitization	 strategies,	 which	 in	 turn	 makes	 further	 recognition	 possible	 in	
amnesia,	 we	 could	 speculate	 on	 a	 possible	 account	 for	 KA’s	 profile.	 It	 seems	 to	 us	
possible	 that,	 if	 an	 amnesic	 patient	 were	 highly	 –	 abnormally	 –	 dependent	 on	 prior	
knowledge	 for	 subsequent	memory,	 it	would	make	sense	 that	he	would	develop	much	
more	 self-interest-guided	 behaviours	 than	 his	 pairs,	 just	 because	 this	 gives	 him	 more	
chance	not	 to	 forget.	Thus,	 it	may	have	been	 the	case	 that	his	actual	 intense	 interests,	
and	 comparatively	 superior	 knowledge	 in	 some	 domains,	 may	 in	 fact	 reflect	 the	
continuous	development	of	such	learning	strategies.	That	 is,	by	focusing	on	a	restricted	
set	of	conceptual	domains,	preserved	learning	through	unitization	may	take	place,	giving	
the	patient	more	chance	to	keep	the	track	of	his	on	going	activities.	As	an	example,	it	has	
been	 demonstrated	 that	 patients	 with	 damage	 limited	 to	 the	 hippocampus	 could	
perform	 like	 controls	 in	 learning	 combinations	between	grocery	 items	and	 their	 prizes,	
but	only	when	the	combination	was	congruent	with	existing	(i.e.	real)	prizes.	Moreover,	
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this	 was	 not	 observed	 in	 patients	 with	 damage	 extending	 to	 structures	 of	 the	
parahippocampal	gyrus	(Kan	et	al.,	2009).	
	
Box	 5.	 Intense	 conceptual	 interests	 first,	 then	 unitization	 triggered	 by	 existing	
knowledge?	
Therefore,	it	is	conceivable	that	patient	KA	has,	along	his	development,	started	to	focus	
on	 the	 only	 “intense	 conceptual	 interests”	 for	 which	 he	 had	 successfully	 acquired	
knowledge,	because	this	may	 increase	the	 likelihood	of	memory	formation,	 in	kind	of	a	
“virtuous	 circle”:	 prior	 knowledge	 triggers	 unitization	 which	 allows	 associative	
recognition	which,	along	multiple	episodes,	leads	to	concept	formation.	
	
Future	research	is	needed	to	better	characterize	whether	pre-existing	representations	in	
long-term	 memory	 (i.e.	 prior	 knowledge)	 alone	 can	 benefit	 subsequent	 associative	
memory,	or	whether	congruency	with	prior	knowledge	is	the	key	factor.	In	the	last	case,	
theories	 putting	 forward	 the	 role	memory	 schemas	would	 be	 strongly	 supported	 (e.g.	
SLIMM	framework),	while	 in	the	other	case,	older	accounts	 like	the	 levels-of-processing	
framework	should	be	considered	 (for	example,	patient	 Jon	was	shown	to	benefit	 from	
depth-of-processing	 manipulation	 with	 words,	 see	 Gardiner,	 Brandt,	 Vargha-Khadem,	
Baddeley,	 &	 Mishkin,	 2006).	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 we	 need	 more	 investigations	 of	 the	
boundaries	 between	 unitization	 and	 conceptual	 elaborative	 encoding.	 So	 far,	 only	 one	
study	has	brought	evidence	suggesting	that	these	processes	may	correspond	to	distinct	
cognitive	form	of	learning	(Parks	&	Yonelinas,	2015).	Noteworthy,	this	investigation	found	
that	unitization	especially	enhanced	associative	learning	involving	faces-word	pairs	(Expt.	
4),	which	 again	 support	 this	mechanism	 as	 an	 important	 candidate	 to	 account	 for	 the	
pattern	reported	in	patient	KA.	
	
What	could	be	the	brain	substrates	for	preserved	concept	formation	in	patients	like	KA?	
The	Anterior	Temporal	network	may	support	rapid	neocortical	learning	
	
Our	 imaging	results	 in	KA	have	contributed	addressing	the	 issue	of	what	could	be	such	
preserved	learning	processes.	We	have	brought	evidence	that	 in	DA,	brain	damage	may	
well	extend	beyond	the	hippocampal	formation.	This	confirmed	prior	reports	of	damage	
to	diencephalic	structures,	and	extended	the	findings	to	the	whole	hippocampal	system.	
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That	 is,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 to	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge,	 a	 case	 report	 provided	 data	
suggesting	not	only	that	there	is	some	degree	of	hippocampal	atrophy	in	that	syndrome,	
but	also	that	each	and	every	structure	connecting	the	subiculum	to	the	anterior	thalamic	
nuclei	 has	 abnormal	 features.	 This	 reinforces	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 system	 has	 some	
functional	 specificity,	 and	 also	 makes	 it	 unlikely,	 at	 variance	 with	 prior	 studies,	 that	
preserved	 structures	within	 the	 circuit	 could	 be	 responsible	 for	 the	 remaining	 learning	
abilities	in	KA.	Of	greater	interest	here	is	the	status	of	extra-hippocampal	structures.	We	
found	 very	 robust	 evidence	 for	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 parahippocampal	 gyrus	 and	
entorhinal	cortices,	exception	made	of	a	right	entorhinal	volume	loss.	Moreover,	cortical	
thickness	and	volumes	segmentation	revealed	an	unexpected	higher	grey	matter	density	
in	 the	 medial	 temporal	 pole,	 broadly	 encompassing	 Brodmann’s	 areas	 38	 and	 36.	
Paralleling	 other	 cortical	 thickness	 reports	 in	 neurodevelopmental	 conditions,	 these	
results	are	highly	suggestive	of	a	reorganization	of	the	MTL	following	early	injury,	which	
has	 never	 been	 reported	 in	 DA.	 We	 can	 only	 speculate	 that	 the	 particularly	 severe	
hippocampal	atrophy	in	KA,	by	comparison	to	previous	cases,	encompassing	all	subfields,	
might	 have	 triggered	 such	 functional	 reorganization.	 Although	 controversial,	 animal	
studies	previously	suggested	that	more	severe	hippocampal	damage	would	in	fact	result	
in	 a	 more	 efficient	 functioning	 of	 extra-hippocampal	 structures,	 maybe	 due	 to	 the	
absence	of	interference	from	the	residual	hippocampal	system.	
	
Box	6.	The	case	for	two	learning	pathways	within	the	PMAT	framework	
Our	suggestion	 therefore	would	be	 that	at	 least	 two	explicit	 learning	pathways	coexist	
within	 the	 MTL.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 proposal	 from	 the	 PMAT	 framework	 (Ranganath	 &	
Ritchey,	2012;	Ritchey	&	Ranganath,	2015),	one	pathway	would	mainly	rely	on	the	Anterior	
Temporal	(AT)	network	including	the	perirhinal	cortex	as	a	core	node;	the	other	pathway	
would	 depend	 on	 the	 Postero	 Medial	 (PM)	 network	 including	 the	 parahippocampal	
cortex	as	a	core	node.	In	the	case	of	KA,	beyond	the	hippocampal	injury,	damage	to	most	
of	the	PM	network	is	most	likely,	which	could	have	favoured	a	differential	development	
of	the	AT	network	as	reflected	in	our	cortical	thickness	measures	(see	Gogtay	et	al.,	2007;	
Huttenlocher,	1990;	Khundrakpam,	Lewis,	Zhao,	Chouinard-decorte,	&	Evans,	2016;	Shaw	
et	al.,	2008).	
	
Of	 great	 relevance	 here	 are	 recent	 findings	 of	 thinner	 temporal	 poles	 cortices	 in	 the	
syndrome	of	Highly	Superior	Autobiographical	Memory	(HSAM)	(LePort	et	al.,	2012;	for	a	
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recent	review	see	Palombo,	Sheldon,	&	Levine,	2018).	These	subjects	have	very	superior	
abilities	 of	 autobiographical	 memory	 recall,	 while	 they	 cannot	 be	 discriminated	 from	
normal	controls	on	standard	tests	of	episodic	and	semantic	memory.	
	
Perspective	5.	The	case	for	a	neurodevelopmental	continuum	regarding	explicit	learning	
One	promising	perspective	would	thus	consist	in	considering	the	syndrome	of	DA	and	of	
HSAM	on	 a	 continuum	with	 respect	 to	 the	 PMAT	 framework.	While	 early	 injury	 to	 the	
hippocampal	 system	 would	 have	 shifted	 further	 synaptogenesis	 and	 synaptic	 pruning	
towards	favouring	the	AT	network	 in	DA,	unknown	atypical	developmental	condition	 in	
HSAM	might	 have	 shifted	 brain	maturation	 towards	 favouring	 the	 PM	 network.	 In	 the	
case	of	HSAM,	very	recent	support	for	this	 idea	has	just	been	reported	in	an	task-based	
fMRI	 studies	 revealing	 that	 most	 of	 the	 PM	 regions	 display	 higher	 activity	 during	
autobiographical	 memory	 retrieval	 in	 HSAM	 than	 in	 controls	 (Santangelo	 et	 al.,	 2018).	
Similarly,	 the	 lack	of	 autobiographical	 recollection	 in	 a	 subject	with	 “Severely	Deficient	
Autobiographical	Memory”	(SDAM,	Palombo,	Alain,	Söderlund,	Khuu,	&	Levine,	2015)	has	
recently	 been	 associated	 with	 reduced	 neural	 synchrony	 in	 the	 gamma	 band,	 a	 MEG	
marker	of	recollection	in	normal	controls	(Fuentemilla,	Palombo,	&	Levine,	2018).	We	thus	
have	preliminary	but	consistent	evidence	showing	that	in	HSAM,	the	PM	network	may	be	
abnormally	 efficient,	 while	 comprehensive	 cognitive	 assessment	 does	 not	 reveal	 any	
specificities	 regarding	 semantic	 knowledge.	 Conversely,	 in	 SDAM,	 neural	 markers	 of	
recollection	 are	 apparently	 lacking.	 An	 hypothesis	 that	 needs	 further	 investigation	 is	
whether	 in	DA,	a	pattern	closer	 to	 the	one	observed	 in	SDAM	but	opposite	 to	 the	one	
reported	 in	HSAM	could	be	highlighted,	as	 long	as	early	damage	to	core	regions	of	 the	
PM	network	were	severe	enough	to,	as	we	speculate,	lead	to	a	reorganization	favouring	
the	efficiency	of	the	AT	network.	This	could	account	for	the	superior	semantic	knowledge	
observed	 in	KA,	and	 for	his	particularly	 fast	 responses	when	dealing	with	 famous	 faces	
discrimination.	
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Perspective	 5.	 Characterizing	 the	 network	 underlying	 familiarity	 for	 famous	 vs.	
unknown	faces	in	KA	and	controls.	
A	 related	 issue	 would	 be	 the	 investigation	 of	 whether	 KA	 presents	 with	 an	 abnormal	
discrepancy	 between	 familiarity-based	 recognition	 for	 famous	 vs.	 unknown	 faces,	 as	
compared	to	controls,	and	whether	this	could	be	related	to	the	reorganization	of	his	AT	
network.	 We	 have	 started	 a	 behavioural	 experiment	 using	 the	 speeded	 recognition	
paradigm	to	collect	preliminary	data,	before	we	can	hopefully	design	an	fMRI	experiment	
for	that	purpose.	
	
	
Altogether,	 we	 have	 completed	 the	 first	 series	 of	 objectives	 of	 this	 thesis	 by	 bringing	
additional	 data	 supporting	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 rapid	 learning	 pathway	 outside	 the	
hippocampus.	 In	doing	so,	we	did	confirm	the	hypothesis	that	semantic	knowledge	can	
be	acquired	and	retrieved	despite	no	residual	episodic	learning	abilities,	and	with	no	need	
of	dedicated	learning	techniques.	Furthermore	we	also	have	verified	the	assumption	that	
such	 learning	 processes	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	 the	 result	 of	 residual	 functioning	 in	 the	
extended	 hippocampal	 system.	 However,	 we	 brought	 evidence	 for	 a	 material-specific	
effect	in	a	recognition	procedure	mainly	tapping	on	familiarity,	 in	contradiction	with	the	
dual	processes	framework.	Among	the	possible	accounts	for	these	findings,	we	suggest	
that	 pre-existing	 representations	 available	 at	 encoding	 could	 be	 responsible	 for	 this	
material-specific	 effect	 favouring	meaningful	 stimuli.	How	prior	 knowledge	affects	new	
learning	was	the	second	main	goal	of	this	thesis,	which	we	further	discuss	below.	
	
---	
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Prior	knowledge,	not	stimulus	novelty,	is	a	powerful	learning	enhancer	
	
When	 the	 to-be-learned	 stimuli	 carry	 pre-existing	 representations,	 we	 have	 brought	
evidence	that	 it	considerably	 increases	the	 likelihood	of	 long-term	memory	formation.	
Around	 20%	 improvement	was	 reported	when	 comparing	 famous	with	 unknown	 faces,	
which	 represents	 a	 very	 large	 benefit	 due	 to	 an	 experimental	 manipulation	 that	 was	
incident	to	the	encoding	task:	the	orienting	tasks	we	used	did	not	differ	across	novel	or	
familiar	stimuli.	
This	 result	 extends	 numerous	 prior	 studies	 suggesting	 that	 familiar	 items	 yield	 better	
memory	than	unknown	ones,	again	highlighting	to	us	an	overlooked	fact,	namely	that	our	
learning	 processes	 may	 be	 biased	 towards	 the	 acquisition	 of	 new	 memories	 about	
memoranda	 that	 we	 are	 familiar	 with.	 An	 original	 contribution	 that	 is	 added	 by	 the	
present	work	is	that,	by	directly	contrasting	novel	with	familiarized	or	famous	faces,	our	
result	 help	 resolving	 prior	 contradictions	 in	 the	 literature.	 As	 noted	 by	 Poppenk	 et	 al.	
(2010),	there	was	a	sharp	contrast	between	the	acknowledged	role	of	stimuli	repetition	in	
learning	and	proposals	putting	 the	emphasis	on	novelty	detection	as	a	 critical	 factor	 in	
triggering	long-term	memory	encoding	(e.g.	Tulving	&	Kroll,	1995).	We	have	extended	the	
findings	 from	 Poppenk	 et	 al.	 (2010)	 who	 used	 written	 proverbs	 to	 demonstrate	 that	
familiar,	 but	 not	 novel,	 items	 were	 better	 remembered,	 and	 obtained	 similar	 findings	
using	 more	 relevant	 materials	 for	 everyday	 cognition,	 that	 is	 face-scene	 associations.	
Besides,	the	use	of	faces	also	allowed	us	to	make	sure	that	novel	stimuli	had	never	been	
experienced	before,	which	is	a	confounding	factor	that	cannot	be	ruled	out	with	words.	
We	do	not	take	our	results	as	evidence	against	the	models	predicting	that	novelty	should	
increase	memory	 performance;	 in	 fact	we	 only	 demonstrate	 that	 such	 prediction	 does	
not	 apply	 to	 absolute	 stimulus	 novelty.	 Refinement	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 novelty	 (see	
Bastin	et	al.,	2019)	is	needed	to	clarify	inconsistent	reports	regarding	the	issue	of	memory	
enhancement.	Similarly,	we	need	to	better	characterize	the	sources	of	familiarity,	or	prior	
knowledge,	 if	 we	 are	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 relationship	 between	 knowing	 and	
learning.	 The	present	 thesis	 aimed	 at	 doing	 so	 by	 contrasting	 two	main	 forms	of	 prior	
knowledge,	as	we	will	discuss	below.	
One	 of	 our	 objectives	 was	 to	 contrast	 stimulus	 novelty	 and	 stimulus	 familiarity	 in	 the	
same	learning	task	where	the	status	of	the	items	in	memory	would	be	carefully	checked,	
where	the	availability	of	prior	knowledge	at	encoding	would	be	incidental	and	irrelevant	
for	the	task	instructions,	and	where	the	testing	format	(source	memory	judgment)	would	
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circumvent	the	confounding	factor	due	to	differential	retrieval	demands.	By	doing	so	and	
using	materials	 that	 are	 relevant	 for	 everyday	 cognition	 (face-scene	 associations),	 and	
that	 further	 reduce	 the	 inter-individual	 variability	 regarding	 perceptual	 expertise,	 our	
data	 helps	 resolving	 the	 contradictions	 related	 to	 how	 both	 novelty	 and	 familiarity	
could	enhance	long-term	memory.	
An	 important	 result	 that	we	 think	we	have	brought	here	 is	 actually	 a	 negative	 finding:	
when	novelty	is	operationalized	as	stimulus	novelty	(i.e.	a	previously	unseen	face),	it	does	
not	 lead	 to	 better	 memory	 formation	 than	 familiar	 stimuli	 (i.e.	 already	 experienced	
faces).	Besides,	this	was	true	even	for	 item	memory,	suggesting	a	robust	advantage	for	
famous	faces	because	considering	items	recognition	alone	in	fact	should	yield	more	False	
Alarms	for	famous	faces	than	for	unknown	faces,	which	was	not	the	case.	An	implication	
of	 this	 finding	 is	 that	 novelty	 detection	 processes	 known	 to	 trigger	 efficient	 long-term	
memory	encoding	may	have	more	to	do	with	our	ability	 to	process	errors	of	prediction	
than	novelty	per	 se.	That	 is,	neurocognitive	accounts	 like	 the	PIMMS	model	 (Predictive	
Interactive	Multiple	Memory	Systems,	Henson	&	Gagnepain,	2010)	assume	that	memory-
guided	 behaviours	 result	 from	 the	 dynamic	 interaction	 between	memory	 systems,	 and	
that	 backwards	 flow	 of	 information	within	 the	MTL	 hierarchy	may	 provide	 predictions	
(e.g.	 based	 on	 contextual	 processing)	 that	 are	 compared	 to	 the	 actual	 sensory	 input	
processing.	This	may	result	 in	signalling	an	error	of	prediction	that,	when	 large	enough,	
could	trigger	additional	long-term	encoding	mechanisms.	
	
Box	 7.	 Contextual	 novelty,	 not	 stimulus	 novelty,	 may	 drive	 the	 novelty	 effect	 on	
subsequent	memory	
	Thus,	 and	 in	 accordance	with	 recent	proposals	 suggesting	 that	 contrasting	 conceptual	
novelty	(an	unexpected	combination	of	familiar	elements)	with	conceptual	familiarity	(an	
expected	 combination	 of	 familiar	 elements)	 should	 be	 helpful	 in	 resolving	 the	
discrepancies	(Reggev	et	al.,	2017),	our	results	suggest	that	the	role	of	novelty	should	be	
considered	 as	 related	 to	 isolation,	 bizarreness,	 or	 incongruent	 effects	 rather	 than	 as	 a	
lack	of	prior	knowledge.	
	
Along	 this	 line,	 it	 could	 well	 be	 the	 case	 that	 both	 relative	 novelty	 (i.e.	 as	 a	 result	 of	
broken	 expectations,	 or	 large	 prediction	 error)	 and	 prior	 knowledge	 (i.e.	 pre-existing	
representations	congruent	with	the	 incoming	 information)	drive	 learning	enhancement,	
as	 predicted	 in	 the	 SLIMM	 framework	 (Van	Kesteren	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 This	 perspective	 has	
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very	 recently	 found	 support	 in	 a	 series	 of	 behavioural	 experiments	 using	 visual	
discrimination	 learning	 to	generate	memory	 for	 rules	 (considered	as	memory	 schemas)	
and	 testing	 memory	 for	 trials	 either	 congruent	 or	 incongruent	 with	 the	 learned	 rule	
against	unrelated	trials	 (Greve	et	al.,	2019).	The	authors	found	 increased	event	memory	
for	 both	 incongruent	 and	 congruent	 trials	 by	 comparison	with	 the	 unrelated,	 baseline	
trials,	and	further	argued	for	their	results	to	reflect	distinct	learning	processes	that	would	
support	 either	 congruency-based	 memory	 or	 non-congruent-based	 memory.	 This	
illustrates	 more	 generally	 how	 prediction	 error	 models	 may	 gain	 influence	 in	 future	
research,	as	they	reflect	the	utmost	importance	of	considering	the	dynamic	interactions	
between	what	we	know	and	how	we	learn	to	gain	further	insight	into	the	understanding	
of	learning	mechanisms.	
	
In	that	context,	a	remarkable	result	of	this	thesis	is	that	standard	memory	measures	used	
in	clinical	settings	displayed	differential	 relationships	with	our	assessment	of	stimulus	
novelty-	 or	 stimulus-familiarity	 based	 learning.	 The	 fact	 that	 some	 universally	 used	
testing	procedures	 like	the	Logical	Memory	subtest	of	the	Wechsler	Memory	Scale	may	
tap	 on	 prior	 knowledge-based,	 but	 not	 novelty-based,	 learning	 is	 of	 great	 matter.	
Because	 we	 have	 shown	 that	 stimulus	 novelty	 yields	 lower	 long-term	 memory	
performance,	it	implies	that	current	neuropsychological	assessment	may	underestimate	
memory	impairments	at	least	in	some	patients.	We	will	come	back	to	this	idea	later.	
	
Beyond	Levels-Of-Processing:	benefits	of	conceptual	and	perceptual	knowledge	
	
One	 way	 to	 account	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 is	 to	 consider	 the	 levels-of-
processing	 framework	 (LOP),	 which	 assumes	 that	 deeper	 (i.e.	 semantic)	 encoding	will	
result	in	a	higher	probability	of	successful	learning.	However,	and	as	stated	in	section	VI.I,	
p.	 147,	 one	 weakness	 of	 the	 framework	 is	 that	 depth	 of	 encoding	 is	 actually	 hard	 to	
define.	
Typically,	it	has	been	operationalized	using	orienting	tasks	at	encoding	that	stress	either	
semantic	or	perceptual	processing,	showing	that	the	former	exceeds	the	latter	 in	terms	
of	 subsequent	memory.	 In	an	effort	 to	 further	 investigate	 the	hypothesis	derived	 from	
this	 framework,	we	 contrasted	 two	 kinds	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 the	 same	 task	 design.	
Following	Poppenk	et	al.	(2010),	“Experimental	Knowledge”	(EK)	was	operationalized	as	
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pre-study	familiarization	with	previously	unknown	faces;	“Pre-Experimental	Knowledge”	
(PEK)	was	operationalized	with	 the	use	of	 famous	 faces.	While	 the	 former	 results	 from	
recent	 exposures,	 and	 is	 therefore	 unlikely	 to	 trigger	 conceptual	 processes	 when	
encountered	again	at	study,	the	latter	results	from	countless	exposures	over	the	lifetime,	
and	triggers	conceptual	processing	at	study.	We	have	therefore	argued	that	experimental	
knowledge	 resulting	 from	 recent	 exposures	would	mainly	 yield	 perceptual	 knowledge,	
potentially	 triggering	 perceptual	 fluency	 during	 the	 study	 phase.	 By	 contrast,	 famous	
faces	 are	 expected	 to	 yield	 both	 conceptual	 and	 perceptual	 fluency	 at	 study.	We	 thus	
consider	that	our	task	may	help	isolating	the	specific	benefits	associated	with	conceptual	
processing	 (associated	 with	 both	 identification	 and	 reactivation	 of	 a	 large	 knowledge	
network,	and	conceptual	fluency	during	study).	
Following	 the	 LOP	 framework,	 we	 would	 expect	 PEK	 to	 generate	 more	 Hits	 than	 EK.	
Moreover,	given	 that	correct	 rejection	of	 famous	 faces	used	as	 lures	 (PEK	condition)	 is	
more	demanding	than	correct	rejection	of	unknown	faces	(EK	&	Novelty	conditions),	we	
would	 expect	 to	 see	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 rate	 of	 FAs	 in	 the	 PEK	 condition.	 A	 famous	
paradigm	 in	psychology	has	 repeatedly	 shown	this	pattern	of	FAs:	 the	Deese-Roediger-
McDermott	(“DRM”)	paradigm.	Several	accounts	have	been	advanced	for	the	finding	of	
high	 FAs	 rates	 to	 critical	 lures,	 but	 a	 common	 feature	of	 these	models	 is	 the	 idea	 that	
conceptual	similarity	between	the	lure	and	the	encoded	representations	of	the	targets	at	
study	will	increase	the	probability	to	endorse	a	lure	as	studied	(i.e.	Activation	Monitoring	
Theory,	 Roediger,	 Watson,	 McDermott,	 &	 Gallo,	 2001;	 Fuzzy	 Trace	 Theory,	 Brainerd	 &	
Reyna,	2002).	
In	 contradiction	 with	 these	 frameworks,	 we	 found	 that	 the	 PEK	 condition	 generated	
fewer	 FAs	 than	 EK,	 while	 Hit	 rates	 were	 similar	 in	 both	 conditions.	We	 replicated	 the	
result	in	an	independent	sample,	which	strengthens	in	our	opinion	this	conclusion.		In	our	
view,	this	pattern	means	that	conceptual	processing	(i.e.	semantic,	or	“deep”	encoding)	
might	not	be	required	to	massively	improve	item	recognition,	since	recent	exposures	(i.e.	
perceptual	 knowledge)	 seems	 sufficient.	 However,	 conceptual	 processing	 seems	 to	 be	
mandatory	 to	 correctly	 reject	 associated	 lures,	 so	 enhancing	 the	 efficiency	 of	 retrieval	
processes.	In	addition,	the	fact	that	high-confidence	Hits	were	more	frequent	for	famous	
faces	seems	to	reinforce	this	idea	of	enhanced	retrieval	efficiency,	and	so	did	the	findings	
of	a	selective	increase	in	recognition	memory	for	the	context	in	the	PEK	condition.	
	
	
		 369	
Box	8.	Challenging	the	Levels-Of-Processing	framework?	
A	 core	 prediction	 of	 the	 LOP	 framework	 is	 that	 semantic	 processing	 should	 increase	
memory	formation,	but	also	should	yield	higher	false	alarms	in	recognition	memory.	The	
findings	 of	 increased	 Hits	 to	 similar	 levels	 for	 stimuli	 with	 both	 Pre-Experimental	
Knowledge	 and	 Experimental	 Knowledge,	 and	 the	 findings	 of	 fewer	 False	 Alarms	 for	
stimuli	with	 Pre-Experimental	 Knowledge	 than	 Experimental	 Knowledge	 contradict	 the	
LOP	prediction.	
	
In	line	with	prior	proposals	(Gagnepain	et	al.,	2008;	Gagnepain	et	al.,	2011;	L.	M.	Reder	et	
al.,	2013;	Reder,	Liu,	Keinath,	&	Popov,	2015)	we	have	suggested	that	processes	outside	
the	range	of	learning	mechanisms	per	se	could	account	for	this	pattern	of	results.	
When	facing	with	familiar	stimuli,	perceptual	and	conceptual	fluency	refer	to	the	ease	of	
processing	 of	 these	 stimuli,	 due	 to	 past	 experiences	 (Oppenheimer,	 2008).	 Generally,	
increased	 fluency	 causes	 inflation	 in	 Hits	 and	 FAs	 rates	 (Whittlesea,	 2002),	 because	
fluency	on	 its	own	 is	not	systematically	attributed	to	recent	exposures.	However,	given	
that	 fluency	 by	 definition	 generates	 a	 subjective	 experience	 of	 increased	 ease	 of	
processing,	our	suggestion	is	that	it	can	modulate	the	other	cognitive	processes	involved	
at	encoding.	In	the	case	of	face-scene	associations,	increased	fluency	for	face	may	free-up	
attentional	 and	 working	 memory	 resources	 that	 are	 necessary	 to	 fulfil	 the	 task	
instructions,	 namely	 imagining	 an	 event	where	 the	 participant	 himself	would	meet	 the	
person	depicted	by	the	face,	 in	the	background	that	 is	displayed	as	a	 landscape.	Such	a	
task	typically	 requires	the	binding	of	separate	elements	to	further	make	a	pleasantness	
judgement	 (see	 Experiments	 3a	 &	 3b),	 which	 cannot	 be	 achieved	 without	 the	
involvement	of	attention	and	working	memory.	Thus,	we	suggest	that	fluency	triggered	
by	 the	 face	 displayed	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 screen	 may	 have	 favoured	 these	 binding	
processes.	When	successful,	they	should	ideally	result	in	the	building	of	a	representation	
that	 is	 distinctive	 enough	 to	 resist	 interference.	 This	 account	would	 predict	 that	more	
fluency	 at	 study	 would	 yield	 a	 more	 distinctive	 representation	 that	 would	 therefore	
support	higher	recognition	for	the	face-scene	association.	
Coming	back	 to	 the	comparison	between	EK	and	PEK,	 familiarized	 faces	 (EK	condition)	
are	 expected	 to	 yield	 mostly	 perceptual	 fluency,	 while	 famous	 faces	 (PEK	 condition)	
should	trigger	both	perceptual	and	conceptual	fluency.	Therefore,	associative	binding	for	
famous	faces	is	expected	to	be	more	successful	than	associative	binding	for	familiarized	
faces.	 We	 have	 brought	 evidence	 that	 increasing	 stimuli	 distinctiveness	 by	 using	 a	
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different	background	scene	for	each	faces	indeed	improved	associative	memory,	but	only	
for	 the	 PEK	 condition,	 in	 accordance	 with	 our	 proposal.	 Furthermore,	 increased	
distinctiveness	 of	 the	 materials	 resulted	 in	 an	 overall	 decreased	 accuracy	 in	 item	
recognition	 that	 did	 not	 interact	with	 the	 different	 prior	 knowledge	 conditions.	 Again,	
this	is	supportive	of	our	view	pointing	towards	the	role	of	fluency	and	working	memory	/	
attentional	 resources	 allocation,	 since	 changing	 the	 study	 contexts	 at	 each	 trial	
unsurprisingly	 would	 leave	 fewer	 attentional	 resources	 for	 the	 processing	 of	 the	 face	
only.	
	
Box	9.	The	role	of	fluency,	attention	and	working	memory	resources	
In	 an	 associative	 memory	 task,	 increasing	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	 the	 paired	 stimuli	
increased	 source	 memory	 and	 decreased	 item	 memory,	 leaving	 the	 pattern	 of	 prior	
knowledge	 benefits	 unchanged.	 We	 suggest	 that	 more	 fluency	 (perceptual	 and	 /	 or	
conceptual)	 at	 study,	 due	 to	 prior	 knowledge,	 may	 free-up	 attentional	 and	 working	
memory	resources	for	context	processing.	This	might	enable	more	efficient	item-context	
binding,	thus	increasing	the	distinctiveness	of	the	association.	
	
	
Perspective	 6.	 Testing	 the	 role	 of	 working	 memory	 in	 associative	 binding	 processes	
during	encoding.	
A	testable	prediction	from	the	above	proposal	is	that	a	dual-task	paradigm	should	reduce	
the	advantage	associated	with	prior	knowledge	for	associative	memory.	For	example,	in	a	
condition	where	 subjects	 would	 perform	 a	 visual	 span	 task	while	 encoding	 face-scene	
associations,	prior	knowledge	should	not	yield	superior	source	memory.	
	
	
Interestingly,	 in	 a	 recent	 investigation	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 unitization	 on	 recollection	 and	
familiarity,	it	was	reported	that	increased	unitization	could	improve	associative	memory,	
leaving	 item	 memory	 unchanged	 (Parks	 &	 Yonelinas,	 2015).	 The	 authors	 manipulated	
levels	of	 unitization	or	word	pairs	 (Expt.	 1),	 essentially	manipulating	how	 the	emphasis	
was	placed	on	the	semantic	relationship	between	individual	words	in	a	pair	at	encoding.	
These	 findings	 are	 in	 line	 with	 the	 proposals	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 at	 encoding,	 and	
especially	 in	 the	 form	of	 large	semantic	knowledge	accumulated	over	 the	 lifetime,	may	
trigger	learning	processes	that	augment	long-term	memory	item-context	binding.	
		 371	
The	 highly	 dynamic	 view	 of	 how	 pre-existing	 representations,	 processing	 fluency,	 item	
and	associative	encoding	interact	together	in	the	service	of	learning	clearly	needs	further	
investigations.	 One	 possible	 avenue	 could	 be	 to	 further	 investigate	 the	 benefits	 of	
perceptual	vs.	conceptual	fluency	at	encoding,	for	example	by	manipulating	the	number	
of	 exposures	 prior	 to	 the	 study	 phase.	 One	 could	 contrast	 single	 vs.	 multiple	 prior	
exposures	 of	 unknown	 faces	 to	 increase	 perceptual	 fluency.	 We	 would	 predict	 that	
repeated	 prior	 exposures	 should	 allow	 associative	 memory	 for	 unknown	 faces	 to	 get	
closer	to	the	level	of	associative	memory	for	famous	faces.	
	
Finally,	an	important	experimental	perspective	resulting	from	our	results	in	Experiments	
3a	 &	 3b	 is	 that	 source	 memory	 assessment	 within	 classical	 designs	 might	 well	
underestimate	performance.	
	
Box	10.	The	limitations	of	source	memory	paradigms	
Source	memory	 tasks	 typically	 use	 lists	 of	 individual	 items	 that	 are	 presented	 at	 study	
bound	 with	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 contexts,	 most	 often	 two	 (e.g.	 2	 different	 colourful	
backgrounds,	 2	different	 task	 instructions,	 2	different	voices	associated	with	 the	 target	
item,	4	spatial	 locations,	etc.).	 In	the	present	thesis,	we	have	shown	that	using	as	many	
different	 contexts	 as	 the	 number	 of	 individual	 items	 yielded	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	
associative	memory,	 and	 also	 impacted	 item	memory.	We	believe	 this	 should	be	 taken	
into	account	and	investigated	further.	
	
	
Prior	knowledge	triggers	age-resistant	learning	processes	
	
The	 present	 work	 has	 also	 brought	 strong	 evidence,	 across	 two	 independent	 studies,	
that	 the	 benefits	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 were	 age-resistant,	 and	 this	 was	 also	 true	
considering	associative	memory.	
This	 is	 a	 striking	 result	 given	 the	 well-acknowledged	 associative	 deficit	 hypothesis	 in	
aging	 (Naveh-Benjamin,	 2000),	 stating	 that	 memory	 for	 association	 is	 particularly	
sensitive	to	aging.	As	stated	above,	due	to	floor	effects	in	our	tasks,	our	findings	should	
be	taken	with	caution,	and	this	especially	holds	since	we	did	not	replicate	the	associative	
deficit	 expected	 in	 elderly	 subjects,	 for	 novel	 stimuli.	 Still,	 a	 consistent	 result	was	 that	
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elderly	 subjects	 benefit	 from	 pre-experimental	 knowledge	 as	 well	 as	 their	 youngest	
counterparts,	 including	 when	 considering	 source	 memory	 associated	 with	 high	
confidence	 ratings.	 Similarly,	 Hits	 rates	 associated	 with	 high-confidence	 ratings,	 often	
considered	 as	 mainly	 reflecting	 recollection-based	 retrieval,	 benefited	 from	 pre-
experimental	 knowledge	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 in	 young	 and	 elderly	 participants.	 Again,	
given	 the	 relative	 frailty	of	 recollection	processes	 in	aging,	 these	 findings	 look	of	great	
matter	to	us.	
First,	as	we	discuss	below,	they	suggest	that	new	declarative	learning	supported	by	prior	
knowledge	 of	 semantic	 nature	 may	 depend	 on	 neural	 substrates	 that	 are	 relatively	
spared	by	physiological	aging.	
Second,	as	 some	authors	 recently	 suggested	 (Parra,	 2017),	we	need	memory	 tasks	 that	
show	 little	 sensitivity	 to	 aging	 if	 we	 are	 to	 discover	 novel	 cognitive	 markers	 of	
neurodegenerative	diseases	associated	with	age,	like	Alzheimer’s	disease.	In	the	present	
work,	we	have	made	one	step	forward	in	that	direction.	
	
Perspective	 7.	 Benefits	 of	 Pre-Experimental	 Knowledge	 as	 a	 cognitive	 marker	 of	
abnormal	memory	decline	with	aging?	
A	promising	perspective	here	is	to	build	a	recognition	memory	task	allowing	to	quantify	
the	 degree	 of	 benefits	 associated	with	 pre-experimental	 knowledge,	 in	 other	 words	 a	
task	 inspired	 by	 our	 design	 that	 could	 provide	 a	 standard	 measure	 of	 the	 expected	
discrepancy	between	memory	for	novel	vs.	 familiar	stimuli.	Given	that	this	 index	should	
have	 only	 little,	 if	 any,	 dependency	 on	 age,	 it	 may	 provide	 a	 very	 useful	 score	 to	
discriminate	 elderly	 patients	 with	 genuine	 memory	 impairments.	 More	 specifically,	 as	
discussed	 below,	 one	 testable	 prediction	 could	 be	 that	 incident	 Alzheimer’s	 Disease	
might	be	detected	through	a	reduced	discrepancy	between	source	memory	for	unknown	
but	familiarized	faces,	and	famous	faces.	
	
The	 fMRI	 study	 described	 in	 Experiment	 4	 replicated	 the	 finding	 of	 increased	 source	
memory	 for	 famous	 over	 unknown	but	 familiarized	 faces	 in	 an	 independent	 sample	 of	
carefully	 screened	 healthy	 elderly.	 Importantly	 this	 time,	 the	 task	 design	 did	 not	
contaminate	 the	data	with	 floor	effects.	Yet,	we	observed	on	average	a	 15%	 increase	 in	
source	memory	in	the	PEK	condition,	which	is	strikingly	close	to	the	results	we	had	in	the	
behavioural	 studies.	 Again,	 this	 critically	 confirms	 that	 when	 semantic	 knowledge	 is	
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available	for	an	item	at	encoding,	the	benefits	for	subsequent	memory	extend	from	item	
to	context	recognition.	
However,	in	our	sample	or	patients	with	early	Alzheimer’s	disease,	the	benefit	of	prior	
knowledge	did	not	hold	anymore.	This,	to	us,	may	represent	an	important	step	towards	
a	novel	cognitive	marker	of	Alzheimer’s	disease	well	before	the	dementia	stage.	
Third,	 our	 results	 fit	 with	 an	 emerging	 literature	 suggesting	 that	 the	 elderly	 may	
disproportionately	 benefit	 prior	 knowledge	 (Badham	 et	 al.,	 2012,	 2015;	 Castel,	 2005;	
Naveh-Benjamin	et	al.,	2003;	Umanath	&	March,	2014).	Still,	recent	efforts	to	demonstrate	
how	 associative	 memory	 deficits	 could	 be	 alleviated	 when	 separate	 elements	 share	 a	
semantic	 relationship	 at	 encoding	 have	 sometimes	 failed	 (e.g.	 through	 unitization,	
(Delhaye	 &	 Bastin,	 2016;	 Delhaye,	 Tibon,	 et	 al.,	 2018).	 Further	 research	 is	 therefore	
required	to	better	characterize	the	boundaries	conditions	for	prior	knowledge	to	enable	
better	associative	memory.	
Fourth,	and	as	suggested	before,	our	findings	speak	for	a	more	thorough	consideration	
of	how	prior	knowledge	may	play	a	 role	 in	 the	usual	psychological	 tests	used	 in	clinical	
settings.	 Considering	 that	 existing	 long-term	 memory	 representations	 clearly	 help	 the	
elderly	 to	 increase	 associative	 and	 item	 memory,	 the	 large	 number	 of	 tests	 that	 use	
meaningless,	previously	unknown,	materials	 (think	of	 the	Rey	Complex	Figure,	but	also	
visual	memory	subtests	of	the	Wechsler	Memory	Scale,	the	Warrington	Memory	Test,	in	
French	 most	 visual	 subtests	 of	 the	 “Batterie	 d’Evaluation	 de	 la	 Mémoire”	 from	 J.L.	
Signoret,	 etc.)	 might	 lead	 to	 overestimate	 memory	 impairments.	 Conversely,	 as	 we	
discuss	 below,	 other	 tests	 involving	 familiar	 materials	 may	 underestimate	 memory	
performance.	
	
Thus,	one	 important	perspective	regarding	clinical	neuropsychology	 is	 that	the	 lack	of	
consideration	 for	 the	 role	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 new	 learning	may	 result	 in	 increased	
type	 I	 or	 type	 II	 errors	 when	 neuropsychologists	 interpret	 their	 patients’	 scores	 on	
memory	tests.	
	
Neural	routes	for	prior	knowledge-based	declarative	learning	
	
Our	 work	 with	 patient	 KA	 has	 provided	 clues	 for	 the	 neural	 basis	 of	 prior-knowledge	
based	 declarative	 learning.	We	 have	 suggested	 that	 these	 learning	 processes	 enabling	
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better	item	and	source	memory	in	controls	and	in	KA	may	not	rely	upon	the	hippocampal	
system.	 One	 possibility	 that	 we	 have	 discussed	 above	 is	 that	 prior	 knowledge,	 and	
especially	 in	 the	 form	 of	 an	 existing	 conceptual	 network	 (a	 notion	 rather	 close	 to	 the	
concept	 of	 schema),	 would	 trigger	 unitization	 processes,	 thus	 favouring	 binding	
operations	 in	 long-term	 memory	 that	 would	 not	 be	 dependent	 on	 hippocampal	
operations.	This	account	can	in	our	view	be	strengthened	by	our	findings	that	long-term	
memory	 binding	 of	 famous	 faces	 with	 their	 spatial	 (scene)	 context	 was	 preserved	 in	
aging,	 despite	 the	 acknowledged	deleterious	 effects	of	 age	on	 the	hippocampus.	 Prior	
studies	 have	 suggested	 that	 memory	 for	 stimuli	 that	 are	 congruent	 with	 existing	
knowledge	 could	 be	 preserved	 as	 long	 as	 the	 anterior	 sub	 hippocampal	 structures	 are	
preserved,	 even	 in	 case	 of	 bilateral	 hippocampal	 damage	 (e.g.	 Kan	 et	 al.,	 2009).	More	
recently,	it	was	shown	that	item	familiarity	due	to	recent	exposures	as	well	as	familiarity	
resulting	from	lifetime	accumulated	knowledge	(quite	similar	to	the	EK	and	PEK	condition	
that	we	used	in	this	thesis)	could	be	encoded	within	the	perirhinal	cortex	(Bowles	et	al.,	
2016;	 Duke,	 Martin,	 Bowles,	 Mcrae,	 &	 Köhler,	 2017).	 We	 believe	 this	 reinforces	 our	
hypothesis	 that	prior	knowledge	may	 increase	 (conceptual)	 fluency	during	encoding,	 in	
turn	 facilitating	 unitization	 (or	 binding)	 operations,	 and	 this	 would	 allow	 further	
recognition	of	the	association	to	rely	on	familiarity	(Parks	&	Yonelinas,	2009,	2015).	One	
important	prediction	however	is	that	any	damage	to	the	perirhinal	cortex	should	result	in	
an	 inability	 to	 benefit	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 new	 learning.	 We	 actually	 have	 reported	
evidence	 consistent	with	 this	 idea	 in	 our	 fMRI	 experiment	 (Experiment	 4).	 In	 fact,	 we	
found	 that	 patients	 with	 early	 Alzheimer’s	 disease	 and	 relatively	 slight	 cognitive	
impairment,	 not	 demented,	 totally	 failed	 to	 increase	memory	 performance	 in	 the	 PEK	
(famous	 faces-scene	 combinations)	 condition.	Moreover,	 the	patients	 lacked	 the	BOLD	
signal	observed	in	controls	as	predicting	associative	memory.	Yet,	such	activity	in	controls	
was	correlated	with	source	memory	performance.	
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Box	11.	Perirhinal	cortex	damage	as	observed	in	early	Alzheimer’s	Disease	prevents	from	
benefiting	Pre-Experimental	Knowledge.	
We	 have	 brought	 fMRI	 evidence	 for	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 in	
subsequent	associative	memory	effects	for	stimuli	carrying	Pre-Experimental	Knowledge.	
This	 effect	was	 lacking	 in	 early	 AD	patients.	 These	 findings	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 early	
memory	 symptoms	 might	 have	 more	 to	 do	 with	 subhippocampal	 structures	 than	
hippocampal	dysfunction,	and	that	memory	for	highly	familiar	 items	may	be	particularly	
vulnerable.	This	 is	strikingly	congruent	with	the	patients’	complaints,	namely	day-to-day	
memory	losses	for	personally	relevant,	daily	routine	activities.	
	
These	results	are	 important	because	 it	 is	well	acknowledged	that	early	tau	pathology	 in	
Alzheimer’s	disease	first	occurs	in	the	rhinal	cortices	(Braak	&	Braak,	1991;	Delacourte	et	
al.,	 1999).	 Not	 only	 this	 pattern	 of	 results	 fit	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 sub	 hippocampal	
structures	may,	 together	with	other	structures	possibly	within	the	“Anterior	Temporal”	
network	(Ritchey	&	Ranganath,	2015),	support	new	learning	when	pre-existing	semantic	
representations	are	available,	but	also	they	suggest	that	we	probably	underestimate	the	
memory	 impairments	 in	 early	 Alzheimer’s	 disease.	 Given	 that	 most	 of	 the	 testing	
procedures	 used	 involve	multiple-trials	 learning,	 typical	 assessment	 thus	 imply	 gradual	
familiarization	with	 initially	unfamiliar	materials,	which	broadly	corresponds	with	the	EK	
condition	we	have	used.	 In	that	condition,	patients	actually	performed	fairly	well,	while	
they	showed	severe	impairment	in	the	condition	involving	pre-experimental	knowledge.	
This	 aspect	 of	 the	 present	 thesis	 dramatically	 highlights	 how	 prior	 knowledge	 and	
beyond,	the	kind	of	prior	knowledge	involved	in	memory	tasks,	truly	matters.	
	
Beyond	memory	disorders:	the	role	of	retrieval	processes	in	new	learning	
	
The	case	study	that	launched	the	present	work	brought	evidence	for	he	existence	of	an	
efficient	 learning	 process	 that	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 hippocampal	 system.	We	 have	
argued	 that	 MTL	 reorganization	 following	 early	 injury	 can	 have	 triggered	 a	
neurodevelopmental	 shift	 favouring	 the	Anterior	 Temporal	 system	 that	 in	 turn	may	be	
the	 foundation	 for	 unitization	 processes	 at	 encoding	 in	 the	 service	 of	 familiarity-based	
recognition	 memory.	 As	 we	 suggest,	 this	 would	 occur	 only	 if	 existing	 long-term	
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knowledge	representations	might	be	reactivated	at	encoding,	thus	being	responsible	for	
the	triggering	of	an	automatic,	fast	and	efficient	learning	pathway.	
While	 this	may	 occur	 in	 patients	with	 developmental	 amnesia,	 there	 is	 no	 reason	why	
these	learning	processes	could	not	take	place	in	healthy	subjects	as	well.	
	
A	 second	 thought	 on	 what	 is	 learning,	 as	 extensively	 presented	 in	 the	 introduction	
section,	 suggests	 that	 memory-guided	 behaviours	 must	 result	 from	 fast	 and	 rather	
automatic	processes,	instead	of	slow	“episodic	recollection”,	at	least	in	many	of	our	daily	
routines.	Learning	is	therefore	much	more	about	what	we	know	that	what	we	don’t.	
If	 learning	 is	 supposed	 to	 basically	 refer	 to	 our	 ability	 to	 detect	 environmental	
regularities,	 our	 work	 so	 far	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 theoretical	 frameworks	 that	
emphasize	 the	 role	 of	 existing	 representations	 (i.e.	 regularities	 detection)	 in	 learning.	
Therefore,	what	we	need	is	to	focus	on	the	processing	approaches	that	aim	at	predicting	
how	knowledge	and	learning	interacts	in	the	service	of	behaviour,	rather	than	furthering	
the	 structural	 approach	 that	 has	 provided	 useful	 heuristics	 (i.e.	 semantic-episodic	
distinction),	 but	 little	 mechanistic	 accounts	 for	 explicit	 learning.	 As	 an	 example,	 a	
promising	perspective	could	be	to	consider	that	during	learning,	acquisition	and	retrieval	
processes	 largely	 overlap.	When	 dealing	with	 familiar	 stimuli,	 we	 have	 suggested	 that	
perceptual	processing	up	to	the	level	of	e.g.	the	entity	(a	face,	an	object,	etc.)	may	trigger	
additional	 retrieval	 processes,	 in	 that	 current	 sensory	 inputs	 match	 with	 existing	
representations.	 It	 is	 well	 acknowledged	 that	 these	 retrieval	 processes	 are	 associated	
with	 increased	 long-term	 memory	 (i.e.	 retrieval	 practice	 effect	 or	 “testing	 effect”,	
Roediger	 &	 Karpicke,	 2006).	 Thus,	 an	 outstanding	 issue	 to	 further	 address	 is	 whether	
retrieval	 processes	 involved	 during	 prior	 knowledge-based	 learning	 contribute	 to	
improve	further	remembering,	and	on	which	neural	grounds.	
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Perspective	8.	The	role	of	repeated	retrieval	in	new	learning	
Prior	 knowledge	 dramatically	 enhances	 new	 learning.	 The	 impact	 of	 prior	 knowledge	
implies	that	during	learning,	sensory	input	“matches”	to	some	extent	with	existing	long-
term	 representations.	 This	 is	 a	 defining	 feature	 of	 successful	memory	 retrieval,	 which,	
when	 repeated	 across	 time,	 is	 known	 to	 enhance	 long-term	 retention,	 an	 effect	 called	
“retrieval	practice”	or	“testing	effect”.	An	interesting	perspective	would	therefore	be	to	
investigate	whether	the	testing	effect	can	occur	under	circumstances	that	are	favourable	
even	for	patients	with	amnesia,	i.e.	during	recognition	memory.	Put	simply,	can	repeated	
successful	recognition	yield	better	long-term	memory	retention?	
	
	
We	 have	 started	 examining	 this	 question	 as	 shown	 in	 Appendix	 A.	 Complementary	
experiments	are	currently	 running,	but	preliminary	 results	 suggest	 so	 far	 that	 repeated	
retrieval	 as	 it	 occurs	 in	 recognition	 memory	 tests	 does	 improve	 long-term	 retention.	
Furthermore,	data	speak	for	a	retrieval	practice	effect	even	when	retrieval	processes	are	
highly	constrained	and	likely	to	be	limited	to	fast,	familiarity-based	recognition.	This	may	
hopefully	 bring	 new	 perspectives	 to	 alleviate	 memory	 disabilities	 in	 hippocampal	
amnesia,	and	also	to	optimize	teaching	techniques	in	the	field	of	educational.	
	
Limitations	
	
As	 for	any	experimental	 research,	 several	 limitations	must	be	outlined	here.	One	major	
limitation	of	our	work	is	that	the	tasks	we	designed	in	Experiments	3a	and	3b,	proved	too	
difficult	 regarding	 the	 associative	memory	 component.	 This	 is	why	we	 should	 consider	
the	above	interpretation	with	great	caution,	since	they	await	further	replication	in	larger	
samples	and	with	maybe	fewer	target	stimuli.	Nonetheless,	we	wish	to	underscore	that	
our	effort	to	replicate,	 in	a	larger	independent	sample,	our	first	findings	was	successful,	
so	 that	 our	 conclusions,	 while	 not	 definitive	 regarding	 associative	 memory,	 can	 be	
considered	 as	 robust	 for	 item	 recognition.	 Moreover,	 behavioural	 findings	 from	
Experiment	 4	 largely	 replicate	 the	 advantage	 of	 pre-experimental	 over	 experimental	
knowledge	 in	 healthy	 elderly,	 thus	 reinforcing	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 prior	
knowledge	does	matter.	A	related	limitation	is	that	we	failed	to	replicate	the	associative	
deficit	 expected	 in	 older	 participants,	 which	 again	 may	 relate	 to	 issues	 regarding	 the	
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optimal	 number	of	 trials.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 caveat	 and	we	 should	 keep	 in	mind	 that	
stronger	evidence	for	the	role	of	prior	knowledge	in	aging	might	arise	in	further	studies	
that	 could	 demonstrate	 prior	 knowledge	 benefits	 above	 and	 beyond	 observed	 deficits	
associated	with	age,	on	an	intra-individual	basis.	Another	limitation	is	that	we	only	asked	
participants	 in	 Experiments	 3a,	 3b,	 4	 &	 5	 to	 make	 a	 fame	 judgment	 on	 all	 the	 faces	
involved	in	the	experiment.	This	was	further	used	to	discard	from	analyses	the	items	for	
which	 inaccurate	 fame	 judgments	were	performed.	While	 this	 represents	 an	 important	
methodological	effort	that	has	generally	not	been	completed	in	prior	studies,	it	does	not	
allow	 to	completely	 rule	out	outliers	 responses.	 For	example,	 a	 correct	 fame	 judgment	
made	 on	 a	 famous	 face	 does	 not	 prevent	 from	 situations	 were,	 in	 fact,	 the	 subject	
incorrectly	 identified	 the	 face	 (e.g.	 confusion	 between	 two	 celebrities).	 To	 circumvent	
this	limitation,	we	could	have	better	tested	the	actual	knowledge	of	the	participants	for	
each	 famous	 face.	Use	of	 a	quantitative	 scale	would	 furthermore	allow,	with	 sufficient	
trials,	 to	 investigate	 whether	 the	 amount	 of	 semantic	 knowledge	 about	 a	 face	 could	
modulate	the	benefits	of	prior	knowledge	on	subsequent	memory.	
Regarding	studies	with	patient	KA,	a	critical	 limitation	of	our	work	is	that	we	could	only	
speculate	 on	 the	 brain	 basis	 for	 his	 particular	 profile,	 rather	 than	 drawing	 direct	
inferences	 on	 this	 issue.	 This	 is	 because	 we	 did	 not	 manage	 to	 run	 an	 appropriate	
experimental	design	involving	e.g.	task-based	fMRI	with	patient	KA.	This	was	something	
we	planned	to	do,	however,	with	accumulated	knowledge	on	these	techniques,	 it	soon	
appeared	 that	gathering	BOLD	signal	data	 in	a	 single	 case	vs.	a	 control	group	with	 the	
hope	of	elucidating	brain-behaviour	relationships	 is	a	very	hard	challenge.	We	therefore	
plan,	as	stated	before,	to	run	a	rs-fMRI	experiment	hopefully	this	summer	that	may	give	
us	some	preliminary	findings.	In	the	meantime,	 inferential	reasoning	like	 in	the	tradition	
of	neuropsychology	was	the	best	we	could	use.		
Finally,	 regarding	our	 fMRI	study	with	early	AD	patients,	 sample	size	 is	a	main	concern,	
and	it	was	really	challenging	to	get	this	number	of	participants.	This	is	why	we	will	publish	
the	article	as	a	preprint	 first,	 together	with	hopefully	a	 full	open	access	 to	our	data,	so	
that	 further	 replications	 or	 meta-analysis	 might	 be	 doable.	 Moreover,	 our	 conclusions	
regarding	 the	 lack	 of	 involvement	 of	 the	 perirhinal	 cortex	 in	 the	 subsequent	 memory	
effects	 in	AD	must	also	be	taken	with	caution.	 It	 is	well	acknowledged	that	even	 in	the	
earliest	stages	of	MCI	due	to	AD,	tau	pathology	extends	far	beyond	the	rhinal	cortices,	so	
that	any	generalization	about	the	relationships	between	this	region	and	prior	knowledge-
based	 learning	 cannot	 be	 taken	 at	 face	 value.	 We	 believe	 an	 interesting	 promising	
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complementary	 approach	 would	 be	 to	 investigate	 possible	 correlations	 between	
perirhinal	 cortices	 volumes	 and	 an	 index	 of	 the	 PEK	 vs.	 EK	 discrepancy	 for	 source	
memory,	 as	 suggested	 in	 Perspective	 8	 above,	 in	 a	 sample	 of	 elderly	 participants	with	
various	degrees	of	cognitive	decline.	
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Conclusion	
	
In	this	work,	we	have	put	forward	the	utmost	importance	of	existing	knowledge	for	new	
learning	 in	 declarative	memory.	 Pre-existing	 representations	profoundly	 affect	 the	way	
we	encode,	consolidate	and	retrieve	our	experiences.	In	our	opinion,	this	is	an	overlooked	
fact	in	the	field	of	memory	research	and,	accordingly,	only	recent	theoretical	frameworks	
aim	at	accounting	for	such	influence.	
We	 suggest	 that	 prior	 knowledge	 could	 trigger	 a	 rapid	 learning	 route	 for	 conscious	
memories	 that	 is	 largely	 independent	 from	 the	hippocampal	 system.	With	 this	 respect,	
we	have	provided	very	strong	evidence	 in	patient	KA	for	the	existence	of	such	 learning	
pathway.	 Further	 neuropsychological	 studies	 with	 amnesic	 syndromes	 of	 various	
aetiologies	should	clarify	the	boundaries	of	this	learning	route.	We	propose	that	focusing	
on	 the	 relationships	 between	 “fast-mapping”	 and	 intense	 conceptual	 interests	 in	 a	
developmental	 cognitive	 perspective	 might	 prove	 very	 insightful.	 More	 research	 is	
warranted	here,	given	the	deep	impact	this	may	have	for	memory-impaired	patients.	
Under	some	circumstances,	we	also	have	shown	that	prior	knowledge	can	alleviate	the	
impact	of	age	on	memory,	whereas	patients	with	early	Alzheimer’s	Disease	proved	totally	
unable	 to	 benefit	 prior	 knowledge.	We	 believe	 that	 this	 is	 a	major	 contribution	 of	 our	
work.	Not	only	it	opens	perspectives	for	new	cognitive	markers	of	the	disease,	but	also	it	
suggests	 that	 neuropsychological	 assessment	 of	 learning	 and	 memory	 may	 well	 be	
riddled	 with	 type	 I	 and	 type	 II	 errors.	 Taking	 into	 account	 prior	 knowledge	 in	 the	
development	 of	 new	 assessment	 tools,	 and	 in	 current	 interpretations	 of	 test	 scores,	
could	be	an	important	guideline	following	the	present	thesis.	Similarly,	we	report	on	the	
possible	 underestimation	 of	 associative	 memory	 performance	 in	 the	 literature	 using	
typical	 source	memory	paradigms,	which	again	should	be	taken	 into	account	 from	now	
on.	
Finally,	 and	 hopefully,	 this	work	 could	 also	 be	 fruitful	 regarding	 the	 field	 of	 education,	
emphasizing	on	some	critical	factors	involved	in	the	acquisition	of	new	knowledge.	
	
Overall,	our	learning	system	may	well	be	biased	towards	the	acquisition	of	new	memories	
about	what	we	already	know	rather	than	about	what	we	ignore.	
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“Case	studies	continue	to	illuminate	the	cognitive	neuroscience	of	memory”	
Rosenbaum,	Gilboa,	&	Moscovitch,	2014,	Annals	of	the	New	York	Academy	of	Sciences	
	
	
	
	
“Je	pense	que	je	l’ai	vu,	mais	je	suis	pas	certain,	pas	sûr…non,	je	peux	pas	dire”	
Patient	KA,	July	2017.	
	
[English	translation:	
“I	think	I	saw	it	already,	but	I	am	not	certain,	not	sure….no,	I	can’t	tell.”]		
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Appendix	A:	Experiments	6a	&	6b.	Does	repeated	recognition	
memory	result	in	a	testing	effect?	
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Abstract	
	
Retrieval	of	information	from	memory	yields	better	long-term	retention	that	mere	restudying	the	
very	same	 information,	a	 finding	called	“testing	effect”	or	“retrieval	practice	effect”.	While	 the	
testing	effect	has	been	the	target	of	intensive	research	in	recent	years,	there	is	no	agreement	on	
its	 theoretical	 underpinnings.	A	 core	prediction	of	 the	dominant	 retrieval	 effort	 hypothesis	 has	
received	 very	 little	 attention.	 Indeed,	 retrieval	 practice	 should	 not	 be	 beneficial	 for	 further	
retention	if	retrieval	is	based	on	effortless,	automatic	processes.	In	this	study,	we	aimed	at	testing	
this	 prediction	 in	 two	 experiments	 using	 recognition	 memory	 tasks.	 In	 the	 first	 experiment,	
learning	 schedules	 were	 manipulated	 between	 participants,	 contrasting	 repeated	 studying,	
repeated	testing	and	alternate	Study-Test	phases.	In	the	second	experiment,	we	aimed	at	ruling	
out	 the	 contribution	of	 recollection	 to	 retrieval	with	 a	 speeded	 recognition	memory	paradigm,	
which	allowed	contrasting	the	effect	of	repeated	study	vs.	repeated	testing	on	further	retention.	
In	both	experiments,	we	found	an	advantage	for	testing	schedules,	despite	less	exposure	to	the	
learning	 material.	 The	 second	 experiment	 importantly	 yielded	 equivalent	 retention	 after	 6	
months	for	Study	and	Test	intervening	conditions,	even	when	retrieval	practice	was	largely	based	
on	 familiarity.	 We	 therefore	 failed	 to	 verify	 an	 important	 prediction	 of	 the	 retrieval	 effort	
theoretical	framework.	
	
Keywords:	testing	effect;	retrieval	practice;	retrieval	effort;	recognition	memory;	familiarity	
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Introduction	
	
Retrieval	of	information	from	memory	leads	to	better	long-term	retention	that	merely	restudying	
the	same	information,	a	finding	called	“testing	effect”	or	“retrieval	practice	effect”	(Bowles	et	al.,	
2016;	Köhler	et	al.,	2017).	 Importantly,	 the	testing	effect	occurs	even	when	the	number	of	 tests	
events	and	study	events	is	equated,	so	that	it	cannot	be	explained	by	a	simple	effect	of	extra-re-
exposure	 to	 the	 material	 (Carrier	 &	 Pashler,	 1992).	 Beyond	 the	 great	 variability	 in	 the	
experimental	designs	used	across	previous	studies,	the	testing	effect	is	usually	observed	using	a	
three-step	 procedure.	 First,	 during	 an	 initial	 encoding	 phase,	 to-be-remembered	 stimuli	 are	
presented.	Second,	during	an	intervening	learning	phase,	either	encoding	is	repeated	(intervening	
study	trials)	or,	 in	the	experimental	condition,	memory	for	the	stimuli	 is	tested	(intervening	test	
trials).	 Third,	 after	 a	 variable	 delay,	 a	 final	 test	 assesses	 memory	 for	 the	 previously	 learned	
information.	 As	 long	 as	 exposure	 to	 the	 material	 is	 equivalent	 between	 test	 and	 study	 trials,	
observation	of	 a	better	memory	after	 an	 intervening	phase	of	 test	 trials	 is	 the	key	 finding	 that	
characterizes	the	retrieval	practice	effect.	This	 finding	was	replicated	many	times	with	different	
kinds	of	materials	(for	a	recent	meta-analysis,	see	(Carrier	&	Pashler,	1992).	The	retrieval	practice	
effect	 represents	 a	 major	 move	 forward	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 factors	 contributing	 to	
successful	 learning,	 as	 it	 points	 toward	 a	 break	 in	 the	 typical	 paradigm	 used	 in	 learning	 and	
memory	research.	Indeed,	the	testing	effect	clearly	suggests	that	testing	can	serve	as	a	learning	
event,	and	thus,	that	learning	does	not	occur	only	during	study	phases.	
Surprisingly,	despite	an	impressive	surge	in	research	with	more	than	40	studies	on	the	topic	over	
the	 last	3	years,	we	still	 lack	a	consensual	account	of	the	mechanisms	driving	the	testing	effect.	
Furthermore,	among	 the	numerous	 theories	proposed,	not	all	proved	 testable	or,	 alternatively,	
can	only	be	tested	using	specific	experimental	material	 (e.g.,	word	pairs,	Carpenter,	2011;	Pyc	&	
Rawson,	 2009).	 The	 present	 study,	 therefore,	 aimed	 at	 testing	 a	 core	 prediction	 of	 one	 of	 the	
most	influential	account	for	the	testing	effect,	namely,	the	retrieval	effort	hypothesis.	
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An	 influential	 account	 for	 the	 retrieval	 practice	 effect	 states	 that	 the	 difficulty	 of	 the	 initial	
retrieval	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 effect	 (Carpenter	&	Delosh,	 2006;	 Glover,	 1989).	 This	 account	 is	
derived	 from	the	desirable	difficulty	 framework	 (Bjork,	 1994),	but	 the	 idea	 that	 the	difficulty	of	
learning	may	result	in	better	retention	can	be	tracked	back	to	Ebbinghaus’	seminal	studies:	“what	
is	learned	with	the	greatest	difficulty	is	best	retained”,	(as	cited	in(Bjork,	1994).	The	general	idea	
is	 that	 retrieval	 from	 memory	 during	 the	 intervening	 phase	 implies	 an	 active	 updating	 of	 the	
memory	trace	together	with	the	creation	of	multiple	retrieval	routes.	This	is	supposed	to	increase	
the	 probability	 of	 further	 recall	 by	 contrast	 with	 passive	 restudying	 (Roediger	 &	 Butler,	 2011).	
Whereas	the	kind	of	elaborative	processes	and	mechanisms	involved	remain	to	be	fully	specified,	
much	 evidence	 has	 supported	 this	 influential	 account	 for	 the	 testing	 effect.	 For	 example,	
manipulating	 the	amount	of	 letters	available	as	cues	 in	a	 stem-completion	paradigm	during	 the	
intervening	phase	led	to	an	inverse	relationship	between	final	test	performance	and	the	amount	
of	 cues	 needed	 during	 intervening	 retrieval	 (Roediger	 &	 Butler,	 2011).	 In	 another	 study,	
participants	 had	 to	 learn	 target	 words	 presented	 in	 a	 cue-target	 words	 pairs	 paradigm	where	
researchers	 manipulated	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 association	 between	 cue	 and	 target.	 As	
hypothesized,	 they	 found	 better	 performance	 at	 final	 test	 for	 weak	 pairs	 by	 comparison	 with	
strong	 pairs	 (Carpenter,	 2009),	 supporting	 the	 idea	 that	maximizing	 the	 effort	 associated	with	
retrieval	will	 increase	 the	benefits	of	 testing	 (i.e.,	 retrieval	 effort	being	 stronger	 for	weak	pairs	
like	“Basket	–	Bread”	than	strong	pairs	 like	“Toast	–	Bread”).	Former	research	manipulated	the	
testing	format	used	during	the	intervening	tasks,	and	demonstrated	that	free	recall	led	to	better	
performances	at	final	test	than	cued	recall,	which	 in	turn	gave	rise	to	better	performances	than	
recognition	 (Glover,	 1989);	 again	 supporting	 the	 idea	 that	more	 elaborative	processes	 involved	
during	 the	 critical	 test	 trials	may	 increase	 the	 effect	 of	 testing.	 The	 retrieval	 effort	 hypothesis	
therefore	 assumes	 that	 controlled,	 elaborated,	 effortful	 retrieval	 processes	 during	 the	
intervening	phase	are	responsible	for	the	retrieval	practice	effect.	Conversely,	a	core	prediction	of	
these	theories	is	that	automatic,	effortless	retrieval	processes	should	not	lead	to	a	testing	effect.		
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While	 free	or	 cued	 recall	procedures	generally	used	 in	 the	 testing	effect	 literature	 strongly	 rely	
upon	recollection	of	the	context	associated	with	the	learning	event,	recognition	memory	(i.e.,	the	
judgment	 of	 prior	 occurrence)	 involves	 more	 automatic	 retrieval	 processes,	 distinct	 from	
contextual	recollection	(Glover,	1989).	Indeed,	in	a	typical	recognition	memory	task,	subjects	are	
asked	 to	 discriminate	 between	 lures	 and	 targets	 by	 reference	 with	 the	 study	 phase.	 Being	
presented	 with	 the	 target	 information	 during	 target	 trials,	 subjects	 can	 rely	 on	 familiarity	
judgment	 to	 give	 a	 correct	 answer,	 thus	 retrieving	 prior	 occurrence	 of	 the	 stimuli	 through	
automatic	 processes.	 More	 specifically,	 visual	 recognition	 memory	 in	 humans	 has	 been	
characterized	as	a	very	efficient	system,	with	a	massive	storage	capacity.	For	example,	single-trial	
learning	of	10	000	pictures	for	5	seconds	each	yielded	an	impressive	recognition	memory	accuracy	
over	80%	after	a	2	days	delay	(T.	F.	Brady,	Konkle,	Alvarez,	&	Oliva,	2008;	Standing,	1973).	One	can	
therefore	wonder	whether	 recognition	memory-based	 retrieval	 practice	may	be	of	 benefits	 for	
long-term	 retention.	 Again,	 because	 recognition	 memory	 retrieval	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 achieved	
through	rather	effortless,	automatic,	processes,	the	dominant	retrieval	effort	hypothesis	predicts	
that	 it	 should	 not	 be	 the	 case.	 As	 briefly	 reviewed	 below,	 we	 suggest	 that	 evidence	 is	 not	
conclusive	with	this	respect.	
Previous	 studies	 brought	 some	 evidence,	 although	 limited,	 that	 alternate-forced	 choice	
recognition	testing	during	the	intervening	phase	may	lead	to	a	testing	effect	(T.	F.	Brady,	Konkle,	
Alvarez,	 &	 Oliva,	 2008;	 Standing,	 1973);	 but	 see	 Duchastel,	 1981).	 These	 studies	 used	multiple-
choice	testing	during	the	intervening	phase	while	final	test	formats	were	based	on	either	free	or	
cued	recall.	Importantly	however,	Roediger	&	Marsh	(2005)	also	showed	that	the	positive	testing	
effect	 due	 to	 prior	 testing	 under	multiple-choice	 format	 came	 at	 some	 cost.	 Indeed,	 the	 lures	
used	in	the	intervening	testing	phase	were	often	chosen	as	wrong	answers	during	the	final	cued	
recall	 test	 (see	 also	 Odegard	 &	 Koen,	 2007).	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 generally	 assumed	 that	 when	
recognition	memory	is	used	as	the	intervening	task,	this	may	at	best	lead	to	a	very	limited	testing	
effect,	 and	at	 the	 cost	of	 false	memories	which	overall	 tend	 to	discard	any	eventual	benefit	of	
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recognition	memory-based	retrieval	practice	on	long-term	retention	(see	also	Kang,	McDermott,	
&	Roediger,	2007;	McDaniel	&	Masson,	1985).	
It	 is	worth	noting	 that	exception	made	of	Carpenter	&	DeLosh	 (2006)’s	 study	who	used	words	
lists,	 these	 studies	 used	 prose	 passages	 as	 material	 to	 be	 learned,	 a	 common	material	 across	
testing	effect	studies.	Use	of	prose	passages	implies	the	elaboration	of	rather	complex	alternate	
forced	 choice	 recognition	 memory	 tests,	 for	 example	 asking	 to	 complete	 the	 following	
statement:	“In	 the	 last	 stage	before	a	blackhole	 is	 formed,	a	detonation	occurs,	known	as	a:	 1)	
starbust;	2)	explosion;	3)	blastula;	4)	supernovae”	(Meyer	&	Logan,	2013).	The	cognitive	processes	
involved	in	such	a	task	cannot	be	taken	as	examples	of	automatic,	effortless	retrieval	processes	
like	the	one	involved	in	simple	Old/New	recognition	memory	tasks,	even	if	elaborative	processing	
required	here	remains	limited	by	comparison	with	a	typical	free	recall	task	(Meyer	&	Logan,	2013).	
Supporting	this	view,	it	has	been	shown	that	when	multiple-choices	recognition	tasks	are	built	to	
intentionally	 trigger	 elaborative,	 controlled	 retrieval	 processes,	 they	 may	 give	 rise	 to	 testing	
effects	even	larger	than	after	cued	recall	procedure	during	the	intervening	phase	(Glover,	1989).	
These	data	are	therefore	broadly	supportive	of	the	retrieval	effort	hypothesis,	and	would	suggest	
that	a	testing	effect	driven	by	simple	Old/New	recognition	memory	procedures	is	unlikely.	
Little	work	has	been	done	to	constrain	the	 intervening	tasks	to	very	simple,	automatic	 retrieval	
tasks,	and	then	assess	whether	a	testing	benefit	still	holds.	We	are	aware	of	only	three	studies,	
the	most	cited	being	(Little	et	al.,	2012)	(experiment	4).	However,	since	the	authors	did	not	use	a	
study-only	control	 condition,	 their	 conclusions	are	difficult	 to	align	with	more	 recent	controlled	
studies	 on	 the	 testing	 effect.	 However,	 in	 a	more	 recent	 report,	 Carpenter	 and	DeLosh	 (2006)	
orthogonally	 manipulated	 the	 type	 of	 intervening	 tasks	 within	 participants	 (restudying,	 free	
recall,	cued	recall	and	Old/New	recognition)	and	the	type	of	final	test	between	participants	(free	
recall,	cued	recall	and	Old/New	recognition)	to	highlight	potential	benefits	of	retrieval	practice	for	
lists	of	nouns	(experiment	1).	They	failed	to	find	any	interaction	between	the	intervening	task	and	
the	final	test	type,	suggesting	that	the	retention	across	the	different	types	of	final	test	was	not	
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modulated	by	 the	kind	of	 intervening	 task.	Nonetheless,	 an	 important	 result	was	 that	when	an	
intervening	recognition	task	was	used,	no	testing	effect	was	found.	By	contrast,	an	earlier	study	
using	 nouns	 found	 that	 a	 simple	Old/New	 intervening	 recognition	 task	 did	 increase	 both	 recall	
and	recognition	performances	during	final	tests	(Mandler	&	Rabinowitz,	1981),	but	at	the	cost	of	
an	increase	in	false	alarms	rate.	One	important	difference	between	these	studies	lies	in	the	delay	
before	 final	 test,	which	 lasted	5	minutes	 in	Carpenter	and	DeLosh’s	experiment	 (2006)	versus	 1	
week	 for	 Mandler	 &	 Rabinowitz’s	 (1981).	 Given	 that	 retrieval	 practice	 effects	 are	 generally	
observed	 after	 long	 delays	 but	 are	 sometimes	 absent	 at	 short	 delays	 (Mandler	 &	 Rabinowitz,	
1981),	 this	might	explain	the	discrepancies.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	noteworthy	that	 in	 the	Mandler	&	
Rabinowitz’s	 study,	 recognition	 memory	 accuracy	 during	 the	 intervening	 phase	 was	 very	 high	
with	 a	Hit	 rate	 around	90%	 and	 a	 discriminability	 index	 d’	 superior	 to	 2.5.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising	
given	that	participants	were	tested	on	50	items	only,	including	25	targets	items,	which	is	far	from	
the	 large	 storage	 capacity	 of	 recognition	 memory	 in	 humans,	 as	 stated	 above	 (in	 the	 case	 of	
recognition	memory	 for	words,	 see	 (Roediger	&	 Butler,	 2011).	 Such	 a	 high	 accuracy	 during	 the	
intervening	 learning	phase	 actually	 suggests	 that	 the	participants	 in	 that	 study	were	 far	 below	
their	learning	possibilities.	Such	a	ceiling	effect	in	the	intervening	learning	phase	may	have	led	to	
underestimate	 the	 benefits	 associated	 with	 recognition	 memory-based	 testing.	 The	 same	
comment	applies	to	Carpenter	&	Delosh's	study	(2006)	where	intervening	testing	via	recognition	
memory	involved	successive	blocks	where	8	targets	nouns	were	to	be	circled	among	8	distractor	
nouns.	 That	 brief	 review	 of	 the	 use	 of	 recognition	 memory	 tasks	 during	 intervening	 phases	
suggests	 that	 we	 lack	 experimental	 data	 to	 determine	 whether	 or	 not	 effortless,	 automatic,	
retrieval	processes	can	drive	a	testing	effect.	
In	 summary,	while	 the	 testing	 effect	 has	 been	 the	 target	 of	 intensive	 research	 in	 recent	 years,	
there	 is	 still	 no	 agreement	 on	 its	 theoretical	 underpinnings.	 A	 core	 prediction	 of	 the	 dominant	
retrieval	 effort	 hypothesis,	 which	 is	 that	 retrieval	 practice	 should	 not	 be	 beneficial	 for	 further	
retention	 (if	 retrieval	 is	 based	 on	 effortless,	 automatic	 processes)	 has	 received	 little	 attention.	
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Our	 aim	 here	 was,	 therefore,	 to	 assess	 whether	 recognition	 memory-based	 retrieval	 can	 or	
cannot	lead	to	a	testing	effect.	In	a	first	experiment,	we	adapted	a	typical	learning	schedule	from	
the	 testing	effect	 literature,	with	 intervening	 tasks	 and	 final	 test	based	exclusively	on	Old/New	
recognition	 tests.	 In	 a	 second	 experiment,	 we	 adapted	 a	 speeded	 recognition	 memory	 task	
known	as	the	“Speeded	and	Accuracy	Boosting	procedure”	(Besson,	Ceccaldi,	Didic,	&	Barbeau,	
2012)	 to	 further	 assess	 whether	 or	 not	 familiarity-based	 retrieval	 practice	 could	 overcome	
repeated	 study	 regarding	 retention	 at	 short	 (i.e.,	 25	 minutes)	 and	 long-term	 (i.e.,	 6	 months)	
delays.	 Finally,	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 despite	 the	 importance	 of	 pictures	 in	 learning,	 either	 in	
educational	settings	or	in	everyday	lives,	there	is	a	dearth	of	studies	using	that	kind	of	stimuli	 in	
the	testing	effect	 literature	(but	see	Carpenter	&	Pashler,	2007;	Tse,	Balota,	Moynan,	Duchek,	&	
Jacoby,	2010;	Wartenweiler,	2011;	Wheeler	&	Roediger,	1992).	This	is	why	pictures	of	objects	were	
used	as	stimuli	in	the	following	experiments.	
	
Experiment	1	
Methods	
	
Stimuli	
930	photographs	of	objects	were	taken	from	the	Bank	of	Standardized	Stimuli	(Brodeur,	Guérard,	
&	Maria,	2014),	then	resized	to	390x390	pixels	and	reformatted	in	an	uncompressed	format	(i.e.,	
.bmp).	 210	 pictures	were	 randomly	 sampled	 across	 participants	 to	 serve	 as	 targets,	 and	 210	 to	
serve	as	distractors.	All	stimuli	were	presented	on	a	grey	background.	
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Experimental	setting	
Stimuli	 were	 presented	 on	 a	 laptop	 computer	 screen,	 using	 E	 Prime	 2.0	 software	 (Psychology	
Software	 Tools,	 Pittsburgh,	 PA).	 Subjects	 responded	 by	 left-clicking	 on	 the	 button	 below	 the	
track	pad,	and	response	accuracy	was	always	emphasized	in	the	instructions.	
	
Experimental	design	and	procedure	
An	initial	encoding	phase	and	a	final	test	phase	were	common	to	all	participants.	During	the	initial	
encoding	 phase,	 participants	 were	 instructed	 that	 they	 would	 have	 to	 memorize	 a	 series	 of	
photographs	for	further	recognition.	Each	stimulus	was	presented	for	a	fixed	duration	of	700ms,	
with	 a	 250ms	 inter-stimuli	 interval.	 The	 210	 targets	 were	 presented	 in	 a	 random	 order,	 across	
three	 blocks	 of	 70	 stimuli	with	 a	 self-paced	break	 between	blocks.	During	 the	 final	 test	 phase,	
participants	were	explained	that	they	would	be	presented	a	series	of	Old	and	New	stimuli.	They	
were	instructed	to	respond	as	fast	as	possible	for	an	Old	item	(Go	response),	and	to	not	respond	
in	case	of	a	New	item	(No	Go	response).	The	420	stimuli	were	presented	for	700ms	each,	with	a	
jittered	 inter-stimulus	 interval	 ranging	 from	 100	 to	 500	 ms.	 Subjects	 were	 provided	 with	 an	
immediate	 visual	 feedback	 for	 their	 response	 accuracy,	 lasting	 600	ms,	 after	 each	 recognition	
trial.	Correct	No	Go	and	correct	Go	responses	were	followed	by	the	word	“Bravo”	presented	at	
the	center	of	the	screen,	incorrect	responses	by	the	word	“Incorrect”;	and	“Too	late”	appeared	
whenever	no	response	was	recorded	within	 the	700	ms	delay.	6	successive	blocks	of	70	stimuli	
were	 used,	 with	 a	 self-paced	 pause	 between	 blocks,	 the	 order	 of	 presentation	 being	 fully	
randomized	across	participants.	
Three	different	 learning	procedures	were	administered	during	the	 intervening	phase:	the	Study-
Test	 (ST)	procedure,	 the	Study	 (S)	procedure	and	 the	Test	 (T)	procedure.	 Each	participant	was	
randomly	 assigned	 to	 one	 group	 (ST,	 S	 or	 T)	 in	 a	 cross-sectional	 design.	 An	 overview	 of	 the	
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experimental	design	is	provided	in	Figure	1.	In	the	ST	group,	a	learning	cycle	consisted	in	a	Study	
phase	identical	to	the	initial	encoding	phase,	followed	by	a	Test	phase,	 identical	to	the	final	test	
phase	described	above.	In	the	S	group,	a	learning	cycle	consisted	in	a	Study	phase	identical	to	the	
initial	encoding	phase.	 In	the	T	group,	a	 learning	cycle	consisted	 in	a	Test	phase	 identical	to	the	
final	 test	phase.	Within	each	group,	two	successive	 learning	cycles	were	administered.	For	each	
recognition	memory	phase	of	the	experiment	(either	during	learning	cycles	or	for	the	final	test),	a	
different	set	of	foils	was	used.	This	means	that	3	x	210	=	630	stimuli	were	randomly	sampled	from	
our	original	set	of	stimuli	to	be	used	as	distractors	in	the	Study-Test	group	and	Test	group,	while	
only	 210	 stimuli	 were	 required	 for	 the	 Study	 group.	 Importantly,	 for	 each	 group,	 a	 3	 minutes	
cartoon	randomly	selected	among	a	set	of	12	cartoons	was	presented	as	a	distracting	task,	after	
the	initial	encoding	phase	and	between	each	learning	cycle.	
	
	
	
	 435	
	
Figure	1.	Experiment	1,	design	overview.	After	an	initial	encoding	phase	common	to	all	
participants,	three	groups	(Study-Test,	Study,	Test)	received	distinct	learning	schedules.	In	the	
Study-Test	group,	a	study	phase	preceded	a	test	phase,	this	study-test	cycle	was	repeated	once;	in	
the	Study	group,	learning	consisted	in	two	successive	study	phases;	in	the	Test	group,	participants	
received	a	recognition	memory	test	twice.	After	a	fixed	delay	of	25	minutes,	every	participant	was	
administered	a	final	recognition	memory	test.	
	
Our	design	allowed	us	to	contrast	three	learning	procedures:	(1)	In	the	Study-Test	group,	learning	
was	tested	through	a	typical	alternation	of	encoding	and	retrieval	phases,	as	it	occurs	in	most	of	
the	multiple-trials	 learning	 tests,	 except	 that	 retrieval	 trials	 consisted	 in	 a	 recognition	memory	
test,	instead	of	the	free	or	cued	recall	procedures	usually	used	across	testing	effect	literature;	(2)	
in	 the	 Study	 group,	 repeated	 encoding	 phases	 imitates	 the	 “Study”	 condition	 usually	
administered	 in	 the	typical	 testing	effect	experiments;	 (3)	 in	 the	“Test”	group,	we	replaced	the	
typical	 repeated	 free	 recall	 trials	 used	 in	 prior	 testing	 effect	 studies	 with	 recognition	memory	
trials.	 Critically,	 this	 design	 implies	 a	 strong	 difference	 in	 study	 duration	 between	 groups.	
Whereas	the	total	time	spent	explicitly	studying	the	stimuli	was	set	at	7.35	minutes	in	the	Study-
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Test	and	Study	groups,	 it	was	highly	 restricted	to	2.45	minutes	 in	 the	Test	groups.	That	 is,	 time	
spent	by	participants	to	explicitly	study	the	to-be-learned	stimuli	for	further	memory	testing	was	
three	times	less	important	in	the	Test	group.	
After	 the	 last	 learning	 phase	 and	 during	 the	 delay	 before	 the	 final	 test	 phase,	 participants	
completed	a	general	health	questionnaire	 and	 the	McNair	 cognitive	difficulties	 scale	 (McNair	&	
Kahn,	1983),	the	French	version	of	the	National	Adult	Reading	Test	(Mackinnon	&	Mulligan,	2005),	
and	the	Logical	Memory	subtest	of	the	Wechsler	Memory	Scale,	3rd	Ed.	(Wechsler,	2001).	These	
tasks	filled	a	fixed	delay	of	25	minutes	between	the	last	learning	trial	and	the	final	test.	
	
Hypotheses	
Following	 the	 retrieval	 effort	 hypothesis,	 retrieval	 from	 memory	 derived	 from	 repeated	
recognition	memory	 tasks	 (i.e.,	 correct	discrimination	between	Old	 and	New	 items)	 should	not	
benefit	final	testing,	because	judgment	of	prior	occurrence	theoretically	does	not	typically	involve	
effortful	 retrieval	 processes.	 Thus,	 we	 expected	 performance	 at	 final	 test	 to	 be	 positively	
influenced	only	by	the	time	spent	encoding	stimuli	as	well	as	the	global	exposure	duration	to	the	
material.	
	
Participants	
90	 healthy	 young	 subjects,	 undergraduate	 students	 from	 Rennes	 University	 provided	 written	
informed	consent	 for	 their	participation	 to	 the	study,	which	was	conducted	 in	compliance	with	
the	Declaration	of	Helsinki.	The	health	questionnaire	revealed	recent	psychiatric	condition	and	 /	
or	psychoactive	medication	 in	 10	cases.	2	participants	apparently	 lacked	motivation,	 resulting	 in	
very	 poor	 performances.	 1	 participant	 scored	 significantly	 below	 expected	 performance	 from	
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available	 norms	 at	 both	 immediate	 and	delayed	 trials	 of	 the	 Logical	Memory	 subtest.	 Finally,	 a	
software	bug	resulted	in	the	loss	of	one	participant’s	data.	This	resulted	in	the	final	inclusion	of	76	
healthy	participants	 (57%	 females),	with	normal	memory	 functioning	and	 free	of	any	medical	or	
psychological	 condition.	 Overall,	 participants	 were	 aged	 19-30	 years	 old	 (median	 =	 22),	 had	
completed	10-20	years	of	education	(median	=	15),	and	had	a	median	full-scale	estimated	IQ	of	107	
(ranging	from	91	to	124)	(see	Table	1	 for	socio-demographic,	questionnaires	and	 logical	memory	
data).	
	
Groups	 Sex	ratio	%Female	Age	
Years	of	
education	
f-NART	
FSIQ	 CDS	
Immediate	
Recall	
Delayed	
Recall		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Study-Test,	N=27	 63	 22.15	(2.4)	 15.04	(2.3)	 106.47	(6.4)	 48.85	(15.4)	 12.37	(2.9)	 12.37	(3.0)	Study,		N=24	 68	 22.25	(1.8)	 15.08	(1.6)	 107.17	(6.36)	 52.04	(15.3)	 12.08	(2.7)	 12.00	(2.9)	Test,		N=25	 44	 22.56	(2.1)	 14.20	(2.0)	 106.31	(3.73)	 52.40	(13.4)	 12.12	(2.9)	 11.48	(2.6)		
Table	1.	Experiment	1.	Sociodemographic	and	psychometric	background	of	participants.	Means	are	displayed	above	standard	deviations	(in	brackets).	F-NART	FSIQ=	French	version	of	the	National	Adult	Reading	Test,	estimated	Full-Scale	IQ	;	CDS=	Cognitive	Difficulties	Scale	;	Immediate	&	Delayed	recall	are	expressed	as	scaled	scores	from	Wechsler	Memory	scale,	3rd	Ed.	The	three	groups	were	matched	for	Age,	Sex	ratio,	Education,	FSIQ,	CDS,	immediate	&	delayed	verbal	recall	(Bayes	Factors	well	below	1,	BF10	range=	[0.121	-	0.880]).	
Statistical	analyses	
Accuracy	 at	 final	 test	 was	 operationalized	 through	 signal	 detection	 theory	 analyses,	 with	 the	
following	dependent	variables:	Accuracy	(percentage	of	correct	responses),	Hits	(percentage	of	
Go	response	to	targets)	and	FAs	(percentage	of	Go	responses	to	foils).	
We	 tested	 our	 hypothesis	 within	 a	 Bayesian	 probabilistic	 framework	 rather	 than	 using	 the	
standard	 frequentist	 approach	 (Null	 Hypothesis	 Significance	 Testing),	 given	 the	 acknowledged	
limitations	 in	 the	use	and	 interpretation	of	p-values	 (see	 (Brodeur,	Guérard,	&	Maria,	2014).	We	
therefore	computed	Bayesian	factor	values	(BF10)	using	the	JASP	software	v.	7.5.6.	(Love	et	al.,	
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2015;	 for	 very	 recent	 similar	 approach	 in	 experimental	 psychology,	 see	 e.g.,	 Kelly	&	Heit,	 2017).	
The	Bayes	Factor	(BF10)	provides	an	odds	ratio	for	the	alternative	vs.	null	hypotheses,	with	values	
<	 1	 favoring	 the	null	hypothesis	and	values	>	 1	 favoring	 the	alternative	hypothesis.	 Importantly,	
because	Bayes	factor	is	a	probability	ratio	(i.e.,	ratio	of	the	likelihood	of	data	under	the	alternative	
vs.	the	null	hypotheses),	 it	allows	comparing	the	respective	 likelihoods	of	a	testing	effect	(after	
recognition	 memory	 intervening	 tasks)	 or	 its	 absence,	 rather	 than	 simply	 considering	 the	
likelihood	of	the	absence	of	testing	effect	under	these	conditions.	To	give	a	concrete	example,	an	
estimated	BF10	of	0.4	would	 indicate	that	data	are	2.5	times	more	 likely	to	occur	under	the	null	
hypothesis	than	under	the	alternate	hypothesis,	and	more	generally,	an	estimated	BF10	value	of	
30	–	100	is	considered	very	strong	support	for	the	alternative	hypothesis.	Robustness	analyses	for	
the	estimation	of	the	Bayes	factor	were	also	performed	with	JASP	software,	allowing	qualifying	
the	degree	of	evidence	for	either	hypothesis	(Jeffreys,	1961).	
	
Results	of	experiment	1	
	
As	illustrated	in	Table	1,	group	assignment	resulted	in	27	participants	in	the	Study-Test	group	(ST),	
24	in	the	Study	group	(S)	and	25	in	the	Test	group	(T).		
As	described	in	the	methods	section,	S	and	ST	groups	critically	differed	from	T	group	in	terms	of	
the	total	duration	devoted	to	explicitly	studying	the	to-be-learned	stimuli.	Indeed,	participants	in	
the	group	T	explicitly	encoded	the	items	during	the	initial	encoding	phase	only,	thus	leading	to	a	
total	duration	of	210x700ms=2.45	minutes;	while	participants	 from	the	groups	ST	and	S,	due	 to	
two	 extra	 study	 trials,	 spent	 7.35	 minutes	 studying	 the	 pictures.	 We	 also	 computed	 the	 total	
exposure	 time	 to	 stimuli	 (Roediger	 &	 Karpicke,	 2006b)	 to	 compare	 the	 different	 learning	
schedules,	 taking	 into	account	response	times	during	recognition	trials	administered	before	the	
final	test.	Participants	in	the	ST	group	were	exposed	to	the	items	during	11.03	minutes	(s.d.=	0.23)	
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on	average,	versus	6.39	minutes	 (s.d.=	0.18)	on	average	 for	T	group.	 In	 the	S	group,	 that	value	
was	fixed	by	design	at	7.35	minutes.	
A	 series	 of	 Bayesian	 ANOVAs	 with	 group	 entered	 as	 a	 between-subjects	 variable	 yielded	 BF10	
estimates	>	1000	for	Accuracy	and	Hits,	corresponding	to	a	very	strong	level	of	evidence	for	the	
hypothesis	of	 a	group	effect	on	 the	 final	 test	performance	 (see	Figure	2).	 Further	 independent	
sampled	t-tests	confirmed	our	expectations	of	superior	performances	in	the	ST	group	vs.	S	group	
(Accuracy,	BF10>	 1000;	Hits,	BF10=>	 1000)	as	well	as	a	superiority	of	 the	ST	group	over	T	group	
(Accuracy,	BF10=	 119;	Hits,	BF10=	 16).	Robustness	analyses	 suggested	 that	evidence	 favoring	ST	
group	over	S	and	T	groups	was	decisive	or	very	strong	for	the	comparison	ST	vs.	S	(median	effect	
sizes	 for	 Accuracy	 =	 2.033,	 95%CI=[1.341,	 2.742];	 Hits	 =	 1.847,	 95%CI=[1.178,	 2.522]),	 while	 it	 was	
decisive	 or	 strong	 for	 the	 comparison	 ST	 vs.	 T	 (median	 effect	 sizes	 for	 Accuracy	 =	 0.929,	
95%CI=[0.360,	1.527];	Hits	=	0.697,	95%CI=[0.190,	1.277]).	
However	at	odds	with	our	hypothesis,	 final	 test	performances	proved	better	 in	 the	T	group	by	
comparison	with	the	S	group	(Accuracy,	BF10=	0.092;	Hits,	BF10=	0.063),	and	robustness	analyses	
suggested	either	decisive	or	strong	 level	of	evidence	(median	effect	sizes	 for	Accuracy	=	0.059,	
95%CI=[0.001,	0.271];	Hits	=	0.061,	95%CI=[0.002,	0.307]).		
	
Figure	2.	Experiment	1.	Notched	boxplots	for	final	test	results.	Asterisks	indicate	estimates	of	the	
Bayesian	Factor	BF10	≠	1	for	t-tests	planned	comparisons	between	groups.	Each	circle	represents	
one	observation,	notches	represent	the	95%	Confidence	Interval	of	the	median.	
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The	gain	observed	in	final	accuracy	measures	at	final	test	in	the	T	group	by	comparison	with	the	S	
group	came	with	substantial	changes	in	response	bias	(we	used	the	non	parametric	B”	response	
bias	 index	 after	 Grier	 [1971])	 and	 median	 response	 times.	 Estimates	 of	 BF10	 made	 under	 the	
hypothesis	of	a	difference	between	groups	reached	114	for	B”	(median	effect	size	=	1.030,	95%CI	
[0.426,	 1.651])	 and	was	 superior	 to	 1000	 for	 the	median	 response	 times	 for	Hits	 (median	effect	
size	=	1.385,	95%CI	[0.755,	2.036]).	Evidence	suggesting	that	participants	in	the	T	group	adopted	a	
more	 liberal	 response	 bias	 and	 were	 faster	 in	 making	 accurate	 Go	 responses	 was	 decisive	 or	
strong	and	decisive	or	very	strong,	 respectively.	However,	and	 importantly,	 the	 two	groups	did	
not	differ	regarding	the	false	alarms	rate	(BF10=	0.320)	(see	Figure	2)	and	evidence	supporting	a	
difference	between	groups	 for	 the	median	response	times	 for	 false	alarms	was	only	positive	or	
substantial	 (BF10=	5,	median	effect	 size	=	0.659,	95%CI	 [0.100,	 1.231]),	with	T	group	participants	
being	faster.	
	
Discussion	of	experiment	1	
	
To	sum	up	the	results	of	experiment	1,	 final	 test	data	only	partly	confirmed	our	hypothesis	of	a	
group	effect.	Final	test	accuracy	measures	were	found	to	be	superior	in	the	ST	group.	However,	T	
group	participants	obtained	a	better	accuracy	and	hit	rate	than	S	group	participants,	without	any	
cost	 in	terms	of	false	alarms	rate.	This	occurred	despite	significantly	 less	total	exposure	time	to	
targets	and	a	time	spent	at	explicitly	studying	stimuli	three	times	 less	 important	 in	the	T	group.	
Furthermore,	T	participants	were	also	faster	 in	making	hits,	overruling	the	possibility	of	a	trade-
off	effect	between	hits	and	reaction	times.	
Thus,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	experiment	1	provides	the	first	evidence	for	a	testing	effect	
following	recognition	memory-based	retrieval	practice,	which	is	at	odds	with	our	main	hypothesis	
derived	 from	the	 retrieval	effort	 theory	of	 the	 testing	effect.	However,	 it	 is	well	acknowledged	
that	recognition	memory	relies	upon	two	distinct	processes,	recollection	and	familiarity	(Mandler,	
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1980;	 Yonelinas	 &	 Jacoby,	 1994).	 While	 recollection	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 retrieval	 of	 qualitative	
information	 about	 the	 study	 episode	 (contextual	 retrieval),	 familiarity	 is	 defined	 as	 an	
acontextual	 sense	 of	 prior	 exposure	 (Yonelinas,	 2002;	 Yonelinas,	 Aly,	Wang,	 &	 Koen,	 2010).	 In	
experiment	1,	we	used	a	typical	Old	/	New	recognition	memory	paradigm	that	does	not	allow	the	
estimating	of	the	respective	contributions	of	 recollection	and	familiarity	to	performance.	This	 is	
important	 since	 recollection	 “involves	 the	 recovery	 of	 qualitative	 associations	 prompted	 by	 a	
critical	cue”	(Eichenbaum,	Yonelinas,	&	Ranganath,	2007,	p.124).	In	other	words,	the	contribution	
of	 recollection	 to	 recognition	memory	matches	 the	 controlled,	 effortful	 processes	 described	 in	
the	 retrieval	 effort	 hypothesis,	 and	 it	 follows	 that	 the	 contribution	 of	 recollection	 to	 retrieval	
practice	in	experiment	1	may	explain	our	finding	of	a	testing	effect.	To	further	explore	whether	a	
testing	effect	may	occur	due	to	effortless,	automatic,	 retrieval	processes,	one	should	 therefore	
rule	 out	 the	 contribution	 of	 recollection-based	 retrieval	 to	 focus	 on	 familiarity-based	 retrieval.	
This	is	what	we	attempted	to	in	experiment	2.	
	
Experiment	2	
Methods	
	
Experiment	 2	 aimed	 at	 testing	 whether	 memory	 retrieval	 practice	 associated	 with	 familiarity-
based	recognition	memory	may	lead	to	a	testing	effect.	For	that	purpose,	we	adapted	the	Speed	
and	 Accuracy	 Boosting	 (SAB)	 procedure	 recently	 introduced	 by	 Besson	 et	 al.,	 (2012)	 for	 each	
testing	phase	of	experiment	2.	Since	familiarity	is	supposed	to	be	a	rapid	and	automatic	process	
by	 contrast	 with	 the	 slow,	 controlled	 processes	 that	 support	 recollection	 (Brown	 &	 Aggleton,	
2001;	Yonelinas,	2002),	the	SAB	procedure	is	assumed	to	mainly	rely	on	familiarity	(Sauvage,	Beer,	
&	Eichenbaum,	2010;	Besson	et	al.,	2012;	2015).	
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The	Speed	and	Accuracy	Boosting	procedure	
The	Speed	and	Accuracy	Boosting	 (SAB)	procedure	 constraints	participants	 to	use	 their	 fastest	
strategy	and	has	been	used	in	several	studies	(Barragan-Jason,	Besson,	Ceccaldi,	&	Barbeau,	2013;	
Besson,	Ceccaldi,	Tramoni,	Felician,	Didic,	Barbeau,	2015;	Besson	et	al.,	2017).	Based	on	a	classical	
Go/NoGo	task,	the	SAB	procedure	requires	participants	to	provide	a	go	response	to	targets	within	
a	given	response	time	deadline	following	stimulus	onset.	Based	on	previous	studies,	the	deadline	
was	set	at	500ms	 in	 the	present	experiment.	A	go	 response	before	 this	 response	deadline	was	
followed	by	an	audio-feedback,	positive	if	the	item	was	a	target	(hit),	negative	if	the	item	was	a	
distractor	 (false	 alarm).	 Similarly,	 a	 no-go	 response	 was	 followed	 by	 a	 positive	 (correct	 no-go	
response	for	a	distractor,	i.e.	correct	rejection)	or	negative	(incorrect	no-go	response	for	a	target,	
i.e.,	omission)	audio-feedback.	Before	presentation	of	each	 item,	a	 fixation	cross	was	displayed	
with	a	jittered	duration	ranging	from	300	to	600ms.	Stimuli	were	then	presented	and	participants	
had	 up	 to	 500ms	 to	 give	 their	 answer.	 The	 SAB	procedure	 is	 a	 very	 demanding	 task,	 thus	 two	
training	 blocks	 of	 10	 target	 stimuli,	 to	 be	 recognized	 among	 10	 distractors,	 were	 administered	
before	the	experiment.	These	items	were	not	used	in	the	subsequent	trials.	A	schematic	diagram	
provided	in	Figure	3	illustrates	the	SAB	procedure.		
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Figure	3.	Experiment	2.	Speed	and	Accuracy	Boosting	(SAB)	procedure	overview.	After	a	typical	
study	phase,	a	speeded	Go	/	Nogo	task	required	participants	to	provide	Go	responses	for	targets	
only,	within	a	short	response	deadline	(500	ms).	After	each	response,	an	audio-verbal	feedback	was	
provided.	
Stimuli	
795	photographs	of	real	objects	were	taken	from	the	web	(mean	~	379x345	pixels,	SD	~	107x92	
pixels),	without	any	context,	 reformatted	 in	an	uncompressed	format	(i.e.,	 .bmp)	and	displayed	
on	 a	 grey	 background.	 The	 required	 number	 of	 targets	 and	 distractor	 pictures	 was	 randomly	
sampled	 across	 participants,	 and	 different	 sets	 of	 distractors	 were	 used	 for	 successive	 test	
phases	(see	below).	
	
Experimental	setting	
For	all	experiments,	stimuli	were	presented	on	a	CRT	computer	screen,	using	E	Prime	2.0	software	
(Psychology	Software	Tools,	Pittsburgh,	PA).	Subjects	 responded	by	 raising	their	 fingers	 from	a	
dedicated	infrared	response	pad,	and	response	speed	was	always	emphasized	in	the	instructions.	
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Experimental	design	and	procedure	
Figure	 4	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 design	 of	 experiment	 2.	 During	 Study	 phases,	 stimulus	
presentation	was	self-paced,	with	minimal	presentation	duration	of	2	s,	and	with	a	500ms	 inter-
stimuli	 interval.	 Two	 learning	 conditions	 were	 used	 in	 a	 cross-sectional	 design:	 the	 “Study”	
condition,	 further	 labeled	 “S”,	 and	 the	 “Test”	 condition,	 further	 labeled	 “T”.	 Both	 learning	
conditions	included	4	encoding	blocks	intermixed	with	4	test	blocks.	In	both	learning	conditions,	
encoding	 instructions	 emphasized	 the	 memorization	 of	 a	 series	 of	 photographs	 for	 further	
recognition.	
	
	
Figure	4.	Experiment	2.	Design	overview.	“SAB”	refers	to	the	Speed	and	Boosting	Procedure	
described	in	the	methods	section.	Top	row:	“Study”	condition;	Bottom	row:	“Test”	condition.	In	the	
Study	condition,	two	thirds	of	the	items	were	repeatedly	studied	but	tested	only	once	before	final	
tests	procedure.	In	the	“Test”	condition,	items	were	studied	only	once	but	two	thirds	were	further	
repeatedly	tested.	For	the	sake	of	clarity,	ISIs	are	not	displayed.	
	
In	 the	 S	 condition,	 during	 the	 study	 phase,	 a	 third	 of	 the	 156	 targets	 (i.e.,	 52	 items)	 were	
presented	only	once,	another	third	twice	and	the	 last	third	three	times.	Presentation	order	was	
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pseudo-randomized	 across	 participants,	 so	 that	 three	 different	 items	 at	 least	 separated	 two	
consecutive	occurrences	of	identical	pictures.	After	each	encoding	block,	a	three-minutes	cartoon	
was	displayed	as	 an	 interference	 task,	 randomly	 taken	 from	a	 series	of	 12	 videos.	 Thereafter,	 a	
test	block	started.	Each	test	block	consisted	in	a	recognition	memory	test	administered	under	the	
speed	and	accuracy	boosting	procedure	 (SAB),	where	 an	equal	 number	of	 foils	were	 randomly	
intermixed	with	 target	 pictures,	 with	 a	 jittered	 100-500msec	 inter-stimulus	 interval.	 During	 the	
delay	 before	 the	 final	 short-term	 test	 phase,	 participants	 completed	 the	 same	 tasks	 and	
questionnaires	as	in	experiment1,	for	a	fixed	25	minutes	delay	before	the	final	test.	The	final	test	
was	also	based	on	the	SAB	procedure,	though	with	a	different	set	of	156	distractors	than	during	
the	previous	test	phases.	
In	the	T	condition,	the	156	target	items	were	presented	in	the	same	manner	as	in	the	S	condition,	
except	 that	 items	 were	 presented	 only	 once.	 Instructions	 were	 the	 same,	 i.e.,	 to	 memorize	 a	
series	of	photographs	 for	 further	 recognition.	After	 the	 three-minutes	 interference	phase	 filled	
with	a	cartoon	as	described	above,	a	recognition	memory	test	was	administered	under	the	SAB	
procedure.	During	the	test	blocks,	one	third	of	the	target	 items	were	presented	once,	one	third	
twice,	 and	one	 third	were	presented	 three	 times.	Participants	 therefore	had	one,	 two	or	 three	
opportunities	of	 target	 retrieval	within	 the	 test	blocks.	During	 the	delay	before	 the	 final	 short-
term	test	phase,	participants	completed	the	same	tests	and	questionnaires	as	described	for	the	S	
condition,	 and	 the	 final	 test	 phase	 started	 automatically	 after	 25	 minutes.	 That	 phase	 was	
identical	to	the	one	described	above	for	the	S	condition.	
In	 both	 groups,	 participants	 were	 not	 aware	 that	 they	 would	 be	 asked	 to	 come	 back	 to	 the	
laboratory	for	a	long-term	final	test.	6	months	after	the	final	short-term	test	phase	took	place,	we	
contacted	 the	participants	 and	asked	 them	 to	 come	back	 for	 a	 long-term	 test	phase,	using	 the	
same	procedure	 as	during	 the	 short-term	 final	 test	phase,	 except	 that	 a	new	 set	of	distractors	
was	 used.	 The	 practice	 trials	 were	 administrated	 again	 to	 train	 participants	 for	 this	 very	
demanding	 recognition	memory	paradigm.	A	6	months	delay	was	chosen	because	prior	 studies	
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suggest	 that	 long-lasting	 memories	 can	 be	 highlighted	 by	 use	 of	 recognition	 memory	 tasks	
(Dolcos,	LaBar,	&	Cabeza,	2005;	McCullough	&	Yonelinas,	2013;	Milton	et	al.,	2011).		
Our	 design,	 therefore,	 allowed	 us	 to	 contrast	 the	 effect	 of	 repeated	 study	 versus	 repeated	
familiarity-based	 retrieval	 on	 short-	 and	 long-term	 retention.	 Importantly,	 the	 same	 testing	
procedures	were	used	during	the	intervening	phases	and	at	final	tests,	either	short-	or	long-term.	
This	was	intentionally	done	by	reference	to	the	Transfer-Appropriate	Processing	(TAP)	theoretical	
framework,	 stating	 that	 the	 testing	 effect	 magnitude	 may	 be	 optimized	 when	 the	 processing	
demands	 involved	during	 initial	 and	 final	 testing	 closely	match	 (Dolcos,	 LaBar,	&	Cabeza,	 2005;	
McCullough	 &	 Yonelinas,	 2013;	 Milton	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Because	 our	 goal	 in	 experiment	 2	 was	 to	
explore	whether	 or	 not	 a	 testing	 effect	may	 occur	when	 retrieval	 practice	 is	mostly	 based	 on	
familiarity,	 and	 possibly	 being	 resistant	 to	 a	 6	months-delay,	we	 reasoned	 that	 using	 the	 same	
testing	procedures	during	 learning	and	final	testing	 limited	the	risk	of	a	type	II	error	(i.e.	a	false	
absence	of	the	effect).	
	
Hypotheses	
Recognition	memory	under	the	SAB	procedure	yields	very	short	response	times,	and	it	has	been	
showed	 that	 responses	 up	 to	 420	 ms	 reflect	 familiarity-based	 responses	 (Morris	 et	 al.,	 1977;	
Roediger	&	Butler,	 2011).	Our	 first	 hypothesis,	 thus,	was	 that	minimal	 reaction	 times	 estimated	
during	 the	 intervening	 phases	 should	 remain	 in	 that	 range,	 a	 sine	 qua	 non	 condition	 for	 any	
further	 interpretation	 in	terms	of	familiarity-based	retrieval	practice.	Furthermore,	following	the	
core	prediction	of	 the	retrieval	effort	hypothesis,	we	hypothesized	that	retrieval	practice	based	
on	such	automatic,	effortless	processes	should	not	lead	to	a	testing	effect.	In	other	words,	final	
testing	performances	were	expected	to	be	mainly	driven	by	the	time	spent	explicitly	studying	the	
material,	which	was	up	to	three	times	more	important	in	the	S	group.	Indeed,	participants	in	the	S	
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group	studied	the	items	either	once	(for	 items	presented	only	once),	twice	or	three	times	while	
participants	 in	 the	 T	 group	 studied	 items	 only	 once.	 Across	 participants,	 this	 resulted	 in	 total	
study	duration	of	23.5	minutes	in	the	S	group	versus	13.6	minutes	in	the	T	group.	Meanwhile,	the	
mean	 time	 spent	 studying	 each	 picture	 did	 not	 differ	 between	 groups	 (S	 group,	mean=	 4.5	 s,	
range	 [3.2	 –	 6.7];	 T	 group,	mean=	 5.2	 s,	 range	 [3.8	 –	 7.4]).	 Further,	 the	 test	 trials	 also	 exposed	
participants	to	the	target	stimuli	for	a	maximum	time	of	78	seconds	in	the	S	group	vs.	156	seconds	
in	the	T	group.	Overall,	this	resulted	in	a	total	exposure	to	target	information	far	less	important	in	
the	T	group	(24.8	vs.	16.2	minutes).	Finally,	we	expected	delay	to	influence	performances	in	both	
groups	 (i.e.	 forgetting	 at	 6	months-delay),	 but	 no	group	X	delay	 interaction	was	 hypothesized,	
because	 the	 same	 pattern	 of	 S	 group	 advantage	 was	 expected	 at	 both	 short-	 and	 long-term	
delays.	
	
Participants	
41	 healthy	 young	 subjects,	 undergraduate	 students	 at	 Toulouse	 University,	 signed	 informed	
consent	 forms	 for	 their	 participation,	 and	 were	 paid	 for	 their	 time.	 Technical	 issues	 with	 the	
infrared	 response	 pad	made	 4	 learning	 datasets	 unavailable,	 2	 participants	 scores	 significantly	
below	 norms	 at	 recall	 tests	 on	 the	Wechsler	 memory	 scale,	 and	 5	 other	 participants	 failed	 to	
reach	 a	 minimal	 level	 of	 performance	 either	 during	 the	 first	 training	 session	 or	 the	 first	
recognition	 block,	 reflecting	 the	 very	 demanding	 nature	 of	 the	 task.	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 final	
inclusion	of	30	healthy	participants	(16	included	in	the	group	T	and	14	in	the	S	group)	(see	Table	2	
for	socio-demographic,	questionnaires	and	logical	memory	data).	At	6	months,	only	9	participants	
from	each	group	proved	reachable	and	consented	to	perform	the	long-term	final	test.	
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Groups	 Sex	ratio	%Female	 Age	
Years	of	
education	
f-NART	
FSIQ	 CDS	
Immediate	
Recall	
Delayed	
Recall		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Study	«	S	»	 79	 22.79	
(3.5)	
13.86	
(1.5)	
105.68	
(5.9)	 48.21	(16.5)	 44.93	(7.9)	 31.21	(6.2)	Test	«	T	»	 69	 24.69	
(4.0)	 14.50	(1.9)	 108.26	(5.4)	 46.73	(13.2)	 45.32	(7.0)	 31.69	(5.5)		
Table	2.	Experiment	2.	Sociodemographic	and	psychometric	background	of	participants.	Means	are	displayed	above	standard	deviations	(in	brackets).	F-NART	FSIQ=	French	version	of	the	National	Adult	Reading	Test,	estimated	Full-Scale	IQ	;	CDS=	Cognitive	Difficulties	Scale	;	Immediate	&	Delayed	recall	are	expressed	as	scaled	scores	from	Wechsler	Memory	scale,	3rd	Ed.	The	groups	did	not	differ	for	Age,	Sex	ratio,	Education,	FSIQ,	CDS,	immediate	&	delayed	verbal	recall	(Bayes	Factors	well	below	1,	BF10	range=	[0.348	-	0.690]).	
Statistical	analyses	
The	 SAB	 procedure	 provides	 a	 continuous	 distribution	 of	 responses	 times,	 which	 allows	 the	
estimation	of	the	minimal	processing	time	required	for	each	task,	through	the	computation	of	a	
minimal	reaction	time	(min	RT).	After	dividing	RT	distributions	in	bins	of	equivalent	width	(20	ms),	
across-participants	 minimal	 reaction	 times	 were	 computed	 by	 determining	 the	 first	 of	 three	
consecutive	bins	for	which	the	number	of	Hits	started	to	significantly	outnumber	the	number	of	
FAs	 (Fischer’s	 exact	 test,	 p<0.05).	 To	 increase	 statistical	 power	 and	better	 reflect	 each	group’s	
behavior	in	terms	of	min	RT,	we	also	pooled	together	all	trials	from	all	participants	and	computed	
across-trials	min	RT	for	each	group.	Across-trials	min	RT	were	defined	as	the	middle	of	the	first	of	
three	consecutive	bins	where	Hits	rate	significantly	outnumber	FAs	rate,	using	χ2-tests,	p<0.05.		
The	same	analyses	as	in	experiment	1	were	used	to	compute	recognition	memory	performances.	
	
Results	of	experiment	2	
	
As	illustrated	in	Table	2,	group	assignment	resulted	in	14	participants	in	the	Study	group	(S),	and	
16	in	the	Test	group	(T).		
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Minimal	reaction	times	during	the	intervening	phase	
Estimates	 of	 the	 minimal	 processing	 time	 required	 to	 accurately	 recognize	 a	 target	 across	
participants	were	 in	the	expected	range	(group	T,	mean	minRT	=	345	(+/-	26.8)	ms,	range	[320	 -	
400];	group	S,	mean	minRT	=	390	(+/-15.2)	ms,	range	[380	-	420]).	However,	across-trials	min	RT	
revealed	very	similar	profiles	in	the	temporal	dynamics	of	responses.	As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	5,	
across-trials	min	RTs	were	very	similar	between	groups.	
	
	
Figure	5.	Distribution	of	the	reaction	times	during	the	intervening	phase	in	groups	S	&	T,	across-
trials.	The	minimal	reaction	times	(vertical	lines)	were	computed	as	the	first	moment	when	hits	
significantly	outnumber	false-alarms	(FA)	rate.	
	
Altogether,	 minimal	 reaction	 times	 analysis	 confirmed	 that	 participants	 chiefly	 used	 fast	 and	
automatic,	presumably	familiarity	based,	recognition	processes.	
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Short-term	final	test	
The	 alternative	hypothesis	 being	 that	 group	S	outperforms	group	T	 regarding	 accuracy	 at	 final	
test	did	not	 receive	 support	 from	an	 independent	Bayesian	 t-test	 (Accuracy,	BF10=	0.668),	 and	
the	 robustness	 analysis	 yielding	 a	 moderate	 level	 of	 evidence	 favoring	 the	 null	 hypothesis	
(median	 effect	 sizes	 for	 Accuracy	 =	 0.313,	 95%CI=[0.018,	 0.881]).	 Regarding	 Hits	 rates,	 a	mixed	
Bayesian	ANOVA	with	group	as	a	between	factor	and	number	of	items	presentations	(i.e.,	1,	2	or	
3)	as	a	within-subjects	factor	brought	evidence	for	a	main	effect	of	the	number	of	presentations	
(BF10>	1000),	but	we	did	not	find	any	contribution	of	the	main	effect	of	group	(BF10=	0.444),	and	
the	group	X	number	of	presentation	interaction	did	not	add	value	to	the	model	(BF10=	0.261).	As	
expected,	a	very	strong	level	of	evidence	was	found	for	the	effect	of	the	number	of	presentations	
(median	effect	sizes	for	1	vs.	2	presentations	=	-1.321,	95%CI=[-1.823,	-0.831];	2	vs.	3	presentations	=	
-0.754,	95%CI=[-1.162,	-0.364]).	
A	planned	comparison	further	focused	on	the	items	presented	three	times,	thus	benefiting	from	3	
study	events	but	only	one	test	event	in	the	S	group,	and	conversely	three	test	events	but	only	one	
study	event	in	the	T	group.	Independent	t-tests	yielded	moderate	evidence	for	the	null	hypothesis	
(Accuracy,	BF10=	0.407;	median	effect	size	=	0.234,	95%CI=[0.011,	0.761];	Hits,	BF10=	0.579;	median	
effect	size	=	0.285,	95%CI=[0.016,	0.864]).	Figure	6	summarizes	short-term	final	test	results.	
Interestingly,	we	found	moderate	evidence	favoring	the	absence	of	a	group	differences	for	Bias	
and	False	Alarms	measures	(Bias:	items	presented	only	once,	BF10=	0.341;	items	presented	twice,	
BF10=	 0.340	 and	 for	 items	 presented	 three	 times,	 BF10=	 0.342;	 False	 Alarms:	 BF10=	 0.340).	
Likewise,	median	reaction	times	(RTs)	for	Hits	and	FAs	were	similar	 in	both	groups	(Hits	median	
RTs,	 S	 group:	 421ms	 [403	 -	 454],	 T	 group:	 418ms	 [402	 -	 454],	 BF10=	 0.398;	 FAs	median	 RTs,	 S	
group:	402ms	[351	-	456],	T	group:	398ms	[352	-	426],	BF10=	0.345).	Hits	RTs	were	also	similar	for	
targets	 presented	 only	 once,	 twice	 or	 three	 times,	 respectively.	 Across-trials	 minimal	 reaction	
times	were	estimated	at	300	and	340	ms	in	the	S	group	and	the	T	group,	respectively,	thus	being	
in	the	same	range	and	well	below	the	expected	upper	limit	of	420	ms.	
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Altogether,	 these	 results	 indicate	 that	 short-term	 retention	 increases	 with	 repetition	 of	 the	
material	during	the	learning	phase	in	both	groups.	However,	one	single	study	event	coupled	with	
three	 test	events	yielded	equivalent	short-term	retention	 than	 three	study	events	coupled	with	
one	 single	 test	 event,	 despite	 the	 total	 time	 spent	 looking	 at	 the	 stimuli	 being	much	 shorter.	
Moreover,	 learning	 associated	 with	 repeated	 familiarity-based	 retrieval	 yielded	 equivalent	 Bias	
and	False	alarms	rate	at	final	test.	
	
	
Figure	6.	Experiment	2.	Notched	boxplots	for	Short-term	final	test.	(A)	Accuracy;	(B)	Hit	rates	for	
items	presented	once,	twice	or	three	times	either	at	study	or	at	test	during	the	intervening	phase;	
(C)	False	Alarm	rates.	Each	circle	represents	one	observation,	notches	represent	the	95%	
Confidence	Interval	of	the	median.	
Long-term	final	test	
Figure	7	summarizes	the	long-term	final	test	results.	Only	two	participants	from	the	S	group	failed	
to	 outperform	 the	 chance	 level	 at	 6	 months,	 confirming	 that	 visual	 recognition	 memory	
paradigms	allow	to	evidence	long-lasting	memories.	Removing	data	from	these	two	subjects	did	
not	 affect	 the	 results	presented	below.	We	 found	moderate	 evidence	 for	 an	 absence	of	 group	
effect	on	Accuracy	 (BF10=	0.426;	median	effect	 size	=	0.254,	95%CI=[0.012,	0.878]).	Focusing	on	
the	 items	being	presented	 three	 times,	we	 found	moderate	or	 anecdotal	 evidence	 in	 the	 same	
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direction	 (Accuracy,	 BF10=	 0.229;	 median	 effect	 size	 =	 0.157,	 95%CI=[0.007,	 0.637];	 Hits,	 BF10=	
0.591;	median	effect	size	=	0.314,	95%CI=[0.016,	1.006]).	
We	found	moderate	or	anecdotal	evidence	for	similar	Bias	and	False	Alarms	rate	 in	both	groups	
(Bias:	items	presented	only	once,	BF10=	0.286;	items	presented	twice,	BF10=	0.250	and	for	items	
presented	three	times,	BF10=	0.223;	False	Alarms:	BF10=	1.219).	Reaction	times	(RTs)	analysis	for	
Hits	and	FAs	yielded	the	same	pattern	as	the	one	found	for	short-term	final	test,	with	very	similar	
results	between	groups.	Finally,	across-trials	minimal	reaction	times	were	fast	(260	and	320	ms	in	
the	 S	 group	 and	 the	 T	 group,	 respectively),	 again	 suggesting	 the	 involvement	 of	 very	 fast	 and	
automatic	retrieval	processes.	
Taken	 together,	 these	 results	 suggest	 that	 one	 single	 study	 event	 associated	 with	 three	 test	
events	 led	to	the	same	 long-term	retention,	and	with	a	similar	retrieval	speed,	than	three	study	
events	 associated	with	 a	 unique	 test	 event.	 Learning	 thus	 clearly	 occurs	 very	 efficiently	 during	
repeated	familiarity-based	retrieval,	and	not	only	during	study	events.	Importantly,	we	found	that	
these	 findings	 are	 not	 associated	 with	 any	 difference	 in	 response	 Bias	 or	 in	 the	 rate	 of	 False	
Alarms.			
	
Figure	7.	Experiment	2.	Notched	boxplots	for	Long-term	final	test.	(A)	Accuracy;	(B)	Hit	rates	for	
items	presented	once,	twice	or	three	times	either	at	study	or	at	test	during	the	intervening	phase;	
(C)	False	Alarm	rates.	Each	circle	represents	one	observation,	notches	represent	the	95%	
Confidence	Interval	of	the	median.	
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Spacing	effects	
The	between-subjects	design	used	 in	experiment	2	 introduces	an	 important	difference	between	
groups.	 During	 the	 intervening	 learning	 phases,	 because	 items	 can	 be	 repeated	 across	
recognition	 trials	 in	 the	 T	 group	 but	 not	 in	 the	 S	 group,	 and	 because	 we	 had	 to	 keep	 the	
probability	of	target	occurrence	constant	between	groups	(i.e.,	50%),	 there	were	twice	as	many	
distractors	 in	 the	 T	 group	 than	 in	 the	 S	 group.	 In	 the	 S	 group,	 recognition	 test	 during	 the	
intervening	phase	 included	an	overall	number	of	 156	targets	and	156	distractors.	By	contrast,	 in	
the	T	group,	52	targets	were	presented	only	once,	52	were	presented	twice,	and	52	three	times,	
thus	 leading	 in	 the	 use	 of	 312	 distractors.	 It	 follows	 that	 the	 number	 of	 items	 separating	 two	
successive	presentations	of	the	same	picture	(further	labeled	“Lag”)	may	inherently	be	greater	in	
the	T	group,	thus	introducing	a	spacing	effect	during	the	learning	trials	that	could	advantage	the	
T	group.	However,	it	was	recently	demonstrated	that	spacing	effects	interact	with	testing	effect	
up	 to	 the	 cancellation	 of	 the	 retrieval	 practice	 effect	 when	 the	 learning	 schedules	 control	 for	
differences	in	lags	between	conditions	(Soderstrom,	Kerr,	&	Bjork,	2016).	
Based	 on	 the	 inspection	 of	 the	 distributions,	 each	 item	 with	 a	 lag	 superior	 to	 60	 items	 was	
removed	(leading	to	similar	lags	means	of	22	items	across	study	trials	in	the	S	group	vs.	28	items	
across	 test	 trials	 in	 the	 T	 group).	We	 ran	 the	 same	 analysis	 as	 the	 ones	 presented	 above	 after	
removing	these	items.	Results	were	identical	to	the	pattern	described	before	for	short-	and	long-
term	retention.	Briefly,	we	found	moderate	to	strong	evidence	for	a	main	effect	of	the	number	of	
presentations	 at	 short-term	 only	 (BF10=	 61.429),	 decisive	 evidence	 for	 a	 main	 effect	 of	 delay	
(BF10>	1000	for	both	delays),	but	no	effect	of	group,	and	interactions	did	not	either	add	value	to	
the	models.				
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Discussion	of	experiment	2	
	
Experiment	 2	provides	 the	 first	 evidence	of	 learning	and	 long-term	 retention	of	object	pictures	
after	 familiarity-based	 recognition	 memory	 practice.	 Indeed,	 minimal	 reaction	 times	 analysis	
suggested	 that	 both	 groups	 made	 use	 of	 familiarity-based	 retrieval	 during	 the	 intervening	
learning	phases,	with	a	range	of	minimal	reaction	times	falling	well	below	400	ms.	This	confirms	
the	very	fast	and	automatic,	effortless,	processes	engaged	in	the	task.	However,	at	odds	with	our	
hypothesis	of	a	better	 retention	 in	 the	S	group,	due	 to	 the	higher	number	of	 study	events,	we	
found	that	increasing	the	number	of	study	events	did	not	make	any	difference	at	both	25	minutes	
and	6	months	delay.	At	first	sight,	these	data	may	not	speak	for	a	testing	effect	strictly	speaking,	
i.e.,	when	defined	 as	 a	 better	 retention	 following	 intervening	 retrieval	 trials	 than	 following	 the	
same	amount	of	intervening	study	trials.	Yet,	participants	in	the	T	group	benefited	from	only	one	
study	 event	 per	 item,	while	 up	 to	 three	 study	 events	 occurred	 for	 participants	 in	 the	 S	 group.	
Moreover,	 in	 the	 Test	 condition,	 participants	 initially	 learned	 (i.e.,	 encoded)	 the	 pictures	much	
faster	 since	 they	 spent	 only	 13.6	 minutes	 looking	 at	 the	 stimuli	 whereas	 23.5	 minutes	 were	
required,	on	average,	in	the	S	condition.	We	thus	argue	that	results	of	experiment	2	provide	clear	
evidence	that	a	strong	 learning	effect	arises	from	effortless	retrieval	practice.	Despite	spending	
considerably	 less	 time	 in	 learning,	 and	 being	 exposed	 less	 frequently	 to	 the	material	 at	 study,	
participants	in	the	T	condition	retained	as	much	information	at	short-	and	long-term	delays	as	in	
the	S	condition.		
General	discussion	
	
Decades	 of	 research	 have	 established	 that	 retrieval	 processes	 are	 not	 neutral	 for	 learning:	
memory	 retrieval	 by	 itself	 can	 enhance	 future	 retrieval,	 a	 finding	 called	 the	 retrieval	 practice	
effect.	The	present	study	 is	 the	 first	 investigation	of	 the	retrieval	practice	effect	using	Old/New	
recognition	 memory	 paradigms	 for	 pictures	 both	 during	 intervening	 and	 final	 test	 phases.	
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Another	originality	 of	 our	 study	 is	 that	we	 tested	 retention	 at	 final	 test	 after	 a	 6	month	delay,	
which	 is	 considerably	 longer	 than	 the	 delay	 usually	 used	 in	 most	 prior	 studies	 (but	 see	
(Soderstrom,	Kerr,	&	Bjork,	2016).	Following	the	retrieval	effort	hypothesis,	an	influential	account	
of	the	testing	effect,	we	hypothesized	that	the	automatic,	effortless	retrieval	processes	involved	
in	recognition	memory,	should	not	be	beneficial	at	final	test.	The	results	from	experiment	1	were	
at	odds	with	that	prediction,	highlighting	better	retention	after	repeated	retrieval	under	Old/New	
recognition	memory	conditions	than	after	repeated	studying.	Experiment	2	constrained	retrieval	
practice	to	familiarity-based	recognition	memory,	which	produced	similar	retention	at	both	short-	
(25	minutes)	and	 long-term	(6	months)	delays	than	repeated	study.	Overall,	 these	results	speak	
for	 the	 involvement	 of	 very	 efficient	 learning	 processes	 during	 recognition	 memory-based	
retrieval,	even	when	such	retrieval	involves	minimal	effortful	processes.	
	
Old/New	recognition	memory	as	a	learning	paradigm	
	
To	date	very	little	attempts	had	been	made	to	assess	whether	retrieval	based	on	simple	Old/New	
recognition	memory	paradigms	could	trigger	a	testing	effect.	One	reason	for	this	is	probably	the	
frequent	reference	to	educational	settings,	where	implementation	of	the	retrieval	practice	effect	
is	 more	 likely	 to	 involve	 multiple-choice	 or	 recall	 formats.	 However,	 some	 methodological	
challenges	may	also	explain	 the	 lack	of	 such	 studies.	 First,	because	 recognition	memory	 is	 very	
efficient	in	healthy	subjects,	the	trade-off	between	avoiding	ceiling	effects	with	a	high	number	of	
stimuli	 (typically	 hundreds),	 and	 an	 acceptable	 duration	 of	 the	 experiment	 for	 the	 participants	
may	 require	 a	 long	 piloting	 phase.	 This	 also	 highly	 constrains	 the	 experimental	 plan,	 because	
within-subjects	designs	are	made	quite	unlikely	due	to	the	need	for	twice	as	much	stimuli	as	for	a	
between-subjects	designs.	Second,	recognition	memory	paradigms	imply	that	target	items	will	be	
presented	again	at	retrieval,	after	initial	encoding,	in	the	experimental	or	testing	condition.	This	is	
a	critical	difference	with	the	usual	testing	effect	designs	where	recall	format	is	used	(either	cued	
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or	 free	recall),	 so	that	after	 initial	encoding,	 target	 items	are	presented	again	only	 in	 the	study-
only	condition,	during	the	intervening	phase.	We	dealt	with	these	constraints	by	closely	matching	
the	number	of	study	and	test	events	across	conditions	in	both	experiments,	and	by	using	a	study-
only	condition	in	experiment	1.	In	experiment	2,	we	manipulated	the	ratio	of	study	vs.	test	trials	by	
presenting	items	either	once,	twice	or	three	times	either	during	study	or	test	phases.	Besides,	the	
study	condition	included	a	test	trial	immediately	after	the	study	period	and	before	the	final	tests,	
so	 that	any	difference	between	groups	should	be	associated	not	with	 retrieval	per	 se,	but	with	
retrieval	practice	(retrieval	repetition).		
Prior	studies	using	Old/New	recognition	paradigms	
	
As	 already	 presented	 in	 the	 Introduction,	 we	 are	 aware	 of	 only	 three	 prior	 studies	 using	 an	
Old/New	 recognition	memory	 format	during	 the	 intervening	phase.	 The	 study	by	Glover	 (1989)	
has	methodological	 limitations.	 In	 the	 second	 study	 by	 Carpenter	 &	 Delosh	 (2006),	 no	 testing	
effect	 was	 found	 after	 recognition	 memory	 testing,	 whereas	 the	 third	 study	 from	 Mandler	 &	
Rabinowitz	(1981)	found	such	an	effect,	but	at	the	cost	of	a	significantly	higher	false	alarms	rate	
during	final	recognition	test.	
We	 avoided	 ceiling	 effects	 during	 the	 intervening	 phase	 by	 greatly	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	
stimuli	used	 in	both	experiments,	which	 is	a	pre-requisite	given	 the	acknowledged	efficiency	of	
visual	 recognition	 memory	 in	 humans.	 We	 also	 examined	 final	 retention	 at	 25	 minutes	
(Experiments	 1&2)	 and	 6	 months	 (Experiment	 2)	 post	 learning	 (vs.	 5	 minutes	 in	 Carpenter	 &	
Delosh,	 2006	 and	 1	 week	 in	 Mandler	 &	 Rabinowitz,	 1981),	 and	 final	 retention	 was	 assessed	
through	 recognition	 memory	 conditions	 only.	 These	 differences	 may	 explain	 our	 divergent	
findings.	 Results	 from	 experiment	 1	 showed	 a	 striking	 advantage	 for	 repeated	 testing	 over	
repeated	studying,	even	when	testing	relies	on	fast,	simple,	recognition	processes,	and	despite	a	
time	 devoted	 to	 explicit	 encoding	 three	 times	 less	 important	 in	 the	 Testing	 condition.	 These	
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results	are	at	odds	with	predictions	from	the	retrieval	effort	framework,	because	it’s	central	claim	
is	 that	 effortful,	 controlled	 retrieval	 processes	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 effect.	 Here	 we	 found	
strong	 level	 of	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 rather	 automatic	 and	effortless	 retrieval	 processes	do	
benefit	 long-term	 retention	 by	 comparison	 with	 a	 study-only	 condition.	 Importantly,	 we	 also	
found	that	this	advantage	of	repeated	recognition	memory-based	retrieval	came	with	no	cost	in	
terms	 of	 false	 alarms,	 but	 with	 an	 increased	 speed	 of	 processing	 because	 participants	 in	 the	
experimental	group	presented	with	shorter	reaction	times	overall.		
Can	familiarity-based	retrieval	trigger	a	testing	effect?	
	
In	 an	 effort	 to	 further	 constraint	 retrieval	 under	 Old/New	 recognition	 memory	 paradigm	 to	
familiarity-based	processes,	 experiment	 2	 tapped	 the	 fastest	 responses	of	 participants	 through	
the	use	of	a	Speed	and	Accuracy	Boosting	procedure.	 In	contrast	 to	experiment	 1,	we	 failed	 to	
highlight	any	difference	between	 repeated	 study	and	 repeated	 testing	at	both	 short-	 and	 long-
term	 final	 tests.	 However,	 we	 bring	 two	 lines	 of	 arguments	 that	 actually	 speak	 for	 a	 positive	
effect	of	retrieval	practice.	
First	of	all,	in	the	repeated	study	condition,	participants	had	up	to	three	opportunities	to	explicitly	
encode	the	material,	whereas	only	once	in	the	repeated	test	condition.	Moreover,	test	occurred	
also	 in	 the	 repeated	 study	condition	because	 in	our	design,	 after	 initial	 encoding,	a	 recognition	
task	 was	 administered.	 Our	 procedure	 therefore	 allowed	 us	 to	 directly	 compare	 the	 effect	 of	
repeated	 testing	 events	 after	 a	 single	 study	 to	 multiple	 study	 events	 associated	 with	 a	 single	
testing	 event,	 each	 test	 trial	 being	 completed	 under	 the	 same	 format.	 In	 such	 a	 design,	 we	
therefore	 believe	 that	 an	 absence	 of	 testing	 effect	 should	 have	 led	 to	 better	 retention	 in	 the	
repeated	 study	 condition,	 due	 to	 extra-exposure	 to	 the	 stimuli,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 frequency	 of	
study	events	and	in	total	time	spent	studying.	
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Second,	as	pointed	out	by	Karpicke,	Lehman,	&	Aue	(2014),	one	must	consider	that	retrieval	also	
occurred	during	repeated	study	trials,	(so-called	“Study-phase	retrieval”).	Indeed,	repeated	study	
trials	 provided	 up	 to	 three	 opportunities	 of	 retrieving	 100%	 of	 the	 material,	 without	 any	
interference	due	to	extra-list	stimuli.	By	contrast,	participants	in	the	repeated	Test	condition	had	
up	 to	 three	 trials	 to	 accurately	 retrieve	 target	 items	 (i.e.,	 recognize	 an	 Old	 item),	 but	 an	
equivalent	number	of	trials	were	made	of	extra-list	 items.	 In	other	words,	whereas	 in	the	Study	
condition,	the	critical	encoding	phase	allowed	subjects	to	perfectly	retrieve	100%	of	the	material	
up	to	three	times,	without	any	 interference,	subjects	 in	the	Test	conditions	had	to	discriminate,	
up	to	three	times,	between	Old	and	New	stimuli.	 In	the	end,	 this	clearly	 favored	the	restudying	
condition	where	no	extra-list	item	can	interfere	at	encoding,	and	where	twice	less	foils	were	used	
at	 test,	 thus	 reducing	 the	 opportunities	 of	 inaccurate	 recognitions.	 This	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 very	
constraining	 paradigm,	 where	 an	 absence	 of	 testing	 effect	 would	 predict	 that	 the	 number	 of	
study	 events	 should	mainly	 drive	 retention,	 thus	 leading	 to	 a	 clear	 advantage	 of	 the	 repeated	
studying	condition.	
At	odds	with	this,	our	findings	revealed	that	one	extra	test	trial	was	sufficient	to	boost	retention	
up	 to	 the	 level	 achieved	 through	 repeated	 studying,	 even	when	 comparing	 three	 study	 events	
with	 only	 two	 tests	 events	 (see	 results	 section	 and	 Fig.	 6	 B),	 and	 the	 effect	 remained	 after	 6	
months.	 By	 reference	 to	 the	 seminal	 report	 from	 Tulving	 (1967),	 the	 surprising	 result	 in	
experiment	2	 comes	 from	the	 fact	 that	participants	 in	 the	 study	condition	did	not	 reach	better	
short-and	 long-term	 retention	 than	 participants	 in	 the	 test	 condition	 (see	 also	 Roediger	 &	
Karpicke,	 2006a,	 2006b).	 This	 finding	 of	 learning	 effects	 just	 as	 efficient	 following	 repeated	
familiarity-based	 retrieval,	 i.e.,	 a	 fast,	 automatic	 and	 effortless	 retrieval,	 as	 following	 repeated	
studying	clearly	challenges	in	our	view	the	retrieval	effort	hypothesis.			
	 459	
Limitations	
	
Two	 limitations	of	 the	present	 study	must	be	mentioned,	however.	 First,	 because	we	aimed	at	
testing	participants	after	a	6	months	delay	in	experiment	2,	without	leaving	any	opportunities	to	
rehearse	 the	 study	material	 during	 that	delay,	 this	 resulted	 in	 a	 very	 small	 sample	 size	 at	 long-
term	 final	 test.	 More	 generally,	 results	 from	 experiment	 2	 should	 be	 replicated	 with	 larger	
samples.	Yet,	among	the	participants	who	performed	the	long-term	test,	only	two	failed	the	task,	
both	pertaining	 to	 the	 “Study”	group.	 This	 confirmed	 that	 visual	 recognition	memory	 is	 a	 very	
efficient	system,	with	above-chance	performances	reachable	after	6	months	following	one	single	
study	event	in	the	case	of	the	“Test”	group.	
Second,	 the	 use	of	Old/New	 recognition	paradigms	 in	 both	 experiments	made	 it	mandatory	 to	
use	 feedback	 after	 each	 recognition	 trial.	 Karpicke	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 have	 argued	 that	 a	 feedback	
approach	may	be	unsatisfactory	because	it	can	on	its	own	drive	some	testing	effect	that	cannot	
be	 teased	 apart	 from	 the	 main	 effect	 of	 retrieval	 per	 se.	 Indeed,	 in	 our	 study,	 the	 benefit	 of	
retrieval	 we	 observed	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 direct	 (retrieval	 success)	 and	 indirect,	 or	 mediated,	
effects	 (feedback	 post	 recognition	 trials).	 Nonetheless,	 in	 the	 particular	 case	 of	 recognition	
memory,	participants	in	the	test	condition	are	presented	with	both	targets	and	lures,	so	that	false	
alarms	are	as	likely	to	occur	as	hits.	It	follows	that	without	any	feedback,	not	only	participants	in	
the	 test	 condition	would	 be	 disadvantaged	 because	 of	 the	massive	 interference	 generated	 by	
extra-list	 items,	 but	 also	 this	would	 drop	 the	 successful	 retrieval	 rate	 far	 from	 the	 study-phase	
successful	 retrieval	 rate,	 where	 only	 targets	 are	 presented.	 In	 addition,	 the	 study	 condition	 in	
experiment	2	also	involved	a	test	condition	including	feedback,	like	any	other	test	phases	used	in	
the	experiments.	Thus,	any	positive	effect	of	feedback	should	have	benefited	participants	in	the	
study	 groups	 as	 well.	 Taken	 together,	 these	 considerations	 do	 not	 rule	 out	 a	 contribution	 of	
feedback	per	se	to	our	findings,	but	make	it	 less	likely	than	the	main	contribution	of	recognition	
memory-based	retrieval	processes.		
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Conclusions	and	future	directions	
	
An	influential	account	of	the	testing	effect,	the	retrieval	effort	hypothesis,	predicts	that	effortful,	
controlled,	 retrieval	 processes	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 effect.	 Our	 findings	 of	 a	 testing	 effect	
triggered	by	recognition	memory	based	retrieval	are	not	consistent	with	that	prediction,	and,	 if	
replicable,	 may	 call	 for	 a	 revision	 of	 that	 account.	 However,	 that	 hypothesis	 is	 by	 no	 mean	 a	
mechanistic	account	for	the	testing	effect,	which	is	still	lacking	(but	see	Karpicke	et	al.,	2014).	As	
suggested	 earlier	 (Chan	 &	 Mcdermott,	 2007),	 studies	 crossing	 testing	 formats	 both	 during	
intervening	 and	 final	 test	 phases	 are	 required,	 and	with	 respect	 to	 the	present	 study,	 a	 design	
allowing	 to	 test	 whether	 familiarity-based	 recognition	 can	 enhance	 cued	 or	 free	 recall,	 for	
example,	would	be	appropriate.	Furthermore,	it	would	be	insightful	to	cross	designs	allowing	the	
investigation	 of	 transfer	 effects	 (i.e.,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 testing	 effect	 may	 generalize	 to	
unstudied	 materials)	 with	 experimentally	 controlled	 procedures	 allowing	 to	 assess	 core	
predictions	 of	 the	 emergent	 mechanistic	 accounts	 for	 the	 testing	 effect.	 As	 an	 example,	 the	
recent	 “automatization	 account”	 from	 (Chan	 &	 Mcdermott,	 2007)	 suggest	 that	 learning	 after	
retrieval	 practice	 may	 share	 properties	 with	 skill-learning.	 If	 so,	 generalization	 after	 retrieval-
based	learning	should	be	rather	limited.	Otherwise,	important	clinical	perspectives	may	arise	from	
our	 findings.	 If	 indeed	 effortless	 retrieval	 processes	 proves	 to	 trigger	 a	 testing	 effect,	 brain-
injured	 patients	 with	 impairments	 in	 controlled	 processes	 but	 preserved	 automatic	 processes	
may	take	advantage	of	retrieval	practice	methods.	There	is	already	some	evidence	that	retrieval	
practice	 effects	 can	 efficiently	 serve	 as	 a	 rehabilitation	 technique	 in	 severe	 amnesia	 following	
traumatic	brain	injury	(Pastötter	&	Bäuml,	2014;	Sumowski	et	al.,	2010;	Sumowski,	Coyne,	Cohen,	
&	 Deluca,	 2014).	 Our	 hope	 is	 that	 future	 work	 may	 help	 determine	 whether	 such	 effortless	
learning	 processes	 as	 the	 one	 used	 in	 the	 present	 study,	 far	 easier	 than	 successive	 recall	
schedules	in	clinical	settings,	could	be	of	some	rehabilitation	interest.		
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Appendix	B:	Experiment	8.	Relational	and	conjunctive	binding	in	visual	
short	term	memory	dissociates	within	the	medial	temporal	lobe	
	
	
	 492	
	 493		
	 494		
	 495		
	 496		
	 497		
	 498		
	 499		
	 500		
	 501		
	 502		
	 503		
	 504		
	 505		
	 506		
	 507		
	 508		
	 509		
	 510		
	 511		
	 512		
	 513		
